Pakistan's relations with the Middle East by Male, Beverley M.
AustralianNationalUniversity
THESES SIS/LIBRARY 
R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA
TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 
FACSIMILE: +61 2 6125 4063 
EMAIL: library.theses@anu.edu.au
USE OF THESES
This copy is supplied for purposes 
of private study and research only. 
Passages from the thesis may not be 
copied or closely paraphrased without the 
written consent of the author.
PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST
by
Beverley M. Male 
SUMMARY
The origins of Pakistan's relations with the Middle 
East lie in the history of the Muslims of the Indian 
subcontinent before 1947 and their contacts with fellow 
Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, both Arabs and Turks, who 
had developed quite different traditions. Such 
interchange as took place involved only slightly those 
who eventually took leading roles in the government of 
Pakistan, and little thought was given to the kind of 
foreign policy Pakistan might follow once it came into 
existence.
Immediately after Partition internal problems 
engaged the attention of the Government, and hardly more 
attention was devoted to foreign policy than previously. 
In the early years, therefore, Pakistan did not have a 
clearly thought out foreign policy with regard to the 
Middle East, although relations with the countries of 
that region soon developed. During the first five years 
of Pakistan's existence the influence of those who might
2be termed Pan-Islamists was particularly strong, carried 
high by the tide of religious fervour surrounding 
Partition.
Three main foreign policy problems concerned 
Pakistan from the beginning: the Kashmir dispute with 
India, the quarrel with Afghanistan over Pushtunistan, 
and the Palestine question. There were some hopes in 
Pakistan that the formation of a Muslim bloc in 
international affairs, which would take a neutral 
position between the Western and Soviet blocs, would 
assist Pakistan to gain its objectives with respect to 
these problems more effectively than had the British 
Commonwealth and the United Nations. Suggestions 
regarding the formation of a Muslim bloc did not appeal 
to the countries of the Middle East and were abandoned 
after 1952, although the ideal of closer collaboration 
with other Muslim countries was not forgotten in 
Pakistan.
Pakistan's drift towards alignment with America was 
a gradual movement which gained momentum after 1952. 
Membership of the Baghdad Pact, which Pakistan joined in 
1955, was obviously connected with acceptance of American 
military aid, but Pakistan had been interested (though 
not active) in earlier attempts to establish a Middle 
East defence organisation. Although membership of the 
Baghdad Pact created difficulties for Pakistan's
3relations with some of the Arab countries, it meant that 
for the first time Pakistan was allied to three other 
Muslim countries - Turkey, Iran and Iraq.
The concept of closer collaboration among the 
countries of the northern tier (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Afghanistan) was first manifested in the Saadabad Pact 
of 1937. Pakistan had come to be considered one of the 
northern tier countries, and the ideal of closer 
collaboration within this region developed in Pakistan, 
along with wider ideas of Muslim solidarity, almost 
from this time. Some suggestions of confederation 
appeared from time to time but hostility between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan precluded any agreement along 
these lines, and in any case while the idea of Muslim 
solidarity appealed to most Pakistanis, there was 
considerable opposition to any proposal which would 
limit Pakistan's national sovereignty.
The Baghdad Pact, renamed Central Treaty 
Organization in 1959 after Iraq's departure, provided 
for the first time an institutional framework within 
which the northern tier countries could operate. It 
accustomed them to consult regularly with each other 
on defence and foreign policy matters, although they 
have not always been in agreement. The formation of 
Regional Co-operation for Development in 1964 provided 
an alternative framework for this consultation outside
4CENTO, and at the same time helped promote economic 
development on a regional basis.
The response of the countries of the Middle East to 
Pakistan's quarrel with Afghanistan over Pushtunistan and 
with India over Kashmir places this aspect of Pakistan's 
foreign relations in the context of its overall foreign 
policy, as does Pakistan's involvement in the Palestine 
question which is essentially an Arab problem. Relations 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan are closely connected 
to the relations of each with the USA and the USSR, and 
the influence of such Middle Eastern countries as appear 
interested is negligible. On the question of Kashmir, 
with the exception of Egypt which maintained a position 
of neutrality, Pakistan received the verbal and/or 
diplomatic support of the other countries of the Middle 
East. This has been only marginally affected by 
Pakistan's relations with the USA and the USSR, but in 
turn the attitude of the Middle Eastern countries has 
not had any appreciable effect on the course or outcome 
of the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan has involved itself in 
the Arab-Israel dispute over Palestine, giving diplomatic 
support to the Arab countries, but Pakistan's 
intervention on the Palestine question has had no 
effect on its outcome.
Religious affinity with the countries of the 
Middle East has caused Pakistan to pay more attention
5to the affairs of this region, of which it sometimes 
considers itself a part, than of any other outside the 
subcontinent. Differences existing among the Middle 
Eastern countries contribute to the difficulties 
experienced by Pakistan in the conduct of its policy in 
this region. This policy has from time to time been 
modified in order to take into account Pakistan's wider 
interests and its relations with the big powers.
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INTRODUCTION
Pakistan's foreign policy is usually considered in 
the context of its relations with India, or from the 
point of view of its relations with the great powers.
In both cases Pakistan is usually regarded as a part of 
the Indian subcontinent, and the Kashmir dispute tends 
to dominate the discussion. This study of Pakistan's 
relations with the countries of the Middle East is an 
attempt to see Pakistan's foreign policy in another 
context and to look beyond the Kashmir dispute and the 
relationships with the USA, the USSR and China. It is 
impossible, of course, to ignore these questions, but 
it is useful to ask what other factors influence 
Pakistan's foreign policy, and to what extent. Where 
do Pakistan's relations with the Middle East fit into 
the entire spectrum of Pakistan's foreign relations?
To what extent do its relations with the countries of 
that region affect other aspects of Pakistan foreign 
policy, and what influence does Pakistan exert in the 
Middle East?"*"
1
Most of the research for the thesis was done during a 
field trip to Pakistan, Turkey and Iran in 1967-8.
Much reliance was placed on English language sources, 
particularly newspapers and periodicals, in Pakistan, 
and on conversations with diplomats and other officials 
in Karachi, Rawalpindi, Istanbul, Ankara and Teheran.
(cont.)
V'The Middle East' is a slippery term and raises 
awkward problems of definition. When Pakistanis refer 
to the Middle East, they sometimes mean that area 
stretching south from Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, 
through the Fertile Crescent, to include the countries 
of the Arabian peninsula, and across the Red Sea to 
include Egypt. On other occasions, usually when questions 
concerning the Arab world are under discussion, the Muslim 
states of North Africa - Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco 
and the Sudan - are included by implication, as members 
of the Arab League. In this thesis the first definition 
is used, although the writer is aware that in references 
to the Arab League the Muslim states of North Africa must 
be included, although their policies and attitudes have 
not been specifically discussed.
(cont.)
Because of the nature of the information thereby gained, 
many of these sources cannot be quoted. Such information 
has been used only to illustrate and not to sustain the 
main argument. Considerable difficulty was encountered 
in obtaining Arab and Afghan sources. The BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts proved invaluable in this respect, 
but at times there was no alternative except to refer 
to Keesing's Contemporary Archives and Asian Recorder.
The period under consideration ends in 1967, and only 
brief reference to subsequent events has been made where 
this was considered relevant. In the case of Chapter 
VIII, dealing with the Kashmir dispute, discussion stops 
with the Tashkent Declaration in January 1966.
vi
There is, in addition, the question of whether 
Pakistan itself should be included in the Middle East.
When the 'northern tier' is under discussion, Pakistan, 
along with Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, is usually 
considered to be a member, and indeed Pakistan so 
considers itself. However, when the wider term 'Middle 
East' is used, although this generally includes the 
'northern tier', Pakistan and Afghanistan, though 
peripheral and clearly associated, are rarely thought to 
belong. Pakistanis themselves are ambivalent on the 
question: there is a division of opinion (not only between 
people but by the same people on different occasions) as 
to whether Pakistan is primarily a part of the Indo- 
Pakistan subcontinent or part of the Middle East. In 
support of their position, those who claim that Pakistan 
is part of the subcontinent frequently point to the large 
number of Pakistanis who were born in what is now India 
and who in many cases still have relatives there. They 
argue that Partition did not amount to rejection of their 
ties with the subcontinent, but gave the Muslims of India 
a separate state within it. Their survival as a community 
assured, they maintain that the objective of the 
Government should be to work for a modus vivendi with 
India, there being many opportunities for cooperation, 
particularly in economic matters. It is often claimed 
that Pakistanis know the Indians, while Arabs, Turks 
and Iranians are comparative strangers with whom
Pakistanis have nothing in common except religion, which 
in the modern world is not sufficient basis for a foreign 
policy. In addition, East Pakistan, separated from West 
Pakistan by over a thousand miles of Indian territory, 
can hardly be considered part of the Middle East, even 
if this is true of the»West.^
The continuing hostility between Pakistan and India, 
particularly regarding the Kashmir dispute, has 
progressively weakened the position of this group, for 
only a very small minority will, even in private, advocate 
a compromise over Kashmir. Until this issue is resolved 
progress towards cooperation with India cannot go far.
Those who see Pakistan's future bound up with the 
Middle East use the reverse arguments to support their 
case. Partition proved that Hindus and Muslims cannot 
get along together, that they are two separate peoples, 
and that Pakistanis therefore have much more in common
1
The special position of East Pakistan is not discussed 
in the following pages. While East Pakistanis tend to 
differ from the people of West Pakistan on a number of 
issues, these are difficult to document. For the most 
part, power in Pakistan has been in the hands of West 
Pakistanis, and although some East Pakistanis have held 
office (for example, Mohammed Ali Bogra and Hussein 
Shaheed Suhrawardy), the influence of East Pakistan on 
the conduct of foreign policy, especially with respect 
to the Middle East, appears to be very small.
with the Muslim peoples to the west, both in terms of 
history and culture. Their position is further 
reinforced by the special status of religion as a 
nation-building force in Pakistan, and by the concept 
of the unity of the Muslim community, the umma, which 
is deeply embedded in Islamic theology.
Fear of domination by a majority community who did 
not share their faith or their customs led the Indian 
Muslims to demand a state of their own - Pakistan.
This state comprises several different groups, of which 
the largest are the Pathans, Sindhis, Baluchis,
Punjabis and Bengalis, each with a strong sense of their 
separate identity, united by their religion and by fear 
of India, which is essentially a single issue. For this 
reason successive Pakistani leaders, although mostly 
modernists and secularists for whom their religion is a 
personal thing, cannot deny the strength of Islam as a 
political force within the country. In many ways the 
influence of the orthodox ulema works against the kind 
of development the Government wants to promote, yet it 
cannot undermine the strength of religion in the country 
without undermining national unity at the same time.
As this is true of domestic politics in Pakistan, 
so too it has some bearing on the conduct of foreign 
policy. The demand for a foreign policy oriented towards 
the Muslim world, especially towards the Middle East, is
ix
an external manifestation of the internal demand for the 
establishment of an Islamic state.
It was found impossible to reconcile all the views 
of what an Islamic state should be and at the same time 
it was equally difficult to agree upon what was meant by 
Islamic solidarity when applied to the outside world.
This question was further complicated insofar as it 
involved Muslims outside the subcontinent, who had 
different ideas on this question from those current 
among Pakistanis. The confusion arises largely from the 
vagueness about the concept of unity in Islamic theology, 
particularly as it applies to the modern world. The 
umma (Muslim Community) is said to be united, but on what 
basis and in what manner? Is it only a spiritual unity, 
or should it be something more? This vagueness permits 
the leaders of Muslim countries to give verbal support 
to 1 Islamic unity' which in effect commits them to nothing, 
its meaning depending on the interpretation placed upon 
it by the audience. As a corollary to this, no leader of 
a Muslim country can deny Islamic solidarity, for this is 
to deny the concept of the umma, thus opening the way to 
criticism from the orthodox population that he is not a 
true Muslim, a serious accusation in an area where the 
majority of the population tends to be as conservative 
in matters of religion as in other respects. This is 
substantially true of all the Middle Eastern countries,
Xfor even in Turkey and Egypt, where secularism is more 
acceptable, care must be taken not to offend orthodox 
groups. The stature of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was such 
that he could afford to appear anti-religious, but later 
Turkish leaders have been forced to compromise to some 
extent in such matters. Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt 
placed Arab unity first when he wrote The Philosophy of 
the Revolution, but he included Islamic solidarity as 
the ultimate goal.^
For Pakistani leaders as well, Islamic unity is a 
goal, the nature of which is not made explicit, and the 
time span for its achievement, if not infinite, is 
certainly very long. Nevertheless, the concept of 
Muslim solidarity and the desire for Muslim support, 
combined with the deadlock in relations with India on 
the question of Kashmir, have impelled successive 
Pakistan Governments to seek closer relations with the 
nations of the region which lies to the west.
This has not always been a simple matter for 
Pakistan. The Middle East is by no means monolithic, 
but is divided between Arabs and non-Arabs, and again 
among the Arab countries themselves. There is a 
romantic view in Pakistan of the Arabs as the original
1
Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation, The Philosophy 
of the Revolution (Public Affairs Press: Washington, 
D.C., 1955), pp.111-4.
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Muslims, whose language is the language of the Quran, 
and whom many Pakistanis tend to associate with the 
'Golden Age' of Islam. This romanticism frequently 
clouds the vision of many Pakistanis in their dealings 
with the Arab countries. While they might admire them, 
few Pakistanis speak their language or understand the 
factors which cause the modern Arab world to act as it 
does, and as a result are inclined to ignore divisions 
within the Arab world which for the most part make it 
misleading to speak of an Arab point of view. Even a 
clear-eyed government encounters difficulty in following 
a policy of friendship towards the Arab countries because 
a policy calculated to please one group might well offend 
others: what is acceptable in Cairo might be anathema to 
Riadh.
In addition, Pakistan's close relationship with the 
non-Arab countries, Turkey and Iran, which are in general 
distrusted by the Arab stdtes, have not made relations 
with the latter easy, and Pakistani attempts to improve 
its relations with the Arabs have not always been 
welcomed in Ankara or Teheran.
CHAPTER I
Historical Background to Pakistan's 
Relations with the Middle East
1. Introduction
Although Pakistan did not come into existence until 
1947 most of the attitudes which have since governed its 
relations with the countries of the Middle East had by 
that time already been formed. The conception of the 
role of Islam as a factor in relations between Muslim 
countries evolved separately and quite distinctly in the 
Indian subcontinent, and nationalism as it developed in 
the Middle East lacked the strong religious overtones 
which it acquired among the Indian Muslims. The Mughal 
Empire in India, vast and powerful in its day, in effect 
represented the control of a Hindu majority by a Muslim, 
often foreign (Iranian, Turkish or Afghan), minority.
By the end of the eighteenth century the Mughal Empire 
had for all practical purposes ceased to exist, and 
Indian Muslims were dimly aware that something terrible 
had happened which they were virtually powerless to 
resist. The declaration of India as dar-ul-harb  ^by
A land where Islam has no authority.
1
(1)
2the leading ulema had an important effect on the direction 
taken subsequently by Indian Muslim thought. The Muslims 
of the Middle East, while sometimes in revolt against the 
Turkish Empire, remained unquestionably under Islamic 
rule, and although deeply concerned with the need for 
rethinking large sections of Islamic theory, did not feel 
their religion to be under pressure. The Indian Muslims, 
from the beginning of the nineteenth century, were 
threatened not only with loss of power and wealth but 
also with the swamping of their religion and culture by 
Hindu revivalism and by Christianity, imported by British 
missionaries and supported by British power.
Originating in the Arabian peninsula In the seventh
century A.D., Islam had within a hundred years been
carried by Muslim Arab armies into Sassanid Persia, into
Syria, across into Egypt and North Africa. It had been
carried by Arab traders across the Oxus where it was
adopted by the Seljuks in the tenth century. Sind had
been conquered in the eighth century, but the northward
expansion of Islam was blocked by Hindu rulers. Mahmud
of Ghazni, descending from the Hindu Kush, reached Lahore
in the eleventh century, and two hundred years later Afghan
2armies carried Islam across India to Bengal.
1
The religious scholars, approximating to the role of 
the Christian clergy.
2
See H.W. Hazard, Atlas of Islamic History (Princeton 
University Press: Princeton, 1952), and Tamara Talbot Rice, 
The Seljuks in Asia Minor (Thames & Hudson: London, 1961).
The Arab empire was shattered by the Mongol 
invasions of the twelfth century, and gradually three 
new empires came to dominate the Muslim world: that of 
the Ottomans in Turkey, the Safavids in Persia and the 
Mughals in India. While embassies were exchanged by 
the three Emperors, trade was carried on and there was 
considerable mobility among intellectuals, the general 
atmosphere was one of distrust, and almost constant 
warfare in the outlying borderlands between Turks and 
Persians and Persians and Mughals.
Geographically remote, the Indian Muslims were 
further cut off from the rest of the Islamic world by 
the action of the first Mughal Emperor, Babur, who in 
the early fifteenth century withheld recognition from 
the Turkish Caliph, reading the Khutba in his own name 
and striking his own coins,"*’ no doubt on the assumption 
that the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph was too far away to 
undertake reprisals. The collapse of the Mughal and 
Ottoman Empires some three centuries later contributed 
further to the isolation of the Indian Muslims, for 
control of India passed out of Muslim hands and the 
Ottoman Empire, the last of the great Muslim states,
1
The reading of the Khutba (Friday prayer) in the name 
of a particular ruler constituted recognition of 
allegiance to him, as did striking coins in his name. 
Babur's action amounted to a declaration of independence
was too weak to take any measures to prevent it. The 
collapse of the Ottoman and Mughal empires contributed 
further to the separation of the Indian Muslims from 
those elsewhere.
2. The Decline of the Mughal Empire
The rapid decline of the Mughal Empire set in after 
the death of Alamgir I in 1707, but the seeds of 
disintegration had been sown much earlier by Aurangzeb, 
whose orthodoxy may have won him the praise of some 
among the ulema but probably did more than anything else 
to destroy whatever unity existed in his rambling empire. 
His intolerance was felt initially by his Hindu subjects, 
who suffered under disabilities and discrimination 
carefully avoided by Aurangzeb's more far-sighted if less 
saintly predecessors. Jizyah, the tax on non-Muslims, 
was reintroduced, and Hindus were no longer recruited to 
the government service. At the same time Muslims 
belonging to the Shi ' i sect'*' were also discriminated
1
The sectarian split between Sunni and Shi'i Muslims 
is almost as old as Islam itself. When the claim of the 
fourth Caliph, All, son-in-law of the Prophet (who 
succeeded in 656 A.D.), was disputed he took up arms to 
defend his title, later agreeing to submit to arbitration 
which went against him in favour of the first of the 
Ummayad Caliphs, Muawiya. All's son, Hassan, resigned 
his claim to the Caliphate. During the reign of Muawiya, 
Ali's second son, Hussain, remained aloof from politics, 
but following Muawiya's death (both Ali and Hassan
(cont.)
5against by the government. These internal differences 
were seized upon by the enemies of the Emperor, 
especially the Marathas, who found allies in the 
southern sultanates, and a stronghold in the Deccan 
hills. After the death of Alamgir the situation 
deteriorated rapidly into widespread anarchy.
The appearance of British power in India, the 
policies of the East India Company and the way in which 
they were carried out, served to make matters far worse 
for the Muslim population, especially in Bengal where it 
first felt the impact of British rule. By an agreement 
with the Emperor in Delhi, who appointed the East India
(cont.)
having died previously) Hussain revolted against Muawiya's 
successor Yazeed, whom he refused to recognise as Caliph. 
He and many of his followers, known as Shi'is, were 
defeated at the battle at Karbela in 680 A.D. The 
development of Shi'ism as a sect within Islam could be 
said to date from this time. The word Shi'i literally 
means 'one who dissents' and its followers deny the 
claims of the later Caliphs. Persia is the only country 
in which Shi'ism is the official religion. Many Shi'i 
holy places, including Karbela, are in Iraq, which is 
predominantly Sunni (orthodox), as are Turkey, Afghanistan 
and Arabia. While most Muslims of the Indian subcontinent 
are Sunni, there is a large Shi'i minority.
This difference was a bone of contention between the 
Safavids and the Mughals, and the Shi'i persuasion of the 
Deccan Sultans opened the door for Persian intervention.
In the modern world the division has wide implications 
for relations among Muslim countries. See Alfred 
Guillaume, Islam (Penguin: Second Edition, 1956).
6Company Dewan (revenue collector), the Company obtained 
legal status and took over the administration of the 
province. One of the principal sources of revenue was 
the duty imposed on internal transit of goods by road 
and river, for which the Company obtained exemption, 
but for which the local merchants were heavily taxed.
Many were ruined, and the Nawab's revenue declined.^-
British changes in the system of land revenue
collection also helped undermine the Muslim position.
Previously the actual collection of the revenue had been
in the hands of minor Hindu officials appointed by
Muslims who held all the higher posts. Both were able
to make a percentage on the transaction before the
required amount was remitted to Delhi. Under the English
Permanent Settlement of 1793, the positions of the Muslim
officials were taken over by Company employees appointed
to each district. This step, which deprived the Muslim
nobility of an important source of income, at the same
time allowed the Hindu collectors gradually to gain the
2status of landholders.
This in turn had a serious effect on the traditional 
Muslim education system, whereby every Muslim nobleman
1
Romesh Dutt, The Economic History of British India 
(K. Paul, Trench, Trtibner: London, 1902), p.19.
Ibid., p .162.
2
7maintained a scholastic establishment where his sons and 
those of his poorer neighbours could be educated. The 
impoverishment of the Muslim nobility made the maintenance 
of the system impossible. A further blow to education 
was the resumption by the British of land which had been 
alienated from the government. Those hardest hit were 
usually the Muslim colleges and foundations (waqfs) which 
depended on their rent-free land, the loss of which 
forced most of them to close.'*'
As a result of these measures, which undermined the 
position of the Muslim community, their religion 
assumed greater importance in the thinking and writing 
of Muslim intellectuals in India than of those elsewhere. 
The Muslim revival on the Indian subcontinent developed 
in two m a m  directions: the traditionalist school seeking 
a solution in a return to what it believed to be classical 
Islamic values, and those modernists who adopted a kind 
of secular nationalism, although with strong Islamic 
overtones.
The roots of the traditionalist school may be found 
in the movement initiated by Shah Waliullah of Delhi in 
the latter half of the eighteenth century. His object 
was to stimulate a popular revival among the Muslims,
1
W.W. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans (Trübner: London, 
1872), p.177.
8since it was obvious that Mughal power had collapsed so
completely that it was pointless to hope for leadership
from the government. When in 1803 the British took the
Emperor under their protection, Shah Waliullah's son,
Shah Abdul Aziz, one of the leading ulema, issued a
fatwa (ruling) declaring that India had ceased to be
dar-ul-Islam'*' and had become dar-ul-harb. It was thereby
forbidden that Muslims should learn English, or work for
the British, if such employment was directed towards the
entrenchment of British power in India. Since English
was soon to become the language by which preferment was
obtained, replacing Persian, the language of the Mughal
government, the Muslims were before long at a disadvantage,
for the Hindus were prepared to learn English and work for
the British just as they had earlier learned Persian and
worked for the Mughals. The Muslims therefore did not
send their children to the schools set up by the British,
although it has been suggested that their reaction might
have been different had the medium of instruction been
English rather than Hindi, had the curriculum made
provision for traditional instruction in Persian and
Arabic given to young Muslims, and had the teachers not
2been mainly Hindus.
1
A land ruled by Islamic law.
Hunter, The Indian Musalmans, p.177.
2
9It is not surprising that the old Muslim ruling 
classes refused to accept the complete and permanent 
destruction of their power. Nor is it surprising that, 
finding themselves without any weapon with which to 
resist the British presence, they turned to religion in 
the hope of stimulating a mass reaction that would make 
British control impossible.
The followers of Shah Abdul Aziz began to turn more 
to the Muslim powers outside India, especially to Turkey, 
in the hope that assistance would be forthcoming on the 
cry of 'Islam in danger'. One of the leaders of the 
movement, Saiyid Ahmed Barelawi, in 1821 went on a 
pilgrimage to Mecca, the meeting place of Muslims from 
all parts of the world, where numerous plots were 
doubtless hatched and many ideas disseminated. There 
is a report"*- that he visited Constantinople in search of 
support from the Ottoman Sultan. If it is correct, this 
was a reasonable enough objective, but one doomed to 
failure, for it would indeed have been a rash Sultan who 
would then have chosen to go to war with Britain, which 
is what Saiyid Ahmed Barelawi was in effect asking him 
to do. Nevertheless alliance with Turkey came to form 
an important part of the programme of what was by this
1
I.H. Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan 
Subcontinent (610-1947) (Mouton and Co.: 'S Gravenhage, 
1962), p.199.
10
time a well organised movement, and in 1841 another 
attempt was made to enlist Turkish cooperation against 
the British, again without success.
In 1857 the Indian Mutiny put the final touches to
the misery and degradation of the Muslims of the
subcontinent. Although it was discovered later that
many Hindus had also been involved in the Mutiny, the
British at the time held the Muslims largely responsible.
A number of prominent ulema were, however, deeply involved
in the organisation and in the actual fighting, many of
2them followers of Saiyid Ahmed Barelawi. Following 
the Mutiny a division grew among the Muslims between 
the followers of Barelawi and those who urged cooperation 
with the British, as the only means to improve the 
condition of their community. Two distinct schools of 
thought developed, one centred on the Darul-Ulum college 
at Deoband and the other on the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental 
College at Aligarh.
1
Z.H. Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for 
Pakistan (Asia Publishing House: Bombay, 1963), p.19 n.
2
Evidence of this complicity was revealed at the trial 
in 1858 of the 'Maulavi of Fyzabad1, who appeared to be 
the 'brain and the hand of the conspiracy' in Lucknow, 
and had been working 'in closest cooperation with the 
group of Wahabis and the followers of Sayyid Ahmed 
Barelawi'. K.M. Ashraf, 'Muslim Revivalists and the 
Revolt of 1857', in Joshi (ed.), Rebellion 1857 (Peoples 
Publishing House: New Delhi). (Cited, Faruqi, The 
Deoband School, p.20.)
11
The college at Deoband, established in 1867, 
represented a continuation by peaceful means of the 
attempt to gain the objectives for which the ulema had 
supported the Mutiny. Its founder, Maulana Nanawtawi, 
a follower of Barelawi, was determined that the religious 
and cultural heritage of the Muslims, apparently 
threatened by official British education, should be 
preserved. It might be said therefore that the college 
at Deoband was founded on a tradition of disloyalty to 
British rule.^
The Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh 
was established in 1878 by Syed Ahmed Khan, the leader 
of the modernist school of thought which argued that 
Muslims should in self-defence accept the British presence 
and learn to work with it. Syed Ahmed had entered the 
service of the British about 1838 and by 1855 had risen 
to the position of sadr amin (subordinate native judge).
At a time when it was no easy matter for Muslims to gain 
employment in the government service, Syed Ahmed's 
experience probably had considerable effect on the 
formation of his view that the British were too firmly 
entrenched to be ousted by force. He therefore opposed 
the Mutiny which he feared would end in disaster for the
Faruqi, The Deoband School, p.25.
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Muslims. He wrote a pamphlet, published in 1860,^ in 
which he attempted to persuade the British that not all
Muslims had been involved in the revolt of 1857 and that 
many were completely loyal.
Believing that the secret of the strength of Western
Europe was based on intellectual progress, especially in
the physical sciences, he was convinced that if his
people were ever to make up the leeway between themselves
and the advanced countries of Europe they must learn
Western skills. The need as he saw it was for an
institution in India which would teach these things to
the Muslims while it imbued them at the same time with
the values of Islam. Although he encountered some
opposition from the orthodox who claimed that such an
institution would teach young Muslims Syed Ahmed's own
'heresies', there was no lack of support from the small
but growing Muslim middle class who shared his views,
or from the British who by this time were patronising
2the modernist movement. When the college at Aligarh
was opened it was affiliated with Calcutta University
and attracted students from all over the subcontinent as
3well as from neighbouring Muslim countries.
1
Entitled The Loyal Mohammedans of India.
2
W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, A Social Analysis 
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3. The Clash Between the Aligarh and Deoband Traditions
Although the ideals and objectives of the two schools 
were quite different, the disagreement did not become a 
public issue until the formation of the Indian National 
Congress in 1885. Nanawtawi's successor at Deoband, 
Gangohi, declared that in certain matters cooperation with 
Hindus could be accepted providing Islamic principles were 
not thereby violated. In 1887 Syed Ahmed came out publicly 
against the National Congress. He feared that its aims 
could lead to an outbreak of violence similar to that of 
1857, which, if the Muslims became involved, would spell 
their final rum. Should the Congress succeed in 
establishing representative institutions, he believed 
that the consequences would be unfortunate for the 
backward Muslim minority, particularly as the growing 
Hindu revivalist movement's demands that Hindi replace 
Urdu as the language of the courts increased in tempo.
Syed Ahmed's support of the British had already 
brought him into conflict with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani'*' 
during the latter's visits to India, although al-Afghani 
won a number of supporters from among the younger 
generation of Muslims. The Deoband ulema were no less
1
S.A. Rizve, Aspects of Muslim Politics in India on the 
Eve of 1919 (unpublished paper, ANU (n.da)), pp.11-12. 
For discussion of al-Afghani, see below p :24_
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disapproving of Syed Ahmed's politics than Jamal al-Dm, 
especially over the question of allegiance to Britain, 
the Egyptian revolt of 1881 and the Turkish-Greek war of 
1897. So long as Turkish policy remained friendly to 
Britain Sultan Abdul Hamid's claims to the Caliphate,  ^
and to the spiritual allegiance of all Muslims, were 
allowed to go unchallenged by Syed Ahmed. By 1897, 
however, the situation had changed and he wrote articles 
in the Aligarh Institute Gazette denying the Sultan's 
claim and exhorting support for British policy even if 
it were unfriendly to Turkey.
4. The Generation 'Who Knew not Syed Ahmed'
The turn of the century brought significant changes 
to the Muslim nationalist movement. The new generation 
at Aligarh was growing less receptive to Syed Ahmed's 
ideas. The Western education he had given them inclined 
them more towards the ideals of the National Congress and 
they were not prepared to wait patiently for the British 
to reward unconditional Muslim loyalty. This dissident 
group found a spokesman in Maulana Shibli who sensed 
the feeling of depression that had gripped the younger 
generation of Muslims and whose writing had considerable 
influence on the generation who came in contact with him,
1
See below, pp.25-27.
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one of the most important of whom was Maulana Mohammed 
Ali. Although Mohammed Ali died before Pakistan became 
a reality, he is claimed by many Pakistanis as one of 
those who was instrumental in shaping the Indian Muslims“ 
sense of nationality. Born at Rampur, he was educated 
at Aligarh and Oxford, returning to India where he joined 
the services of the State of Rampur and Baroda. Although 
apparently successful, he was seized like many of his 
contemporaries by a deep discontent and restlessness.
He decided to go to Calcutta in 1910, and the following 
year began publishing his own journal, The Comrade. 
Greatly affected by 'the shameless brigandage of Italy 
in Tripoli1 he contemplated suicide in 1912 when he 
learned that the Bulgarians were only 25 miles from 
Constantinople.^ He began what was to be a life-long 
struggle with the British authorities, through the pages 
of his newspaper, in which he was soon joined by his 
brother Shaukat Ali.
5. The All-India Muslim League
The Aligarh tradition was carried on by the Muslim 
League which was formed in 1906 in response to a growing 
demand for Muslim political organisation. By that time 
there remained few Muslims in the National Congress and
1
Mohammed All, My Life: a Fragment (Shaikh Muhammad 
Ashraf: Lahore, 1942), p.49.
16
the militant Hindu wing of the Congress was becoming more 
strident in its demands. A group of prominent Muslims 
led by Nawab Mohsin ul-Mulk, the successor of Sir Syed 
Ahmed at Aligarh, and the Agha Khan, in October 1906 
sought an interview with the Viceroy, Lord Minto. 
Emphasising their loyalty to the British they asked at 
the same time for separate electorates for the Muslims 
to ensure that their rights as a minority would be 
protected. Their demands were accepted, but they felt 
the need to form an organisation to protect the gains 
already made, and in December that year convened a meeting 
of leading Muslims at Dacca, as a result of which the 
All-India Muslim League was established.
It was an association of wealthy, upper class 
Muslims, steeped in the English liberal constitutional 
tradition, many of them graduates of Aligarh. It is not 
surprising that it did not appeal to that generation of 
Muslims referred to earlier who 'knew not- Seyyid Ahmed 
and regarded his teachings as obsolete','*’ nor is it 
surprising that it was with this organisation, pledged 
to promote loyalty to the British government, that the 
British later chose to deal.
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, regarded by Pakistanis as the 
founder of their country, did not join the Muslim League
1
Sir Valentine Chirol, India Old and New (Macmillan: 
London, 1921), p.137.
until 1913. Educated in England, he was a competent and 
highly paid barrister when he entered politics, bringing 
his ability for cold legal argument into the Viceroy's 
Executive Council in 1909. At first attracted to the 
nationalist ideals of the Congress, he remained aloof 
from the Muslim League because he disliked its 
pre-occupation with communal issues. After the revision 
of the partition of Bengal in 1911^ the League was more 
inclined to the nationalist aims of the Congress and 
Jinnah was finally persuaded to become a member. As a 
member of Congress, the League and the Viceroy's 
Executive Council, he soon became an influential political 
figure, but found it difficult to appeal to the illiterate 
uneducated Muslims as Gandhi was able to appeal to the 
Hindus, and for many years regarded such an appeal as 
unnecessary, believing that he was right and that in time
17
1
Bengal, a large unwieldy administrative unit, was 
partitioned by the British Government in 1905. A new 
province of East Bengal was established which was 
predominantly Muslim, leaving the old Bengal as a 
predominantly Hindu area. This arrangement was 
satisfactory to the Muslims of Bengal who were anxious 
to escape from a situation where they were dominated by 
a Hindu majority, but was opposed by the Nationalists 
as an attempt by the British to 'divide and rule'. 
Pressure against the decision from the Nationalists was 
so great that in 1911 the partition was annulled, a 
decision which diminished the faith of the Muslim 
community in the British government.
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everyone else would see that he was right. He was 
instrumental in bringing about the 'Lucknow Pact' in 
1916 whereby the League agreed to support certain 
Congress demands for self-government while Congress 
conceded separate electorates to the Muslims.
The leadership of Deoband had fallen to another 
militant, Maulana Mahmud Hasan Deobandi, better known 
as Sheikh-ul-Hind, under whose direction Deoband began 
to participate in the politics of the subcontinent: 
its activity until then had been confined to attempts to 
make contact with the Turkish Government. At the same 
time, with the growing discontent among the Aligarh men, 
he attempted to bridge the gap between the two schools, 
and in 1910 organised a conference attended by some 
30,000 Muslims of varying shades of opinion, including 
some from Aligarh.
Meanwhile Turkey was fighting in the Balkans, and 
the young Muslim nationalist press was choking with 
resentment at British refusal to intervene to protect 
Constantinople and the Caliph. Mohammed Ali began to 
collect funds to organise a medical mission to Turkey, 
which eventually set out in 1912.
6. The Decline of the Ottoman Empire
At this time, on the eve of the First World War, 
the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapse.
Although it had survived the Mughal Empire by more than
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100 years it too had been in retreat from the end of the 
eighteenth century. Its strength had rested on superior 
organisation, manpower and technology, which at the end 
of the Middle Ages had given the Turks a decided 
advantage over Europe. Since then there had been little 
or no progress. From the Treaty of Jassy in 1792, 
Turkey's European frontiers were slowly driven back 
before victorious Russian armies.
At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 England, France 
and Austria, with Russian consent, agreed to define and 
guarantee the integrity of the boundaries of the Ottoman 
Empire, for they believed that the break-up of the empire 
would endanger the peace of Europe. The Sultan 
understandably viewed this as a humiliating intervention 
in Turkish affairs on the part of foreign powers and 
refused to have anything to do with the suggestion.
Superior Western technology and compulsive 
territorial expansionism were not at this stage the only 
sources of danger to Turkish security. The ideas of 
liberty, nationalism, of the rights of men and nations 
which grew from the French Revolution were seeping 
through, creating internal troubles with which Turkish 
Governors either could not or would not cope. Trouble 
with Greece occupied the Turkish Government throughout 
the 1820s as newly developed Greek nationalism, with 
Russian encouragement, made increasing demands on Turkey. 
As was becoming the custom with Turkish affairs, the
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great powers of Europe once more took matters into their 
own hands, and by a series of protocols, treaties and 
agreements, the Danubian provinces were taken from 
Turkey and Greece became independent.
Reduced international prestige made the internal 
situation even more difficult to control, and in 1831 the 
Governor of Egypt, Mohammed Ali Pasha, rose in revolt, 
with French support. In 1833 an agreement was reached 
with Russia whereby Turkey was offered Russian protection. 
By 1839 the European powers decided to save Turkey from 
this fate and forestall any Russian advantage. Pressure 
was placed on Mohammed Ali, who accepted the hereditary 
governorship of Egypt in return for the abandonment of 
other territorial claims.
Following the Crimean War of 1854-56, Turkish 
territorial integrity was once more guaranteed. This 
did not prevent French intervention in a Lebanese revolt 
in 1860 after which Turkey was forced to accept a Christian 
Governor of Lebanon, to be chosen by the European powers.
From the 1860s, Pan-Slavism gained increasing 
popularity in those areas where the Turkish writ still 
claimed to run. Trouble with Greek nationalism continued.
A brutally suppressed Bulgarian revolt in 1876 lost Turkey 
much sympathy in Europe, especially in the United Kingdom. 
The treaty of San Stephano and the Congress of Berlin in 
1878, following another Russian victory, drove Turkey's 
European frontier back still further. This pattern
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continued through the remainder of the century: in 1881 
England occupied Egypt; in 1897 Turkey won a victory over 
Greece, the fruits of which were lost as a result of the 
intervention of the European powers, this time with the 
significant exception of Germany and Austria, who 
remained aloof. In 1911 war broke out with Italy, in 
which Turkey lost Tripoli and Cyrenaica. The Balkan 
wars of 1912 and 1913 deprived Turkey of all territory 
west of the Maritsa river, and led into the First World 
War, which ended in the final destruction of the Ottoman 
Empire.
7. The Development of Pan-Islamism
Modern Pan-Islamic ideals were founded on the basis 
of theories related to the Caliphate and to the classical 
(and largely theoretical) unity of Islam. The Caliphate 
was initially devised by the Companions of the Prophet 
in order to retain unity among the Arabs, to retain divine 
guidance in government and to give to both a new continuity. 
Although all of the first four Caliphs were chosen by 
different means, they were all chosen by the Community, 
and the choice was accepted as legitimate. Under the 
Abbasid Caliphate, established in the mid-eighth century, 
the ideals of unity, divine guidance and continuity came 
to be rigidly interpreted. Unity became strict political 
unity under one Caliph, divine guidance became divine
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right, and continuity came to mean the hereditary right 
of the Abbasids to the Caliphal throne.'*'
As the power of the Abbasids declined and individual
Sultans successfully revolted and seized power without
troubling to depose the Caliph, these theories were
severely shaken. Some theoreticians took the view that
the true Caliphate had ceased to exist, but to accept
this would have been to admit that the entire Community
was living in sin, without any spiritual guidance
whatsoever, and would have destroyed the three pillars
(of unity, divine guidance and continuity) which upheld
the entire system. The confused jurists were rescued
towards the end of the eleventh century by the bluntness
of the theologian, el-Gazali:
Government in these days is a consequence 
solely of military power, and whosoever he 
may be to whom the holder of military power 
gives his allegiance, that person is the 
Caliph. And whosoever exercised independent 
authority, so long as he shows allegiance to 
the Caliph in the matter of his prerogatives 
of the Khutba and the Sikka^...the same is a
1
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sultan, whose commands and judgements are 
valid in the several parts of the earth.1
An extension of this rationalisation, following the
disruption of the Mongol invasions, was the formulation
of the theory that 'every righteous ruler who governs
2with justice and enforces the Shariah is entitled to
3the style and prerogatives of the Caliphate.' This, 
rather than the classical theory, lay behind the use of 
the terms Caliph and Caliphate in Persia and Turkey.
It became clear to many Muslim intellectuals during 
the nineteenth century that Islam as it existed could 
not protect Muslim social institutions from the onslaught 
on Western liberalism, brought back to the Middle East 
from the universities of Europe, any more than Western 
technology could be prevented from defeating Muslim 
armies on the battlefield. There was a need for much 
rethinking, for modernisation and for unity. Three 
exponents of this argument were Namik Kemal, Jamal al-Din 
al-Afghani and, for obvious reasons, Sultan Abdul Hamid 
of Turkey.
1
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Namik Kemal argued that modernisation was the 
answer to Western advance, not simply a blind adoption of 
European methods, as some Western!sers believed, but an 
adaptation of these methods to Islamic values and way of 
life, In order to achieve this Kemal believed that all 
Muslims should unite under some strong leadership.
Ottoman Turkey seemed to be the ideal candidate for this 
leadership, the Caliphate a ready-made rallying point.
While Namik Kemal put forward his views on paper,
. 2his contemporary, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, travelled 
widely through the Middle East arguing for their adoption. 
Al-Afghani was genuinely disturbed by the apparent 
physical collapse of the Islamic countries before the 
European advance and advocated solidarity among Muslims 
as a means of damming the flood. Solidarity was the 
primary requirement of human society, and religion an 
effective means of producing this solidarity. In the 
course of his travels al-Afghani built up a large following, 
especially among the early Arab nationalists during his
1
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eight year sojourn in Egypt from 1871 to 1879. He
visited India twice, briefly in 1869 and later in 1879
after his expulsion from Egypt, when he remained three
years in Hyderabad and Calcutta, later travelling to
France, Russia and Persia. He became thoroughly
unpopular with the Shah and the orthodox ulema in
2Teheran, and left Persia for Constantinople, probably 
sensing in Abdul Hamid a potential patron.
The appeal of Pan-Islamism to the Ottomans is 
fairly clear, as least insofar as it called on Muslims 
to rally around the Caliph and the Turkish Empire. In 
claiming the allegiance of all Muslims, the Sultan-Caliph 
sought to bolster his own tattered prestige, and perhaps 
even to increase his real power. The first hint of this 
claim appeared as early as 1774, long before the doctrine 
of Pan-Islam itself became important, and was put forward 
without any thought of its future implications. The 
Sultan, following a defeat by Russia, was forced in the 
Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca to concede to the Czar certain 
rights of intervention on behalf of the Orthodox Church 
in Christian parts of the Ottoman Empire. In order to
1
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save face the Sultan insisted on the inclusion of the
following article in the Treaty:
As to the practices of religion, the Tartars, 
being the same religion as the Muslims, and 
his Sultanian Majesty being as Supreme 
Mohammedan Caliph, they are to conduct 
themselves towards him, as is prescribed in 
the rules of their religion, without, however, 
compromising their political and civil 
independence, as has been laid down.l
These claims to purely spiritual allegiance were a 
radical departure from established Islamic practice. The 
caliph was always, in theory at least, associated with 
the exercise of temporal power over certain sections of 
the Muslim community. To endow him with a kind of 
titular leadership outside this territory was indeed an 
innovation.
The Ottoman claims were put forward more strongly 
in the Constitution of 1876, by this time no doubt with 
greater awareness of their potential usefulness.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Jamal al-Din
al-Afghani was drawn to the Court at Constantinople,
seeing himself as 'the political guide who could further
arouse Pan-Islamic feeling and could lead Abdul Hamid to
2the successful achievement of Muslim unity.' While each
1
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may have thought he could work with or even use the
other, their aims were divergent: Abdul Hamid adopted
Pan-Islamism as a means to preserve his own power, while
to al-Afghani it was a means whereby the integrity of
Muslim culture might be preserved in the face of the
advancing Christian West. Instead of enlisting al-Afghani
as a major foreign policy adviser, the Sultan merely had
him persuade 'a circle of Persian Shi'is, Babus and
agnostics to write letters to the Shi'i ulema to support
the Sultan's Pan-Islamic schemes.1^  Even this function
was no longer required once the Sultan began to suspect
al-Afghani of joining schemes for the establishment of
2an Arab Caliphate.
As official Ottoman policy, Pan-Islamism was 
successful only to the extent that support for the Turkish 
cause during the Turko-Greek war of 1897 and later during 
the Italian and Balkan wars was engendered among Muslims, 
especially in India. When the crucial test came at the 
outbreak of the First World War, Pan-Islamic calls for 
support for Turkey fell on deaf ears. The only response 
came from the Indian Muslims, but theirs was a special
1
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situation, and they failed to understand that non-Turkish 
Muslims could resent Turkish rule, even though the Turks 
were Muslims, as much as the Indians resented the rule of 
the British. It was probably unfortunate for the further 
development of Pan-Islamism that it had become so closely 
linked with the failing Ottoman regime, and was therefore 
regarded frequently as a scheme on the part of an 
imperialist government to maintain a grip on the peoples 
under its control.
8. The Conflict of Nationalism and Pan-Islamism
Rising Arab and Turkish nationalism also represented 
forces militating against the success of the Pan-Islamic 
ideal. The study of the eastern pre-Islamic Turks gave 
the Turkish nationalists a new awareness of their own
history and of fellow Turks beyond the borders of their
1 2 own country. Though later renounced firmly by Ataturk,
Pan-Turanianism held a strong appeal for many of the Young
Turks, with which Pan-Islamism, tainted as it was by the
touch of Abdul Hamid, could not compete. If local
nationalism among the Turks overshadowed Pan-Islamism it
is not a matter for great wonder that the growing
1
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nationalism of the Arabs, unfettered by the 1914-18 War 
and encouraged by the British, swamped it completely.
Before the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 there was 
practically no agitation within the Ottoman Empire for 
a free Arab state. Once the Young Turks seized power 
propaganda, encouraged by the apparent liberalism of the 
new government in Constantinople, came out into the open, 
along with the claims of non-Arab Turkish subject peoples, 
demanding more than the Young Turks were prepared to 
concede. They were willing to give the Arabs certain 
civil liberties and parliamentary representation, but 
they were by no means prepared to admit Arab autonomy or 
secession from the Empire. The result was growing 
disillusionment and uncertainty among the Arabs, finally 
turning to revolt during the 1914-18 War.^
Although the Arab nationalist movement did not gather 
momentum until the beginning of the twentieth century, 
much of the intellectual ground had been prepared earlier. 
The influence of al-Afghani in this regard should be 
noted, for he helped remind the Arabs that Islam was 
originally their religion, recalling to them the greatness 
of their history. In addition, by his emphasis on
1
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solidarity and his insistence on Islam as a mainspring 
of this solidarity, 'he placed it on the same footing as 
other solidarity-producing beliefs1'*' such as nationalism, 
and helped to spread among Middle Eastern intellectuals 
a secularist, activist attitude to politics, a necessary 
condition for the acceptance and spread of an ideology 
such as Arab nationalism.
The manner in which Islamic revivalism and
Pan-Islamism drifted into Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism
so that these ideas have, to some extent, remained linked,
is demonstrated in the writings of later Arab nationalists.
One of the foremost of these was Rashid Rida, who became
Rector of al-Azhar University in Cairo, the most important
seat of theological learning in the Arab world. Although
a Muslim before all else, Rashid Rida represented the
beginning of a particularly Arab view of Islam, and his
writing from time to time refers to the Arab origins of
Islam and hints that the Turks, although Muslims, could
2not really be regarded as part of the umma. One of his 
best known followers, al-Kawakibi, was even more explicit
3on this subject. He believed that the Ottomans could
1
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never preside over the regeneration of Islam. This should 
be the work of the Arabs who would provide a Caliph, 
residing in Mecca and acting as a kind of spiritual head 
of an Islamic union. He would have only religious 
authority, symbolising Arab unity, with no political 
power, a revolutionary idea in terms of Islamic theory.
It seems that al-Kawakibi was not alone in taking this 
view for there were reports that Muslim Arabs, talking 
in the years before the First World War of a possible 
Turkish collapse, looked to Egypt to provide new 
leadership and suggested the possibility of an Arab 
Empire with the Sharif of Mecca as the spiritual head 
and the Khedive of Egypt as the temporal head.'*'
The argument eventually developed that Arab unity
was a prerequisite of Islamic unity:
It is not possible for any sane person to 
imagine union among Cairo, Baghdad, Tehran,
Kabul, Haiderabad, and Bukhara, or Kashgar,
Persia and Timbuctoo, without there being 
union among Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Mecca 
and Tunis. It is not possible for any sane 
person to conceive the possibility of union 
among Turks, Arabs, Persians, Malayans, and 
Negroes, while denying unity to the Arabs 
themselves.... The idea of Muslim unity is, 
it is true, wider and more inclusive than 
the concept of Arab unity, but it is not 
possible to advocate Muslim unity without 
advocating Arab unity. We have, therefore,
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the right to assert that whoever opposes 
Arab unity, in the name of Muslim unity 
or for the sake of Muslim unity he 
contradicts the simplest necessities of 
reason and logic.^
9. The 1914-18 War and the Khilafat Movement
With the outbreak of war in 1914 and Turkey's 
subsequent decision to join Germany and Austria, Britain 
decided it would be to the advantage of itself and its 
allies to encourage revolt in the disaffected parts of 
the Ottoman Empire. While Syria was probably ripest for 
revolt, it was too deep within Turkish territory to be 
accessible. British efforts were concentrated, therefore, 
on Arabia proper, although the task was divided between 
the Foreign Office and the India Office, each having 
slightly different objectives. The Indian Government, 
aware of the uneasy temper of the Indian Muslims, was 
opposed to fomenting widespread revolt against the Turkish 
Government, and was content merely to buy the neutrality 
of Aziz Ibn Saud, ruler of Saudi Arabia. The Foreign 
Office, in addition to its immediate objective of causing 
trouble within the Ottoman Empire, wanted to ensure, when 
the war was over, that a friendly Muslim state would 
replace the Turkish Empire as a buffer between Europe
1
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and India, thus protecting British interests in that 
direction. The ruler of Mecca, Sharif Hussain, was 
willing to cooperate, and agreed to raise an army to 
fight the Turks following a British promise that he would, 
after the Turkish defeat, become king of an independent 
Arab state which would include the Holy Places, and receive 
in addition a British subsidy of £200,000 a month. An 
unofficial hint was dropped by Kitchener, then High 
Commissioner in Egypt, regarding the possibility of an 
Arab Caliphate. It is almost certain that Kitchener 
visualised the Caliphate as a spiritual office without 
realising that such an interpretation would not be shared 
by most Muslims. It is not unlikely that this rash 
suggestion helped kindle the ambitions of the Sharifian 
house, particularly of Hussain's sons, leading them to 
envisage Hussain replacing the Turkish Sultan as Commander 
of the Faithful, with sovereignty over the Muslim world.
The Indian Muslims had hoped that Turkey would either 
join the allies or remain neutral, but after Turkey joined 
the Central Powers, on 14 November 1914, they directed 
their efforts towards persuading the British to protect 
the holy places in the Middle East. The British 
Government, anxious not to antagonise its Muslim subjects, 
authorised the Viceroy to give an assurance that these 
holy places would be immune from attack so long as there 
was no interference with Indian pilgrims. This assurance 
was confirmed by the Prime Minister, Asquith, on
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9 November 1914, and endorsed by the Governments of France 
and Russia.'*'
Support for Turkey in India, however, was suppressed 
by the British. Mohammed All wrote an article in The 
Comrade in which he justified Turkish action in joining 
Germany, and the British responded by suspending the 
journal, confiscating the press and interning the Ali 
brothers. Most of the opposition press was treated 
similarly at this time and open support for Turkey in 
India virtually ceased for the duration of the war.
Deoband however was active as never before. It was
felt that nothing could be done in India against the
British unless the Central Powers attacked India through
2Iran and Afghanistan. So in 1915 Ubaidallah Sindhi went 
to Afghanistan and Sheikh-ul-Hind went to the Hijaz in an 
effort to get in touch with the Turkish authorities. The
1
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Sheikh arrived in Mecca in 1916, and by chance was able
to contact the Turkish War Minister, Anwar Pasha, who was
on a visit to the area. The Pasha reportedly promised to
help the Sheikh to attack India through the Khyber Pass,
and sent a message to the North-West Frontier tribes
assuring them of all possible aid in their anti-British
venture.'*’ It is debatable that the Turkish government
seriously considered such a plan, although Enver Pasha
2perhaps had it in mind. In any case pressures on Turkey 
precluded its execution, and the King of Afghanistan,
Amir Habibullah, was distinctly wary of incurring British 
or Russian displeasure by throwing his neutrality into 
question. Although Ubaidallah Sindhi was able to continue 
his fruitless campaign for several years, Sheikh-ul-Hind 
was captured when Sharif Hussain of Mecca revolted 
against the Turks in 1916.
The revolt of Sharif Hussain caused shock and 
disappointment in India. In November 1914 the Ottoman 
Sheikh-ul-Islam had issued a fatwa declaring jihad in the 
name of the Sultan-Caliph, and calling on all Muslims to 
take up arms and fight with the Muslims of the Ottoman 
Empire. This appeal to Pan-Islamic sentiment fell on 
deaf ears except for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent.
1
Rowlatt Committee Report, cited, ibid., p.61.
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See Lord Kinross, Ataturk, the Rebirth of a Nation 
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1964), p.117.
To them,
the Arab nationalists were not patriots 'rightly 
struggling to be free' but traitors to the cause 
of Islamic solidarity - Muslims who had made 
common cause with the Caliph's enemies at a time 
when the duty to assist the Caliph was 
especially incumbent upon them. The resentment 
of the Indian Muslims towards the Arab 
Nationalists was a curious contrast to the 
attitude of the Turks who frankly recognized 
the fait accompli of Arab national independence 
and bore their former subjects no ill will for 
having asserted against Turkey a right which 
the Turks themselves were determined to assert 
against the Allies.!
At the Delhi session of the Muslim League in 1918,
following the Allied victory in November, the question
of the fate of Turkey came very much to the fore.
Although Jinnah argued that, under the Muslim League
constitution it had no right to dabble in the foreign
2politics of the Government, the weight of Muslim feeling 
was against this view, and a resolution in support of the 
Caliphate was adopted.
Although the fate of Turkey was a specifically Muslim 
grievance, there were other issues appearing at this time
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which aroused anti-British feeling among both Hindus and
Muslims/ leading to their cooperation in a campaign
against the Government. The Indians regarded the
Montagu-Chelmsford Report, which promised responsible
government, but only in stages, as a poor reward for the
cooperation extended to the British during the war by
the vast majority of them. The Rowlatt Report, which
led to the passage of the Rowlatt Acts, severely
curtailing Indian civil liberties, aroused widespread
resentment. The publication of these reports was followed
by the incident at Amritsar in April 1919 when General
Dyer opened fire on a crowd, killing nearly 400 people.
A Committee of Inquiry made up of four Englishmen and
four Indians under the Chairmanship of Lord Hunter was
set up the following October. It divided on racial lines,
and while the Government disavowed Dyer's view of the use
of force, its disciplinary action was thought to be not
strong enough.'*' Gandhi described it as a thinly
2disguised whitewash.
1
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Meanwhile, in May 1919, the Turkish peace treaty 
(the Treaty of Sevres) was published, its terms completely 
ignoring the demands of the Indian Muslims.'*’
A conference was held in Lucknow in September 1919 
to discuss the question of the Turkish peace treaty and
2the decision to establish the All-India Central Khilafat
3Committee was made. The first Khilafat conference was
held in November, and was attended by a number of Hindus,
including Gandhi, who put forward a plan for a
non-cooperation campaign. The Committee decided to send
a delegation to England to place before the British
Government the Indian demands that the Caliph should be
permitted to retain custody over the three holy cities,
Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, that he should retain
4sovereignty over the whole Jaziratu11-1arab and that he
1
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up the Turkish Empire and that after the cessation of 
hostilities Turkey would be given back all its possessions.' 
Khalid bin Sayeed, Pakistan, the Formative Phase (Pakistan 
Publishing House: Karachi, 1960), p.47. See also Hector 
Bolitho, Jinnah (John Murray: London, 1954), p.81.
2
Caliphate.
3
Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, p.48.
4
The Arabian peninsula proper and the adjacent Arab 
countries of Iraq, Palestine and Syria.
39
should not suffer diminution of dominions as they existed
at the outbreak of the war.'*' Although the delegation, 
which was led by Maulana Mohammed Ali# was received by 
Lloyd George, it was apparently unable to influence the 
British Government in any way.
Their faith in the usefulness of deputations to the
British authorities gone, the Khilafatists agreed to join
Gandhi's non-cooperation movement, and in September 1920
a special Congress meeting followed suit. The Muslim
League also joined the movement in December that year
despite a large group of dissenters, including Mohammed
Ali Jinnah, who, while he condemned the Treaty of Sevres
and the treatment of Turkey, refused to support the
2Khilafat movement. Unable either to prevent the Muslim 
League joining the non-cooperation movement or to accept 
it himself, Jinnah virtually retired from politics until 
the end of the 1920s.
Gandhi's support of the Khilafat cause has been 
regarded by some, usually Muslim League supporters, as 
an attempt to lure Muslims into a gigantic Hindu trap, 
to persuade them to submerge their identity, organisation 
and interests in a Hindu campaign. Supporters of this 
view point to Gandhi's decision to call off the entire
1
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civil disobedience campaign in 1922 following the attack 
on the police post at Chauri-Chaura, just as the campaign 
appeared on the verge of success. The Khilafatists, who 
were not committed to non-violence in any case, felt that 
they had been cheated. The other view, put forward by 
supporters of Gandhi, is that he saw an opportunity to 
unite Hindus and Muslims unlikely to occur again for a 
very long time, and while admitting that the Khilafat was 
a Muslim issue, argued that it was connected with Indian 
freedom, for an unfree India could do nothing to help 
Turkey.'*’ Whatever Gandhi's motives in adopting the 
Khilafat cause, his sudden action in calling off the 
campaign left a legacy of bitterness between the Muslims 
and the Hindus.
The momentum of the Khilafat movement had been 
destroyed by Gandhi's action. Its raison d'etre was 
removed by the Turks themselves. In November 1922 the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly stripped the Caliph of 
his functions. A well-meaning attempt by two venerable 
Indians, the Agha Khan and Sayyid Ameer Ali, one a 
member of the Privy Council and the other a Judge of the 
High Court of Appeal, to intervene in November 192 3 on 
behalf of the Caliph did not prevent the abolition of 
the office the following March, and in fact antagonised 
the new Turkish Government. The Turkish Prime Minister,
1
Nanda, Mahatma Gandhi, p.185.
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Ismet Pasha, to whom their letter had been directed, 
denied their competence as Indian representatives to 
comment on the Turkish Constitution, or as Shi'is to 
comment on the affairs of a Sunni country. Underlying 
this resentment was a suspicion that the whole affair 
was a British plot to weaken the Nationalist government. 
The intervention was made doubly insulting by the 
unfortunate chance that the letter fell into the hands 
of the Constantinople press, for the most part opposed 
to the Ankara Government, before the original reached 
the Prime Minister himself.
Toynbee has suggested that there was a basic 
misunderstanding between the Indian Muslims and the 
Turkish nationalists: this seems to have been the case. 
The Indians, that is the Deobandis and the Ali brothers, 
supported the Turkish nationalists in the belief that 
they were 'loyal servants of the Caliph of Islam, 
fighting to rescue their master from a humiliating 
captivity in the hands of non-Muslim powers.1 They 
gave enthusiastic support to both the Sultan-Caliph and 
to Ataturk, without taking into consideration the fact 
that the Caliph regarded Ataturk as an enemy of religion, 
and Ataturk viewed the Caliph as a traitor to the 
Turkish nation.'*'
1
Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, p.48.
42
10. The Indian Muslims and the Middle East, 1924-31
Following the abolition of the Caliphate by the Turks 
the Islamic world was thrown into a dilemma. Could the 
Caliphate simply be abandoned? If so, what was to become 
of the community of Islam of which the Caliph was the 
head? Could there be an umma without a Caliph, and what 
would it be like? If not, then who or what was to replace 
the Ottoman incumbent so unceremoniously ejected?
At about the same time another problem arose as a 
result of the upheaval which had driven Turkish 
overlordship from the Holy Land and replaced it by an 
infidel, European protectorate. Linked with the problem 
of the Holy Land was the rivalry between the Hashemite 
rulers of the Hijaz and the Saudis of Najd, who made 
the protection of the Holy Land and the rights of pilgrims 
a pretext for their war against the Hijaz.
In Egypt there were two different reactions to the 
abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate. The leading ulema 
saw an opportunity of regaining for Egypt the position 
of primacy in the Islamic world held from the twelfth 
century until the Ottoman conquest in 1517. Immediately 
after the Grand National Assembly abolished the 
Caliphate, the Egyptian ulema declared that the 
Caliphate of Prince Abdul Mejid had never been a legal 
Caliphate, since the Islamic religion did not recognise 
the Caliphate in terms laid down by the Turkish
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Government and accepted by him. They called for a 
conference to be held in Cairo in March 1925, under the 
auspices of the University of al-Azhar, with the Grand 
Mufti of Jerusalem as President.'*’
The Egyptian Government reacted quite differently
from the ulema, arguing that the Ottoman Caliphate had
been an object of suspicion to the European powers which
had often led to acts of hostility against Turkey.
Although the name of the King replaced that of the Caliph
in the Khutba, it was made known that the Government had
2no wish to import the Caliphate into Egypt.
Others were not so reluctant. As a result of his 
war-time alliance with Britain the influence of the 
Hashemite ruler of the Hijaz was considerably increased. 
His sons Faisal and Abdullah were made rulers of the 
British mandated territories of Iraq and Transjordan 
respectively, and Abdullah, foreseeing the collapse of the 
Ottoman Caliphate, was anxious that it should be replaced 
by an Arab Caliphate with his father as Caliph. Sharif 
Hussain realised that this move would not be welcomed 
by many Islamic governments and tried to protest, but
1
Ibid., p.83.
Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, p.82.
2
44
to no avail.'*' Through March 1924 he was recognised as 
Caliph by one after another group of ulema in Palestine, 
Iraq and Syria, and finally by the ex-Sultan-Caliph 
himself.
The growing power of the Hashemites appeared to Ibn 
Saud of Najd to threaten his own position in the Arabian 
Peninsula, and their claim to the Caliphate provoked him 
to invade the Hijaz in August 1924, on the pretext that 
Hussain had failed to protect the rights of pilgrims 
visiting Mecca and Medina. Saud's action in carrying 
the war into the Holy Land was disliked in general by 
Muslims elsewhere who tended to regard his puritanical 
interpretation of Islam as heresy and distrusted his 
guarantees regarding the safety of pilgrims to Mecca and 
Medina. His suggestion of a conference to discuss the 
future of the Holy Land was resented by the Egyptians 
who suspected that he was trying to steal the thunder 
of their proposed Caliphate Conference.
Saud received the unqualified support of the Indian 
Khilafat Committee which had little time for Hussain.
It is interesting to note that in their righteous 
indignation with the King of the Hijaz for rebelling 
against the Turks for British money, the Khilafatists 
overlooked the fact that Saud had remained neutral, also
Ibid., p.65.
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for British money, although not so much of it. Shaukat 
Ali was despatched at once as a delegate to the proposed 
conference. While in Cairo and Jedda in December 1924 he 
became involved in an argument with the Egyptian ulema 
who accused him of meddling.
As it happened, neither conference took place until 
1926. The Caliphate Conference in Cairo was ignored by 
many Muslim governments, including those of Turkey, 
Persia, Afghanistan and Najd. The lone Indian who 
attended did so in a private capacity. An explanation 
of this reaction may be that the subject for discussion 
was considered too controversial, or perhaps, by 1926, 
no longer of sufficient real importance to warrant 
participation in what could become acrimonious and 
useless discussion. The Conference decided that an 
Islamic Caliphate in conformity with the prescriptions 
of the Shariah was possible under existing world 
conditions, and that another conference should meet to 
appoint a Caliph. No date was set, however, and such 
a conference was never convened.
King Saud's conference in Mecca later that year was 
better attended: the administration of the Holy Land and 
Haj facilities were of importance to all Muslims, 
although the conference tended to bog down in minute and 
tedious detail. A decision to set up a permanent 
Standing Committee to confer annually in Mecca on
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Islamic affairs was not implemented, but, more significant 
in terms of the effort to achieve Islamic solidarity were 
the divisions and rivalries which permeated the discussion. 
One example was the decision to adopt Arabic as the 
official language of the Conference, made possibly only 
because Arabic speaking delegates overwhelmingly 
outnumbered the others, and which was opposed by the 
Indian delegates, Shaukat and Mohammed Ali.
The next Islamic conference was held in 1931 in 
Jerusalem, convened at a time when Muslim opinion was 
aroused over the Palestine issue. The Conference arose 
from the efforts of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, al-Hajj 
Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, and Mr Shaukat Ali.
Invitations were sent to a wide group in an effort to 
have every shade of Islamic opinion represented.
Reactions were mixed and suspicious, for the vagueness 
of Shaukat's announcement that the conference was to be 
held 'for the purpose of investigating the actual 
situation of Islam and the measures to be taken in defence 
of its interests''*' left many wondering what the real 
purpose of the conference was. A section of modernist 
opinion in Egypt declared the proposal reactionary and 
contrary to the evolution of modern nation states, a 
view supported by the Turkish government. In addition, 
some Palestinian Muslims believed that the whole idea
1
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was a manoeuvre by which the Grand Mufti and Shaukat 
Ali hoped to strengthen their respective personal 
positions against rivals in their own countries.
The Conference met in December 1931. As a result 
an Executive Committee was set up consisting of a 
President and 25 members, as well as a Central Bureau of 
seven members, although little was achieved by them 
owing to a lack of funds. This time particular care was 
taken to avoid the appearance of a Pan-Arab rather than 
a Pan-Islamic gathering, and while the Arab delegates 
did hold an 'Arab Congress' and draw up an 'Arab 
Covenant', they 'met privately in another building and 
their action was not in any way associated with the 
Islamic Congress.'"*" This was the last attempt to hold 
an Islamic Congress until after the establishment of 
Pakistan.
11. The Muslim League, 1924-47
While Shaukat and Mohammed Ali represented a 
diminishing core of militants, the larger, more moderate
Ibid., p .107.
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group, after the collapse of the Khilafat movement and 
the abolition of the Caliphate, turned once more to 
internal affairs. Cooperation with the British became 
acceptable to both the Congress and the Muslim League.
The appointment in 1927 of the Simon Commission 
changed the atmosphere completely. Both Hindu and 
Muslim nationalists resented the appointment of an 
entirely British body to consider a future constitution 
for India. The Muslim League split on the issue, one 
group pledging complete loyalty to the British, the 
other, led by Jinnah (who was once more active in 
politics), advocating cooperation with the Congress in 
opposition to the Simon Commission. The publication by 
the Congress of the Nehru Report in 1928 dealt a severe 
blow to Jinnah's group, for the constitution it proposed 
ignored the provision of separate electorates for Muslims 
contained in the Lucknow Pact of 1916. Jinnah sought a 
compromise which the Congress rejected on the grounds 
that he could not be regarded as the spokesman of 
India's Muslims.
Already shaken by Congress rejection of his proposals 
regarding the Nehru Report, Jinnah became thoroughly 
disillusioned with prospects for Hindu-Muslim unity 
during the Round Table conferences in London in 1930 
and 1931. His view was shared by the poet and philosopher, 
Allama Iqbal, also a Muslim representative at the
49
Conference in 1930, and a close associate of Jinnah from 
that time. In his Presidential address to the Muslim 
League meeting at Allahabad in December 1930, Iqbal made 
the much-quoted statement that he would like to see the 
Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan 
united into a single state, within or without the British 
Empire. It was ten years before this became official 
League policy.
Jinnah did not return to the subcontinent until 
1935, when the Government of India Act gave India a new 
constitution and the campaign for the 1937 elections 
began. The Muslim community was still hopelessly 
divided and the League had not recovered from the effects 
of the Nehru Report. Representing the wealthier Muslim 
landowners, officials and professional men it was 
essentially conservative and had a limited appeal for 
the mass of poorer Muslims. Other groups appeared in 
the late 1920s and early 1930s which drew support from 
the lower middle class and the wealthier peasants. Most 
of the ulema supported the Jamiyat-al Ulama-i-Hind (the 
Indian Association of Muslim Clergy), one of whose main 
objectives was complete freedom for India. Believing 
that after the British withdrew Muslims and Hindus would 
be able to reach a satisfactory modus vivendi, the ulema 
were committed to unconditional support for the Congress, 
making them uneasy allies of any Muslim organisation.
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They regarded the Muslim League as a puppet of the British 
and the League saw them as traitors and campfollowers of 
the Congress.
The Congress won widespread victories in the 1937 
elections, and the discrimination experienced by the 
Muslims in many Congress-dominated areas between 1937 and 
1939 convinced the various Muslim groups of the need to 
cooperate, a situation which the League was quick to 
exploit. Its membership increased rapidly. It was 
particularly effective in capturing the imagination of 
the young Muslims, largely through the medium of the 
All-India Muslim Student's Association, founded at 
Aligarh in 1937.^ Aligarh became the emotional centre 
of 'Pakistan' before the idea of Partition was adopted 
by the League as its primary objective at Lahore in 
1940. The demand was based on the argument, known as 
the 'two nation theory' that the Muslims of India 
constituted a separate nation on the subcontinent, and 
could not be regarded merely as a minority group. The 
idea of Pakistan was initially opposed by many Muslim 
groups outside the League who regarded it as a red 
herring which diverted Indian Muslims from what they 
considered its main objective: the independence of all
Smith, Modern Islam in India, p.152.
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India. It was argued by many of the ulema that to speak 
of nationalism in connection with Islam was to speak of 
the whole Islamic community, and to use the term in a 
territorial sense as did the Muslim League was either a 
contradiction in terms or a heresy. Many were eventually 
won over when the Muslim League leaders began to speak of 
a Muslim state. They no doubt meant by this simply a 
state for Muslims; to the ulema it meant a state governed 
according to the Shariah law. They became a little more 
interested, and if the Muslim League was aware of the 
misconception it remained silent about it. Many of the 
ulema remained suspicious and continued to oppose the 
demand for Pakistan to the last.
By the 1940s the League organisation was sufficiently 
powerful to exert authority over its provincial branches 
and eventually, on the basis of the 'two nation theory', 
to claim that it represented the majority of Muslims of 
the subcontinent. The Congress refused absolutely to 
accept this theory. It was, by this time, prepared to 
concede some measure of autonomy to the Muslim majority 
areas, but sought to persuade the League to join it in 
ejecting the British, after which the Muslim demands 
would be discussed. Jinnah was not prepared to trust 
in the good faith of the Congress leaders, and insisted 
on the acceptance of Partition before independence. 
Finally, in June 1947, the British government agreed to 
the League's demands, and on 15 August that year
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Pakistan, consisting of the North-West Frontier Province, 
Sind, Baluchistan and the western Punjab, together with 
East Bengal and Sylhet, became an independent sovereign 
state.
12. Conclusion
By the time the new state of Pakistan was established 
there had been contact with and deep concern for the Middle 
East on the part of a quite large group of Indian Muslims, 
and the shape of the relationship which Pakistan was to 
have with the countries of that region was outlined in 
the previous century as a consequence of developments 
both in India and in the Middle East. The decline of 
the Mughal and Ottoman Empires reinforced the relative 
isolation of the Indian Muslims, and the importance of 
Islam as a rallying cry increased in the subcontinent as 
it diminished throughout the Middle East. Although 
Pan-Islamism originated in the Middle East, it was 
directed primarily against Western encroachment, and 
became a political weapon of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul 
Hamid. It was essentially a negative force, and proved 
no match for the rising tide of nationalism, both Turkish 
and Arab, which flooded the Ottoman Empire in the 
nineteenth century. To the Muslims in India, under 
Western imperialist domination, surrounded by an 
overwhelming Hindu majority, the Pan-Islamic ideal 
represented the hope of salvation. This attitude
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lingered on after the establishment of Pakistan, and it
was a long time before it was understood there that, so 
far as the countries of the Middle East were concerned, 
religion took second place to issues of national 
allegiance. At the same time, Pakistan was assessed 
by many Middle Eastern governments in terms of values 
other than common religion, such as socialism and 
anti-imperialism.
By 1947 that group of Indian Muslims, the remnants 
of the Khilafat movement, who had maintained closest 
contacts with the Muslims of the Middle East, had formed 
certain preferences regarding several issues. Although 
disappointed in Turkey after the abolition of the 
Caliphate, they admired Ataturk for the manner in which 
he defended Turkey against the Allied plans embodied in 
the Treaty of Sevres. Most Indian Muslims aligned 
themselves with Ibn Saud in his dispute with the 
Hashemites, partly because they took the view that 
Hussain had betrayed their cause by rebelling against 
the Ottoman government in 1916, but also because they 
believed the Saudis were in a better position than any 
others to take over the leadership of the Muslim world, 
which had not so much slipped from the hands of the 
Turks as been cast aside by them. Their involvement
54
in this dispute brought the Indian Muslims into conflict 
with the Egyptians for the first time. At the same time 
a close relationship developed between the Grand Mufti of 
Jerusalem and some of the Khilafatists. This is not to 
say that involvement with various factions in the Middle 
East was decisive in the subsequent formation of Pakistan 
foreign policy, but rather that attitudes formed before
1947 might well have influenced the hopes and 
expectations which developed in Pakistan at the time of 
Partition and immediately after.
When the Government of Pakistan was at last created, 
it fell however into the hands of the Westernised, 
modernist leaders of the Muslim League. While the League 
had adopted resolutions supporting the Palestine Arabs, 
after 1924 it had been too preoccupied with domestic 
issues to involve itself deeply in the affairs of the 
Muslim world. Policy making was therefore in the hands 
of men who shared with many of the leaders of the Middle 
East the attitude that the interest of the nation came 
before that of the Community. At the same time they 
were under pressure from the extremely vocal Pan-Islamist 
group within Pakistan. As a result Pakistan's leaders 
frequently expressed themselves in Pan-Islamic terms, 
although religion as such was not a major factor in the 
determination of foreign policy.
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Some Factors Influencing the 
Formation of Foreign Policy, 1947-52^
1. Introduction
Up to the time of independence, little thought had 
been given to this subject, and any expressions of policy 
objectives resolved themselves into a vague Pan-Islamism, 
appearing from time to time in the form of admiration for 
Turkey, the first Muslim state to defeat European 
attempts at domination, or of pleas to the British 
Government to abandon attempts to set up a Jewish state 
in Palestine. Such attitudes were a reaction to a 
particular set of circumstances, rather than a coherent 
policy. This situation evolved largely because there 
was no one in the Muslim League who had given much 
thought to the role of a possible Indian Muslim state 
in world affairs.
CHAPTER II
Since the object of this chapter is to describe the 
context of the formation of foreign policy rather than 
to discuss the details of its implementation, the views 
of Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister, and 
Khwaja Nazimuddin, who succeeded Jinnah as Governor- 
General, are referred to only briefly, as is the 
International Islamic Economic Organization, the 
brainchild of Pakistan's astute Finance Minister 
(later also Governor-General), Ghulam Mohammed.
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In more specific terms, there were many other 
difficulties encountered by Pakistan's policy makers 
after 15 August 1947. In addition to the lack of 
coherent thought on the subject there were huge 
technical difficulties. It was necessary to build up 
a foreign service right from the beginning. There was 
a shortage of senior Muslim administrators, and the few 
available, with assistance from some Englishmen who 
remained, had to cope with the seemingly overwhelming 
problems of creating the apparatus of government. As 
a completely new state Pakistan had the additional 
problem of establishing its identity in the eyes of 
the rest of the world. The name of Pakistan was 
unfamiliar, its leaders were little known outside the 
subcontinent, as were the policies they might adopt.
In these respects Pakistan was at a disadvantage
vvis-a-vis India, and since competition with India was 
from the time of Partition a fact of life for Pakistani 
diplomacy this disadvantage was especially important. 
Economic and strategic factors also played an important 
part in the shaping of foreign policy: underdeveloped 
economically, divided into two wings separated by a 
thousand miles of Indian territory, Pakistan inherited 
many of the strategic problems of undivided India as 
well as acquiring new ones of its own. Problems of 
economics and strategy have been of continuing 
importance. The difficulty of reconciling a solution 
of these with the inclinations of ideology quickly 
became apparent.
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These are the conditioning factors. What were the
principal strands of thought which emerged? An
examination of the statements of Jinnah and Iqbal'*' reveals
at the most a sketchy view of Pakistan's role in the world,
and in the Middle East in particular. Contemporary writing
on foreign policy, with few exceptions, tended to be vague
2and emotional. The choice of Ahmed and Suleri as examples 
rests on the availability and relative coherence of their 
writing, though it is reasonable to regard them as to a 
large extent representative of their less articulate 
countrymen. The activities of Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, a 
Muslim League leader though not an uncritical admirer of 
Jinnah, are also worth noting. His concept of 
'Islamistan', his attempt to make it a reality, and the 
controversy thereby aroused throw interesting light on 
the climate of opinion existing in the years immediately 
following Partition. The Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami (World 
Muslim Congress) which also had ideals of Islamic unity, 
was established in 1949. It too made a considerable
1
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contribution to thinking on Pakistan's role in the world. 
This was the heyday of the Pan-Islamists (though they 
dislike this term). They and their ideas still exist in 
Pakistan, but both have lost much of their impetus.
2. Absence of a Coherent Foreign Policy
There were a number of reasons why the men who led 
the Muslim League had not really considered the kind of 
foreign policy they would follow in an independent state, 
perhaps the most important being that until 1940 the 
creation of a separate Muslim state did not become their 
official objective. Only in June 1947 was this objective 
achieved, and the form of the new state decided. In the 
meantime their energy had been totally absorbed by the 
internal struggle for Partition, a dual struggle against 
the Indian National Congress on one hand and the British 
on the other. As a result the Muslim League leaders 
acquired a deep suspicion of the Congress, which later 
became the Indian Government. There emerged also a 
tendency on the part of the League to look to the British 
for support against the Congress, although Mountbatten's 
apparent preference for the Congress and its leaders, 
and Radcliffe's decisions on Pakistan's boundaries with 
India, caused a deterioration in the relationship 
between Britain and Pakistan.
The Muslim League was also at a disadvantage in not 
having a 'foreign policy man' in the sense that Congress 
had Nehru. While Nehru had been vitally interested in 
world politics, and in the role India would fill after
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independence, neither Jinnah nor anyone else in the Muslim 
League had given the same attention to this problem as it 
concerned Pakistan. The Muslim League had needed lawyers 
rather than foreign policy theorists, and the field was 
therefore left open to the sentimental Pan-Islamists.
Nehru, of course, had had the advantage that, from the 
beginning, he could be reasonably certain that there 
would one day be an independent India.
As there had been no time to consider possible foreign 
policy for an independent Pakistan before August 1947, so, 
in the months immediately after, domestic issues were so 
overwhelming that there was still little time to think 
about it. The Boundary Award was not published until 
16 August 1947. The movement of refugees was accelerated, 
and communal violence broke out again. Most of the Muslim 
refugees from India flocked to Karachi, capital of the 
new Pakistan. The trickle became a flood with which the 
Pakistan Government was barely able to cope, for the 
events of Partition placed an enormous strain on the 
slight administrative resources of the new state.^ In
1
The Civil Service of Pakistan was formed by 157 officers 
of the Indian Civil Service, 36 of whom were British, who 
came to Pakistan at the time of Partition. Ralph 
Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan (Duke 
University Press: Durham, N.C., 1966), p.97. Of these, 
only one had the rank of Joint Secretary, and half a 
dozen the rank of Deputy Secretary. Statement by Liaquat 
Ali Khan, 6 March 1948, Government of Pakistan,
Constituent Assembly (Legislature) Debates, 1948, vol.I, 
p.279. (In future referred to as CA(L)D.)
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addition the Pakistan Government was faced with the 
problem of extending control into the frontier areas, 
and it was not until March 1948 that the Khan of Kalat 
was persuaded to accede to Pakistan.
3. Lack of Experienced Diplomats
Both India and Pakistan, after Independence, suffered 
from a lack of trained personnel capable of filling the 
diplomatic posts necessary, although India was a little 
better off in this respect. The Foreign Political 
Department had, until 1946, been concerned with the conduct 
of relations with the Princely States within India, and 
with the Gulf States, as well as the administration of 
special areas in the North-West Frontier Province and 
Baluchistan. After 1946 there were representatives in the 
UK, Ceylon, South Africa, Australia, Burma and Malaya.
There were Indians employed in the British Embassy in 
Iran and in Afghanistan, and there was an Agent-General 
in China. India had sent a delegation to the League of 
Nations, and was represented at the San Francisco 
conference in 1945. Of these representatives, the 
majority were Hindus, Sir Muhammed Zafrulla Khan and 
Malik Firoz Khan Noon being the notable Muslim exceptions.
Immediately after Partition, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Commonwealth Relations was set up, the 
portfolio in the hands of the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali 
Khan. In December Zafrulla Khan took over from Liaquat.
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The Ministry was housed in temporary accommodation in 
Karachi, and served by nine or ten diplomatic officers. 
Posts set up abroad before Partition were retained by 
the government of India, and Pakistan had to set about 
establishing diplomatic relations and opening offices 
of its own.'*’
Almost immediately representatives were appointed 
to New Delhi, London, Washington, Kabul, Cairo and 
Teheran. The Charge d'Affaires in Cairo was one of the 
few officials with previous experience, having been 
Indian Trade Commissioner in Egypt from 1945. In April 
1948 Ambassadors were appointed to Egypt and Iran. 
Representatives of Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, 
Syria and Jordan were appointed to Karachi. These 
appointments were made on an ad hoc basis.
Not until November 1948 did the Pakistan Government
announce its decision to establish the Pakistan Foreign
Service. Its members were to be drawn from both Central
and Provincial Services, from the armed forces and the
public. Of the 85 posts advertised, 56 had been filled
2by March 1951. Although the intention was that
1
Partition Proceedings, Vol.III. Expert Committees 
Nos.III-IX, (Government of India Press: New Delhi, 
1948). Report of the Expert Committee on Foreign 
Relations, p.209.
CA(L)D, 1951, vol.I, 27 March 1951, p.450.
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diplomatic personnel should be drawn as far as possible 
from this source, the government reserved the right to 
make appointments 'from public life' until sufficient 
career officers were available to fill senior positions.^
Despite the steps taken to formalise diplomatic 
appointments, the difficulty of setting up an adequate 
service remained. No Ambassador could be found to fill 
the post at Ankara until April 1949. The man eventually 
chosen, Mian Bashir Ahmed, a member of the Muslim League 
Working Committee, was described as a writer, poet and 
barrister. The Ambassador in Teheran, Ghazanfar Ali 
Khan, also accredited to Baghdad, had been Pakistan's 
first Food and Agriculture Minister. Haji Abdas Sattar 
Saith, Ambassador to Egypt and Saudi Arabia concurrently, 
had a reputation as an Islamic scholar. In May 1949 
B.N. Qureshi, formerly Professor of Oriental Languages 
at Lahore University, was appointed Pakistan 
representative concurrently to Jordan, Lebanon and 
Syria.
1
Zafrulla Khan, 24 December 1948. CA(L)D, 1948, vol.
II, p.358.
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4. The Problem of Identity
Another serious problem which confronted Pakistan 
was the need to make itself known throughout the world.
In the process of Partition, an Expert Committee on 
Foreign Relations had been set up to discuss the legal 
implications of the partition of India, in terms of 
foreign relations. The most important question was that 
of 'international personality1. The Expert Committee 
immediately split into two groups, putting forward 
diametrically opposed opinions, with the result that no 
agreement could be reached.
The majority view was that, if certain parts were 
separated from the main body of India, the remainder 
would continue the international personality of India.
It was a recognised principle of international law that 
a reduction in the size of a State, so long as an essential 
part remained, would not obliterate its identity. In the 
proposed Partition of India, nearly three quarters of the 
old State would remain. The majority went on to argue 
that the British government had recognised the position 
that the Dominion of India inherited the international 
personality of British India, although in the final 
resort the issue would be decided'by appropriate 
international bodies'.
The Pakistan members of the Committee, Iskandar 
Mirza and Mohammed Ikramullah, refused to accept this 
view. They argued that on 15 August two independent
64
dominions of equal international status would come into 
existence as successors to the existing government of 
India which would disappear altogether as an entity.
This argument was reinforced by the fact that two 
governments were functioning in the country, one for 
Pakistan and one for India, with equal status. In 
addition, they claimed, the wording of the Indian 
Independence Act lent no support to the view put forward 
by their colleagues and it set out to create two 
independent Dominions out of existing India.^
They hoped, ultimately, that two new Dominions, 
Pakistan and Hindustan, would emerge from old India, 
thus at least setting both on an equal footing 
internationally from the start. Despite their efforts 
the Partition Council ultimately accepted the view of 
the majority of the Expert Committee that all 
international obligations assumed by pre-existing India 
would devolve on the Dominion of India and that Dominion 
would be entitled to the rights associated with such 
obligations. Into this category would fall India's 
membership of the United Nations.
After Partition, therefore, considerable effort had 
to be made by the Pakistan Government to gain effective
1
Partition Proceedings, Report of Expert Committee on 
Foreign Relations, pp.203-6.
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recognition. The name itself was unfamiliar to people. 
Pakistanis tended to feel that the world regarded their 
country as a theocratic, breakaway state. The need to 
negotiate new treaties and agreements, and set up new 
diplomatic missions, put Pakistan diplomatically behind 
India. This was of particular importance in the light 
of the almost immediate dispute with India over Kashmir.
The problems created for Pakistan by the decision 
of the Partition Council were accentuated by the 
personality of the Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, 
who was determined that India should claim a central 
role in international politics, particularly with regard 
to Asia. With this in mind he was instrumental in 
organising the first Asian Relations Conference in New 
Delhi in March 1947. It was first intended that the 
Conference should be restricted to Southeast Asia, but 
finally 'it was decided to send invitations to all Asian 
countries (and to Egypt which is so closely allied to 
the Middle East countries in culture and general economic 
and political development) oji the ground that 
psychologically this would have a more profound effect....'
1
Asian Relations, being the Report of the Proceedings 
and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, 
New Delhi, March-April, 1947 (Asian Relations Organization: 
New Delhi, India, 1948), p.4.
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Delegates included representatives of cultural 
associations, individual scholars and some government 
observers.
In his inaugural address to the Conference, Nehru
expressed his belief regarding the role India was to
play in the region:
The old imperialisms are fading away. The 
land routes have revived and air travel suddenly 
brings us very near to one another. This 
Conference itself is significant as an expression 
of that deeper urge of the mind and spirit of 
Asia which has persisted in spite of the 
isolationism which grew up during the years of 
European domination. As that domination goes, 
the walls that surround us fall down and we 
look at one another again and meet as old friends 
parted.
In this Conference and in this work there 
are no leaders and no followers. All countries 
of Asia have to meet together on an equal basis
1
Delegations attended from Afghanistan, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, Cochin China, Laos, 
Ceylon, China, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, 
Kirghizia, Korea, Malaya, Mongolia, Nepal, Palestine Jewish 
Delegation, Philippines, Siam, Tadjikistan, Tibet, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam, and observers from 
the Arab League, Australian Institute of International 
Affairs, the Australian Institute of Political Science, 
the India Institute (London), the Institute of Pacific 
Relations (Moscow), Institute of Pacific Relations (New 
York), Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), 
and the United Nations.
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in a common task and endeavour. It is fitting that 
India should play her part in this new phase of 
Asian development. Apart from the fact that India 
herself is emerging into freedom and independence 
she is the natural centre and focal point of the 
many forces at work in Asia. Geography is a 
compelling factor and geographically she is so 
situated as to be the meeting point of Western and 
Northern and Eastern and Southeast-Asia.... There 
you will find magnificent evidence of the vitality 
of India's culture which spread out and influenced 
vast numbers of people.1
The Muslim League was significantly absent from the 
Conference. Jinnah's calculation was that if the Muslim 
League were to send a representative, this might be 
construed, since he would be part of the Indian delegation, 
as acceptance of India as one nation, and might at a 
later date jeopardise the creation of Pakistan. The 
effect of this decision was to leave the field open for 
India to make the first diplomatic moves. The Conference 
undoubtedly gained for Nehru much prestige, and wide 
acceptance of India as central to the Asian scene. An 
opportunity to lobby among the countries of the Middle 
East and the rest of Asia had been lost to the Muslims 
and, as it turned out, to Pakistan. It seems, according 
to those close to Jinnah at the time, that not only did 
he refuse to participate, he took special care to ignore 
the Conference completely. There were no unofficial 
contacts.
Asian Relations Conference Report, pp.20-7.
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Another advantage which India gained over Pakistan, 
small, but irritating to Pakistanis, was its ability to 
appoint Indian Muslim Ambassadors to Muslim countries: 
Syed Ali Zaheer, a Shi'i Muslim, was appointed Ambassador 
to Iran in October 1947 and Dr Syed Hossain was appointed 
to Egypt. This was a valuable initial propaganda 
advantage in the projection of the image of India as a 
secular state, and a reminder that there remained a 
significant group of Muslims (about 35 million) within 
India.
India's relative diplomatic effort in the Middle 
East has sometimes been overestimated. By 1952 Pakistan 
was represented by seven envoys in nine posts (out of 
a total of 30): two Ambassadors, two Ministers (one of 
whom was accredited to three capitals) and three Charges 
d'Affaires. At the same time India had five envoys in 
eight posts (out of a total of 48): three Ambassadors, 
one of whom was accredited in four capitals, and a 
Minister. In terms of the number of posts, Pakistan 
gave proportionally more weight to the Middle East than 
India, but it should be noted that India's Ambassador 
in Cairo (Amman, Beirut and Damascus) was Sardar K.M. 
Pannikar, a man of considerable status and capacity.^
1
See The Statesman's Year-Book 1953,- (Macmillan: London, 
1953).
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Much concern was expressed in Pakistan regarding 
Indian propaganda in neighbouring Muslim countries, and 
many questions were asked in the Constituent Assembly 
about counter measures taken by the Government. A Press 
Attache had been appointed in Cairo, and in December
1948 it was announced that the Government hoped to send 
Press Attaches soon to Ankara, Teheran and Kabul.'*' A
similar announcement was made on 7 March 1949 - the
. . 2 officials had apparently not been appointed. Attempts
were made to overcome the difficulties which arose from
a shortage of available personnel by the formation of
Cultural Associations, each of which received a subsidy
3of 1,000 rupees a year from the Pakistan Government. 
Arrangements were made for Iranian, Egyptian, Syrian 
and Turkish students to take up scholarships in Pakistan,
1
Khwaja Shahabuddin, 21 December 1948. CA(L)D, 1948, 
vol.II, p.210.
2
Khwaja Shahabuddin, 7 March 1949. Ibid., 1949, 
vol.I, pp.466-7.
3
These were the Pakistan-Iran, Pakistan-Turkey, 
Pakistan-Afghanistan and Pakistan-Arab Cultural 
Associations. It is significant that it was not thought 
necessary to differentiate among the Arab countries. 
(Statement by Fazlur Rahman, 18 December 1948. Ibid., 
1948, vol.II, pp.106-7.)
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and in return Pakistani students were to be sent to these
countries. There were also exchanges of delegations of
journalists/ writers and academics from Egypt, Turkey
and Iran.'*' By the end of 1950 broadcasts were being
made by Radio Pakistan in Arabic, Persian, Pushtu, and
arrangements were under way for similar broadcasts in
Turkish. A publicity organisation in Karachi was issuing
2magazines and pamphlets in Arabic, Persian and Pushtu.
At the same time Pakistan had trade representatives in
3Teheran, Baghdad and Jiddah.
5. Economic and Strategic Problems
The economic and strategic problems facing Pakistan 
were as important in conditioning the emerging foreign 
policy as the ideological climate. In fact, in the long 
run, they have probably proved stronger. The most 
striking of these problems was the division of the country 
into two wings, separated by India. The west wing, 
comprising North-West Frontier Province, Sind, Baluchistan 
and the divided Punjab, accounted for approximately
1
Mahmud Hussain, 20 March 1950. Ibid., 1950, vol.I, 
pp.190-2 .
2
Khwaja Shahabuddin, 24 November 1950. Ibid., 1950, 
vol.II, p.712.
3
Statement, 11 October 1950. Ibid., 1950, vol.II, 
p.410.
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85 per cent of the area and only 45 per cent of the 
population.^  While the east wing (East Bengal) was and 
has remained the major export producer, both East and 
West Pakistan were at a disadvantage following Partition, 
in terms of industrial development. There was no major 
urban centre in either wing. Dacca and Chittagong in 
the east, and Karachi and Lahore in the west, had to be 
quickly built up. The new capital, Karachi, previously 
capital of Sind and a fishing town with a population of 
about 300,000, had difficulty in immediately accommodating 
the necessary administrative apparatus to run a country. 
Karachi port was inadequate to handle the shipping which 
of necessity came there when previously it would have 
gone to Bombay.
Communications between the two wings were almost
non-existent and rail communication depended to a large
extent on the goodwill of India. In 1947 Pakistan's
merchant navy consisted of three vessels with a total
2tonnage of 18,267. Air communication was no better.
In 1947-8 there were 'one or two usable airfields and 
some landing strips built for wartime use.' Two private
1
According to preliminary 1951 census figures, quoted 
by The Statesman's Year-Book, 1952.
2
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Pakistan 
Basic Facts, 1964-1965, Fourth Edition, Islamabad.
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airlines between them had twenty DC3's and 5 Convairs, 
and a Super Constellation which had been leased for 
longer flights. They linked less than half a dozen 
towns. ^
In addition to the economic problems, partly 
created by Partition, partly common to the rest of the 
underdeveloped world, Pakistan had a number of strategic 
and defence problems. Some of these arose from Partition, 
but many were inherited from undivided India. The old 
India Army had to be divided between the two new 
Dominions, a necessity raising enormous difficulties.
The decision was made to divide it on territorial 
rather than communal lines, but steps were taken to 
ensure that Muslim units were transferred, before 
Partition, to areas which would be in Pakistan. Although 
the division was not as disastrous to the efficiency of 
the fighting units as had been expected, it was some time 
before they could be properly equipped. An additional 
Pakistani grievance was the claim that India had refused 
to hand over defence supplies to which Pakistan was 
entitled. The fact that it was left without ordnance 
factories and that India retained the major training
1
M. Aftab Khan, 'Vital Links', Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 16 June 1966. Supplement, 'Airlines of Asia'.
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colleges presented further problems which had somehow
1to be overcome.
Defence was doubly complicated by the separation
of East and West Pakistan. The Pakistan Navy was hardly
better off than the merchant fleet. It received two
destroyers from the Royal Navy in 1949 and another in
1951. According to 1953 figures, there were in addition
four frigates, four fleet minesweepers, two trawlers,
two motor minesweepers, motor launches and a fleet
2replenishment ship. The three merchant vessels were
thus no doubt adequately protected, but could not be said
to provide proper inter-wing communication. The Pakistan
Air Force, established in August 1947, retained one
transport squadron, and two of the nine fighter squadrons
belonging to the old Royal Indian Air Force. Pakistan had
a slight advantage over India in that most of the
pre-Partition training establishments and permanent
stations, including the only repair and maintenance
3workshop, were located in Pakistan. The atmosphere of
1
Maj-Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan 
Army (OUP: Pakistan (Lahore), 1963), especially Ch.III.
2
The Statesman's Year-Book, 1953.
3
Lorne J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security; Defence 
Policies, 1947-1965 (University of California Press: 
Berkeley, 1967), p.102, n.l.
74
hostility which quickly developed with India regarding 
Kashmir necessitated the concentration of forces in West 
Pakistan, leaving Bengalis feeling vulnerable to possible 
Indian reprisals for action taken in Kashmir. In the 
west, Pakistan inherited the North-West Frontier Province 
and the related problem of defence of the 'traditional 
invasion route' to the subcontinent. Although the 
relationship of the Pakistan government with the frontier 
tribes was somewhat better than that enjoyed by the 
British, increasingly bad relations with Afghanistan 
meant that West Pakistan was situated between two 
sensitive frontiers. There was also an awareness in 
Pakistan of the huge bulk of Russia, engaged in an 
unforgotten quest for a warm water port'*' and particularly 
menacing to the countries along its southern borders in 
the years following the Second World War. The 
suitability for Russian purposes of Karachi could not
1
For reference to 'the time honoured aspirations of 
Russia' with regard to Turkey and the Straits, see 
Aide-Memoire from Russian Foreign Minister to British 
and French Ambassadors at Petrograd, 19 February/4 March 
1915, in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle 
East. A Documentary Record: 1914-1956, vol.II (D. Van 
Nostrand: New York, 1956), p.7. These ambitions were 
referred to again by the Russian government in 1940 
and 1945. See Harry N. Howard, 'The Development of 
United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951', 
Department of State Bulletin, 19 November 1951, p.810.
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be ignored and Pakistan became aware of the need to 
associate itself, for strength, with other nations, and 
its first thought was of a Muslim bloc, which would take 
a neutral position between East and West, giving mutual 
assistance in economic and defence matters. It seemed, 
just after Partition, that economic and defence needs 
coincided with ideological inclination. The efforts 
made by Pakistan to forge such a bloc and the gradual 
modification of this policy into acceptance of the 
pro-Western Baghdad Pact will be discussed in a later 
chapter.
6. The Views of Iqbal and Jinnah
Apart from economic and strategic considerations,
which largely set the limits of foreign policy in the
early years, the thinking of men like Iqbal and Jinnah
on international questions also had an important though
not very positive effect.
Iqbal bewilders us by the complexity and the 
many-sidedness of his genius. To get a 
glimpse of the pattern of mind and being 
that underlay the phenomenon that was Iqbal 
one has to study him closely. Only then one 
can realise the great miracle he has worked: 
he has moulded the minds of the present 
generation of Pakistanis.^
1
S.A. Vaqid, Introduction to Iqbal (Pakistan 
Publications: Karachi (n.d.)), p.14.
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Certainly it is true that whatever their political
beliefs and objectives, whether they are orthodox
Muslims or modernists with more or less secular views,
most Pakistanis are able to find a quotation from Iqbal
to support their arguments. A philosopher-poet rather
than a politician, Iqbal was concerned with the fate of
Islam not only in the Indian subcontinent but throughout
the world. In the twentieth century he discussed the
problem of the decline of Islam and the Islamic world
taken up by al-Afghani in the nineteenth century.
Iqbal's writing on the Middle East reflects this concern.
He was aware of the need for what he called the
reconstruction of religious thought in Islam, but was
at the same time distrustful of Westernisation and
liberalism. He admired the revolution wrought by
Ataturk in Turkey, although with some reservations:
The truth is that among the Muslim nations of 
today, Turkey alone has shaken off its 
dogmatic slumber, and attained to self- 
consciousness. She alone has claimed her 
right of intellectual freedom; she alone 
has passed from the ideal to the real - a 
transition which entails keen intellectual 
and moral struggle.^
While he was in favour of some rethinking of Islam, he
was by no means a modernist, and although he approved
1
Sir Muhammed Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious 
Thought in Islam (Sh. Muhammad Ashraf: Lahore, reprinted 
1962), Ch.6, p.162.
of much that was being done in Turkey, he believed that 
the proper means of reconstruction was 'by healthy 
conservative criticism' to exert 'a check on the rapid 
movement of liberalism in the world of I s l a m . H e  
disapproved of the secular policy of the nationalists 
who were determined to keep politics and religion 
separate. The idea of separation of Church and State, 
he argued, had been adopted from the history of European 
political ideas, and was misleading because this dualism 
did not exist in Islam.
When many Indian Muslims were taken aback, even
seriously disillusioned with the Turkish Republic after
the abolition of the Caliphate, Iqbal was able to
overcome these objections. He upheld the concept of
2the right of Ijtihad and supported the exercise of this
right by the Turks:
Let us now see how the Grand National Assembly 
has exercised this power of Ijtihad in regard 
to the Khilafat. According to Sunni Law the 
appointment of an Imam or Khalifa is absolutely 
indispensable. The first question that arises 
in this connexion is this - Should the 
Caliphate be vested in a single person?
Turkey's Ij tihad is that according to the spirit 
of Islam the Caliphate or Imamate can be vested 
in a body of persons, or an elected Assembly.
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1
Ibid., p .153.
2
Ijtihad means independent judgment in a legal or 
theological question, based on interpretation of the law.
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The religious doctors of Islam in Egypt and 
India, so far as I know have not yet 
expressed themselves on this point.
Personally I believe the Turkish view is 
perfectly sound.1
To those who objected that the Caliphate was a
necessity for the unity of Islam, he replied that the
universal Imamate was no longer a workable idea, once
the Empire of Islam had broken up and been replaced by
several independent states.
Far from serving any useful purpose it has 
really stood in the way of a reunion of 
independent Muslim States. Persia has stood 
aloof from the Turks in view of her doctrinal 
differences regarding the Khilafat; Morocco 
has always looked askance at them, and 
Arabia has cherished private ambition.... 2
Iqbal is thus revealed as a supporter of Muslim
unity, though not in the traditional sense. According
to his view, each Muslim state should 'sink into her
own deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself
alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a
living family of republics.' He added:
It seems to me that God is slowly bringing 
home to us the truth that Islam "is neither 
Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League 
of Nations which recognizes artificial
1
Iqbal, Reconstruction, p.157.
Ibid., p .158.
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boundaries and racial distinctions for 
facility of reference only, and not for 
restricting the social horizon of its 
members.^
He envisaged a vague spiritual unity, to be achieved 
some time in the future. He is not specific as to how 
it will be reached, except to rule out Imperialism, as 
attempted by Ottoman Turkey, and Nationalism as advocated 
by the Arabs.
What was to be Pakistan's role in this? He gave a
hint in his presidential address to the Allahabad
session of the Muslim League in 1930, in which he first
put forward the proposal for partition of the subcontinent:
I therefore demand the formation of a 
consolidated Muslim State in the best interests 
of India and Islam. For India it means security 
and peace resulting from an internal balance 
of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid 
itself of the stamp that Arabian imperialism 
was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, 
its education, its culture, and to bring them 
into closer contact with its own original 
spirit and with the spirit of modern times.^
Iqbal appears to have had in mind some messianic 
role for the newly created Muslim State, a view which 
was later taken up by many Pakistanis and extended until
1
Ibid., p .159.
Cited Vaqid, Introduction, p.46.
2
80
it amounted to a claim by Pakistan for the leadership of 
the Muslim world, a claim which did not help to enhance 
its popularity in the Arab Middle East during the early 
years of its existence. It is difficult, however, to 
build up any firm picture of Iqbal's views on the possible 
future relationships of Pakistan in the world in general 
and the Middle East in particular from these scattered 
references. His concern was only marginal, and he died 
before the prospect of Pakistan became a reality. Yet 
his close relationship with the Muslim League leaders 
suggests that he would not have been much at odds with 
the early policy which advocated a third Muslim bloc, 
independent of both the capitalist West and communist 
East, neither of which, it was asserted, had very much 
to give Islam, which in essence represented the hope of 
the world. It is doubtful whether he would have been a 
supporter of Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman's 'Islamistan' 
project,"*" but his statement that 'for the present every 
Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper self' until 
such time as all were strong and powerful, is perhaps 
an indication that he would have been among those who 
found Chaudhri Saheb's efforts premature and embarrassing.
See pp.90-7 below.
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If Iqbal is regarded as having provided much of the 
inspiration for Pakistan, Jinnah holds a special place 
as father of the nation, as Quaid-i-Azam or 'Great Leader 
It is probably fair to say that he was responsible for 
the formation of Pakistan's early foreign policy, as he 
was responsible for so much else. It is certain that 
he tended to dominate his colleagues.
In many ways it is difficult to discover much 
about Jinnah. Although numerous biographies have been 
written, these are frequently of a sentimental nature, 
whether written by Pakistanis or by foreigners, and they 
tend to conclude with the achievement of Pakistan, with 
only a short postscript dealing with the vital 12 months 
of his Governor-Generalship. His own papers remained 
in the hands of his sister, Miss Fatima Jinnah, until 
her death in 1967, after which they were quickly seized 
by the Government of Pakistan, and are as yet unpublished 
Successive governments have assiduously worked at 
building up the legend of the 'Quaid-i-Azam' and not 
until the last two or three years, in fact, has even 
the mildest criticism of Jinnah, his personality or his 
decisions, been permissible. It is difficult therefore 
to make a fair assessment of the man or his policy, 
particularly with regard to independent Pakistan. If 
he had any firm views on foreign policy they are hard 
to trace, except as they appear through Muslim League
82
Resolutions which, at least after 1935, may be regarded 
as a reflection of his opinions. Those Resolutions 
containing any reference to foreign affairs are 
comparatively rare, and almost without exception refer 
to Palestine. It is said that the only issue on which 
he had any strong views was that of Palestine and he is 
reported to have given support in July 1946 to the 
suggestion that an 'All-Orient Pro-Palestine Conference' 
be held in India.'*'
Despite his boycott of the First Asian Relations 
Conference in March 1947, and the propaganda opportunities 
thereby lost, Jinnah had, however, made contact with some 
Middle Eastern leaders, especially those of Egypt, when 
he and Liaquat visited Cairo and Basra in December 1946.
In Cairo Jinnah explained the demand for Pakistan, 
saying: 'It is only when Pakistan is established that 
we [Indian Muslims and Egyptians] should be really free, 
otherwise there will be the menace of Hindu imperialist 
Raj spreading its tentacles right across the Middle East.'
These episodes do not amount to a detailed and 
coherent foreign policy, and Jinnah's few public 
statements on this subject before Partition were couched 
in general terms.
1
Ahmed, Pakistan and the Middle East, p.167.
2
Ibid., p .174.
In reply to questions at a press conference in Delhi 
in May 1947 he said: 'The foreign policy of Pakistan can 
only be for peace and friendly relations with all other 
nations, and we shall certainly play our part in 
membership of the United Nations'. He also envisaged a 
relationship between Pakistan and Britain which would 'be 
really beneficial to both', but refused to make any explicit 
statement on the form this relationship might take.
On possible relations with other Muslim countries he 
made no comment, except to repudiate any suggestion that 
he envisaged a Pan-Islamic state 1 stretching from the Near 
and Middle East to the Far East after the establishment of 
Pakistan'.^  Whatever he may have thought about Pakistan's 
more immediate role in the Middle East was not revealed.
His statements as Governor-General were not frequent.
During most of the year his health was seriously failing, 
his attention taken up with domestic matters and with the 
dispute with India over Kashmir. His public appearances 
became fewer, and he eventually died in September 1948, 
leaving the government in the hands of his Prime Minister, 
Liaquat Ali Khan, and the Governor-Generalship to the 
then Premier of East Bengal, Khwaja Nazimuddin.
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7. Liaquat and Nazimuddin and the Concept of a Muslim
Bloc
During this period there developed in Pakistan, 
among intellectuals, officials and political leaders, 
the concept of a Muslim bloc standing between the 
Communist powers and the West. On one hand a manifestation 
of the overflow of the 'two nation' theory into foreign 
policy, satisfying a deep emotional leaning towards the 
idea of Pan-Islam and therefore commanding wide support, 
it was on the other hand a response to the feeling that 
the nations of the West, both in the United Nations and 
the Commonwealth, had not been particularly sympathetic 
to Pakistan's international aspirations, while communism 
was a philosophy repugnant to most Muslims. In 
international terms the solution to Pakistan's problem 
appeared to be an independent Muslim bloc.
Although the idea was generally favourably regarded, 
there were many ideas on just how this 'bloc' should be 
formed. Some saw it as a formal alliance, some as a kind 
of 'League of Nations', but for most people it represented 
simply an attempt to coordinate policy among nations with 
a common spiritual and cultural link. Liaquat Ali Khan 
probably falls into this last category. Westernised, 
politically acute, his main object was to strengthen
vPakistan's position in the world vis-a-vis India.
Pakistan should have friendly relations with all countries, 
but Liaquat saw the internal political appeal, and probably
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the diplomatic value, of fostering closer relations with 
the neighbouring Muslim countries. He certainly made 
strenuous efforts in this regard. The emphasis remained 
however on the vague objective of 'fostering better 
relations', until 1951 when, in his 'Id al-Fitr address, 
he asked:
If the Western Democracies can enter into 
pacts to protect their way of life, if the 
Communist countries can form a bloc on the 
basis that they have an ideology, why 
cannot the Muslim peoples get together to 
protect themselves...?
So far we have only been showing 
sympathy to each other by passing resolutions 
or issuing statements, but the time has come 
when we must get closer together and jointly 
play our part in the councils of the world 
if we want to survive. There are different 
types of imperialisms raising their ugly 
heads. We must unite to defeat their evil 
designs....1
This veiled reference to India, and the stronger view 
on Muslim unity, arose from Liaquat's conclusion that no 
effective support for Pakistan could be expected from 
either the United Nations or the Commonwealth, the two 
bodies on which Pakistani leaders had initially pinned 
their hopes.
1
Liaquat's 'Id al-Fitr Address, 6 July 1951. The Islamic 
Review, September 1951.
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Most Pakistanis rejected the use of the term
1 Pan-Islamism1 as a Western invention which was designed
to arouse suspicion of Pakistani intentions among its
neighbours. Despite Jinnah's declaration that the theory
of Pan-Islamism had long ago been exploded,'*' it was
argued that the 'lie' (about Pakistan's Pan-Islamic
ambitions) was being repeated with a view to creating
a gulf between Pakistan and other Muslim states looking
to a nationalist regeneration of the Middle East rather
. 2than a religious union.
Statements in the British press from time to time
describing Pakistan as a potential leader of the Islamic
3world did contribute to this suspicion, and efforts
were made by Pakistani officials to alter this impression.
A spokesman for Liaquat Ali Khan said, in May 1949,
'Pakistan also makes it clear that she is not striving
for leadership of the Muslim countries but would welcome
4greater cohesion among them.' In December 1949 the 
Pakistan Ambassador to Egypt said that Pakistan was not
1
Jinnah, Press Conference 21 May 1947. The Times, 
22 May 1947.
2
Ahmed, Pakistan and the Middle East, p.208.
3
The Economist, 23 July and 30 July 1947.
4
Dawn, 11 May 1949.
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running for leadership but was willing to serve wherever 
and whenever she could."*" Nevertheless, the activities 
and writings of a number of people in Pakistan, and the 
actions of the government in giving them support, tacit 
or otherwise, only affirmed the feeling that if Pakistan 
was not striving for leadership, this was counted its 
automatic possession. In the years following Independence 
Pakistan initiated two World Muslim Congresses, both of 
which were held in Karachi. It was the founder of the 
International Islamic Economic Organization, in which 
the Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammed, was the dominant 
figure.
If Liaquat displayed, for the most part, a reserve 
towards the more extravagant expressions of Islamic 
solidarity, Khwaja Nazimuddin was one of its more 
enthusiastic supporters. As Liaquat was westernised, so 
Nazimuddin was a strictly orthodox Muslim, both in 
appearance and in practice. His attachment to the idea 
of Islamic unity was not only a matter of policy, it was 
a primary conviction. As Governor-General he gave his 
support to such bodies as the Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami.
When Liaquat was assassinated in October 1951, Nazimuddin 
became Prime Minister. He carried on with enthusiasm the 
policy which his predecessor had only a short time before 
begun to pursue with conviction.
1
The Pakistan Times, 15 December 1949.
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Nazimuddin was perhaps representative of a broad 
strand of opinion existing in Pakistan at the time.
Numerous statements by religious leaders, journalists 
and academics were reported in the press describing the 
creation of Pakistan as an event hailed throughout the Muslim 
world, a great victory and a symbol of Islamic regeneration. 
They tended to create within Pakistan a false impression of 
the degree of Islamic consciousness which existed outside 
the country. The nationalist Arabs and the secular Turks 
looked askance at this ebullient addition to the community 
of nations.
Two examples of the writing which appeared in Pakistan 
at the time are M. Ahmed's Pakistan and the Middle East, 
quoted above, published in 1948 and perhaps the first book 
dealing with Pakistan's place in the Middle East, and 
Whither Pakistan? by Z.A. Suleri. Ahmed, a civil servant, 
did not continue to write, but Z.A. Suleri is today a 
prominent journalist.
Ahmed swayed between confidence and despondency in
his discussion of the prospects of Islamic unity. He
saw the need for 'some common written agreement' binding
both Arab and non-Arab Muslims, perhaps an extension of
2the Arab League. While recognising and regretting the
1
Referred to above, p.57, n.2.
2
Ahmed, Pakistan and the Middle East, p.211.
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differences existing between Muslim countries, he 
optimistically (and mistakenly, as it turned out) 
predicted that with the disappearance of the older 
generation of politicians, many of whom were 'trained 
in clan leadership, blood feuds and treated politics 
as a matter of personal deeds and personal alliances', 
these differences would be overcome, for 'the younger 
generation of political leaders, drawn chiefly from 
the graduates of Cairo and Beirut are far more nationalist 
than their elders' and consider 'the Arab League as the 
authentic answer to their long held and mounting desire 
for the unification of the Muslim States....'
Suleri also supported the idea of an Islamic bloc, 
which would take a neutral position between the two world 
power blocs. He maintained that a Muslim bloc, 'natural
under any circumstances', became urgent 'in the light of
. . 2 anti-Islamic policies followed by the power groups.'
The United Nations had a Western bias; only when united
could the Muslim states influence its deliberations.
He referred in this connection to the recent vote to
partition Palestine, though overlooking the fact that,
on that occasion, the Muslim states even united were
too few to be effective. The Muslim governments, Suleri
1
Ibid., p .205.
2
Suleri, Whither Pakistan?, p.83.
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argued, should institute some consultative machinery and
Pakistan should take the lead in helping to channel
emotional unity into 'mechanical and constitutional
forms.' There should be cultural exchanges and the
Pakistan government should again take the lead in
'constituting a study group on the economic resources of
all the Muslim countries.' The aim should be to avoid
becoming economically dependent on the United States,
the United Kingdom or 'any other country'. In this
regard he reminded his readers of the strategic value
to the countries of the Middle East of their oil
1reserves.
8. Chaudhri Khalicfuzzaman' s ' Islamistan' Project
While people like Ahmed and Suleri were content to 
write, others such as Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman took more 
direct action. From February 1949 Khaliquzzaman held 
the office of President of the Pakistan Muslim League.
He began to promote his idea of Islamistan, in October
1948, when he expressed his intention of making a tour 
of the Middle East after the Muslim League elections 
'with a view to sounding public opinion for the formation 
of a world Muslim League representing all Muslim 
countries.' Such an organisation, he insisted, would
1
Ibid., p .84. Suleri's arguments are an illustration 
of the kind of statement which helped to make Pakistan 
suspect in the Middle East.
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be useless unless it had a 'genuine peoples' sanction 
behind it.'^
Following his election to the presidency of the
Muslim League, he again referred to his plan. He said
he had discussed it with the delegates to the Fifth
World Muslim Congress held in Karachi in February 1949,
and received a sympathetic response. He would make the
tour with the object of spreading his idea through
personal contacts. He would not take it to government
2level unless Muslim peoples gave it support.
It is not clear to what extent if at all he had
the support of the Pakistan Government. While they
dissociated themselves from his project, it seems they
were content to let him test the atmosphere, to await
the reception of his plan, without committing Pakistan
officially one way or the other. Khaliquzzaman himself
believed that Liaquat considered the Islamistan project
too ambitious and, knowing he would fail, made no attempt
3to oppose the tour. At the same time, Khaliquzzaman's 
position as President of the Muslim League, at that time 
the governing party, lent a degree of official sanction
1
Dawn, 10 October 1948.
2
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to his efforts which the Government subsequently found 
embarrassing.
He set out in September 1949, visiting Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia (for Haj) and Egypt, 
continuing his journey to London. Despite his 
insistence that this should be an appeal to people and 
not to governments, his approach in all capitals was at 
a high official level. Khaliquzzaman told reporters that 
he had received a generally favourable response, but that 
it would take time to work out the details. He was 
concentrating on 'selling the idea' of Islamistan,
'leaving it to the governments concerned to find the 
means of achieving it.' He believed that the proposed 
Arab Security Pact, which he discussed with Egyptian 
leaders, paved the way for a larger regional grouping 
including Turkey and Pakistan."*"
He was apparently becoming more ambitious as his
tour progressed, and from Egypt he went on to London
where he said:
I am not here as a propagandist, but as a 
negotiator. I am here to find out the British 
Government's reaction towards a grouping of 
Middle Eastern countries, that is, the Arab 
States, Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.2
1
Dawn, 4, 8, 14, 29 and 30 October 1949.
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There is no record of his conversations with British 
officials. No doubt the British were wary of this 
self-appointed ambassador. At the same time there was 
probably some interest in the idea and in the reactions 
of the Middle East countries. There was at this time a 
Soviet propaganda offensive, particularly in Iran, and 
it was a time during which the British at least were 
anxious to establish some defence plan or organisation 
in the region. Khaliquzzaman reported that, though they 
had favoured the Arab League, they appeared dubious about 
an organisation uniting all Muslim countries.'*’
Meanwhile, his activities had aroused apprehension 
in Pakistan. Dawn, close to the Government, expressed 
criticism of Khaliquzzaman's enthusiasm in an editorial 
on 15 November entitled 'Caution Islamistan':
...however well intentioned Chaudhri 
Khaliquzzaman's 'Islamistan tour' might have 
been it has actually resulted in far more 
harm than good to Pakistan. He occupies at 
present the position of head of the national 
organization of the Muslims of Pakistan 
which is the party in power. Naturally his 
move would be, and to our knowledge has been, 
misconstrued as a move which has the support 
of the Muslim League as well as the 
Government. This, of course, is a mistaken 
assumption. While a general desire for 
friendship and relations of brotherly 
cooperation among all the Muslims of the 
world naturally exists, the Muslim League as
Dawn, 10 November 1949.
1
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an organization has not accepted any such 
policy as the 'Islamistan' concept developed 
into a security pact connotes: nor can the 
Government have even considered it.
The editorial concluded by suggesting that 
'Islamistan' be 'put in cold storage'. The forthcoming 
International Islamic Economic Conference in Karachi 
would be a much better way of bringing the Muslim countries 
together without creating doubt or ill-feeling anywhere.
In December 1949 the Pakistan Ambassador in Cairo 
hastened to correct any wrong impression that may have 
been made:
Pakistan is not trying to creat 'Islamistan' 
or even an 'Islamic bloc' from the countries 
between Indonesia and North Africa. The 
greatest need is to get individually strong 
and my government believes it is no use 
talking of alliances until the countries 
are strong enough.1
Regarding the rumoured alliance between Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey in which the Arab League 
would be asked to participate, he said that such an 
alliance would only create suspicion. 'What Islamic 
countries need is solidarity and closer collaboration 
between them.'^
The following month the Acti-ng Foreign Minister,
Mahmud Hussain, speaking in the Constituent Assembly,
1
The Pakistan Times, 15 December 1949.
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denied any government authorisation for Khaliquzzaman to 
negotiate 'security pacts' with other Muslim countries, 
or that the government had anything at all to do with 
his mission.'*' These statements appear to indicate some 
sympathy for Khaliquzzaman's objectives, and at the same 
time the embarrassment of the government at the reactions 
to the too hasty manoeuvres which were in many quarters 
outside Pakistan not only unwelcome but strongly 
objected to.
Afghanistan and India both reacted sharply. The
Afghan view was that such an idea was not only untenable
but un-Islamic, and that India had a better claim than
Pakistan to leadership of the Muslim world on the basis
2of her support for Indonesian independence. Nehru also
condemned the proposal: 'I do not appreciate grouping
based on religion. Cultural bonds can be exchanged but
politics based on religion can be of no help at all and
3spell no peaceful aims.' Apart from this predictably 
negative reaction, it appears, despite the favourable 
reports sent back to Karachi by Dawn1s enthusiastic 
correspondents, that Khaliquzzaman's proposals were
1
Mahmud Hussain, 9 January 1950. CA(L)D, 1949-50, 
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received with coolness. He himself has commented, many
years after the event, that while the Shah's views were
encouraging, Nuri es-Said of Iraq (although he did not
differ in principle from Khaliquzzaman's idea) was
inclined towards 'a more co-ordinated and smaller group.'
The Syrian government 'did not show any special liking'
for the idea. King Abdullah of Jordan had his own
worries about the Palestine problem and, while sympathetic,
considered the idea premature. In Mecca there was more
support, though it seems not at the highest level, and
in Egypt again there was disappointment. Here, of
course, the question of Palestine was discussed at great
length, both with the Egyptian Prime Minister and the
Secretary-General of the Arab League. According to
Khaliquzzaman, the only hope of the 'liberation' of
Palestine was through the kind of grouping he envisaged.
Much later he wrote:
I do not think the Pasha [Ibrahim Abdel Hadi 
Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister] appreciated 
my point of view and did not condescend to 
reply. That was practically the end of my 
hopes of seeing in my life-time a well-knit 
Islamic polity, for in that tour I found the 
Arab world completely unaware of world 
affairs, particularly of-Pakistan....1
His mission, he now considers, was ill-timed. Pakistan
was too new, too little known, and the governments of
1
Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, Only If They Knew It (Private 
publication: Karachi, 1966), also serialised in Mus1im 
World (organ of the Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami) 21 May -
9 July 1966.
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the Middle East were more concerned with their own 
disputes with their neighbours than with coming together 
in some kind of pact.
Following his retirement from the presidency of the 
Muslim League Khaliquzzaman attempted to found the 
Muslim Peoples' Organization. Similar in aim to the 
better organised Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami, it was not 
really successful. The attempt to set up a separate 
organisation possibly reflects the jealousy and political 
rivalry which afflicted even those with common goals.
9. The Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami
The foundations of the present Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami 
or World Muslim Congress are lost in a haze of 
post-Partition jealousy. Credit for its formation is 
claimed by the present Secretary-General, Inamullah Khan, 
and by the President of the Pakistan branch, Professor 
A.B.A. Haleem. Since the records of the organisation have 
been lost, if ever they existed, it is difficult to 
establish the details. It seems, however, that the 
Motamar was founded by a group of Pakistanis who wanted 
to revive the traditions of the World Muslim Conferences 
held before the Second World War. The first conference 
called by the new group was held in Karachi in February
1949, and Professor Haleem, then Vice-Chancellor of Sind 
University, as Chairman of the Reception Committee 
figured prominently in the press reports. It was an
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unofficial conference, attended by delegates, mostly 
scholars, from fourteen countries.'*' It was emphasised 
that the objects of the Conference were religious, 
cultural, social and educational. The domestic politics 
of any country would not be discussed, although 
international questions affecting the Muslim world, and 
on which all Muslims were in agreement according to
2Professor Haleem, would find a place on the agenda.
The Fifth World Muslim Congress opened on 18 February
1949 and lasted two days. It was treated very gingerly by
the Pakistan Government: although the Congress was
addressed by Mr Fazlur Rahman, Minister for the Interior,
Education and Information, it was emphasised that he
spoke only 'in his capacity as a Muslim'. Resolutions
favourable to Pakistan were adopted on Palestine, Kashmir,
Hyderabad, Junagadh, and the condition of the Indian
Muslims. Other resolutions called for the setting up of
a permanent organisation to carry on the work of the
Conference, and the institution of Arabic as the common
3language of the Muslim world.
1
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By the time the Sixth World Muslim Conference took 
place m  February 19 51 the Motamar was better organised. 
The permanent organisation set up by the previous 
conference with its headquarters in Karachi had been 
active in making the Motamar and its objectives better 
known. One of its most publicised activities was 'Egypt 
Day', 10 December 1950, on which a public meeting was 
held 'to express the sentiments of the Muslims of 
Pakistan over the Anglo-Egyptian tussle.'^
By the end of 1950 plans for the next Conference,
to be opened on 9 February 1951, -were well under way.
This time delegates from 31 countries attended and, though
the Conference was still unofficial, the Pakistan
government participated readily and in force. The opening
address was delivered by the Prime Minister, Liaquat All
Khan, and speeches were made by three other Ministers,
Fazlur Rahman, Khwaja Shahabuddin and Chaudhri Nazir
Ahmed Khan. Liaquat told the Conference:
To us in Pakistan nothing is dearer than the 
prospect of the strengthening of the world-wide 
Muslim brotherhood. Any endeavour, from 
whatever direction it is made to bring the 
Muslims of far flung countries together and 
to stimulate in them brotherly feelings of 
mutual affection, understanding and 
cooperation readily finds an echo in the 
hearts of the Muslims of Pakistan.2
1
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Pakistan News, 18 February 1951.
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Despite Nazir Ahmed Khan's exhortation that words 
were not enough, that something concrete must be done 
about the backwardness and disunity of the Muslim world, 
the Conference broke up in a hail of resolutions 
reminiscent of the previous conference.
One positive achievement, however, was the 
adoption of a constitution for the Motaram-i-Alam-i-Islami. 
A Permanent Secretariat, situated in Karachi, was set up 
to deal with the problems of Muslims throughout the world.^
While its publicity function continued effectively, 
the Motamar did not meet again in full conference until 
1962, for the most part because of those international 
factors which put an end to the 'Islamic bloc' phase of 
Pakistan foreign policy. Arab delegates, particularly 
those of Egypt, began to feel that Pakistan was taking 
too much of the limelight. The Secretariat decided 
therefore that it was unwise to attempt to hold another 
conference in Pakistan, but no other venue could be 
decided upon. Indonesia was suggested, but the Masjumi 
government fell and its successor was reluctant to play 
host to an Islamic Conference. By this time Nasser had 
come to power in Egypt, and he too was reluctant to open 
the door to this kind of Conference: while the Motamar 
itself was pledged not to intervene in the domestic 
affairs of any country, some of the Muslim Brotherhood
Dawn, 18 and 20 February 1951.
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delegates from other Arab countries were not ready to 
give similar guarantees. In any case there was little 
real enthusiasm through the 'fifties for Islamic unity 
except among the faithful few in Pakistan.
10, Conclusion
The years before Partition had witnessed the growth 
of contacts between a number of Indian Muslims and some 
groups in the Middle East, Except for the passage of 
occasional resolutions, the Muslim League had remained 
aloof from these developments. Nevertheless the atmosphere 
of those years, particularly the emotions aroused concerning 
the Khilafat, left their mark even on men like Jinnah who 
did not support the campaign itself. The Palestine question, 
then as now probably the single most important issue 
concerning the Islamic world, was one to which no Muslim 
could remain indifferent. Pakistan's leaders were therefore 
predisposed in certain directions which did not necessarily 
ease the conduct of foreign policy. They supported the 
demands of the Palestine Arabs, but divisions within the 
Arab world, for instance between the Egyptians, the 
Saudis, and the Hashemite family of Jordan and Iraq, made 
it extremely difficult for Pakistan to remain on equally 
good terms with each. At the same time the attitude of 
most Pakistanis to Turkey was ambivalent: in its progress 
they took pride, but the abcblition of the Caliphate and 
the implementation of secular policy within the country 
could not easily be accepted in Pakistan.
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A set of emotional responses do not however 
constitute a coherent foreign policy. Such a policy 
was not developed either before Partition or for some 
time after so far as the Middle East was concerned. 
Preoccupation with legal questions before Partition, and 
with domestic issues immediately after, pushed consideration 
of foreign policy into the background.
In addition, as a result of the hostile relations 
which developed between Pakistan and India, and Pakistan's 
relative economic and military weakness, the options of 
the government were limited. The need for aid, both 
economic and military, soon made apparent the necessity 
of finding friends who were in a position to give it.
This led to an orientation of Pakistan policy away 
from Pan-Islamism, for it soon became clear that the 
countries of the Middle East were not in a position to 
assist Pakistan, and indeed expressed little evidence 
of wishing to do so. Diplomatically Pakistan started 
behind scratch in the region. Its resources in this 
respect were poor, and if it could be claimed that the 
Arabs did not understand Pakistan, it is equally clear 
that most Pakistanis (for whom their identity as Muslims 
had been the most important single driving force for 
perhaps two generations) did not even begin to understand 
the forces operating in the Arab world. The very 
enthusiasm for Muslim unity with which Pakistan overflowed 
served only to further undermine the tenuous diplomatic 
hold it had in the Arab countries.
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It is not surprising therefore that when links 
were eventually forged with Muslim neighbours, with one 
exception these were, like Pakistan, non-Arab countries, 
and the step was taken under the auspices of a 
Western-oriented defence pact rather than Islamic 
solidarity.
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The First Five Years: Developing 
Relations with the Middle East
1. Introduction
The domestic issues which preoccupied the Pakistan 
Government during the first years of independence - the 
dislocation which resulted from Partition, the difficulties 
of administration, the problem of the refugees - all 
contributed to the relegation of foreign policy to the 
realm of ad hoc response to crisis. Pakistan's relations 
with the countries of the Middle East developed slowly 
during the first two years after Partition, gaining 
momentum towards the end of 1949 largely as a response to 
new problems facing the Government.
Three foreign policy issues which had important 
bearing on Pakistan's relations with the Middle East (and 
with the rest of the world) were the Kashmir dispute, the 
question of 'Pushtunistan',  ^ and the question of Palestine.
CHAPTER III
1
Pushtunistan refers roughly to the Pushtu-speaking areas 
along Pakistan's north-west frontier. It has never been 
precisely defined, and has sometimes been assumed to refer 
to the tribal areas, sometimes to all of West Pakistan 
west of the Indus River.
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Each of these will be discussed in detail in later chapters, 
and it is necessary at this stage only to outline the early 
developments in relations with India and Afghanistan with 
respect to these disputes, in order to put into focus 
Pakistan's initial attempts to seek a solution through 
the United Nations and the British Commonwealth; its 
efforts to form some kind of Muslim grouping; and its 
subsequent abandonment of this objective for a policy of 
alignment with a Western defence system, albeit in an 
Islamic context in the Middle East. Pakistan's 
involvement in the Palestine question helped, along with 
Kashmir and Pushtunistan, to colour its view of the world, 
and of Pakistan's place in it.
The Pakistan Government's faith in the constitutional 
processes which the Commonwealth appeared to represent 
was considerable, and immediately after independence 
membership thereof was, along with membership of the 
United Nations Organization, one of the foremost planks 
of foreign policy. Disillusionment with both mounted 
through 1948 and 1949, and a change in the emphasis of 
Pakistan's foreign policy appeared after the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Conference of April 1949, when Liaquat 
Ali Khan began to seek a role for Pakistan outside the 
framework of the British Commonwealth. Part of this new 
direction in foreign policy was an attempt to establish 
relationships with the USSR and the USA. Another aspect 
of it was the attempt to draw closer to the countries of
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the Middle East, which manifested itself, at least 
superficially, in a Pan-Islamic form. This attempt was 
not particularly successful, and ultimately gave way to 
the objective of a Western-oriented alignment in 
Pakistan's foreign policy. It can be argued that the 
basic ingredients of this policy of alignment have 
always been present in the minds of the men who ruled 
Pakistan, although they have not always been at one 
with public opinion in the country.
The greatest and, as it turned out, the most 
enduring of the crises facing Pakistan was the dispute 
with India over Kashmir.
In strict terms the issue revolves around Pakistan's 
refusal to acknowledge the accession of the Hindu ruler 
of Kashmir, a predominantly Muslim state, to India, and 
its insistence that the Kashmiri people should be given 
the opportunity to decide for themselves what their 
future status should be (on the assumption that they 
would have chosen union with Pakistan rather than with 
India). In addition, however, Kashmir is of economic 
and strategic importance. West Pakistan is heavily 
dependent for water on the three rivers which rise in 
Kashmir, the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab, and 
Pakistan feared that if India were to control Kashmir 
this vital supply might be cut off altogether. In any
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case it rendered West Pakistan hostage to India. The
State was of strategic concern to both dominions. The
Pakistan Government feared that Indian control of Kashmir
would threaten the main strategic road and rail systems
of West Pakistan, making the country's position
'absolutely untenable'.'*' As a result of its geographical
position, sharing borders with China, the USSR and
Afghanistan, India too regarded Kashmir as 'intimately
connected with the security and international contacts 
2of India.'
The dispute centred on the question of a plebiscite 
to which India at one stage agreed, albeit in vague terms, 
and the question of the demilitarisation of Kashmir, 
inextricably and impossibly tangled with the first. 
Hostilities broke out between India and Pakistan following 
the invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen from the North-West
1
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Frontier at the end of 1947, and came to an end on
1 January 1949 with the United Nations call for a 
ceasefire, after which the diplomatic wrangling began. 
Pakistan, initially believing that the UN would support 
its cause, more easily justified on moral than on legal 
grounds, was consequently disappointed when the UN 
appeared both unable and unwilling to force a solution. 
Disillusion followed also with the Commonwealth, whose 
members refused to involve themselves in a dispute 
between two of their number. This was regarded by 
articulate Pakistani opinion as at best moral cowardice 
and at worst favouritism for India.
Although the question of Pushtunistan never assumed 
the importance of the Kashmir issue, this dispute with 
Afghanistan has been equally enduring and was particularly 
important during the first five years. The British had 
encountered much opposition from the tribes, and it appears 
that Afghanistan had some hope of wresting the area, along 
with Baluchistan, from a weak successor state, thus 
regaining the lands at one time ruled by the Afghan kings, 
and at the same time gaining access to the sea.'*'
Afghanistan therefore put forward the demand that the 
people of the North-West Frontier Province should also
1
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be given the option of union with Afghanistan or 
independence, rather than a straight choice between India 
or Pakistan, and gave encouragement to dissident elements 
along the Frontier, including the small but determined 
Pushtu nationalist movement led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan.
Pakistan quickly showed itself stronger than 
expected and able to control the frontier areas at least 
as effectively as the British, but the Afghan attitude 
continued to poison relations between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. It made the demands for autonomy for the 
North-West Frontier Province a more serious problem, 
particularly as it was suspected that the Afghans were 
encouraged by India in order to prevent Pakistan from 
concentrating its energy on the Kashmir frontier.
The third major foreign policy issue which engaged 
Pakistan's attention was the dispute between Arabs and 
Jews over Palestine, under consideration in the United 
Nations when Pakistan became a member in September 1947.
On the question of Palestine the Muslim League had 
traditionally supported the Arabs, and now, as the 
Government of an independent state, they were in a position 
to do so effectively in a world forum. The development of 
the Palestine question was an important factor in the 
formation of Pakistan's attitudes towards the UN and the 
major world powers. The manner in which the UN operated 
against the interests of the Arabs and the cynical way
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in which, so it appeared to Pakistan, this body was 
manipulated in the Jewish interest by the United States 
in particular, contributed along with its disappointment 
over Kashmir, to disillusionment with the United Nations 
as a means by which the interests of the small and weak 
could be protected. That the UN was able to take 
effective action over Korea, an issue in which the United 
States was directly concerned, seemed to many Pakistanis 
to underline its failure in the case of Palestine and 
Kashmir, both Muslim causes. This reinforced their 
conviction that the Western Powers which then dominated 
the United Nations were opposed to Islam. A latent 
tendency to see issues in terms of religion became more 
evident in Pakistan, leading to a determined effort to 
identify with the Muslim world, to generate some kind of 
effective unity among Muslim states. This effort in 
turn was doomed to failure.
2. Disappointment with the British Commonwealth
It took some time before disappointment in the 
Commonwealth crystallised, and was expressed in 
non-government circles in Pakistan before the Prime Minister, 
Liaquat Ali Khan, eventually put it into words. In 1947 
membership of the Commonwealth was one of the principal 
bases of Pakistan foreign policy, and it was with a great 
deal of optimism that Pakistan approached its first Prime 
Ministers' Conference in October 1948. After the
Ill
Conference, Liaquat said:
I shall return to my country with greater 
faith and courage in the ideals of the 
Commonwealth. With India, Pakistan and Ceylon 
coming in, the race and complexion of the 
Commonwealth have been completely changed....
I hope that, with greater understanding between 
the East and the West, the Commonwealth will be 
able to achieve more than it achieved in the 
past.1
Liaquat incurred some criticism for his enthusiastic
references to the Commonwealth connexion, particularly as
he had received no quid pro quo regarding discussion of
2the Kashmir question.
When the next Prime Ministers' Conference met in 
April 1949 India had announced its decision to become a 
republic, which raised the question of whether and under 
what conditions it would remain in the Commonwealth.
This question was of particular interest to Pakistan 
whose Constitution was still under discussion. At this 
time there was difficulty in reaching agreement on a 
ceasefire line in Kashmir, and India appeared reluctant 
to take steps towards holding a plebiscite there. When
1
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the decision was announced providing for continued Indian
membership of the Commonwealth despite its republican
status, Dawn asked:
If Pakistan is not going to be any whit 
more benefitted by continuing to owe 
allegiance to the Crown than India although 
she has dispensed with that allegiance, 
then why should we owe any allegiance to 
the Crown at all?-*-
The question reflected a deeper concern for the extent to
which the Commonwealth was prepared to go to accommodate
India, which, in addition to repudiating allegiance to
the Crown, had made it clear that it would pursue an
independent foreign policy, avoiding power blocs. To
Pakistan, the Commonwealth was an association which
represented some form of security and the opinion was
expressed that 'if the Commonwealth is not to some
extent a power bloc, it is not of great value to 
2Pakistan.1 At the same time, if it could not or would
not take the initiative in attempting to solve problems
among members, then it was 'a nebulous and impotent sort
3of association.1 This dissatisfaction was expressed by
1
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Liaquat Ali Khan who complained of a tendency in the United
Kingdom to take Pakistan for granted.'*’ Again, he was
criticised at home. Dawn called for 'Deeds Not Words',
saying that Liaquat was only now admitting what many of
2his countrymen had felt for some time.
This Prime Ministers' Conference marked a change in
Liaquat's approach to foreign policy. His new strategy
appeared to contain two elements: to establish a closer
relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union,
on one hand, and with the Muslim countries of the Middle
3East on the other. Liaquat countered President 
Truman's invitation to Nehru to visit the USA by 
arranging an invitation for himself to visit Moscow, at 
the same time holding discussions with a Soviet economic 
delegation.
1
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Pakistan was also interested in developing relations 
with other Muslim countries. President Sukarno of 
Indonesia was the first Head of State to visit Pakistan, 
in January 1950. Pakistan support was extended to the 
efforts of the North African Muslims to achieve 
independence. While these aspects of Pakistan's foreign 
policy are important, they do not form part of a 
discussion of its relations with the Middle East, and do 
not substantially alter the situation in any way.
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In April 1949 the Pakistan Finance Minister, Ghulam
Mohammed, expressed the intention of visiting the USA in
order to explain Pakistan's need for economic aid and the
importance of such aid in the fight against communism.
In July the Defence Minister, Iskandar Mirza, toured US
army installations and defence plants. His object, he
said, was to establish liaison with US armed forces with
2a view to closer cooperation in the future.
In December Liaquat Ali Khan announced his acceptance 
of President Truman's invitation to visit America. The 
news was received with coolness by the Pakistan press,
. 3but thereafter little was heard of plans to visit Russia. 
It is possible that the approaches to Moscow were 
tactical rather than genuine, and the statements of 
Ghulam Mohammed and Iskandar Mirza indicate a Pakistani 
preference for the United States. The invitation to
1
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according to Newsweek, 21 December 1949, the Soviet 
Government never replied to communications from Liaquat 
asking for a date to be set.
115
Moscow served to regain much of the popularity which 
Liaquat had lost within Pakistan as a result of his 
Commonwealth policy, and relations with the USSR had in 
any case cooled slightly. Economic discussions were 
broken off when Pakistan refused to devalue the rupee, 
and the Soviet Union was strongly critical of the 
International Islamic Economic Conference, held in 
Karachi in November 1949.^
In May 1950 Liaquat visited the USA and Canada,
explaining Pakistan's problems, and emphasising its
2attachment to peace and freedom. There was an
immediate response in America:
Liaquat Ali Khan spoke with fervour to our 
Congress yesterday when he declared that 'no threat 
or persuasion, no material peril or ideological 
allurement' could deflect his country from its 
chosen path of free democracy. Those are strong 
words and they were spoken in an international 
atmosphere marked, as he noted, by ugly 
manifestations of greed, aggression and 
intolerance. They are a pledge that the Pakistanis 
will stand and be counted among those who are 
devoted to freedom, regardless of the c o s t . 3
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Liaquat's immediate support of the United States position 
regarding Korea contributed to the general impression 
created in his speeches.
He followed this diplomatic foray with a refusal,
in December 1950, to attend the coming Prime Ministers'
Conference, unless Kashmir was placed on the agenda, a
popular decision in Pakistan.’*' When the other Prime
Ministers, already in London, agreed to discuss the
question, albeit outside the formal conference, the news
was headlined by Dawn: 'First Round for Liaquat Claimed1,'
but the following day it asked 'Should Liaquat Ali Khan
have agreed to go to London even though he has scored
this point that Kashmir must be jointly discussed by all
the Prime Ministers?' and concluded that logically he
was right to do so, but that Pakistan had been betrayed
so often that one must conclude that Britain, the
Commonwealth and 'the senior partner in the West' could
not be said to have shown themselves the friends of
3Pakistan. The suggestion was made that Pakistan should 
look first and foremost to the Muslim countries of the
1
See Dawn, Editorial, 31 December 1950.
2
Ibid., 6 January 1951.
3
Ibid., 7 January 1951.
117
world for support. This Liaquat had attempted to do,
but at the same time some of his statements that the
Commonwealth should guarantee the territorial integrity
of India and Pakistan indicate that his belief in the
2usefulness of the Commonwealth had endured.
3. Closer Ties with the Middle East
(i) Liaquat1s Tour, 1949
The discussion of the Kashmir question at the 1951
Prime Ministers' Conference had demonstrated that:
the Commonwealth tie was useful in providing 
facilities for discussion, but could not 
provide an overall common interest when two 
member-States were separated by a real 
conflict of national interest.^
While Pakistan's disillusion with the Commonwealth
increased after this incident, it had been present since
the first Conference attended by Pakistan in 1948.
Unwilling to allow its case regarding Kashmir to go by
1
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default to India, Pakistan remained a member of the 
Commonwealth, but at the same time turned increasingly to 
the Muslim world, that other group, however vague, with 
which it could identify itself. The argument that such a 
group might form a bloc which would be neutral between the 
West and the Communist bloc arose partly from conviction, 
but also as a response to the neutralism of Pandit Nehru 
which, at the time, appeared to Pakistanis to have paid 
such dividends. Up to 1949 little attention had been 
devoted to the Middle East by the Pakistan Government.
In November 1947 Jinnah had sent Firoz Khan Noon as his 
special representative to the Middle East and diplomatic 
relations were established with most countries in the 
area during 1948. Liaquat had stopped in Cairo on his 
way home from London in November that year. This was 
the extent of the contact.
Liaquat's much publicised tour of the Middle East 
on his return from London in May 1949 had several 
objectives. The Pakistan press had been critical of his 
foreign policy, especially with regard to the Commonwealth, 
and there was growing pressure for a new initiative, 
particularly in the Muslim world. By making a tour of 
the Middle East Liaquat was able to allay this criticism 
and regain much of the popularity which he had lost. His 
tour had the additional objective of giving him an 
opportunity to explain Pakistan's problems throughout 
the area, where, it was felt, Indian propaganda had been
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effective at Pakistan's expense. Aware, however, that the 
Middle East was a sensitive area, Liaquat was careful to 
state that his visits had no special purpose other than to 
acknowledge the invitations of the governments concerned 
and to study the constitutions and achievements of the 
countries he visited. He also made it clear that, although 
he would welcome greater 'cohesion' among the Muslim 
countries, Pakistan was not striving for leadership.'*'
In Egypt, Liaquat had two meetings with the Prime 
Minister, Ibrahim Abdul Hadi Pasha, during which they 
reviewed the situation which had developed in the Muslim 
countries since Liaquat's previous visit to Cairo. There 
was at the time increasing strain in Anglo-Egyptian 
relations and a growing Western concern for the security 
of the Middle East, from which came most, of Europe's oil 
supplies. Pakistan was then uncommitted in this regard, 
but it is likely that these were among the topics discussed 
by Liaquat and the Egyptian Prime Minister. It seemed 
that Liaquat hoped to jolt British opinion into awareness 
of Pakistan, as well as encourage 'cohesion' among the 
Muslim countries, and in an interview with the Cairo 
correspondent of The Times Liaquat said that it should 
be the concern of the Western powers to strengthen the 
Middle East countries, who in turn should realise that
1
Dawn, 11 May 1949.
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no country could stand alone, that the weaker should 
accept help from the stronger. Britain, he said, had 
long since dropped its policy of exploitation and 
domination, but this was not always realised in the Middle 
East. This suspicion could be overcome only 'by a large 
gesture such as only a great power could make.'
From Cairo Liaquat went to Baghdad and to Teheran
where he had discussions with Iraqi and Iranian leaders.
On his return to Karachi, he remarked that his tour had
been 'interesting and happy' and that he had been received
2in the Muslim countries as though he was one of them. 
Although he was hailed as 'a super ambassador of Pakistan' 
whose visits to Egypt, Iraq and Iran, 'brief though they 
were have cemented more firmly and closer than ever the
3brotherly ties which already existed,' his tour 
apparently had no practical results.
(ii) The International Islamic Economic Conference
The second half of 1949 also saw the beginning of a 
Pakistani attempt to promote a regional approach to
1
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economic development throughout the Middle East. The 
International Islamic Economic Conference, directed to 
this end, was held in Karachi in November 1949. The 
initiative came principally from the Finance Minister 
Ghulam Mohammed who, aware of the pressing need for 
economic development throughout the region, entertained 
the hope that the countries involved would cooperate 
for this purpose. Ten countries (including Pakistan) 
attended the conference.'*’ The delegations for the most 
part consisted of businessmen, industrialists and 
economists. It was considered wiser at this stage not 
to pitch the conference at an official level.
Ghulam Mohammed explained his idea in his inaugural
2address. While the Muslim countries had nearly all won 
political freedom, economically they were still 'in the 
iron grip of the powerful nations of the West.1 Not 
until they were economically strong and independent 
would they be in a position to make their collective voice 
heard effectively on international matters. To achieve 
this it was necessary to modernise agriculture and improve 
the lot of the peasant, which required land reform. Young
1
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people must be educated in science and technology: the 
traditional Islamic education system would have to be 
revised. Domestic capital must be channelled into 
industry. Foreign capital must be attracted, but without 
political obligation or domination. To prosper, however, 
industry required a sense of security, which was not 
encouraged by political despotism: the Muslim countries 
must hasten to establish democracy. Corruption in high 
places must be eradicated. All these suggestions, he 
argued, were embodied in 'Islamic politico-economic 
ideology as preached and practised by the Prophet and 
further implemented by his successors so long as Islam 
was a living force and a guiding principle.' The system 
would establish economic equality, 'a democratic republic 
designed to be a Welfare State.' In this way he was able 
to present a socialist system, along the lines advocated 
by the British Labour Party, in a manner which he hoped 
would appeal to the conservative Muslim governments of 
the Middle East. Far from advocating that the Muslim 
countries should adopt capitalism, he argued that, in 
an effort to attain social justice, the Western 
democracies were adopting age-old Islamic values. His 
opinion of the communist experiment came out clearly: 
while it had many achievements to its credit which one 
must admire, liberty had suffered at the expense of 
order, and its anti-religious bias tended to deny 
extra-economic values. This no Muslim could accept.
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But unless the governments of the Muslim countries 
realised the need to improve the lot of the masses, 
particularly the peasants, they would run the risk of 
communism erupting in their midst. The Chinese writing 
was on the wall for all to see.'*'
After the fortnight's discussion which followed,
11 committees presented their reports and recommendations. 
It was decided that a permanent International Islamic 
Economic Organization should be set up with the object 
of developing trade, commerce, industry, mining, banking, 
insurance, communications and other forms of economic 
activity 'calculated to raise living standards and enhance 
the national prosperity of the people of the Muslim world.' 
A Secretariat was to be set up in Karachi. The 
recommendations embodied most of the suggestions made by 
Ghulam Mohammed, and it was agreed that they should be 
passed on to the governments concerned. Ghulam Mohammed 
himself was elected President of the IIEO.
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The Times noted in an editorial the attempt to draw 
'the Muslim countries together on the basis of lasting 
economic interests rather than of political alliances, 
which may be transitory and are always liable to be upset 
by personal or dynastic jealousies^ The Soviet 
assessment was that the USA was making use of Pan-Islamic 
tendencies in Pakistan to increase its own influence, in 
collaboration with the Muslim League 'which hoped thereby 
to strengthen its prestige in the Muslim world and to
2take the helm in the Muslim bloc which was to be set up.'
The IIEC was attacked also in the Soviet press and
broadcasts, and although it may have been 'far fetched
and absurd [of the Russians] to suggest... that it had
been engineered by the Western Democracies as part of
their plan to build up a Muslim bloc as a bulwark against
3Communist encroachment' it seems fairly clear from the 
tone of Ghulam Mohammed's address that the prevention of 
the spread of communism was an objective which he could 
support. It appears also that the United States quickly
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recognised that the IIEO was an organisation whose 
objectives ran largely parallel to its own.'*'
The Second Conference of the IIEO was held the
following October in Teheran and, in his Presidential
Address, Ghulam Mohammed was unable to report much
2progress. The delegates had returned home full of
enthusiasm, but had not found opportunities to organise
branches in their own countries. He repeated, in
stronger terms, much of what he had said in Karachi the
previous year, adding:
Our decadence has reached that extreme state at 
which one loses even the awareness of decay. So 
bereft are we of the consciousness of our needs 
that even the few opportunities that are offered 
to us to improve our conditions are not s e i z e d . 3
The Middle East had not shown enough interest in the
non-political work of the United Nations and the
suggestion of establishing an Economic Commission for
the Middle East had not evoked much enthusiasm from the
countries themselves. The role of an Economic Commission
was one which the IIEO itself could take over for the
Middle East, but to do so it would need to have at least
1
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semi-official status, and substantial financial assistance 
from the various governments. Ghulam Mohammed was able, 
however, to report some progress towards the 
establishment of a college to train economists (although 
this progress was largely due to his own efforts).
The Second International Islamic Economic 
Conference broke up with a set of recommendations 
reminiscent of the 1949 Conference, although it was felt 
that the technical nature of the recommendations which 
concerned banking, insurance, transport and communications, 
trade, agriculture and labour reform, needed expert 
planning. It suggested therefore that Committees of 
Experts meet in Cairo before the Third Annual Conference 
which was to be held in Damascus during the coming year.^
Nearly three and a half years passed before the
Third International Islamic Economic Conference met, in
April 1954, in Karachi. It was convened, under extreme
difficulties, by the Secretary-General of the IIEO, Mr
2Hussain Malik. In his report to the.Conference he 
explained that conditions in Egypt and Syria had been
1
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such that neither of the meetings could be held at the 
time or in the place scheduled. After consultation with 
the members' diplomatic representatives, *stationed in 
Pakistan, it was agreed that both meetings should be held 
in Karachi. Even after this decision was reached, the 
opening of the Conference had to be postponed for three 
months, from January to April.'*'
Except in some minor matters, Ghulam Mohammed's 
idealistic scheme was a failure: it had proved 
impossible to persuade the governments of the countries 
concerned to participate, and the organisation could not 
implement its ambitious plans without the financial and 
other support which would have been available had the 
IIEO been given official status.
In May 1952 the IIEO had been accorded consultative 
status by the United Nations, and submitted its first 
report to that body in May the following year. But 
apart from publishing a volume of statistics and 
economic information on the Middle East, nothing else 
was done. The one real achievement was the establishment 
of the institute for the training of economists, with 
considerable American assistance, in Karachi, which as 
the Institute of Development Economics has done important 
work in that field.
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Many of the recommendations put forward by the 
various conferences were unpalatable to those in power, 
and Ghulam Mohammed's forthright references to the need 
for land reform and democratic reform were hardly 
calculated to appeal to the conservative elements 
powerful throughout the region (in Pakistan as 
elsewhere). Nor was the idea of international 
co-operation, with its implication that the wealthy 
should subsidise the less well-off, attractive to the 
only states in the area with sufficient resources to 
make the IIEO work: the oil-producing states.
The organisation suffered also from dependence 
on the efforts of a few men, especially Ghulam Mohammed 
who, after he became Governor-General, was too 
preoccupied to devote much attention to the IIEO.
Other members felt that Pakistan was taking too great a 
role: two of the three Conferences were held in Karachi, 
the two Presidents, Ghulam Mohammed and Chaudhri 
Zafrulla Khan as well as the Secretary-General, Hussain 
Malik, were Pakistanis. The Secretariat was situated 
in Karachi. So was the Institute of Economics. The 
Arab states, particularly Egypt, tended to resent the 
central position taken by Pakistan, and set up their own 
Arab Economic Union, outside the IIEO. By 1954 discussion 
was taking place on the possibility of liaison between 
the two organisations. It is interesting to note, also, 
that while Lebanon had only just joined the IIEO before
the Third Conference, Turkey, though still a member, did 
not send a representative.
In the face of these difficulties, the IIEO simply 
withered away.
4. Development of Bilateral Relations with the Middle
East Countries
Along with the attempt to establish a regional 
economic organisation, and the various demands for the 
formation of some Muslim political grouping (which were 
treated very gingerly by the Pakistan government), some 
efforts were made to extend Pakistan's bilateral 
relations within the region, particularly with Iran and 
Egypt. Taken together these activities do not amount to 
very much, and should be regarded as part of Pakistan's 
efforts to win a propaganda advantage over India.
In July 1949 Iran agreed to a Pakistani suggestion 
that a joint commission be set up to complete demarcation 
of the Baluchistan border, previously abandoned because 
of tension between British and Iranian commissioners. 
Progress in this direction was painfully slow: no 
agreement could be reached on the constitution of the
129
130
boundary commission until January 1951. In October the
Shah accepted an invitation to visit Pakistan and on
18 February 1950, shortly before his arrival in Karachi,
a Friendship Treaty was signed in Teheran. The first
Middle Eastern leader to visit Pakistan, the Shah
received an enthusiastic welcome. In the course of an
address to the Constituent Assembly, the Shah remarked that
Pakistan and Iran which abided by the same principles
and had similar beliefs had now revived their old
relations and it would be 'perfectly logical to state
that both of them will stand united to maintain peace in
2this part of the world.' The visit gave rise to rumours
that some sort of union was being contemplated,
emphatically denied by Liaquat, who added that Pakistan
3was not seeking any military alliances. In November 
1950 negotiations on a trade agreement opened and in the
1
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same month the flagship of the Iranian Navy paid a goodwill 
visit. A Pakistan military mission visited Iran in March 
1951, but up to the end of 1952 the visit had not been 
returned: it was then revealed by a Pakistan Government 
spokesman that no invitation had been extended to the 
Iranians because Pakistan had been too deeply involved 
'with other important duties'.^
Attention was devoted also to relations with Egypt.
An Egyptian Trade Mission had visited Pakistan in May
21949 and a Trade Pact was signed during the same month.
In 1950 both the Finance Minister and the Commerce and 
Education Minister visited Cairo. Liaquat Ali Khan 
stopped again in Egypt on his way back from the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in January 1951, 
and later that year a Pakistan press delegation which 
included Altaf Hussain, the vocal and powerful editor of 
Dawn, toured Egypt. In August a Treaty of Friendship was 
signed.
For the most part the effort was on the Pakistani 
side, but reference should be made to the appointment of 
Abdul Wahab Azzam Bey as first Egyptian Ambassador to
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Pakistan. Frankly pro-Pakistan in his views, he was no 
doubt responsible for much of the enthusiasm for Egypt 
expressed in Pakistan, and his outspoken statements on 
Kashmir involved the Egyptian Government in some difficult 
exchanges with the Government of India.'*'
Friendship Treaties were signed with Syria in August
1950 and with Saudi Arabia in November. A Trade 
Agreement with Iraq was concluded in March 1951, although 
an invitation to the Regent, Prince Abdul Ilah, extended 
the previous year, was not taken up until 1954.
Relations with Turkey, considering later
developments, were slow moving during these years. The
Pakistan Finance Minister visited Ankara, as did the
President of the Pakistan-Turkey Cultural Association,
Dr I.H. Qureshi, who was at the same time Deputy
Minister for the Interior. On his return, he said it was
his object to dispel the ignorance and misunderstanding
among Pakistanis regarding Turkey, and passed on a message
from his Turkish counterpart: 'Tell my Pakistani brethren
that it is a calumny against Turkey to say they are not
2good Muslims.' A Turkish military mission visited
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Pakistan in March 1950, and a Friendship Treaty was 
signed in July. Nevertheless, Turkey was preoccupied 
with its attempts to join the Atlantic Pact, and 
remained cool to professions of Muslim unity.
5. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute and the Anglo-Egyptian 
Dispute over Suez
Britain's disputes with Iran and Egypt raised a 
number of difficulties for Pakistan, since it wanted to 
offend neither the Muslim states involved nor its 
Commonwealth partner. The Anglo-Iranian oil dispute 
developed during*1951, bringing Iranian politics, already 
chaotic, to a state of near anarchy, and suspending the 
normal conduct of Iranian foreign policy for more than 
two years. While Pakistani sympathy lay with Iran in 
its decision to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,^ 
the initial reaction of the press as well as the government, 
was one of caution.
Those who are today demanding the 
withdrawal of British technical experts, seem 
to bank on the Soviet offer to supply technical 
know-how after nationalization. Even if we 
take it for granted this is possible, such a 
replacement of British by Russian experts will 
not achieve the goal of liquidating foreign 
influence. Where is the guarantee that Russian
AIOC.
1
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influence would be more beneficial than 
British? Barring extremists, most people, 
we believe, will agree that a better course 
for Iran will be to defer complete 
nationalization until the entire industry 
can be taken over and manned by Iranians 
themselves.... Too much emphasis by Britain 
on her own imperial interest may lead to 
her completely losing what she has and may 
yet partly retain, as well as to Iran 
finding her independence in jeopardy.^
However, when the decision to nationalise the AIOC
was eventually announced, Dawn assured the Iranian people
that 'their struggle is being keenly watched by the
people of Pakistan whose sympathy for their cause is
sincere and natural because it stems from a common faith
in the inviolability of national sovereignty over natural
2resources.' The British should recognise the fact that
Iran had nationalised its oil, and work towards some
agreement whereby cooperation between the AIOC and
3Iranian Government was possible.
Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan, in a statement on 14 May, 
declared:
1
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The situation is grave and delicate and 
has very sinister possibilities. I expressed 
the hope recently in London that a 
satisfactory and honourable solution and 
agreement might be reached. It has been 
quite obvious that the public opinion in 
Pakistan has been greatly perturbed over 
this matter, and our sympathies are 
completely with Iran.l
This outspoken sympathy with Iran did not endear
Pakistan to the United Kingdom. The Round Table
correspondent, usually sympathetic towards Pakistan,
remarked acidly that, while Pakistan 'feels quite
naturally a sympathy for any country, particularly a
Muslim one, fighting a battle which she has already
won,' in supporting Iran in this way 'the people of
Pakistan have overlooked the sanctity of a contract,
the moral right of free enterprise to reward and, perhaps
above all, the obligation of the Commonwealth to which
2Pakistan belongs.'
During the same period the Egyptian Government was 
waging its own battle with the British over the 1936 
Treaty which gave Britain the right to station troops in 
the Suez Canal zone. This issue, like that of Iranian
1
Pakistan News, 27 May 1951.
Round Table, vol.41, 1951-2, p.373.
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oil, had wide ramifications for the security of British 
interests in and beyond the Middle East, and was one on 
which Pakistan again found itself in sympathy with the 
Muslim party to the dispute, yet was more reluctant to 
take too strong a position. Pakistan had very real 
interest in the fate of the Suez Canal, with which the 
question of Middle East security was inextricably 
linked.
It was assumed, at least in Cairo, that Liaquat Ali 
Khan would act as Egypt's spokesman at the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Conference in January 1951, should he 
decide to attend. While expressing understanding of 
Pakistan's position, an Egyptian spokesman said Egypt 
would regret Pakistan's absence, should Liaquat 
ultimately not go, because 'it would deprive us of a 
sincere friend who could help us in our troubles.'^
At that time Egyptian relations with India exhibited
signs of strain. The Egyptian Ambassador in Pakistan
had publicly expressed the view that 'Kashmir is just as
much a problem of Egypt as the Nile Valley, we fully
reciprocate the sentiments of our Pakistani brethren who
are one with us in the demand of liberation of Suez and
2the Sudan,' thus bringing strong official protest from 
the Indian Government. At the same time Pandit Nehru,
T~
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passing through Cairo on 3 January, had remarked that the 
defence of democracy was a more pressing question than 
the evacuation of British troops from Egypt, thus 
apparently causing 'stunned incredulity' in Egyptian 
Government circles.'*’ Needless to say, the Pakistan press 
took advantage of the situation: 'Political quarters are 
now convinced that it is Pakistan and not Bharat on 
which Egypt can depend for assistance in her national 
struggle.'^
The extent to which Liaquat Ali Khan demonstrated 
this dependability and fulfilled the role expected of him 
by Egypt during the Commonwealth Conference is not clear. 
The Egyptian Government conveyed its thanks to Pakistan 
for the 'sincere attitude' of the Pakistani people and 
the 'true efforts' made by their Prime Minister for the
3Egyptian case. While in Cairo, on his way home from 
London, Liaquat stated formally that, as the Anglo- 
Egyptian negotiations were still continuing, 'I hope it 
will be possible to reach a settlement satisfactory to
1
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Egyptian Foreign Minister, Saleh el-Din, 14 January
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Egypt.' The Suez Canal could only be defended with the 
cooperation and assistance of Egypt.^ Back in Karachi, 
however, Liaquat told the press: 'There was no question 
of taking any stand regarding the Middle East' at the 
Prime Ministers' Conference. 'These conferences are 
held for mutual discussion and taking stock of the 
situation. There was no definite decision taken with 
regard to the matter.' He added significantly: 'Now I 
am better informed with regard to these matters than I 
was before.'^
Public support for Egypt had been quite vehement in 
Pakistan towards the end of 1950, and the Government was 
later criticised for what was regarded in some quarters 
as a lukewarm attitude towards both the Iranian and 
Egyptian causes. One of the most vocal of these critics 
was Mian Iftikharuddin, who, through his newspaper, The 
Pakistan Times, and in the Constituent Assembly, accused
the Government of subservience to British imperial 
designs.
The Government position was defended by the Acting 
Foreign Minister, Mahmud Hussain, who said that support
1
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had been given to Muslim causes through the United 
Nations.
That is our policy which we propose to 
follow and which we shall continue to follow 
whatever suggestions Mian Sahib may make 
with the regard to the sending of rifles and 
troops. That is not the way of dealing with 
problems in a practical manner. That is not 
how states behave ....1
Throughout the following months Pakistan's official 
policy changed little. On 2 November 1951 Zafrulla, 
in London, told the press that Pakistan had very friendly 
relations with both Egypt and the UK since it was an 
Asiatic and Muslim country on one hand and a member of 
the Commonwealth on the other. There had been no formal 
discussion of mediation but if Pakistan 'should be in any 
position to assist in arriving at a solution, we shall be 
too happy to do so.' He emphasised that Pakistan was 
very keenly interested in the security of the whole of 
the Middle East, including the Canal zone, both for the 
purpose of maintenance of international peace and also
from the viewpoint of Pakistan's communications with the
2 .West. During the UN Session he was in almost
1
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daily touch with the Egyptian Foreign Minister regarding 
the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.'*’
Zafrulla's London statement was carefully guarded,
no doubt directed at a British audience. The Prime
Minister, Nazimuddin, in a statement to parliament on
22 November 1951, made it clear that while Pakistan was
'vitally interested in peace and security in the Middle
East and in the prosperity and stability of the Muslim
countries comprised in it', this peace and security could
not be imposed from the outside. It could be maintained
only 'with the willing consent of the people in the area
2affected.'
6. The Attempt to Convene a Muslim Summit Conference,
1952.
During the United Nations Session at the end of 1951, 
Zafrulla had been in close touch with the Arab representatives 
mostly Foreign Ministers. This was a period of mounting 
crisis in the Middle East, and it no doubt appeared desirable 
that discussion initiated at this level should be continued
1
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in the form of a conference at Prime Ministerial level. 
The plan to draw the Muslim countries together for 
discussion and, hopefully, for cooperation ended in total 
collapse and marked the end of Pakistan's attempts to 
bring about any unified action among the Middle Eastern 
states as a group.
Zafrulla's first step was to visit Turkey, Lebanon, 
Syria and Egypt, a tour he was later accused of making 
at British and American instigation. This he denied 
outright: the invitation had been extended initially by 
the Turkish Foreign Minister and his acceptance on the 
advice of his Prime Minister had been a matter purely 
between the governments of Turkey and Pakistan.'*' The 
Turkish invitation had a significance which he did not 
mention, for in November 1951 Turkey, along with the 
USA, UK and France, had put forward what became known as 
the 'Four Power Proposals' on the defence of the Middle 
East. These proposals were rejected outright by Egypt 
and produced a revolutionary situation in Syria. The 
USSR sent Notes to all the Middle Eastern countries 
warning them against acceptance. Not only the USA and 
the UK, but also Turkey, were anxious that some agreement 
could be reached on regional defence arrangements, and 
wanted to narrow the gaps between the Arabs' position
Ibid., 1952, vol.I, 27 March 1952, p.615.
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and their own. It was perhaps hoped that Zafrulla would 
be able to assist them in gaining this objective.
Whatever the hopes may have been, they were vague
and unstated. Much later Zafrulla said that from the
beginning, when he first put forward the idea in Cairo,
he had in mind 'nothing more than that it was an
invitation that we should get together for the purpose
of devising a system of consultation upon matters of
common interest.1'*' A communique issued by the Turkish
Government, after his four-day visit to Ankara, was
couched in vague terms, merely stating that the talks
revealed that Turkey and Pakistan 'were unanimously
in agreement as to the necessity for the different
countries to live free from all pressure and from threat
an honourable and peaceful life with its basis in
equality' and 'agreed to the necessity of applying their
efforts in this sense, while remaining faithful to the
2principles of the United Nations.'
So far Pakistan had not been asked, even indirectly, 
to participate in any Middle East defence scheme,
Zafrulla said, but was interested in such arrangements 
as were made, and would study any such invitation when
1
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2
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it was received. Zafrulla's view was that the Suez issue 
should be settled before any agreement could be reached 
regarding defence, and he urged Britain to accept the 
idea that the 1936 Treaty was a dead letter.^-
When he returned to Karachi, he told the press that
he found a consciousness of kinship and common destiny
throughout the Muslim world, but that in order to survive
present dangers
we must now in all earnest begin to translate 
our consciousness of spiritual and cultural 
oneness into terms of practical politics.
What is essential at this stage is the creation 
of an appropriate system of consultation in all 
matters which affect us as a whole.
No specific proposals had so far been made: only after
initial consultation would it be possible to devise the
shape of the machinery necessary for the implementation
of Muslim unity and decide on ways and means to safeguard
2it. Whatever identity of views Zafrulla found in Ankara, 
Beirut, Damascus and Cairo, he encountered difficulty in 
actually convening the conference.
1
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At a Press Conference on 3 June he strongly denied
the assertion that the proposed conference was a 'flop'.^
At that stage no formal invitations had been sent out.
With the exception of one or two Muslim countries who
were hesitant, and which he declined to name, most had
2expressed willingness to attend such a conference. The
two countries indicating reluctance were Turkey and
Lebanon. Both were apparently disturbed at the religious
emphasis which they feared might be given the conference.
Turkey declined on the grounds that, as a secular state,
it could not attend a conference for which religion was
3the main criteria for invitation. Lebanon, always 
aware of its large Christian minority, was also wary of 
participating in associations with a strongly Muslim 
bias.
By mid-June it was announced that all the Arab League 
States except Lebanon had agreed to attend the Conference, 
expected to open on 15 July. Despite Zafrulla's 
insistence that no proposals had been made other than for 
a meeting, the issue became confused by talk of the
1
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formation of a Muslim bloc. The Secretary-General of the 
Arab League said that Pakistan had simply invited the 
Muslim countries to attend a Prime Ministers' conference 
in Karachi to study ways and means of evolving a system 
of consultation, and to this there was no objection.
The question of a pact was purely hypothetical. This 
view was echoed by the Egyptian Foreign Minister who 
said that Egypt would attend the conference, although it 
had not been decided whether the Prime Minister would 
lead the delegation. Egypt too was probably slightly 
wary of becoming involved at a high official level in 
an Islamic conference which went beyond the bounds of 
Arab nationalism, and to which India would be very 
likely to take exception. Pakistan had the full support, 
however, of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Supreme 
Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, both extremist, orthodox 
Muslims who not only favoured the conference, but also 
the idea of a Pan-Islamic Pact.'*'
Pakistan also had the support, which it might have 
preferred unvoiced, of the United States Ambassador in 
Karachi, who, speaking in Washington on 17 June, said 
that the purpose of the Pakistan Government in trying to 
create a consultative organisation of Muslim States was 
to encourage 'political and economic stability' in the
1
Dawn, 18 June 1952.
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Middle East. 'There is no doubt in my mind where Pakistan
stands on issues which involve world morality, and real -
not illusory - peace and security.1'*' The United States
was in favour of regional conferences, and therefore
supported the proposed Prime Ministers' conference.
America believed that it was being convened to deal with
2regional problems and that the basis was not religion.
Events, however, were working against the conference.
On 29 June the Pakistan Foreign Ministry issued a
statement announcing its postponement:
It was hoped that by the end of Ramazan the 
pressing domestic problems with which some of 
the invited countries were occupied would have 
sufficiently eased to enable the Prime 
Ministers of these countries to attend.
Unfortunately this has not proved to be the 
case.3
Conditions did not improve. On 23 July General Neguib 
seized power in Egypt, after which King Farouk abdicated 
and left the country. In a Press Statement, Zafrulla 
described the situation throughout the Middle East as
1
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precariously balanced between peace and disorder:
It is to be hoped that, in the first instance, 
law and order in all Middle East territories, 
in which Pakistan is also included, will be 
impartially, firmly, and, if necessary, even 
ruthlessly maintained, and that, in the second 
place, these policies will be put into 
operation with the single-minded purpose of 
promoting beneficient cooperation between 
different sections of the people of each 
country and between all the countries of the 
region.^
The tone of the statement seems to indicate that Zafrulla
himself had by this time given up hope of carrying through
his plans of a summit meeting. In November a Government
spokesman told the Constituent Assembly: 'In the present
circumstances it is difficult to predict when the
2proposed conference is likely to be held.1 Its 
abandonment marked the end of what might be termed the 
'Pan-Islamic' phase of Pakistan foreign policy.
Thereafter, the drift towards alignment gained momentum.
7. Conclusion
In 1947 Pakistan sought a solution within the 
framework of the British Commonwealth and the United
1
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2
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Nations to the international problems confronting it.
The lack of success achieved by it within the latter 
organisation underlined the necessity for Pakistan to 
have friends on whom it could rely. These it expected 
to find within the Commonwealth. While the Commonwealth 
was prepared to give Pakistan support in its quarrels 
with countries such as Afghanistan who did not belong to 
the association, in the matter of Kashmir, which for 
Pakistanis was much more important, the Commonwealth 
refused to become involved in a dispute between two of 
its members, and Pakistan received little satisfaction.
There followed attempts to build up relationships 
outside the Commonwealth, with Russia and America, and 
with the other Muslim countries, particularly in the 
Middle East. Religious fervour was high following the 
successful establishment of Pakistan, and the idealism 
which had demanded a separate state for the Muslims of 
the Indian subcontinent, and clamoured for a truly 
'Islamic' Constitution (as yet undefined), clamoured 
also for the extension of Islamic ideals into foreign 
policy. If it had been a sufficiently strong force to 
gain the Indian Muslims a country of their own, might 
it not be strong enough to carry the united Muslim world 
forward on the crest of an irresistible wave to victory 
in all their international objectives?
The Government therefore had popular support for 
its Middle East policy. It is hard to know to what
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extent Liaquat All Khan, Ghulam Mohammed and Iskandar 
Mirza were spurred on by this Pan-Islamic fervour, for 
to even the most westernised Pakistani, his identity as 
a Muslim is of great importance. It was probably a 
stronger driving force for Zafrulla and Nazimuddin, both 
more orthodox in their beliefs and practice. Certainly 
Pakistan's need for friends was an objective which 
all recognised, and no doubt even Liaquat expected that 
the Muslim countries would be predisposed to support 
Pakistan, if only they were made sufficiently aware of 
its problems; Ghulam Mohammed hoped that, through the 
IIEO, economic cooperation could lead to the strengthening 
of the Muslim countries as a group, and ultimately enable 
Pakistan to gain its objectives; and Zafrulla hoped that 
if the Prime Ministers could be brought together they 
could devise some formal machinery for consultation and 
presumably cooperation.
It was obvious by the end of 1952, if it had not 
been obvious earlier, that religion was not an effective 
rallying cry in the Middle East, and that, while its 
bilateral relations with the countries of the region 
were on the whole good, Pakistan's hopes of organising 
them to take concerted action, especially on its behalf, 
were vain. Those who attempted to implement such a 
policy had overlooked, or misunderstood, many realities 
in Middle East politics. Before Pakistan was created 
the Arab states had set up their own machinery for
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consultation in the Arab League. They preferred to 
cooperate, as best they could, on a basis of Arab 
nationalism rather than Islamic unity. They had their 
Council meetings, and Prime Ministers and Foreign 
Ministers met frequently to discuss matters of interest 
to themselves. Suggestions that the Arab League should 
be extended to non-Arab countries did not find favour 
among its members. Even while participating in the IIEO, 
they signed a Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation 
Treaty^- among themselves, and set up an Arab Economic 
Union. By the end of 1952 the Treaty had been ratified 
by Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and 
Lebanon. Yemeni ratification followed in 1953. So far 
as the Arab countries were concerned, Pakistan was 
superfluous.
Pakistan also misunderstood Turkish aversion to 
participation in overtly religious organisations and the 
determination with which Turkey pursued a European 
identity. In any case, the rift between Turkey and the 
Arab countries was too deep for Pakistan to draw them 
together with pious phrases, or even such energetic 
diplomacy as Zafrulla at times displayed.
1
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Iran, isolated like Pakistan, was perhaps most 
receptive to ideas of unity, but its relations with the 
Arabs were not easy, and during the period 1947-52 the 
internal situation was so unstable as to make it more 
than usually difficult for Iran to operate effectively 
within any sort of Middle East grouping.
By the end of 1952 Iran was not the only country 
with severe domestic problems: Egypt, Syria, Lebanon 
and Jordan had all experienced assassination, coup and 
counter-coup. Pakistan was forced to revise the 
strategy of its search for friends. It had tried hard 
in the Middle East, and ironically even the strength of 
its efforts helped defeat its purpose: the constant 
denials of a desire for leadership were not always 
considered convincing, sincere though they probably were.
Just as the Commonwealth was not totally abandoned 
by Pakistan, neither was the idea of Muslim unity. Even 
after the decision was taken to opt for a Western- 
oriented military alliance, the steps in this direction 
were initially with Muslim (albeit secular) Turkey and 
Iraq, and the drift towards alignment was guided as far 
as possible through Islamic channels. Hopes of 
economic cooperation were not forgotten either: these 
objectives were also pursued through the Baghdad Pact 
and later CENTO, and in Regional Cooperation for 
Development (RCD) one finds more than a hint of Ghulam 
Mohammed's International Islamic Economic Organization.
152
CHAPTER IV
The Drift Towards Alignment 
in the Middle East, 1953-55
1. Introduction
Questions of a defence system for the Middle East 
had been discussed in Western capitals virtually since 
the end of the Second World War but, while Pakistan 
expressed concern for the security of the region from 
time to time, no move was made towards participation 
until the second half of 1953. It is in some ways 
unreal to set arbitrary dates in this way, for the drift 
towards alignment began before 1953, perhaps as early as 
1951.^ The exact date is debatable. What is certain is 
that the 'Pan-Islamic phase' did not outlast 1952: it 
had become perfectly clear that the Muslim countries, 
especially Egypt and Turkey, were less than enthusiastic 
about the ideas emanating from Karachi.
Pakistan's entry into the Middle East defence system 
is frequently linked without question to the decision to
1
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align itself to the West: first the agreement with 
Turkey in February 1954, then the Mutual Security 
Agreement with the United States in May, SEATO in 
September, then, a year later in September 1955, almost 
inevitably, adherence to the Baghdad Pact. This is 
perhaps an oversimplification. The negotiations for the 
agreements with Turkey and America are inextricably 
mixed, but they did satisfy two Pakistan policy 
objectives: to strengthen its defence vis-a-vis India, 
and to achieve close cooperation with other Muslim 
countries. This did not occur in the manner in which 
the Pakistan Government would perhaps have liked: an 
agreement concluded with Arab approval would have been 
preferable, as would have been the absence of US 
pressure and interference.
Considering these two policy objectives, there are 
several questions which need to be examined: why was the 
Turkey-Pakistan agreement not used as a basis for the 
Middle East defence system as, according to many 
statements at the time, was intended? Why, if a new
1
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pact was needed, was Pakistan not a founder member of it? 
Why did Pakistan's Government take so many months to 
announce its decision to join the Turkey-Iraq Pact, and 
so many more months before formal accession took place?
If answers are to be sought, it is impossible to 
treat Pakistani action in a vacuum: it is necessary to 
take into consideration the attitudes to defence of the 
Middle East of others concerned in it. The British, the 
Americans, the Arab states, the Turks and the Iranians 
all had their own views of the desirability of various 
systems of defence, as well as the Pakistanis. There 
were conflicting hopes and objectives. It is within 
this context that Pakistani decisions were made and 
action taken.
2. Attitudes to Defence of the Middle East before 1953
(i) Britain and the United States
After the Second World War British and American 
interests in the Middle East coincided to a very large 
extent, although there were some significant differences, 
particularly with regard to the question of Palestine. 
Britain, as a major European power with considerable 
interests in India and the Far East, had been accustomed 
to regard the security of the Middle East as strategically 
vital. Central to this strategy was the security of the
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Suez Canal area. American interests in the region had by- 
contrast been minimal, confined to a few missionaries, 
some educational institutions and a small but growing 
involvement in oil exploration and production, none of 
which had called for participation by the United States 
Government.
After 1945 the region gained new importance in the
light of the developing cold war between Russia and the
West, in that it was the source of most of Europe's
oil supply, on which the economies of the West European
countries were becoming increasingly dependent. This
aspect was of special concern to Britain, but also to
the United States, aware of the growing fuel needs of
Western Europe and fearing America's inability to
meet more than its own domestic needs.'*’ There was
some apprehension, particularly regarding the Iranian
oilfields, that the Soviet Union could be in a position
to deny oil to the West, even if it could not make use
2of the oil itself.
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United States interest was directed therefore mainly
towards the countries along the Soviet borders. In March
1947 President Truman, in response to Soviet pressure in
the area, declared the defence of Greece and Turkey vital
to the USA and agreed to give them military aid. Aid was
also extended to Iran, whose internal security was thought
to be threatened by the presence of Russian troops, and
later by Russian activities in the north-west.'*’ In May
1951 Truman introduced his Mutual Security Programme
designed to assist the countries of the area to withstand
the pressures exerted on them and to progress towards
2stability and improved living conditions.
Britain was at this stage engaged in disputes with
both Iran and Egypt over Iran's nationalisation of the
3Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Egyptian demands that
1
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Britain evacuate the Suez Canal base and recognise 
Egypt's claims regarding the Sudan. The British 
Government regarded the maintenance of a base in Suez 
and access to Iranian oil as vital, and Anthony Eden 
(who became Foreign Secretary once more following the 
Conservative victory in the October 1951 General 
Election) was especially concerned that British prestige 
in the region would be seriously threatened if Britain 
permitted international agreements such as the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the agreements between the 
AIOC and Iran to be unilaterally denounced. This led 
him to take a more or less uncompromising line which the 
Americans, lacking sympathy for what appeared to them 
British colonialism, could not fully support. The 
American policy was to attempt to minimise the differences 
between the Middle Eastern countries and the West, and to 
convince the former that 'their best hope for survival 
lies in firm support of the principle of collective 
security.'^  To this end the United States joined with 
Britain, France and Turkey in putting forward the plan 
(known as the Four Power Proposals) of an Allied Middle 
East Command to Egypt in October 1951. The Arab response 
to this plan was entirely negative, and the new Republican 
Administration which came to power in the United States
1
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in 1953, while still committed to the idea of regional 
security, revised its approach to the problem.
Following a tour of the Middle East and South Asia
in May 1953, the new Secretary of State, Dulles,
concluded that:
a Middle East Defence Organization is a 
future rather than an immediate 
possibility. Many of the Arab League 
countries are so engrossed with their 
quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain 
or France that they pay little heed to the 
menace of Soviet communism. However, there 
is more concern where the Soviet Union is 
near. In general the northern tier of 
nations shows awareness of the danger.
There is a vague desire to have a 
collective security system. But no such 
system can be imposed from without. It 
should be designed and grow from within 
out of a sense of common destiny and 
common danger.
While awaiting the formal creation of 
a security association, the United States 
can usefully help strengthen the 
interrelated defense of those countries 
which want strength, not as against each 
other or the West, but to resist the common 
threat to all free peoples.^
1
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(ii) The Arab Countries
Although a single Arab attitude to the question of 
Middle East defence could not be said to exist, there 
were several fairly common reactions. The Arabs were in 
general unimpressed by Western fears of Soviet communism, 
replying that it was from the old colonial powers of 
Europe with whom they were now being asked to cooperate 
that they had suffered aggression in the past. Egypt 
was in the midst of a dispute over the presence on its 
soil of British troops, and Iraq was anxious to revise 
an old and increasingly unpopular treaty with the UK.
Consequently the Four Power Proposals of October
1951, suggesting the establishment of an Allied Middle 
East Command, in which the countries of the area able and 
willing to contribute to its defence should participate, 
were put to Egypt.^ Egypt was invited to become a founder 
member, and the British base at Suez would then become an 
Allied base. The proposals were rejected out of hand by 
the Egyptian Government which said that it could not 
consider these or any other proposals concerning the 
differences outstanding between the UK and Egypt while 
there were British forces of occupation in Egypt and
1
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the Sudan. This rejection was followed almost immediately 
by the abrogation by Egypt of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 
1936. Despite the instability and lack of consensus which 
plagued Egyptian politics during the early 1950s the 
different men who came to power generally held the view 
that the evacuation of British troops from the Canal zone 
was not negotiable. All that remained to be discussed 
was the manner and time of their departure.
It was generally considered that the Arab Security 
Pact of 1950, which regarded armed aggression against 
one of the signatories to be aggression against all, was 
the proper framework for a Middle East defence system.
If the Western countries were really interested in the 
defence of the region, they could contribute military 
assistance to this organisation.
This was not a satisfactory proposition to the US 
or the UK for a number of reasons. The Arab Security 
Pact was regarded by the signatories as directed 
primarily against Israel, and neither of these Western 
powers could support this. It was confined to members
160
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1
Statement issued Cairo, 14 October 1951. See Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives, 1951, p.11776.
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of the Arab League, and Britain and America were concerned 
that non-Arab countries, especially Turkey and Iran, 
should be part of any Middle East defence arrangement. 
Since, in any case, their objective was the containment 
of Soviet communism and the protection of their oil 
resources, such a pact did not suit their purposes at all. 
There was apparently, then, no meeting point between the 
Arabs' view of their own requirements and the Western 
conception of Middle East defence.
The unity of the Arab states on this question was 
however undermined by the rivalry between Egypt and 
Iraq, and the antagonism which existed between the 
Saudis and the Hashemite kings of Jordan and Iraq. This 
was accentuated-by the resentment which grew with time 
at Egyptian demands that its own disputes with the UK be 
settled before any Arab state should conclude an 
agreement with any Western country. It began to appear 
that the Anglo-Egyptian dispute was frozen into 
stalemate and Iraq in particular was unwilling to permit 
considerations of its own security to remain dependent 
on Egyptian policy. Consequently Iraq showed interest 
in the Turkey-Pakistan agreement of April 1954, and 
itself signed an agreement with Turkey in February 1955. 
The Egyptian reaction was one of violent opposition, in 
which they received Saudi support, for they regarded 
these agreements as the thin end of a wedge which would
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destroy the unity of the Arab world and their own hopes 
of leadership within it. It led also to a struggle 
between these two for influence over the smaller Arab 
states, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, which further 
undermined such unity as may have existed.
(iii) Turkey
Turkey was the only country of the region which,
in the years just after the Second World War, shared
the US and UK interpretation of the Soviet threat to the
area.'*' The aid coming to Turkey under the Truman doctrine
was therefore welcomed, but regarded as insufficient.
Convinced that the security of Italy and the eastern
Mediterranean depended on the security of Greece and
Turkey, and that the Middle East should therefore be
2taken into account at well, the Turks were anxious also
1
L.V. Thomas and R.N. Frye, The United States and 
Turkey and Iran (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 
Mass., 1951), p.148. Russia had a traditional interest 
in gaining access to the Mediterranean from the Black 
Sea, and in 1940 and again in 1945 gave notice of a 
desire to alter the situation in its favour, demanding 
virtual control over the Straits and the cession of 
territory in the Kars and Ardahan region of eastern 
Anatolia. See DSB, 19 November 1951, p.811.
2
The Times, 21 March and 3 December 1949.
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to establish their identity as part of Europe rather than
the Middle East. Membership of NATO became their
'irreducible minimum demand' for which they pressed 'with
all means at their disposal.'^ They refused to accept
2the US view that the countries of the region 'were still 
politically and militarily too weak and unreliable to 
offer solid ground on which an efficient organization 
like that of the Atlantic Pact can be built.' Finally 
Turkey was admitted to full membership of NATO by a 
protocol signed on 22 October 1951, effective the following 
February.
Having gained its objective of becoming part of the 
European defence system, Turkey was still anxious that 
its eastern and southern flank should be protected by 
some sort of security arrangement for the Middle East.
For this reason the Turkish Government supported the Four 
Power Proposals of October 1951. Reactivation of the Suez 
base in the event of attack on Turkey remained a British 
demand, one to which the Egyptian Government reluctantly 
agreed in 1954. With this in mind, Turkey was anxious 
that an Anglo-Egyptian settlement be reached, and the
1
Thomas and Frye, p.150.
2
Put forward in Ankara by Assistant Secretary of State 
George McGhee, The Times, 3 December 1949.
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Ambassador in London urged Eden to come to an agreement 
with General Neguib, to which Eden apparently replied by 
suggesting that the Turks 'continue to impress upon him 
that he must go some way to meet us.'^
Turkey had as little influence in Cairo as it
2appeared to have in London. Although hopeful of
persuading Egypt to come around to the Turkish point of
view, Turkey meanwhile turned its attention, with US
encouragement, to Pakistan and Iraq, two countries
willing to follow the lead it was prepared to give in
3building up Middle Eastern defence.
1
Eden, p.245.
2
The Turks attributed the distrust in a number of Arab 
countries to 'an emotional state of mind which prevents 
those countries taking a realistic view. Egyptian 
sensitiveness, it is believed, is aggravated by the fear 
that Turkey may displace Egypt in leadership of the Arab 
world, especially after the signature of the treaty 
between Turkey and Pakistan.' Report from The Times' 
Istanbul correspondent following a conference of Turkish 
diplomats in Arab countries, 12 July 1954.
3
J.C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (Published 
for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & 
Brothers: New York, 1958), p.52.
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There is in Iran a tradition of neutrality, and 
Iranians take pride in the survival of their nation for 
over two thousand years despite invasion and conquest, 
which, they proudly claim, they have never resisted. 
While under a direct threat from the USSR in the form of 
the presence of Soviet troops immediately after the War, 
and Soviet activity in Azerbaijan, conditions within the 
country were so chaotic as to make participation in 
regional defence arrangements impossible.
Under the Mossadeq regime a suddenly reawakened 
nationalism led to the nationalisation of the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company in May 1951, precipitating a dispute 
with the UK which lasted until 1954. Mossadeq had the 
support of leftist elements, especially the Tudeh Party 
which received financial backing from the USSR. Also 
strongly nationalist were some right wing groups, led 
in the Majlis by Maulana Kashani, who nevertheless was 
personally opposed to Mossadeq. The Fedayyeen, bearing 
close resemblance to the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab 
world, was also extremely nationalistic.
Between these two extremes the Shah held a 
precarious balance, which almost collapsed in August
1953 when he fled the country. The situation was, 
however, reversed by an army counter-coup led by General 
Zahedi, and Mossadeq was overthrown. Negotiations then
(iv) Iran
166
began towards a settlement with the British, finally- 
achieved in August 1954. Not until over a year later 
did the Shah judge his position sufficiently secure for 
him to commit Iran to membership of the Baghdad Pact.
The commitment was a personal one: of the Shah to the 
West; and, by inference, of the West, especially the 
USA, to the Shah.
(v) Pakistan
Pre-Partition India had been an important defence 
base for Britain. In the Persian Gulf area, as on the 
North-West Frontier, Pakistan inherited a strategic 
responsibility.'*' Although aware of the gap left by their
1
'Any concept of defence in this region must take account 
of Pakistan as the largest, if not the most experienced, 
Muslim State, and of India as the geographical centre of 
southern Asia.' Thus wrote Olaf Caroe, an Englishman 
with long experience of India, and the last British 
Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, in 1949.
He went on to argue for a defence organisation centred 
on the Persian Gulf which he maintained was far more the 
hub of the Muslim world than Cairo. See Round Table,
March 1949. With the Persian Gulf oil in mind, he 
enlarged on this argument three years later: the 
regional grouping proper for the defence of the Nearer 
and Middle East was not around the Mediterranean. It 
was the ring of Muslim states of South-Western Asia, 
from Turkey to Arabia and Pakistan, roughly gathered 
around the Persian Gulf. See Olaf Caroe, Wells of Power 
(Macmillan: London, 1951), pp.193-4.
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withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent, the British 
Government was reportedly at first reluctant to support 
plans for a defence system which would include Pakistan, 
fearing that such a move would antagonise the USSR 
unnecessarily, further alienate Nehru, and make a 
settlement of the Suez dispute more difficult.'*’
Pakistan's view of Middle East defence and its own
part in it took time to form. Pakistan took no part in
the early discussions of Middle East defence. It was not
represented at the Commonwealth talks on this subject
held in London in January 1951. According to the British
Defence Minister, the Pakistan Government was aware of
the conference but did not indicate its intention of
attending. Liaquat Ali Khan said that Pakistan had not
attended the talks because it was unwilling to be involved
in any such plans on account of its political and military
2responsibilities in Kashmir.
Regarding the Four Power Proposals, the Pakistan view 
developed in support of the Egyptian stand that no such 
defence plan could be put into action until the major
1
Welles Hangen, writing in The New York Times,
29 January 1954, p.5.
2
Shinwell and Liaquat statements, reported Dawn, 23 June
1951.
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disputes in the area had been resolved. 1 It is 
inconceivable to me,1 said Zafrulla Khan, 'that any kind 
of defence plan [could be implemented] without the consent 
and cooperation of the countries of the area concerned.1'*'
Through 1953, rumours that Pakistan had been invited
2to join 'MEDO' (as it was then called) proliferated,
supported by Turkish statements that such an invitation
3should be extended and by the visit of US military
4experts to Pakistan. A change in Pakistan policy was
foreshadowed in a speech by the Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, Professor Bokhari, who said that
Pakistan needed friends to support it in the UN if it
were to get a 'just and fair settlement' of the Kashmir
dispute. Pakistan had friends in the Middle East because
of religious and cultural links, but the area had its own
problems and difficulties, and was not as highly
5developed as Europe or America.
1
Zafrulla statement, Pakistan News, 9 December 1951.
2
Middle East Defence Organization.
3
Statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mehmet Fuad 
Koprulu, The Pakistan Times, 5 January 1953.
4
Ibid., 27 January 1953.
5
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The need for aid was becoming more pressing as a 
result of falling jute and cotton prices following the 
end of the fighting in Korea in July 1953. If industrial 
development was to proceed at the necessary pace, much 
equipment had to be imported: the fall in foreign exchange
earnings was therefore especially serious. In addition, 
through 1953, a growing food shortage placed even more 
pressure on the Pakistan Government to seek help 
elsewhere. There were, then, many indications that 
Pakistan would seek some kind of aid from the United 
States. But there was no particular reason to believe, 
at least at this stage, that its views on Middle East 
defence had altered.
In January the Prime Minister, Nazimuddin, denied
that any talks of this nature were going on.'*' Zafrulla,
visiting Cairo and Baghdad in February, said that
Pakistan had received no invitation from the Western
powers to join any Middle East defence organisation,
although 'technical proposals' had been received.
Pakistan was, however, interested in Middle East defence,
2and general discussions had taken place.
1
Ibid., 30 January 1953.
2
Ibid., 22 February, 3 March 1953.
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At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in
June the new Pakistan Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali,
emphasised the importance of building up the defensive
strength of the Middle East countries, but maintained
that to achieve this disputes in the area should be
settled.'*' After talks with Neguib and Nehru in Cairo
later that month Mohammed Ali spoke of the need to
organise collective defence in the Middle East, but
added that Pakistan was whole-heartedly behind Egypt's
2case for full sovereignty over its territory.
During the second half of 1953 Pakistan entered 
bilateral negotiations with the United States and Turkey. 
It became clear that US military aid was contingent on 
the signing of a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, 
and also to some extent on the development of a regional 
association. Pakistan would probably have preferred the 
former without the latter, for the establishment of a 
regional organisation was bound to offend the Arabs, 
especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which Pakistan wished 
to avoid. The agreement with Turkey did have the 
advantage, however, in the context of domestic politics,
1
The Pakistan Times, 8 June 1953.
2
Ibid., 23 June 1953.
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of permitting the Government to present the new policy in 
terms of furthering Islamic cooperation.
3. United States Military Aid to Pakistan and the 
Signing of the Turkey-Pakistan Friendly
Cooperation Agreement
As 1953 was the year of the development of a new 
policy of alignment in Pakistan, so it was the year of the 
new Republican Administration in the United States, 
bringing some significant changes in the US approach to 
problems of Middle Eastern defence. The attempt to set 
up a Middle Eastern Command with Egyptian cooperation 
was clearly unacceptable to Egypt, and therefore 
unworkable. Some alternative had to be found. In May
1953 the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, 
toured Asia and the Middle East, assessing the situation 
and emphasising the need for collective regional defence. 
He had no formula to propose but said: 'I have a high 
regard for the contribution which Pakistan could make in 
the defence of freedom. I am confident that whatever 
the development, Pakistan will play a positive and 
constructive role....1
From the changed assessment of these two governments 
came a new policy, described by an Indian writer in the
1
The Pakistan Times, 2 5 May 1953.
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following terms:
There are two views of the development of 
this alignment. The one held by most Pakistanis 
is that after trying to maintain a neutralist 
position for five years, they discovered that 
Pakistan needed strong allies against India 
and it joined the United States in defence 
pacts. The other view is the one held by some 
US observers (eg. Selig Harrison) and some 
Indians that Pakistan was always anxious to 
do so and it is the United States which now had 
an administration which welcomed Pakistan.!
There is probably considerable truth in both views, which
are not entirely incompatible.
In the second half of 1953 feelers were put out by 
Pakistan for US military aid. At the same time tentative 
diplomatic approaches commenced between Turkey and Pakistan 
for the conclusion of some kind of pact of more substance 
than the Friendship Treaty signed in July 1951, or the 
Cultural Agreement of June 1953. While Pakistanis tend 
to present these two moves as separate diplomatic 
achievements, it is clear that Pakistan-US negotiations 
and Turkey-Pakistan negotiations were intricately 
interwoven. A quick glance at the chronological 
development reinforces this view. Although official
1
Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia 
(Asia Publishing House: Bombay, 1964), p.136.
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Pakistani statements were few and far between, the American 
press made several references to US involvement.^"
In mid-September the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief,
General Ayub Khan, accompanied by General Iskandar Mirza,
Under-Secretary for War, visited Turkey, and the United
States, where he discussed the possibility of US aid in
2re-equipping the Pakistan forces. The Governor-General, 
Ghulam Mohammed, was also in America at this time.
Rumours that the United States was to be given bases in 
Pakistan in return for aid were denied by both Pakistan
3and US official sources.
On his way home Ghulam Mohammed visited Egypt, where 
he was reported to have assured Egyptian leaders that
1
For example, W.H. Waggoner, The New York Times,
6 January 1954, p.l, and C.L. Sulzberger, ibid.,
19 January 1955, p.26.
2
The Times, 15, 16 September 1953.
3
Ghulam Mohammed, The Times, 20 November 1953. Dulles, 
on 16 November, had reassured the Indian Ambassador in 
Washington that no plan for military agreement existed, 
but refused to rule out the possibility of such 
negotiations in the future. At a press conference the 
following day he stated that no negotiations were taking 
place between the US and Pakistan regarding military aid 
or bases. Ibid., 18 November 1953.
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Pakistan would not conclude an agreement with Western 
powers unless the Egyptian conflict was first resolved. 
From Cairo he went to Ankara, on what was officially 
described as a 'goodwill visit' The Times commented 
that while Turkish officials were likely to leave the 
initiative in any defence plan to American diplomacy,
1 in view of the close relations between Ankara and 
Washington it is believed that Turkey would support any 
security plan that was sponsored by the US Government.' 
The suggestion that Pakistan be drawn into a regional
defence organisation had come from the Turkish Foreign
. . 3Minister, Koprulu, as early as January 1953.
On 17 December Mohammed Ali revealed that some
informal talks about the supply of military equipment
to Pakistan had taken place, but his government was
neither negotiating any pact for the lease of military
bases in Pakistan nor was it committing Pakistan to the
4defence of any area other than its own region. In a
1
The Pakistan Times, 6 December 1953.
2
The Times, 28 November 1953.
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The Pakistan Times, 5 January 1953.
4
Press conference, Karachi, 17 December, ibid., 
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broadca.st on 1 January he said that any aid from the USA 
to Pakistan, military or otherwise, would be without 
strings attached to it.'*’ The rumours of impending formal 
negotiations continued, but nothing definite occurred. 
Further delays were reported by The Pakistan Times, which 
said that in the US view military aid and some form of 
defence agreement were interdependent.^
Meanwhile Zafrulla Khan went on a tour of Middle
East capitals, including Teheran, Damascus and Amman.
This was apparently an attempt to gauge opinion in the
region and perhaps to gain some support and allay suspicion
regarding the forthcoming agreements, almost certainly
planned at this stage. Whatever the discussions, an
Iranian official spokesman referred to press speculation
on a possible pact between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as
'the result of the fertile imagination of journalists'
and appealed for more discretion in discussing the
3country's foreign policy. In Damascus Zafrulla tried 
to take the heat out of speculation: there had been no 
talks between Pakistan and the US for conclusion of a
1
Ibid., 2 January 1954.
2
Ibid., 26 January 1954.
3
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military pact, he said. All that had happened was that 
the Pakistan commander of the border areas had discussed 
with American authorities the possibilities of obtaining 
arms and equipment for the Pakistan army. Pakistan did 
not intend to interfere in the creation of a Middle East 
defence organisation, and was not working for the 
establishment of a third world bloc.'*’
In January President Celal Bayar of Turkey visited
the USA. His visit was immediately linked in press
reports with the reports of US-Pakistan negotiations.
It was suggested that Pakistan-US negotiations were held
up until discussions had taken place between Bayar and 
2US officials. Turkey and Pakistan were ready, the
reports said, to begin negotiations for a military pact
which would be supported by US aid. Confirmation was
3claimed from 'authoritative sources' in Ankara. The 
Times' correspondent reported that Turkey, although 
willing to support such a plan, realised that the removal 
of political obstacles and the provision of adequate
1
The Times, 31 December 1953; The Pakistan Times,
1 January 1954.
2
The Pakistan Times, 26 January 1954.
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Ibid., 27, 28 January 1954.
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military assistance to the countries involved were
essential, and that these objectives could best be
achieved by appropriate action on the part of the US,
with the cooperation and approval of other members of
NATO. 'It is felt that this subject was probably
examined during President Bayar's visit to Washington,
to be followed by direct conversations between Ankara
and Karachi.'"*' In mid-February the National Security
Council decided to give military aid to Pakistan, but
the decision was not to be announced until a treaty
between Turkey and Pakistan was concluded. The aid
would then be given to the organisation, which it was
2hoped Iran and Iraq might join.
Mohammed Ali said on 14 February that Pakistan was
negotiating a political, cultural and economic treaty
3with Turkey: defence cooperation was not mentioned.
In a joint communique issued on 19 February it was 
announced that Pakistan and Turkey had reached agreement 
on the methods of achieving closer friendly collaboration
1
The Times, 29 January 1954.
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in political, economic and cultural spheres as well as of 
strengthening peace and security in their own interest 
and also in that of all peace loving nations.'*'
On 21 February Pakistan formally sought US military
assistance 'within the scope of the US Mutual Security
legislation'. Before making the request Pakistan had
informed itself of the requirements of the US Mutual
Security legislation and found itself in agreement with
them. In cooperation with other friendly and freedom
loving nations, Pakistan could make an important
contribution to the strength and stability of the region.
As a preliminary step in that direction it had recently
announced its intention of achieving closer collaboration
2with Turkey.
President Eisenhower said on 25 February that the
US would comply with Pakistan's request for aid, and
3welcomed the agreement with Turkey, which was eventually 
signed on 2 April. The Mutual Security Agreement between 
the United States and Pakistan was signed on 19 May.
1
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4. Reactions to the Agreements with Turkey and the USA
(i) Britain and the United States
The reactions to these agreements varied from
satisfaction in London'*' and Washington to disapproval
bordering on hostility in Cairo, New Delhi and Moscow.
The furore aroused by the Turkey-Pakistan pact was out of
all proportion to the innocuous terms of the document: it
was much more a reaction to the view, widely expressed,
that this treaty was to be the basis of a regional defence
system. Not only did it provide for extended membership,
but the Foreign Ministers of both countries stated clearly
2that such a possibility had been actively considered. In 
any case, a glance at a map revealed the nonsense of any
1
Initial British objections were apparently only 
overcome when 'it was explained that the projected 
Turkey-Pakistan entente would not automatically commit 
either party to military or other means to assist others 
in the event of aggression. High ranking United States 
officials were reported to have assured the British that 
the accord envisaged political collaboration and military 
consultations. It did not embrace joint defense 
planning.' Welles Hangen, The New York Times, 29 January
1954, p.5.
2
Statements by Zafrulla and Koprulu, The Times,
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other view:
So far, the Turkish-Pakistani pact, which it 
was hoped would be a cornerstone for a strong 
Middle Eastern edifice, has proved to be, as 
one observer put it, a 'formalization of a 
weakness'. Turkey is militarily strong - quite 
strong defensively; and Pakistan has inherent 
elements of military strength. But nearly all 
the vast area in between, with the exception 
of limited defensive strength in Israel and 
good but very small forces in Jordan, is 
virtually a military vacuum.^
(ii) The Arab Countries
The instand US and UK approval and the obvious 
involvement of the latter gave the agreements a sinister 
hue when viewed from Cairo or Riadh. It was not the pact 
itself but the fear that Iraq would be drawn into it that 
brought such a strong reaction, especially from Egypt.
For the Egyptian Government believed that such a move 
would divide the Arab world while Egypt was still 
attempting to settle its differences with the UK, and 
while the Palestine question remained unsolved. Cairo 
Radio reported a statement by President Neguib that a 
pact between the United States and Pakistan would be 
regarded as a hostile act against the Arab countries.
2The Embassy in Karachi immediately denied the reports,
1
Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, 16 November 1954, 
p.6.
2
The Pakistan Times, 2 February 1954.
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but not long after Salah Salim revealed that a statement
by Neguib, violently critical of Pakistan and against the
policy of the National Revolutionary Council/ had been
suppressed.'*' The apprehension felt in Egypt had
however been expressed by the Commander-in-Chief, Major-
General Hakim Araer, who said:
We would regard Iraq's possible gravitation 
towards the Middle East Defence Organization 
as a very serious matter. Iraq is a 
signatory to the Arab Security Pact and has 
no right unilaterally to drag her Arab 
sister nations into new military commitments.
It would not be in the interest of Egypt or any 
other Arab country to join a Turkish-Pakistani alliance/ 
or any other alliance before achieving full freedom and
independence. The Arab Collective Security Pact was
. . 3sufficient for the purpose of organising Arab defence.
In Iraq the idea of association with the 
Turkey-Pakistan pact was opposed by extreme left and 
right wing groups, and the Egyptian press and radio
1
The New York Times, 27 February 1954, p.2.
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The Pakistan Times, 29 December 1953.
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Wing-Commander Abdel Latif Baghdadi/ Egyptian Minister 
of War and Marine, in an interview with al-Ahram (Cairo). 
Quoted in The Times/ 23 February 1954.
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called on resistance to any such move from 'the streets of
Baghdad'. ^ Although Iraq had not been invited to join the
pact, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Fadhil Jamali, said that
any such invitation would be considered in the light of
the country's interests. Irritated by the Egyptian
attacks, he added: 'We say to our sister Arab states and
anyone else that Iraq will sign any pact she likes if and
2when she sees fit.' Within a fortnight King Faisal, the
ex-Regent, Crown Prince Abdul Ilah and Nuri es-Said
visited Pakistan, amid reports that defence talks would
take place. Nuri stated that it was the duty of the
Iraqi government to undertake consultations with responsible
persons in neighbouring states, for the safety of Iraq
depended upon that of its neighbours. He assured
apprehensive Arab listeners, however, that no matter
what the results of the consultations might be, it was in
the interests of Iraq to uphold the principle of not
assuming any responsibilities or commitments outside its
3frontiers and those of the Arab states.
1
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Arab opinion seems to have been taken quite 
seriously by the Pakistan Government, which made a number 
of attempts to explain away the aspects which the Arabs 
found unpalatable. Neguib apparently accepted an 
invitation to visit Pakistan but the visit was never 
made, either because of his own disinclination to do so 
or as a result of his uncertain position within Egypt. 
King Saud, also suspicious of the pact, visited Pakistan 
in April. There was speculation on the visit and the 
subjects discussed, but very few official statements of 
substance and no joint communique.
Just before the signing of the Mutual Security 
Agreement with the US, Zafrulla Khan paid a two-day visit 
to Egypt, during which he endeavoured to explain 
Pakistan's reasons for concluding these agreements before 
the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, despite 
previous pledges to the contrary, and to assure the 
Egyptians that this did not mean desertion of Arab 
causes on the part of Pakistan. While the Egyptian press 
was unimpressed,^ Zafrulla appeared to have had some 
success at the official level. Major-General Hakim Amer, 
in an interview with al-Ahram, acknowledged that urgent
1
The Cairo newspaper al-Akhbar reportedly stated that 
the pact with Turkey was not expected of a country whose 
leaders had previously assured Egypt that the Egyptian 
national cause was Pakistan's principal preoccupation. 
Ibid., 18 May 1954.
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local and regional necessities lay behind Pakistan's 
decision to enter the pact with Turkey. He added, 
however, that any Arab state adhering to the pact would 
be regarded by Egypt as having violated the charter of 
the Arab League.'*’
In June Mohammed Ali went to Turkey for the formal
ratification ceremony, visiting Beirut and Damascus at
the same time. Although not opposed to consideration of
some kind of agreement with the West, Lebanon was
2disturbed at Turkish support for Israel. Syria was in
the throes of a cabinet crisis, and it is doubtful what
influence his arguments could have had on the preoccupied
politicians in Damascus, although he gave the assurance
that Israel would not be allowed to join the pact. The
3Turkish Government also supported this view.
(iii) India
India too opposed both US aid to Pakistan and the 
pact between Pakistan and Turkey on the grounds that the 
balance of power in the subcontinent would be upset and
1
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the cold war brought to India's borders. Such an
expansion of Pakistan's war resources, Nehru said, would 
be looked upon as an unfriendly act in India. Promising 
discussions between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir 
question had taken place through the second half of 1953, 
particularly regarding the question of demilitarisation 
and the appointment of a plebiscite administrator. The 
decision regarding US military aid led Nehru to declare:
'Inevitably it will affect the major question that we 
are considering, and, more especially, the Kashmir 
issue....The whole issue will change its face completely 
if heavy militarization of Pakistan takes place.' In 
those circumstances, he said, it became ridiculous to 
discuss the demilitarisation of Kashmir.'*'
Indian hostility to the proposal probably contributed 
to the delay in the agreement between Pakistan and the US, 
for while the Defence Department was anxious to extend the
1
Letter from Nehru to Mohammed Ali, 9 December 1953. 
Kashmir, Meetings and Correspondence between the Prime 
Ministers of India and Pakistan (July 1953 - October 
1954), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 
October 1954.
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network of alliances, the State Department was hesitant
about antagonising India.'*' The US Ambassador in New
Delhi said in December that, while the Indian reaction
to an American military alliance with Pakistan would be
taken into consideration, India would not be allowed to
2veto it. Despite attempts on the part of both US and
Pakistani leaders to convince the Indian Government that
3such aid was not for 'aggressive purposes', Indian
hostility did not diminish, and a US offer of similar
4aid to India was rejected out of hand by Nehru.
(iv) The USSR
In a Note of 30 November 1953 the USSR drew the 
attention of the Pakistan Government to
1
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187
the fact that the Soviet Union cannot be 
indifferent to the news concerning the 
aforementioned negotiations [between Pakistan 
and the USA], since the conclusion of an 
agreement concerning the establishment of 
American air bases on the territory of 
Pakistan, that is to say, in an area situated 
near the frontiers of the USSR, and the 
joining of Pakistan in the plans to set up 
the aforementioned bloc in the Middle East 
have a direct bearing on the security of the 
Soviet Union.!
In reply Pakistan denied that there had ever been
any question of granting bases to the USA. It did not
contemplate taking any hostile or unfriendly step towards
the USSR, but maintained that it was its duty to 'take
2every step to safeguard the security of Pakistan'.
The USSR remained unplacated, and on 18 and 26 March
1954 sent Notes to the governments of Turkey and Pakistan
3respectively, protesting against the conclusion of the
1
Note from the USSR to Pakistan on the Defence Negotiations 
Between Pakistan and the USA, 30 November 1953, in Denise 
Folliot, Documents on International Affairs 1953, (OUP: 
London, 1956), pp.266-7.
2
The Pakistani reply to the Russian Note of 30 November,
20 December 1953, ibid., p.268.
3
Russian Note to Turkey, 18 March 1954, and Russian Note 
to Pakistan, 26 March 1954. See Documents on International 
Affairs 1954, pp.179 and 182 respectively.
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Pakistan-Turkish agreement. On 8 July a Note was also
presented to Iran, referring to the Soviet-Iranian
Agreement on guarantees and neutrality of 1927, and
seeking explanation of reports
regarding measures undertaken by the United 
States government and the governments of 
certain other countries for the purpose of 
drawing Iran into the aggressive military 
bloc being created in the Near and Middle 
East on the basis of the Turkish-Pakistan 
military alliance concluded last April.!
5. Negotiation of the Baghdad Pact
Despite this strong regional opposition (perhaps, 
at least in the case of the Soviet response, because of 
it) negotiations towards a Middle East defence system 
continued. The Baghdad Pact between Turkey and Iraq was 
signed on 24 February 1955. Pakistani accession was not 
however formalised until 23 September 1955, although 
Pakistan's intention to adhere had been announced early 
in July, and the decision was reported to have been made 
in May.
Pakistan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact was not a 
surprising development and the majority of books and 
articles dealing with it are content to note the
1
Text of the Russian Note to Iran, ibid., p.189.
occurrence and the date. What is not immediately 
obvious is the reason why a new pact was found necessary 
after the publicity connected with and the hopes pinned 
on the Turkey-Pakistan pact; and why Pakistan was not a 
founder member of the Turkey-Iraq pact, once a new treaty 
had been found necessary, but waited until July to 
announce its decision, and September to finalise the 
arrangements.
The Turkey-Pakistan pact was inspired by the United 
States, and it was no secret that these countries hoped 
that the gap in the alliance represented by Iraq and 
Iran would be filled, and that other Arab countries 
might be induced to participate. Since Iraq and Egypt 
were the largest and most powerful Arab states it was 
regarded as necessary that one should be persuaded to 
join a defence organisation of which the Turkey-Pakistan 
pact was to be the nucleus, and desirable that both 
should be brought in. Although Iraq showed more 
inclination to agree than Egypt it was hoped that Nasser 
might be inclined to modify his position once the problem 
of the evacuation of British troops from Suez had been 
settled.
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See M.A. Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Regional Pacts, 
p.101, and Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, p.124, 
as examples of this view.
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Once Anglo-Egyptian agreement was reached in July
1954 hopes were raised regarding a change in Egypt's 
attitude to Middle East defence, but Nasser, forced to 
defend the agreement at a public meeting in Cairo, was 
not really in a position to push Egyptian opinion any 
further: 'If evacuation comes through peaceful channels, 
are we to refuse it? Should we not save the blood of our 
youth?' he asked."*"
An Egyptian military mission did visit the United
States in September 1954, but the possibility of Egypt
receiving US arms aid foundered on Egypt's refusal to
accept an American military mission to supervise the
distribution and use of the aid on the grounds that this
2would compromise Egyptian sovereignty.
An attempt on his life in which the Muslim 
Brotherhood was deeply implicated took place in November, 
and no doubt helped to deter him from accommodating 
Western objectives. In any case, Saudi Arabia was 
already receiving American aid and the US had a base on
1
The Times, 23 August 1954. An Egyptian government 
statement issued in September said that Egypt was not 
ready for a pact, despite support for the West, because 
the people would not accept it. The New York Times,
3 September 1954, p.l.
2
Ibid., 15 September 1954, p.20, and 18 September 1954,
p.7.
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its territory, a circumstance which did not prevent the 
Saudi Government from opposing Iraqi association with 
the Turkey-Pakistan pact.
Attempts to extend the basic Ankara-Karachi axis
gained impetus after Nuri es-Said returned to power in
Iraq in August 1954. While Nuri was apparently equally
happy to work with either Turks or Pakistanis, it has
been suggested that at one stage he believed that
Pakistanis might have been more acceptable allies to
Iraqis than their former rulers, the Turks.'*' Soon after
Nuri returned to office, the Egyptian Minister for
National Guidance, Salah Salim, visited Baghdad. In the
course of discussions Salim rejected the idea of working
with Pakistan. The Egyptian position was that Pakistan
had nothing whatsoever in common with any Arab state,
militarily or geographically. The religious tie, of
which the Pakistanis made so much, obviously counted
far less with the Egyptians. Nuri suggested as an
alternative that the Arab Security Pact be brought into
line with Article 51 of the UN Charter and then be used
as the basis for a regional defence pact which would be
open to non-Arab countries, including Pakistan. This
2idea did not find favour with Nasser, and was rejected
1
Waldemar J. Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, My 
Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1954-1958 (The Johns 
Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1964), p.29.
2
Ibid., pp.23-4.
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by implication by the Arab League Foreign Ministers at 
their meeting in December 1954.^ Egyptian reluctance 
to be associated with Pakistan may then have been one 
reason for the decision to negotiate a fresh pact, 
leaving Pakistan out, at least for the time being.
The status of the Palestine question was another 
issue about which the Arabs were cautious, and Nuri 
es-Said had to be particularly careful in signing any 
agreement outside the Arab League. He had to be 
assured that on no account would Israel become a member 
of the pact, and that membership of the pact would not 
preclude Iraq from supporting other Arab states in the 
event of a war with Israel. On this question Iraq had 
to be left completely free. On the other hand, Turkey, 
which had cordial relations with Israel, was anxious 
that, in the event of such hostilities, it would not be 
obliged to take part. On this count the Turkey-Pakistan 
pact was not sufficiently specific. Article 6 provided 
that
Any State, whose participation is considered 
by the Contracting Parties useful for 
achieving the purposes of the present 
Agreement, may accede to the present 
Agreement under the same conditions and with 
the same obligations as the Contracting 
Parties....^
1
The Pakistan Times, 18 December 1954.
2
For text of the Turkey-Pakistan Agreement for Friendly 
Cooperation, 2 April 1954, see Documents on International 
Affairs 1954, p.185.
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This clause could have been used effectively to exclude
Israel, but, despite official statements that Israel
would never become a member, this was not regarded as
sufficient assurance by Iraq. The terms of the Baghdad
Pact eventually provided that it should
be open for accession to any member of the 
Arab League or any other State actively 
concerned with the Security and peace in 
this region and which is fully recognized 
by both of the High Contracting Parties....^
At the same time as the pact was signed, letters were
exchanged between Nuri and Adnan Menderes, at the request
of the former, containing the understanding
that this Pact will enable our two countries 
to co-operate in resisting any aggression 
directed against either of them and that in 
order to ensure the maintenance of peace and 
security in the Middle East region, we have 
agreed to work in close co-operation for 
effecting the carrying out of the United 
Nations resolutions concerning Palestine.
This represented a departure from Turkey's traditional
policy of neutrality in the question of Arab-Israel
1
For text of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between 
Iraq and Turkey, 24 February 1955 (the Baghdad Pact), 
see N. Frankland (ed.), Documents on International 
Affairs 1955 (OUP: London, 1958), p.287.
2
For text of the letters, see Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks 
Security, Appendix IV, p.188.
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disputes, and bears witness to the anxiety of Turkey 
and the Western powers to draw Iraq into the alliance.
It is also possible that the terms of the Pakistan- 
Turkey agreement were at the same time too limited and 
too specific for the purposes of the powers, especially 
the US and UK, who were anxious to set up the Middle 
East defence system. The Turkey-Pakistan pact pledged 
the signatories to cooperate in cultural, economic and 
technical fields, in very vague terms, and in the field 
of defence, in terms which were more precisely spelled 
out.'*' This was not the kind of agreement which could 
ultimately represent an extension of effective collective 
defence into the Middle East, at least without drastic 
revision. The Turkey-Iraq pact pledged the signatories 
simply to cooperate 'for their security and defence.
Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to
1
Article 4 states: 'Consultation and cooperation 
between the contracting parties in the field of defence 
shall cover the following points:
(a) Exchange of information for the purpose of 
deriving benefit jointly from technical 
experience and progress;
(b) Endeavours to meet, as far as possible, the 
requirements of the parties in the production 
of arms and ammunition;
(c) Studies and determination of the ways and 
extent of cooperation which might be effected 
between them in accordance with Article 51 of 
the Charter of the United Nations, should an 
unprovoked attack occur against them from 
outside.'
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this cooperation may form the subject of special 
agreement with each other,''*’ Measures for the 
implementation of this Article were to be determined 
once the pact came into force: the wording was made 
vague, presumably in order not to frighten off other 
Arab countries making tentative movements in this 
direction. It was perhaps felt that Pakistan, already 
committed, could be left out for the time being.
These suggestions are for the most part speculation, 
and nothing definite can be concluded from them. A 
Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesman was reported to have 
said that Pakistan had, before February 1955, sent 
invitations to all Middle East countries, including Iran 
and Iraq, to join the Turkey-Pakistan pact, but efforts 
in this direction were likely to be reviewed in view of 
recent developments in the Middle East. Pakistan would 
welcome bilateral as well as multilateral defence 
arrangements. Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan would not wait 
for Arab League countries to agree with them so far as
Article I of the Baghdad Pact.
1
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these defence arrangements were concerned. At the time
of the signing of the Baghdad Pact President Bayar was on
a state visit to Pakistan. There were few reports of the
talks between him and Mohammed Ali but, according to one,
a senior Pakistani official had disclosed that Bayar and
Mohammed Ali had completed plans for a series of defence
alliances to link countries of the Middle East in a
collective security system. In January 1955 a Pakistan
statement had referred to the proposed Turkey-Iraq Pact,
calling it 'an important step towards establishment of
2a collective security system for the region.1 
Pakistan's accession was expected. The Government, 
according to one American writer, 'was merely waiting 
for the best possible moment from the standpoint of its
1
The Pakistan Times, 18 February 1955. M.A. Chaudhri, 
however, argues somewhat simply that Iraq had not been 
invited to join the Turkey-Pakistan pact officially, 
and therefore decided to negotiate a pact with Turkey 
itself. Pakistan and the Regional Pacts, p.100. 
Interviews with senior Pakistani and Turkish officials 
were no more revealing. Most had forgotten, or chose 
to ignore, the defence clauses of the Turkey-Pakistan 
pact, and one, speaking of the delay in Pakistani 
accession said: 'Well, in those days, you know, we were 
all so intent on getting the Arabs in that I suppose we 
just didn't get round to it.'
2
Dawn, 21 January 1955.
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domestic situation and the arrangements for arms aid 
from the United States.1^
In March 1955 Eden visited Karachi and Baghdad on
his way to the SEATO talks in Bangkok. The UK had, he
said, supported the Baghdad Pact since its announcement
in January. He believed it possible that it could grow
'into a NATO for the Middle East. There seemed a chance
that Pakistan.. .would join, as might also Iran and Jordan.1
There were reports that Eden found considerable enthusiasm
in Pakistan and Iraq for early integration of their
3separate pacts with Turkey, although Eden himself gave 
no details of any discussions.
During the Bandung Conference in April, the Iraqi
leader, Jamali, took the opportunity of canvassing the
idea of adherence among Pakistani and Iranian delegates.
In a statement from Taipeh he said that Pakistan would
join the pact within a month, and that Iran was expected
4to adhere in mid-summer. But the Pakistan decision was
1
Campbell, p.59.
2
Eden, p.220.
3
The Pakistan Times, 7 March 1955.
4
The New York Times, 9 May 1955/ p.7.
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delayed: the question had been discussed by Cabinet, 
but until the full financial and military implications 
were examined, so the official story went, a decision 
would be deferred."*"
Towards the end of June, Ayub Khan visited Turkey.
Nuri es-Said was also in Ankara: further discussions
took place, in the course of which it seems the remaining
difficulties were resolved, for Mohammed Ali in a
broadcast on 1 July announced Pakistan's intention to
2adhere to the Turkey-Iraq Pact. The Times, commenting
on the delay, attributed it
partly to internal political conditions in 
Pakistan, and partly, perhaps to the delicate 
situation prevailing between the signatories 
to the pact and certain Arab countries.... It 
is hoped, nevertheless, that a way can be found 
of reconciling this view with Pakistan's 
accession, without making Egypt feel that she 
would be accepting defence commitments too far 
afield.^
The assiduous attempts to cast the net over Syria,
Lebanon and Jordan, carried out at high intensity over 
the preceding six months, had until then met with no 
success. By the time formal Pakistani accession took
1
The Pakistan Times, 7 June 1955.
2
Text of Mohammed Ali's broadcast, ibid., 2 and 3 July
1955.
3
The Times, 4 July 1955.
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place, Egyptian opposition to the pact had hardened, 
and support for Egypt came readily from Saudi Arabia, 
and also, though more reluctantly from Lebanon, Syria 
and Jordan. In September offers of Soviet military aid 
to Egypt dealt the final blow to any hope that the 
Baghdad Pact would be extended in that direction. It 
now had four members - the UK had joined in April. The 
Iranian decision was made in October, and in November 
the Pact held its first Council meeting.
6. Implications for Pakistan's Relations with the
Middle East Countries
Having taken the plunge and joined the Baghdad Pact, 
what were the implications for Pakistan foreign policy 
in the Middle East? It is not altogether possible to 
separate this decision from decisions in other spheres: 
in more or less quick succession, Pakistan had signed 
a pact with Turkey, a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement 
with the United States, joined the South East Asia Treaty 
Organization (September 1954) and involved itself in the 
Baghdad Pact.
The decision to participate in American-backed 
defence arrangements of any kind was bound to incur some 
degree of Soviet displeasure, but it is likely that it 
was Pakistan's involvement in the Middle East defence 
network, which the USSR could not but regard as a threat 
to itself, that aroused Soviet hostility, amply
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demonstrated by statements made during and after the 
visits of Bulganin and Khruschev to India and 
Afghanistan in December 1955.^ It resulted also in 
increased Indian hostility. Whether or to what extent 
Nehru was genuinely alarmed at what he called the changed 
regional situation is difficult to tell; but Pakistan's 
new alliances gave him a pretext for jetisoning past 
commitments regarding Kashmir.
The Baghdad Pact effectively split the Arab states,
at least for some time, and to the more militant Arabs,
made Pakistan appear untrustworthy. Turkey they knew
of old, and consequently they expected little from that
quarter, or from Iran. Pakistan was for the most part
untried and was hardly considered by them except in terms
of support on the Palestine issue, which was largely
taken for granted. Accession to the Baghdad Pact put
Pakistan beyond the pale. In Saudi Arabia, the news
caused astonishment and surprise:
Pakistan knows perfectly well that Turkey is 
putting its hand in the hand of the Zionist 
state of Israel, shows a considerable concern 
in its affairs and feels honoured cooperating 
with the Jewish state....It is hoped that 
Pakistan will review the decision they have 
taken, which is rightly considered to be a 
stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim 
States at a time when all Muslim States should
1
See Chapters VII and VIII.
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have taken the stand of a united bloc against 
tyranny, suppression and occupation...1
One result was the growth of a new-found fellow- 
feeling between Nehru and Nasser, who proceeded to issue
joint communiques deploring military pacts after their
2increasingly frequent meetings. After September 1955 
Pakistan expended a great deal of effort in the attempt 
to win back the ground thus lost to Indian diplomacy in 
the Middle East.
At the same time, however, Pakistan was formally 
allied for the first time to three other Muslim countries, 
Turkey, Iran, non-Arab states, and Iraq, the sole 
representative of the Arab world. Although the military 
aspects of the Baghdad Pact were not crowned with 
outstanding success, cooperation for the improvement of 
communications and for economic development grew and 
became perhaps the most important aspect of the alliance. 
Certain changes have taken place, including the withdrawal 
of Iraq in 1958, and the subsequent change in nomenclature 
to Central Treaty Organization. The organisation itself 
has varied in importance from time to time in Pakistan's
1
Radio Mecca, reported in The Pakistan Times,
26 September 1955.
2
See, for example, the joint communiques of 17 February 
and 12 July 1955, Foreign Affairs Record, 1955, pp.28 and 
137.
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policy in the region, but it has never been abandoned, 
remaining an important aspect of the search for closer 
collaboration with its neighbours of the northern tier.
In joining the Baghdad Pact which was a predominantly 
non-Arab organisation, Pakistan was finally forced to 
recognise, at least implicitly, the division in the Middle 
East between Arabs and non-Arabs, and to choose between 
the two groups. Until then Pakistan had attempted to 
ignore this gulf, for instance in the International 
Islamic, Economic Organization, and in Zafrulla Khan's 
attempt to convene a Muslim Prime Ministers' conference 
in 1952. Neither of these ventures, which sought to 
bridge the gap, met with success.
Although Iraq, an Arab country, did join the Baghdad 
Pact, in this case the exception proves the rule, for it 
was the apparent attempt to divide the Arab world (not 
the Middle East) which so enraged countries like Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia. The revolution in Iraq, and Iraq's 
ultimate withdrawal from the pact, demonstrates the 
pressure exerted on Arab countries not to associate with 
states outside the Arab circle. Although Pakistan's 
decision to adhere to the Baghdad Pact placed it firmly 
in the non-Arab camp so far as many Arab countries were 
concerned, Pakistan was not content to abandon attempts 
to gain Arab support, and one of the greatest problems 
for Pakistani diplomacy in the Middle East has been to 
maintain a balance between these two groups.
The Development of Closer Collaboration 
in the Northern Tier, 1956-67
1. Introduction
Although the attempt to implement a policy based on
the concept of Muslim unity was abandoned, the ideal of
closer collaboration with its Muslim neighbours remained
implicit in the conduct of Pakistan's foreign policy.
It was never spelled out clearly, and as a result there
has been much confusion. With regard to the countries
of the northern tier,'*' Pakistani leaders have usually
meant something more specific. With Turkey and Iran a
close relationship began to develop almost from the*time
of Partition. Relations with Iraq, the only Arab member
of the group, have varied according to the vicissitudes
of internal Iraqi politics. Iraq was one of the members
2of the Saadabad Pact and later (until 1958) of the
CHAPTER V
1
This phrase was first coined by John Foster Dulles 
after his tour of the region in 1953 (see Chapter IV). 
It is taken to mean Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.
2
A Pact between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan 
signed in 1937. See below.
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Baghdad Pact. Although it is no longer formally allied 
to Pakistan, it is usually regarded as one of the group 
with which closer collaboration is possible. Iraq's 
position within the northern tier is, however, complicated 
by its long-standing differences with Iran and its 
identity as part of the Arab world. Afghanistan is also 
generally regarded in Pakistan as being within this 
group, but any hopes of persuading Afghanistan to 
participate more fully in the affairs of the region have 
been thwarted by the Afghans themselves who steadfastly 
refuse to be drawn into any formal regional grouping.
Within the region there is considerable shared 
experience in terms of history, and of current economic 
and strategic problems. No determined effort had been 
made by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan to improve 
cooperation with each other until after the 1914-18 War, 
when revolutions took place in both Turkey and Iran.
A series of bilateral friendship treaties were signed 
and eventually, in 1937, drawn together in the Saadabad 
Pact. This pact was a response to the increasingly tense 
situation in Europe, and the conviction of Ataturk and
1
After the withdrawal of Iraq in 1959 the Baghdad Pact 
was renamed Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). 
Henceforth it will be referred to as CENTO in general 
references to the organisation, and only as the Baghdad 
Pact where it is necessary to draw the distinction.
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Reza Shah that an expression of regional unity would be 
an advantage in an area of traditional interest to the 
big powers.
Although Turkish sources claim that this agreement
was 'of benefit to Turkey and her neighbours' for
'through these pacific endeavours and successes Turkey
became a lasting force for peace in the near east and a
true representative of Western civilization in the area' /
2the agreement was of little practical value. Contrary to
widely held belief at the time it was not designed as a
defence agreement, but merely committed the parties to
non-intervention in each other's affairs, to renunciation
of war in the settlement of disputes and to consultation
'in all international conflicts affecting their common
3interests.' That it was encouraged by the British 
Government and accepted by the Russians is put forward 
as evidence 'that it was far from being a defensive
1
Turkish National Commission for UNESCO, Ataturk (Ankara 
University Press: Ankara, 1963), p.200.
2
General Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs (John Murray: 
London, 1964), p.266.
3
For text of the Saadabad Pact see Helen Miller Davis, 
Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the 
Near and Middle East (Duke University Press: Durham, 1953), 
p. 523 .
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alliance.' Turkey and Iran did not go to the aid of
Iraq at the time of Raschid Ali's revolt in 1941, and
Turkey did nothing to assist Iran when it was invaded
2by Britain and the USSR. For all its mildness the 
Saadabad Pact was significant as the first occasion on 
which the countries involved felt the need to express 
in formal terms their identity as members of a region.
One reason for the high level of mutual awareness 
which existed among these countries was their common 
religion, which gave rise to a common body of literature 
and language, Persian and Arabic being widely understood 
throughout the region. Turkey is perhaps an exception 
in this regard, having retreated since the Young Turks' 
revolution into its own language and literature, 
although Turkish is widely spoken and understood in 
north-west Iran.
While Islam provides a common substructure in the
area, this is not as strong a unifying force as might
at first be supposed: the split between orthodox (Sunni)
Muslims and the sectarian Shi'is makes for bitter
3dissension at times. Iran is the only country where
1
Ar f a, p . 2 6 6 .
2
Ibid., p .27 5.
For the origin of Shi'ism, see Chapter I.
3
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Shi'ism is the state religion, although modern Pakistan 
has a fairly large Shi'i minority. The issue is not 
regarded as vitally important by the Turkish Government 
which claims to be completely secular, nor is it so 
important to Pakistan where there is a mixed population, 
but it is an irritant in relations between Iran and 
Afghanistan and a potential source of disagreement 
between Iran and Iraq, where many Shi'i shrines and holy 
places are situated.
All the countries of the region are economically 
underdeveloped and are heavily dependent on foreign aid 
for the progress of their development plans. While 
there is some division about the means of solving these 
problems, and there are some differences in the stage 
of development of each, all face the fundamental need 
for capital and technical knowledge. In a way this 
makes for certain regional difficulties, for none is in 
a position to give substantial help to the others. 
Strategically, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan all share a 
border with Russia, and the foreign policy of each is 
profoundly affected by the proximity of this immense and 
powerful neighbour.
Considering these factors, and the hostility between 
Pakistan and India, it is not surprising that Pakistan 
should have become part of this regional grouping. At 
the time of Partition in 1947, however, the Saadabad Pact 
had been clearly revealed for what it was, and only a
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vague sense of regional identity remained, kept alive 
by a renewed and articulate Soviet threat directed 
towards both Turkey and Iran. Pakistan shared these 
strategic problems only in part: its concern was 
predominantly with India, and with the capability and 
possible intentions of that country.
Nevertheless, because the difference between Pakistan 
and India was expressed in religious terms, Pakistan 
tended to look to its co-religionists for support, to 
identify with them and ultimately to associate with them 
when this became possible. Pakistan's attention was not 
directed immediately and specifically towards its non-Arab 
Muslim neighbours but to the Middle East as a whole. The 
Arab countries, with the exception of Iraq, did not prove 
very receptive: contact with Turkey and Iran came more 
easily, and out of this the Baghdad Pact was ultimately 
formed. Afghanistan's quarrel with Pakistan over 
Pushtunistan, and its determined brand of neutralism, 
which received Indian encouragement and Soviet support, 
kept that country out of a Western-backed pact. 
Afghanistan's attitude was a source of disappointment 
not only to the regional members, but also to the United 
States. Subsequent American efforts to woo Afghanistan 
away from its neutralist stance, although unsuccessful, 
have laid any suggestions of regional cooperation open 
to the charge that they are American-inspired.
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2. The Concept of Closer Collaboration in Pakistan
The concept of closer collaboration with the other 
countries of the non-Arab northern tier, as opposed to 
Pan-Islamic demands for Muslim unity, was not publicly 
debated in Pakistan until 1958, after rumours spread 
that it was under discussion in Teheran and Karachi.
There is some suggestion, however, that the idea was 
current much earlier: at the time of the Shah's visit 
to Pakistan in March 1950 one commentator wrote that 
there was 'apparently a scheme to bring Iran, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan together, if it is possible, without 
aggravating relations with the USSR.''*’ It seems that 
discussions along these lines took place during 1951 and
1952, but they came to nothing and the following year the
2government began to negotiate the alliance with America. 
There had been no public statements or discussion at the 
time.
1
M. Perlmann, 'Review of Events, January 1-March 1,
1950', Middle Eastern Affairs, March 1950.
2
This suggestion is based on discussions with a Pakistani 
who was close to government circles at the time, and who 
wishes to remain anonymous. The concept of closer 
collaboration had little to do with Pakistan's decision 
to join the Baghdad Pact in 1955, although membership of 
this organisation helped draw Pakistan, Iran and Turkey 
together. For discussion of the Baghdad Pact in this 
context see below.
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The idea next appeared in April 1958 when the newly 
elected President of the Pakistan Muslim League, Khan 
Abdul Qayyum Khan, said that there was in the present world 
no longer room for small nations. Pakistan should not 
restrict its Islamic tie to the people of the two wings 
of the country, but must extend it beyond its frontiers 
and form 1 an Islamic confederation with Turkey, Iran and 
Afghanistan, so that there may be two federations, one 
of the Arab countries and the other of the non-Arab 
countries.' In time these two federations could be united, 
thus establishing a really Islamic state embracing the 
entire Muslim world.'*' The Pan-Islamic overtones of this 
speech were strong, but the idea was being modified.
Later in 1958 the Prime Minister, Malik Firoz Khan
Noon, stated that Pakistan was prepared for a federation
with Iran and Afghanistan if they wanted it, adding that
Pakistan was ready to do away with customs barriers,
passport restrictions, and to have mutual defence
2arrangements. This was the first time the Pakistan 
Government had advocated such a scheme, and one wonders 
exactly what the Prime Minister meant by it. In July
1
Dawn, 2 April 1958.
2
Ibid., 22 August 1958.
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President Mirza had made state visits to Turkey and Iran, 
and speculation on the purpose of these visits was not 
lessened by reports that the Iranian Foreign Ministry 
was examining the possibility of 'federation' along the 
above lines, although no official move had been made."*"
While the idea of a federation might have been in 
the air, it was not very clear what was meant by it, as 
Noon's statement reveals: to speak of federation and then 
to illustrate it by suggesting the removal of customs 
barriers and passport restrictions and the implementation 
of a mutual defence scheme, does not suggest a carefully 
thought out plan for political unity, which was how his 
speech was interpreted by some sections of the local 
press.
Apart from the question of kingship in 
Iran and Afghanistan, would it be wise to 
take upon our shoulders the responsibility 
of looking after economies that are even more 
backward than ours? Would not the acute 
political problems faced by Iran and 
Afghanistan add greatly to our own troubles....
It is reasonable to suggest therefore that 
while we should continue to pursue a policy of 
seeking friendship with every neighbouring 
State - of course, without sacrificing any of 
our national rights - there should be no talks 
for the present of forming a federation or 
confederation with any other country.^
1
Ibid., 6 June 1958.
2
The Pakistan Times, 24 August 1958.
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Even the usually pro-Government Dawn, at this time 
going through an anti-Noon phase, objected that it was 
'a very irresponsible and reckless statement.'"*’
Noon's speech was made, however, in the aftermath
of the revolution in Iraq, and when some reorganisation
of the Baghdad Pact was being contemplated. He was on
the defensive about his foreign policy, especially
regarding Afghanistan, the Middle East, and continued
membership of the Baghdad Pact. Although some difficulties
remained, 1958 was a year of improving relations with
Afghanistan. Noon himself denied that Afghanistan was in
any way hostile to Pakistan, and that earlier Pakistani
governments had pursued a policy designed to force
Afghanistan into submission. This had been a wrong
approach because no self-respecting country would accept
2that position. Noon had therefore attempted to improve
relations with Afghanistan, and his government had
negotiated a new Transit Trade Agreement in June 1958.
The agreement itself aroused some criticism on the grounds
that the Government had, under American pressure, made
concessions to Afghanistan which would be of no benefit
3to Pakistan.
1
Dawn, 24 August 1958.
2
The Pakistan Times, 27 August 1958.
3
See Chapter VII.
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Noon's remarks about federation might have been an 
extension of his policy of friendship with Afghanistan, 
or perhaps a gesture to those who accused him of not 
seeking closer relations with the rest of the Muslim 
world. He might have wanted to test public reaction to 
such a suggestion, or to gain support for cooperation in 
economic and defence matters and been carried away by 
his own idealism. Whatever the explanation, he was left 
in no doubt that the idea did not find favour in the 
press.
Clarifying his remarks at a press conference, he 
said that he did not envisage any loss of sovereignty on 
the part of any participant, and that he had not 
approached either the Iranian or Afghan Government on 
the subject. Discussions of a possible economic union 
among the Baghdad Pact countries had been in progress 
for some time. If Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan could 
abolish passports and customs barriers among themselves 
this would be a beginning. He also said he had in mind 
a defence agreement whereby attack on one would be 
considered attack on all.'*’ In its economic aspects, the 
Prime Minister's modified proposal did not go far beyond 
what had been discussed within CENTO meetings for some 
time .
1
The Pakistan Times, 27 August 1958.
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The suspicion remained, however, that something
further was contemplated. President Mirza's denial that
he had discussed the possibility of federation during
his visit to Teheran'*' had done little to silence the
protests, and Dawn implied that too many rumours had
been circulating for there to be no basis for this 
. . 2suspicion. The rumours received fresh impetus from the
visit of the Turkish President, Celal Bayar, to Iran,
Pakistan and Afghanistan in September 1958, although
Turkish participation had not been suggested. In addition
the Shah was reported to have said that the idea of
federation between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan would
3be received with joy in Iran. Despite Pakistan Foreign 
Ministry assertions that it was all 'pure speculation' 
and a Turkish Foreign Ministry statement that American 
reports of a proposed federation were 'premature', the 
controversy died down only after an Afghan statement 
that there was no question of Afghanistan forming such a
1
Dawn, 25 August 1958.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid., 25 September 1958, and The Pakistan Times, 
29 September 1958.
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federation, and that neutralism would continue to be 
the basis of Afghan policy.'*'
The issue was next raised in January 1962 when
General Hassan Arfa, the newly accredited Iranian
Ambassador to Pakistan, described confederation as the
best solution for Afghan-Pakistan problems. Although
this was his personal view, he maintained that the
matter had been discussed previously between the Shah
and the former Prime Minister, Firoz Khan Noon. The
2Shah, he said, supported the idea.
In August President Ayub, addressing a public meeting
at Quetta, and speaking in Urdu without a prepared text,
said that he would welcome a possible confederation of
Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, adding that divided they
could hardly hope to withstand pressure from without and
would succumb one by one, but that united they could
3defend themselves. Although less outspoken than in
1958, the press again objected to the idea. Dawn,
maintaining that the public were still opposed to the
idea of confederation, refused to believe that the
President meant more than 'the closest collaboration'
4and suggested that he had been widely misquoted.
1 Dawn, 7 October 1958.
2 Ibid., 21 January 1962.
3
Ibid., 6 August 1962.
4
Editorial, 'We and Our Muslim Neighbours', ibid.,
8 August 1962.
The Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ali, found it • 
necessary to clarify the President's remarks: a cultural, 
economic and political 'tie-up' did not mean a merger, 
an amalgamation or the establishment of a confederation 
or a f ederation.
The following June President Ayub raised the subject
once more, in a public address at Peshawar. Again he
spoke in Urdu and again without a prepared text. The
Urdu daily, Jang, reporting the speech, used the English
2word 'confederation' written in Urdu script. The English
language dailies reported that he had advocated
'collaboration' between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and
Turkey, for the first time extending the scheme to
include Turkey, and repeating the argument that none of
these countries could defend itself against any of the
3big powers. Again there was an unfavourable reaction, 
particularly from the opposition weekly Outlook, which 
wrote:
The tenacity with which President Ayub 
at times champions lost causes could be
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1
The Pakistan Times, 10 August 1962.
2
Jang, 14 June 1963. I am indebted to the staff of the 
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 
for the translation of this report.
3
Dawn, 13 June 1963.
admired but for the consequences. He 
has now revived the proposal for a 
confederation....1
Because the President spoke in Urdu, and because
the speech was unprepared, it is difficult even to
discover what he actually said, let alone what he meant
by it. There is apparently no official record of either
2speech available. This suggests that President Ayub
might not have wished to put forward a precise proposal,
and that in any case it is something which the Pakistan
Government or bureaucracy did not wish to preserve. On
both occasions he was addressing tribal groups (in the
frontier towns of Quetta and Peshawar), particularly
sensitive on questions of religious orthodoxy and
relations with Afghanistan. As on the occasion of Noon's
speech in 1958, relations with that country had been bad,
but were improving. It is possible that Ayub, for the
benefit of both the frontier tribes and the Afghan
Government, wished to encourage Kabul by assurances of
3Pakistani goodwill, and demonstrate his interest in 
Muslim solidarity.
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1
Outlook, 22 June 1963.
2
See M.B. Naqvi, ibid.: 'His actual words are: "a sort 
of Confederation". Now "a sort of Confederation" is 
essentially a Confederation. It is therefore a major 
proposal.'
3
Ayub renewed the offer of friendship to Afghanistan in 
a speech at Quetta in August. The Pakistan Times,
7 August 1963.
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The question of the US role in these suggestions 
has been raised by the Indian and Pakistani press,'*’ and 
although there is no evidence of direct American 
involvement there are some indications that the US may 
have had an interest in the matter. The suggestions on 
each occasion came at a time of increased Soviet 
influence in Afghanistan, and followed a period of tension 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The USA wished to 
lessen Soviet influence in Kabul and perhaps encouraged 
such appeals to the Afghan Government by the regional 
powers.
The next time the subject of closer collaboration
arose, at the time of the Istanbul Accord of July 1964,
the circumstances were somewhat different. President
Ayub made no statement of his intentions before he left
Pakistan on his way to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers1
Conference. He stopped for talks in Kabul, Teheran and
Istanbul, where it was announced that later in the month
Ayub, President Gursel and the Shah should meet to
discuss ways and means of cooperating 'outside the
2framework of CENTO.' The three Heads of State later 
decided that the organisation they were setting up would
1
The Times of India, 28 July 1963, and The Pakistan Times,
23 August 1963.
2
Dawn, 6 July 1964.
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be called 'Regional Cooperation for Development'. It 
was presented by Ayub on his return to Karachi as a 
strictly functional organisation: it did not exactly 
amount to a customs union, but might work to lower 
tariffs and create some areas of free trade. Certain 
joint ventures might be undertaken, but none of these 
would affect the internal arrangements of the 
participating countries."*"
This venture into the field of 'closer collaboration'
differs from those mentioned above in several ways, but
especially because on this occasion something concrete
was achieved, and because it seems that for the first
time the scheme had its origin in and gained its impetus
from the region itself. The suggestion that Pakistani
proposals for confederation offered in 1958, 1962 and
1963 were simply gestures to the Afghan Government made
with US approval if not encouragement, does not hold for
the Istanbul Accord in 1964. Pakistan's relations with
Afghanistan had been more or less satisfactory since the
restoration of diplomatic relations in 1963; there was
no special alarm about Soviet activity in Kabul, and in
any case American influence in Pakistan had diminished.
Despite some murmurs that Regional Cooperation for
2Development aimed at creating a new anti-communist,
1
Pakistan Observer, 25 July 1964.
2
See Chapter VI.
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pro-Western bloc in the region, the obvious lack of 
American interest in RCD seems to indicate that the US 
bears no particular responsibility for its formation.
3. The Importance of the Baghdad Pact in the
Development of Closer Collaboration
The ideal of closer collaboration within the region 
was translated into reality for the first time when the 
Baghdad Pact became fully operational at the end of 1955, 
thus providing a framework for cooperation in military 
and economic fields, albeit with the support of outside 
powers, and without Afghan membership.'*' The Baghdad 
Pact was primarily an American-inspired anti-communist 
defence alliance designed to fit in with US global 
strategy. It is in this light that it was considered by 
the USSR, by the Arab countries which did not become 
associated with it, and also by the governments concerned, 
although to some extent it served the national interests 
of each.
The object of building up a Muslim alliance was not 
a primary motive of Pakistan's political leaders at the 
time and stress was placed on the other aspects of the 
agreement. The preamble of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement
1
For discussion of the development of this northern tier 
alliance and American association with it, see Chapter IV.
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for Friendly Cooperation of April 1954 recognised the 
'need for consultation and cooperation between them in 
every field for the purpose of promoting the well-being 
and security of their peoples' and expressed the 
conviction that 'such cooperation would be to the 
interest of all peace-loving nations, and in particular 
also to the interest of nations in the region of the 
contracting parties'; but it was the idea of collective 
defence which was uppermost, not regional cooperation.
In the Pakistan-Turkey joint communique of 13 June 1954, 
this objective was more clearly stated,'*' and was 
reiterated by the Foreign Minister, Hamidul Huq 
Chowdhury, in a speech to the National Assembly in April 
1956.2
The Suez crisis of 1956 had the effect of driving 
a wedge between Britain and the Middle Eastern members 
of the Baghdad Pact with the result that more emphasis 
was placed on the regional and Islamic aspects of the 
pact. At the Council meeting of June 1957 the Pakistan 
Prime Minister, Suhrawardy, referred to the association 
of four Muslim powers in the pact as evidence of the
1
For text of the communique see Denise Folliot (ed.), 
Documents on International Affairs 1954 (OUP: London, 
1957), p.188.
2
National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 1956, vol.l, 
26 April 1956, p.85.
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fact that the Muslim world, after centuries of dissension
and confusion was 'coming together once again in common
enterprise and endeavour.''*’ By 1958 Dawn was writing:
'The one great blessing of the Baghdad Pact has been to
bring us closer to three other Muslim nations. Whether
the Pact remains or goes, the friendly ties forged
2between four nations will endure....' In 1967 Ayub 
Khan, listing retrospectively the reasons for Pakistan's 
association with the Baghdad Pact, included the 'strong 
desire which has always existed in Pakistan that we 
should forge closer relations with our neighbours in the 
Middle East and particularly with other Muslim countries.' 
He argued that it was fear of communism which impelled the 
Christian world to help the Muslim world for the first 
time in history, while 'the Muslim world itself was at 
that time emerging from the domination of western 
powers' and needed material and technological assistance.
'There was no reason why we should not have taken 
advantage of the opportunity. For us, our own needs for
1
For text of speech see Dawn, 4 June 1957.
2
Editorial, 'At the Crossroads - II', ibid., 31 January
1958.
3
Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, a Political 
Autobiography (OUP: 1967), pp.154-6.
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development were paramount and that was the reason we 
joined the Pacts.' The major benefit of the Pact was 
the 'association and friendship which we were able to 
develop with the governments and peoples of Iran and 
Turkey.'^
4. Cooperation within the Scope of the Baghdad Pact
Within the framework of the Baghdad Pact there were 
two principal areas of cooperation: defence and economic 
development. The Council, at its first meeting in 1955, 
set up committees to deal with both. Although the 
alliance was established primarily for defence, as time 
passed its economic activities took precedence over the 
military. Earlier attempts at economic cooperation had 
been restricted to bilateral trade agreements and more 
ambitious multilateral schemes had suffered from lack of 
funds. Within the scope of the alliance members grew 
accustomed to regional activity, and the funds 
contributed by the USA and to a lesser extent by Britain 
made work on larger projects possible. Although military 
cooperation was considered, it was interpreted 
differently by each of the members, and did not develop 
far beyond the discussion stage.
1
Ibid.
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(i) Defence Cooperation
Although some initial moves were made towards 
setting up a joint command structure, and some 
rudimentary machinery was established, when the time 
came for major steps to be taken negotiations bogged 
down. There are two principal, interrelated reasons 
for this: the reluctance of the United States to involve 
itself in the organisation to the extent necessary to 
make such a plan work, and the inability of the regional 
members to set up a properly co-ordinated military 
structure on their own.
When the Military Committee was established in 1955, 
the USA was already giving military aid on a bilateral 
basis to all four regional members. At the Teheran 
meeting in April 1956 the US Observer to the Military 
Committee offered to establish a military liaison group 
at the permanent headquarters of the organisation. In 
the post-Suez atmosphere of 1957, the USA, more 
apprehensive than ever of apparent Soviet advances within 
the Middle East, announced its willingness to join the 
Military Committee, 'a further indication of our 
[America's] continuing strong support for the Baghdad 
Pact and of our determination to assist the Baghdad Pact 
States to meet any threat of communist aggression
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against their territories.' This decision was welcomed
by all the Pact members, although the Pakistani
statement that the US decision would strengthen members'
determination 'to resist aggression from whatever
2quarter it may arise' revealed the differing objectives 
of the Pact members (or at least Pakistan) and the USA, 
and gave warning of conflict to come.
The Military Committee, meeting concurrently with 
the Council, began for the first time to consider the 
question of setting up a joint command structure. The 
result was the establishment of the Combined Military 
Planning Staff, a permanent group whose duty it was to 
co-ordinate defence planning and organise training 
exercises.
On the major question, however, differences among 
the members of the Committee were reported. The Americans 
were reluctant to equip the organisation with a NATO-type 
co-ordinated joint command, believing that the primary
1
Loy Henderson, formally accepting the Council's 
invitation to join the Military Committee, June 1957 
(my italics). For text of speech, see Dawn, 4 June 1957.
2
Ibid. (my italics).
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task of the alliance was co-ordination of military 
assistance to members.'*'
It was clear that if CENTO was to have a
NATO-type defence structure, the USA would have to bear
the cost of its establishment. The regional members,
especially Iran and Pakistan, were anxious for closer
US association with the pact, but the Pakistan view was
that the threat of aggression to the area should be
properly evaluated before any major decisions were taken.
This demand was apparently not pressed very hard, and the
3Council communique of June 1957 reported the Military
1
The Pakistan Times, 31 March 1962. A similar reluctance 
on the part of America was evident as early as 1949 when 
the Turks were anxious that some collective defence 
organisation should be established for the Eastern 
Mediterranean and Middle East, possibly in association 
with NATO. The US view was that the region was not 
sufficiently developed to support a sophisticated, 
integrated defence structure such as NATO required. (The 
Times, 3 December 1949.) When Turkey was finally admitted 
to NATO it proved its ability as a useful member, but the 
cost to the USA of setting up the required NATO defence 
infrastructure in Turkey was in the region of $400 
million. (Turkish Foreign Ministry statement reported by 
Turkiye Radyo Televizyon (T.R.T.), The Pulse, 19 June 
1969.)
2
Dawn, 4 June 1957.
3
N. Frankland (ed.), Documents on International Affairs 
1957 (OUP: London, 1960), p.297.
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Committee's agreement on the nature of the threat, and 
approved the establishment of a more comprehensive 
military planning structure.
Further consideration of the possibility of a
joint command received a set-back with the Iraqi
revolution of 1958 and Iraq's subsequent withdrawal from
the pact. A Permanent Military Deputies group was set
up in October 1959, to begin operation the following
January. The USA had endeavoured to compromise on the
question of greater involvement in the organisation by
signing separate Bilateral Agreements with each of the
regional members in March 1959,^ but their anxiety for
strengthening CENTO remained, together with their demand
that the United States become a full member of the
organisation. It was reported, at the end of 1959, that
the possibility of large standing armies under the
proposed joint CENTO command had been ruled out for the
time being in view of America's non-participation in
2the organisation as a full member, but in April 1961 
it was decided to appoint a Commander, CENTO military
1
Identical Bilateral Agreements of Co-operation between 
the United States and Pakistan, Iran and Turkey were 
signed in Ankara, 5 March 1959. For text, see Department 
of State Bulletin (DSB), 23 March 1959, p.417.
2
Dawn, 4 November 1959.
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staff, to improve co-ordination of defence planning.
Iran and Pakistan wanted the appointment of an American 
General who would have powers comparable to those of 
the NATO Supreme Commander, but the Americans felt that 
such an appointment would not be correct since they were 
not full members of CENTO. The British Government offered 
to make a General available, but this solution was not 
acceptable to Iran or Pakistan unless Britain and America 
agreed to 'put more teeth' into CENTO's military 
organisation. By this time the USA was more reluctant 
than ever to become further involved in CENTO since it 
did not wish unnecessarily to antagonise the USSR or any 
of the region's neutral countries, including India or 
Afghanistan. No agreement could be reached therefore, 
and the attempt to appoint a CENTO Commander was 
abandoned.^
Later communiques paid scant attention to military 
matters, merely agreeing that defence should be 
strengthened. From 1963 Pakistan, endeavouring to build 
up a relationship with China and the USSR, was reluctant 
to involve itself too deeply in the military aspects of 
CENTO, and after the 1965 war with India, refused to 
participate at all. Most Pakistan military personnel 
were withdrawn from CENTO headquarters and Pakistan did
1
The Pakistan Times, 31 March, 14 April and 1 May 1962. 
Dawn, 27 April, 2 and 4 May, 1962.
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not attend the meeting of the Military Committee in 
February 1968. While registering disapproval, Pakistan 
did not take the extreme step of refusing to approve 
budgets, which could have crippled the work of the 
Committee.^
Military cooperation within CENTO has been minimal,
for without United States participation, much development
was out of the question. In any case, as CENTO is not
such a tightly drawn treaty as NATO, which commits its
members to each other's defence much more specifically
than does CENTO, one may ask whether an integrated defence
structure would have been possible for the latter
organisation. This is particularly important when
Pakistan's reluctance to confine CENTO's functions to
defence against Communism is recalled, for its allies
were understandably unwilling to place themselves in a
position which might have involved them in hostilities 
2with India. In these circumstances, the US view that 
CENTO's proper function lay in co-ordination of military 
aid and defence development was probably more realistic.
1
Christian Science Monitor, 5 November 1968, and The New 
York Times, 24 April 1968, p.19.
2
See Chapter VIII.
230
(ii) Economic Cooperation
The CENTO Council identified three main fields for 
economic cooperation. These were regional projects in 
the field of industry and communications, trade and 
technical assistance.
Development in the field of communications, though 
slow, has been the most successful of CENTO's achievements. 
Early in 1957 the USA offered to meet the cost of certain 
rail, highway and telecommunications surveys in the 
region, and announced that $12,570,000 would be made 
available for this purpose. The Economic Committee was 
able to report in July 1958 that tenders had been called 
for the supply of equipment for improvement and extension 
of radio-telephone links between London and regional 
capitals, that a team of US technicians was currently 
engaged in a physical survey for the establishment of 
microwave links between member countries, and that the
2US Government had pledged $18,300,000 towards the cost.
A direct radio-telephone link between Turkey and 
Iran had been inaugurated in September 1957, while 
survey work continued on road and rail links. Although 
the telecommunications project was finally completed and
1
DSB, 6 May 1957, pp.724, 730.
2
Economic Committee Meeting, 17-21 January 1958, 
Keesing1s Contemporary Archives, 1958, p.16024.
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handed over in April 1966, and the section of the highway 
linking Turkey and Iran has been completed, the 
remainder is unfinished, and the railway is not expected 
to be completed before 1970.
Improvements to the port facilities of Trabzon, a 
Turkish Black Sea town, have provided an opening for 
regional trade, and similar work in Iskanderun, an 
important Turkish naval base, is in progress.
The expansion of trade and the possible establishment
of a common market or free trade area also engaged the
attention of the Economic Committee, with little visible
result. In May 1957 the Committee decided to make a
detailed study of the possibility of establishing a
customs union, a free trade area and a common market
in the Baghdad Pact region 'with due regard to existing
obligations and commitments of member countries.1'*’ In
September that year the Subcommittee on Trade recommended
that study of a possible customs union along the lines
of the European Economic Community should not be
undertaken, but that consideration should be given to
2the establishment of a free trade area.
1
Economic Committee Communique, 21 May 1957, ibid.,
1957, p.15617.
2
Communique issued by the Economic Committee Subcommittee 
on Trade, 24 September 1957, DSB, 28 October 1957, p.684.
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The Baghdad Pact scheme envisaged that Iraq, Iran, 
Turkey and Pakistan would maintain full freedom 
regarding the extent and nature of restrictions imposed 
by each of them on outside countries, while establishing 
free trade among themselves. A Pakistani economist 
concluded:
The significant effect of the free trade 
area would be with respect to the future since 
each of the countries including Pakistan is on 
the verge of industrialisation and diversification 
of their agricultural and industrial production.
It would influence as between members the lines 
of specialization in agriculture and industry 
and location of industries in the region, which 
would be different from the pattern which would 
develop otherwise in the protected market of 
each.1
This view was apparently shared by the Pakistan
Government. The scheme had been under consideration for
over two years when Bhutto, then Minister for Information
and Broadcasting, remarked that in order to gain reasonable
benefit out of any such arrangement it would be necessary
2to achieve a minimum level of industrialisation. The 
Iranian view was that the proposal sounded rational, but 
further discussion was necessary. If agreement could be
1
Nurul Islam, 'Pakistan and the Baghdad Pact Free Trade 
Area', Dawn, 8 June 1960.
2
Ibid., 2 January 1960.
233
reached between Iran and Pakistan, the matter could then 
be pursued with other members of the alliance.'*' The 
principal stumbling block to such cooperation, alluded 
to but not explicitly stated, was that each of the 
countries concerned wanted to build up its own industrial 
base, and was not prepared to allow industries believed 
vital for this purpose to be located elsewhere in the 
region.
Bhutto had already referred to a problem which was
beginning to concern countries like Pakistan, and was to
assume importance in the next few years:
What we need is stabilisation of prices of 
raw materials. While prices of manufactured 
goods and machinery are on the increase, the 
market for raw materials fluctuates to the 
detriment of producing countries. In the 
circumstances there is need for raw material 
producing countries to understand each 
other's problems. Whether there should be a 
common market or some other form of closer 
participation among these countries is a 
matter of evolution.2
This problem of industrialisation, together with the 
competitive nature of economic development within the 
region, complicated the question of expanded trade and
1
Ibid., 15 January 1960.
2
Bhutto, on the possibility of a CENTO Common Market, 
at a press conference in Istanbul, 15 October 1959, 
ibid., 20 October 1959.
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the establishment of a free trade area. Beyond bilateral 
trade agreements of a limited nature little progress was 
made.
The field of technical cooperation is both less 
spectacular and beset by fewer problems than the other 
fields of cooperation. Perhaps for this reason it has 
progressed at a continuous though modest pace, for the 
most part in areas such as disease eradication (both 
human and animal) and agricultural development. In 
1959 the Multilateral Technical Co-operation Fund was 
set up to supply technical equipment to member countries 
and to exchange experts and trainees. It had an initial 
capital of $150,000, of which one third each was 
contributed by the USA, Britain and the regional countries 
combined. A Research Institute for Nuclear and Applied 
Science was established at Teheran University and in 1966 
the Economic Committee set up the Multilateral Scientific 
Fund. At the same meeting the Committee, noting that the 
major projects were coming to an end, decided that 
consideration of further development and the establishment 
of priorities and criteria should be undertaken. It 
agreed that cooperation should continue in agricultural 
development, technical and vocational training, health, 
science and development of water resources as well as 
communications.'*' While some more working groups have
1
Economic Committee Press Communique, 17 March 1966, 
Central Treatv Oraanization, Public Relations Division, 
Central Treaty Organization 1966, Ankara (n.d.), pp.24-6.
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been established, no further major projects are planned 
after the completion of the highway and rail links.
After the 1967 meeting of the Economic Committee, a
Pakistani observer asked if 'in the light of the creation
of RCD there was any point in going along as a matter
of routine with such academic exercises as the
Washington meeting of CENTO's Economic Committee turned
out to be?''*' While the establishment of RCD makes CENTO
appear redundant in some ways, CENTO officials maintain
that there are some things which CENTO can do better,
2pointing to the communications scheme. A senior member
of the CENTO staff was quoted as saying:
CENTO has found in regional economic 
development of its members a means of 
keeping the organization alive at a time 
when it is unfashionable to insist on 
Soviet penetration of the area. It 
remains an insurance policy that could 
be very valuable if the times c h a n g e . 3
1
Ejaz Hussain, Dawn, 18 March 1957.
2
From conversations with CENTO and RCD officials during 
1967 and 1968. It is interesting to note that RCD 
officials claim these as 'the RCD road' and 'the RCD 
railway'.
3
The New York Times, 2 5 April 1968, p.9.
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5. Changing Attitudes towards CENTO
There has been much misunderstanding surrounding
Pakistan's membership of CENTO. Announcing his
Government's decision to adhere to the Baghdad Pact,
the Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, had declared that
Pakistan had become a party to securing the defence and
promoting the welfare of a region vital and dear to the
heart of the entire world of Islam.'*' According to the
US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, Pakistan
had joined because it was 'aware of the inherently
predatory nature of Soviet foreign policy and also
because their people, being deeply religious people,
find repugnant the attitude which Soviet rulers take
2towards religion'. Writing in 1967, President Ayub
said that 'the crux of the problem from the very
beginning was the Indian attitude of hostility to us:
3we had to look for allies to secure our position.'
When the Baghdad Pact is seen in the context of 
the East-West tension prevailing at the time of its
1
First-of-the-Month Broadcast, July 1955, The Pakistan 
Times, 3 July 1955.
2
Press conference, 7 February 1956, DSB, 20 February 
1956, p.282.
3
Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.153.
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formation in 1955 there can be little doubt that it was 
designed to prevent the spread of communism in the 
Middle East, and it is difficult to imagine that the 
Pakistan Government was under any misapprehension in 
this regard. Pakistan1s strategy appears to have been 
to involve the United States as deeply as possible in 
the defence of the region, perhaps hoping that once 
America was convinced of Pakistan's loyalty, support 
against India would be forthcoming."*’
Pakistan's interpretation of the Eisenhower
2Doctrine of 1957 as a guarantee of the territorial 
integrity of the Baghdad Pact powers appears to be an 
attempt to make it seem true by saying that it was true. 
By the same token the Bilateral Agreement of March 1959 
was taken as a commitment on the part of America to
1
Official Pakistani statements that the country's 
loyalty over the years was poorly rewarded would seem 
to bear out this argument. See Bhutto statement to the 
Pakistan National Assembly, 17 July 1963, in Z.A. Bhutto, 
Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Pakistan Institute of 
International Affairs: Karachi, 1964), pp.96-7, and 
Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.132.
2
See the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace & Stability 
in the Middle East, text in DSB, 25 March 1957, p.481.
3
See, for example, statements at the Baghdad Pact 
Council Meeting, June 1957, Dawn, 4 June 1957.
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defend Pakistan. Even Ayub Khan, not given to
exaggeration of this kind, refers to America's
commitment to come to Pakistan's assistance in the event
of an Indian attack.'*' The operative article of the
Bilateral Agreement states that, in the case of
aggression against Pakistan, the US Government,
in accordance with the Constitution of the 
United States of America, will take such 
appropriate action, including the use of 
armed forces, as may be mutually agreed 
upon and as is envisaged in the Joint 
Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability, 
in the Middle East, in order to assist the 
Government of Pakistan at its request.2
The Joint Resolution, to which the agreement refers,
promised assistance to any nation or group of nations in
the Middle East against 'armed aggression from any country
3controlled by international Communism....' This can in 
no way, at least up to the present time, be interpreted 
to cover the possibility of Indian attack.
So long as Soviet-US tension continued, and the US 
regarded non-alignment as an international evil, these 
misconceptions were not placed under any great strain.
1
Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.153.
2
Article 1 of the Bilateral Agreement, see DSB, 23 March
1959, p.417 (my italics).
3
See p.237, note 2.
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Although in March 1960 the Pakistan Foreign Minister
stated that the alliance with the West was the sheet
anchor of Pakistan's foreign policy,^ and in June that
Pakistan was 'happy and proud to belong to SEATO and
2CENTO,' the international scene was changing.
In May 1960 an American aircraft on an intelligence 
mission was shot down over the USSR. It was discovered 
to have taken off from Adana in Turkey, refuelled in 
Peshawar and flown north across Afghanistan to Russia. 
Later known as the 'U-2 incident', it brought a sharp 
Soviet reaction in the form of a threat against Peshawar, 
making Pakistanis ask if the risks inherent in such 
alliances were worthwhile.
During 1960 and 1961 Sino-Indian relations began to 
deteriorate, and India sought to build up its defences, 
a move which alarmed the Pakistan Government which 
suspected the new US Administration of taking a more 
tolerant view of neutralist countries like India. 
Criticism within Pakistan of membership of the pacts 
placed the Government on the defensive and in January
1961 the Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir, asserted that 
Pakistan's peculiar geographical and political position
1
Manzur Qadir, reported in Dawn, 12 March 1960.
2
Ibid., 4 June 1960.
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in Asia had necessitated entry into collective security
arrangements. He added that these defence agreements
were only meant to forestall threats of aggression and
thus were not directed against any peaceful and friendly
country.'*' The Pakistan Government regarded with distrust
India's attempts to build up its defences, and President
Ayub, while on tour in America warned that if the US gave
arms aid to India, Pakistan would feel less secure and
that 'tremendous strain' would be placed on friendship
2with America. President Kennedy was apparently able to 
reassure him to some extent, and according to Ayub said 
that 'he was not thinking in terms of abandoning friends 
and embracing "neutrals": all he had in mind was that
3"neutrals" should not be treated as enemies.' 
Dissatisfaction with the American alliance in Pakistan 
grew, however, and in May 1962 Ayub told reporters that 
all Pakistan got from the alliances was 'an enlargement 
of our political difficulties and a lot of abuse and
1
Dawn, 16 January 1961.
2
Speaking to the National Press Club, Washington,
13 July 1961. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, 
vol.IV, July 1961-June 1962 (Pakistan Publications:
Karachi, n.d.), p.36.
Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.138.
3
pressure from Russia and neutralist India.''*' At the
same time India was negotiating the purchase of Soviet
jet fighters, a move which alarmed Pakistan and was
opposed by America which feared that it would lead to
2Indian military dependence on the USSR. There were 
reports that Britain and America were contemplating 
countering Soviet offers to India, and Ayub warned that 
US military aid might force some of India's neighbours
3to seek protection elsewhere.
When in June 1962 the UAR and Ghana abstained from
voting on a UN Security Council resolution on Kashmir
which was favourable to Pakistan, and the USSR vetoed
it, the mood of bitterness in Pakistan increased, and
Pakistan's membership of the pacts was blamed for this
4unfavourable turn of events.
The Sino-Indian border clash of October-November
1962 was followed by an Anglo-US decision to supply 
India with extensive arms aid, which Pakistan feared 
would upset the prevailing military balance on the
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1
Interview with UPI, reported in The Pakistan Times,
11 May 1962.
2
The New York Times, 5 May 1962, p.10.
3
Ibid., 11 May 1962.
4
Dawn, 28 June 1962.
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subcontinent. At the same time it was clear that CENTO 
would not be strengthened as Pakistan desired, and 
disappointment was also expressed with the scale and 
administration of economic aid under CENTO."*"
By 1963 Pakistan was carrying out a successful
policy of rapprochement with China, and a border
agreement and an air agreement were signed. Chou En-lai
visited Pakistan the following year and expressed support
2for Pakistan's position on Kashmir. It no longer suited
the Pakistan Government to be deeply and overtly
committed to the Western military pacts. At the same
time the decrease in tension between Russia and America
resulted in a slackening of Soviet pressure on CENTO
and its members. Soviet press and radio still condemned
CENTO, but increasingly as a spent force which Britain
3and America were desperately trying to maintain.
While Pakistan was probably the first member of 
CENTO to become disillusioned with that organisation,
1
Lt.Gen. Sheikh, ibid., 6 May 1962, and President Ayub, 
ibid., 11 May 1962.
2
See joint communique issued at the end of talks between 
Ayub Khan and Chou En-lai, text, ibid., 4 February 1964.
3
See Moscow home service commentary, 'A Parade or a 
Funeral', 19 April 1966. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
(BBCSWB), Part 1, Soviet Union, SU/2141/A4/3.
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Turkish faith in the American alliance was deeply 
shocked by the US attitude during the Cyprus crisis 
which began at the end of 1963 and almost led to a 
Turkish invasion of the island in August 1964.^ Iran, 
disappointed with the scale of US military aid and 
lack of American support in its propaganda war with 
Nasser, was also growing discontented with the alliance. 
The mood was ripe, therefore, for the formation of 
Regional Cooperation for Development in July of that 
year .
Although the members emphasised that RCD had no
political aims, and that it was neither incompatible
2with CENTO nor opposed to it, the formation of RCD had 
the effect of diverting the attention and energy of the
1
In a letter to the Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inonu, 
in August 1964, President Johnson warned that if Turkey 
intervened in Cyprus and if as a result the USSR then 
attacked Turkey, Turkey's NATO allies would have to 
consider whether they would be under any obligation to 
help Turkey. The substance of this letter was published 
by Hurriyet (Istanbul), 13 January 1966 (The Times,
14 January 1966), and later by the US State Department 
(reported The Times, 17 January 1966) .
2
See Bhutto, press conference Ankara, Ankara home 
service, BBCSWB, Part 4, Africa and the Middle East,
ME/1613/E/5 ; Ayub Khan in London, Pakistan Observer,
16 July 1964; Foreign Ministers' Communique, 4 July, 
text in Dawn, 6 July 1964.
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regional countries from CENTO's economic projects, and 
from CENTO itself.
Pakistan's final disillusionment with CENTO is said
to date from the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965,
but it is possible that the war simply provided Pakistan
with a convenient pretext for withdrawing from the
military aspects of the organisation. Bhutto is reported
to have invoked CENTO in the face of the Indian attack
on Lahore"*- but while CENTO sources states that informal
Pakistani requests for aid had been received, Pakistan
2did not formally invoke the treaty. While it is 
understandable that such informal requests for aid from 
its allies were made, it is unlikely that the Pakistan 
Government believed that CENTO was in any legal sense 
obliged to come to Pakistan's assistance.
There was some talk of Pakistan's leaving CENTO, 
but while military personnel were withdrawn from the 
headquarters and Pakistan ceased to participate in 
military exercises, or meetings of the Military Committee, 
no other action was taken. Pakistan's increasing 
involvement in Afro-Asian affairs, a diplomatic offensive
1
The New York Times, 7 September 1965, p.l.
2
The Times, Dawn, 8 September 1965.
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which was paying dividends in terms of its rivalry with 
India, probably encouraged its disengagement from CENTO.^
So long as Pakistan's allies Iran and (more especially)
Turkey still have an interest in participating in CENTO's
military projects, it costs Pakistan little to remain
within the organisation. President Ayub has expressed
a doubt that 'it would do anybody very much harm if both
these pacts [CENTO and SEATO] were done away with. For
the present, no member country wants to take the blame
2for breaking the arrangement.' While Turkish sources 
deny exerting pressure on Pakistan to remain within the 
alliance, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Arshad Hussein, 
has stated bluntly: 'Turkey desires the preservation of 
CENTO and wants Pakistan to remain within the pact so 
we are staying.'^
Turkey and Iran, always more vulnerable to Soviet 
pressure than Pakistan, have in recent years enjoyed 
relative freedom from Russian hostility. Although both 
Governments have deliberately set out to improve
1
See Chapter VIII.
2
Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp.157-8.
3
Speaking to a Turkish journalist, Daily News (Ankara), 
29 June 1968.
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relations with the USSR, their success has been to a 
large extent a fortuitous result of decreased tension 
in Russo-American relations. This situation could 
change in the future, and the imminent withdrawal of the 
British from the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf 
area, together with Russia's policy of naval expansion, 
has created an air of uncertainty in the region. The 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a reminder 
that Russia is still capable of such activity. The 
possible effect of these changes on the future of CENTO 
cannot be assessed at this stage. It remains, however, 
in the view of its present Secretary-General, a 
high-ranking Turkish diplomat, 'an instrument whose 
value far exceeds its material accomplishments. As a 
shield it continues to make it possible to talk about 
building bridges where bridges can be built.
6. Cooperation Among the Regional Countries
Outside CENTO
While CENTO may not have come up to the expectations 
of its regional members, either in military or economic 
terms, it had the effect of providing a framework for 
cooperation and consultation which was not previously 
available. The custom developed of holding high level
1
Turgut Menemencioglu, The New York Times, 24 April
1968, p.19.
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meetings of regional leaders, usually in response to a 
situation of crisis.
The first occasion on which such consultation was 
felt to be necessary was the Anglo-French invasion of 
Egypt in 1956 when Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi and Pakistani 
leaders met, twice within a month, in Teheran and 
Baghdad. Iraq particularly had been placed in a 
difficult position by the British action, and suggestions 
were made that Britain should be asked to leave the Pact. 
The only solution appeared to be to hold meetings under 
the auspices of the Baghdad Pact, but without UK 
participation. It seemed that disapproval of British 
action had the effect of confirming the regional countries 
in the realisation that they had an interest in 
maintaining their own sense of unity. As a result of 
action taken at these meetings, the four regional powers 
claimed some of the credit for the Anglo-French decision 
to cease hostilities.’*'
Following this precedent, President Celal Bayar of 
Turkey called another conference in July 1958 in order 
to discuss the situation which had arisen following the 
announcement of the union between Egypt and Syria in 
January that year, and the resultant Iraqi-Jordan union. 
Since Iraq was a member of the Baghdad Pact and Jordan,
These meetings are discussed more fully in Chapter IX.
1
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although sympathetic to the West, was not, this had 
created a delicate situation. This particular problem 
was solved by the Iraqi revolution, during which King 
Faisal and Nuri es-Said were killed, which took place 
the morning the conference was scheduled to open. In an 
atmosphere of increased urgency the talks went ahead. 
There were reports that the remaining members of the 
Baghdad Pact were not anxious for continued Iraqi 
membership, and that in response to the new situation 
they would take steps to forge a closer unity among 
themselves.'*' Despite later denials that suggestions of 
confederation were discussed, something of this nature 
seems to have been in the minds at least of Iranian and 
Pakistani leaders, though public support for any 
decisive move at that stage was lacking.
The next meeting between the Heads of State took 
place in November 1959 at Teheran, the first foreign 
visit made by President Ayub Khan since he seized power 
in October 1968. Exercising the minds of the three 
leaders at this time was the Soviet propaganda campaign 
being carried on against the pact members, but especially 
against Iran, in the wake of the Bilateral Agreements 
with the USA earlier that year. Also current was the
1
Donald Wilber, 'Prospects for Federation in the 
Northern Tier', Middle East Journal, vol.12, no.4, 1958; 
The New York Times, 18 July 1958, p.7.
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question of strengthening CENTO's military arm and the 
possibility of establishing a joint command. The talks 
were convened once more the following February at Lahore, 
where the discussions of November were continued.
By the time the Istanbul meeting, also called at
short notice, took place in July 1964, all the participants
were psychologically ready to agree to form an organisation
of their own to promote the development of the region, a
decision spurred on by the recommendations of the UNCTAD
Conference earlier in the year."*" Consultations were also
held during the Kashmir war in September 1965, although
not in such a formal fashion: the Iranian and Turkish
premiers met first in Ankara, then the Turkish Foreign
Minister and the Iranian Prime Minister went to
2Rawalpindi for talks with Pakistani leaders. The next 
'RCD Summit' (as these meetings came to be known) took 
place at Ramsar in Iran in August 1967 in response to 
the situation in the Middle East created by the 
Arab-Israel war in June. The three leaders also discussed
1
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
took place in Geneva during March-June 1964. It was 
particularly concerned with the problems of the less 
developed countries, and one of its recommendations was 
that these countries should, where possible, cooperate 
on a regional basis. See Chapter VI.
2
See Chapter VIII.
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the progress made by RCD, and decided on a substantial 
reorganisation of its committee structure. They decided 
also that such meetings should be held regularly, and 
the next took place at Islamabad in December 1968.
While Pakistan, Turkey and Iran have thus availed 
themselves of the opportunity for increased consultation 
provided initially within the framework of the Baghdad 
Pact, such discussions have not always resulted in 
agreement. Some of the difficulties arising within 
RCD will be discussed in the following chapter: while 
they do not differ vastly from the problems which 
confronted CENTO discussions on economic cooperation, 
it is no longer possible to blame Britain or the United 
States for impeding progress.
Although the three countries are able to cooperate 
on many broad foreign policy issues, there are some 
significant points on which they differ. On the question 
of Kashmir, Turkey and Iran support Pakistan, but not to 
the extent of becoming involved in hostilities with India, 
with which both try to maintain good relations."*- 
Pakistan and Iran give Turkey support over Cyprus: up 
to the present the Turkish Government has not asked for 
more than diplomatic backing. Iran has been less
1
Especially Iran, which has an important trade 
relationship with India. See Appendix I. The Turkish 
and Iranian positions regarding Kashmir are discussed 
in Chapter VIII.
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fortunate in its dispute with Iraq over navigation 
rights in the Shatt al-Arab, for both Turkey and 
Pakistan have good relations with Iraq which they do 
not want to jeopardise. The best they can offer Iran 
is neutrality and, in the case of Turkey, its good 
offices to attempt to settle the dispute. In his 
longstanding quarrel with President Nasser, the Shah 
is also deprived of Pakistani support: in fact 
President Ayub's flattering references in his 
autobiography to President Nasser are reported to have 
angered the Shah considerably, and he is said to have 
raised the matter at the Ramsar conference.
With regard to the Arab-Israel dispute over 
Palestine, Turkish, Iranian and Pakistani policy differs 
substantially, for both Turkey and Iran recognise Israel 
and have enjoyed relatively good relations with that 
country, while Pakistan firmly supports the Arabs. There 
is some flexibility, however, as Turkey has sharply 
reduced its trade with Israel in an effort to win Arab 
support on the question of Cyprus. All three support 
the Arab case on the status of Jerusalem."*-
Differences have also arisen regarding Pakistan's 
relationship with China, which Turkey would prefer was
1
See Chapter IX.
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not quite so close. At the same time Pakistan's efforts 
to persuade Turkey to recognise China, while they have 
not as yet borne fruit, have not been rebuffed.'*’
Despite these differences, the alliance remains 
intact and in Pakistan the ideal of closer collaboration 
continues to flourish. There are from time to time 
expressions of nostalgia for the return of Afghanistan 
and Iraq to the fold and while there has apparently been 
no direct approach it has been made clear to both these 
countries that their membership of RCD would be welcomed, 
if they were prepared to accept its objectives.
1
While visiting Rawalpindi in March 1965, the Chinese
Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, told Turkish journalists
that, during a visit to Afghanistan in 1960 he had
discussed the question of Turkish recognition of China 
with the Turkish Ambassador in Kabul. Turkey had then 
displayed a positive interest, he said, and it was now up 
to Turkey to take steps to complete negotiations. Pakistan 
had informed China and Turkey of its willingness to act as
a mediator. Chen Yi added that China regarded improvement 
of relations with Turkey as of prime importance. 'China is 
a wounded country. I understand that Turkey is also 
experiencing difficulties in its relations with big Powers. 
Both countries must co-operate.' (Voice of Cyprus, in 
Turkish, 28 March 1965, BBCSWB, ME/1822/C/1.) Although 
the Turkish Prime Minister, Suat Urguplu, denied that 
either China or Pakistan had approached Turkey with regard 
to recognition of China (Ankara home service, 29 March 1965, 
BBCSWB, ME/1823/C/2), the Foreign Minister, Hasan Isik, 
some days later told the press that universal acceptance of 
China would facilitate the establishment of world peace and 
that international conditions should be created to facilitate 
this acceptance (press interview in Teheran, Ankara Radio,
7 April 1965, BBCSWB, ME/1831/C/2).
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CHAPTER VI 
Regional Co-operation for Development'*'
1. The Formation of RCD
Although attempts at regional economic cooperation
had been made as early as 1949 when the International
Islamic Economic Organization was established, and had
been carried on within the framework of CENTO, there is
little doubt that the United Nations Conference on
2Trade and Development, held in Geneva from 2 3 March to 
16 June 1964, provided the stimulus for the formation 
of RCD. The Conference met to discuss means of 
overcoming the trade gap faced by many developing 
countries which depended on the export of primary 
products whose prices were steadily declining relative 
to those of the manufactured goods they needed to 
import. It was attended by Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, 
all belonging to the less developed group. Although they 
differed marginally on the measures which they believed
1
See Appendix, Economic Survey of Pakistan, Iran and 
Turkey.
UNCTAD.
2
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should be taken to remedy their economic weakness, they
were in fundamental agreement regarding the problems
involved. It was later noted:
Among the points which were stressed by them, 
and which form the basis of a common policy, 
are the shortage of foreign exchange, and the 
need for the import of know-how and capital 
goods, for the expansion of trade on a fair 
and rational basis, for large scale untied 
assistance from the developed countries and 
for opening the markets of industrialised 
countries more widely to the primary 
commodities which form the main item of 
export of developing countries, as well as 
their manufacture.2
One of the recommendations of UNCTAD was that the 
developing countries might benefit by exploring the 
possibilities .of regional cooperation among themselves. 
Encouraged by discussions which had taken place during 
the conference, Turkey sent a representative to Teheran, 
where he found keen interest in regional cooperation.
1
For example, Turkey was reluctant to support the 
sweeping measures which would have limited the trade 
benefits it enjoyed as a result of its association with 
the European Common Market. See Proceedings of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Geneva, 23 March-16 June 1964, vols.I and II (United 
Nations: New York, 1964).
2
Dr Fuad Rouhani, 'Report on Secretary-General's Visit 
to Geneva and New York to Make Contact with UNCTAD',
RCD Bulletin (Teheran), vol.2, no.3, March 1966.
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He subsequently presented a report arguing that bilateral 
cooperation between Turkey and Iran was feasible. On 
learning of the Turkish-Iranian plans, Pakistan also 
apparently expressed interest, and a similar feasibility 
study was made vis-a-vis Pakistan.'*’
The decision to establish RCD in July 1964 was,
however, an unexpected development, following talks held
by President Ayub in Teheran and Istanbul early that
month. There had been no speculation in the Pakistan
press regarding the President's intentions before his
departure on the apparently hurriedly planned tour which
took him to Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey on his way to
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London.
Although Ayub has disclaimed special credit for RCD, it
was in Pakistan widely held to have been his idea, and
2to have been proposed by him only during that tour. As
1
According to Turkish officials. Pakistani sources do 
not refer to these discussions, and President Ayub said 
in August 1964: 'nobody could ever think of such [an] 
arrangement two or three months back'. (Speech at Ramna 
Green, Dacca, 26 August 1964. See Mohammad Ayub Khan, 
Speeches and Statements, vol.VII, July 1964-June 1965 
(n.d.), p.20.) The speed with which the tripartite 
negotiations were concluded in July 1964 suggests, 
however, that the Turkish report is accurate.
2
Dawn, 19 July 1964, also speech by President Ayub at 
the Thinkers' Forum at the University Campus, Lahore,
4 October 1964. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and 
Statements, vol.VII, pp.44, 46.
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a result of President Ayub's discussions in Teheran and 
Istanbul, it was decided that he and the Shah should 
come to Istanbul later in the month for formal 
discussions. The three Foreign Ministers met 
immediately on 3-4 July in Ankara, and discussed the 
possibilities of multilateral economic cooperation. 
Financial advisers to the three governments were 
summoned to Ankara, and formulated detailed proposals 
which were subsequently discussed by the Foreign 
Ministers on 18-19 July. The report of this Ministerial 
meeting"*" was adopted by the leaders of the three 
governments at their meeting on 20-21 July. The broad
principles on which RCD was to be established were laid
2down in the Istanbul Accord, and more detailed proposals 
were listed in the joint communique signed by the Heads 
of Government, which stated:
1
Report of the Ministerial Pre-Summit Meeting at Ankara, 
18-19 July 1964, to the Summit Meeting at Istanbul in 
July 1964 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Islamabad 
(mimeographed)).
2
For the text of the Istanbul Accord, signed by the three 
Heads of State, President Ayub, President Gursel and the 
Shah, 22 July 1964, see Government of Pakistan, President's 
Secretariat (Planning Division), Background Paper on RCD, 
Prepared by Mr Akbar Adil, for the First Joint RCD Course 
on Public Administration, Pakistan Administrative Staff
College, Lahore, October-November 1967, p.46.
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The formation of economic groupings is 
one of the outstanding features of our time 
and one of the most important factors in 
the acceleration of economic progress. The 
efforts being made for regional economic 
co-operation have received international 
acceptance and the decision of the three 
countries to expand such co-operation between 
the countries of the region is designed to 
achieve the same objective - strengthening 
of development by constant regional 
co-operation.1
At a press conference in Istanbul on 22 July, the
Pakistan Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, said
that the agreement was the culmination of six-year-old
developments in the three countries, in addition to a
recent coincidence of events which helped its formation,
including the 1 greater credence and importance being
given to non-alignment', the relaxation in tension
between America and Russia, and a general tendency
2towards regional cooperation.
According to President Ayub the summit talks 
represented 'a new grand concept', which would pave the
1
For the text of the joint communique signed by the 
three Heads of Government, President Ayub, Ismet Inonu, 
and Hassan Ali Mansur, 22 July 1964, see BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts (BBCSWB), Part 4, ME/1613/E/2, Teheran 
home service, 22 July 1964.
2
BBCSWB, ME/1613/E/5, Ankara home service, 22 July 1964.
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way for more fruitful relations among all Muslim
countries, from Morocca to Indonesia.^  After the
conference he said: 'What we have created is a small
but tidy closely knit organization. This venture will
be as important for us in the long run as the EEC is
2for the nations of Western Europe.' The Iranian Prime
3Minister described RCD as 'the need of the hour', and 
later, speaking to the Majlis, referred to it as a 
turning point in relations between Iran, Pakistan and 
Turkey, and 'one of the major victories in the history
of Iran.' He too emphasised the speed with which the
. . 4decision was reached. The Shah, more cautious, merely
said that cooperation had always been good and that the
5talks proved it could be better. Turkish statements
were also restrained: Inonu said the agreement 'augured
well for the future', while the Foreign Minister, Cemal
6Erkin, professed himself 'happy and satisfied'.
1
Dawn, 21 July 1964.
2
Ibid., 24 July 1964.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid., 9 August 1964.
5
Ibid., 24 July 1964.
6
Ibid.
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The proposals put forward, however, had the 
appearance of a practical beginning for a strictly 
functional scheme. A distinction was drawn between 
measures of economic cooperation which could be worked 
out and implemented at once, and those which would 
require detailed study. A Regional Planning Committee 
was to be established to study development plans and 
make recommendations for long-term purchase agreements 
and joint projects which would be based on the needs 
of all three countries. Specific areas of collaboration 
were outlined and it was proposed to set up working 
groups to study them. There would be regular ministerial 
meetings, and the various working groups would report 
to the Ministers through the Planning Committee.^
2. Organization
The RCD machinery was set up according to the 
recommendations of the Foreign Ministers, and confirmed 
in the Istanbul Accord. The Accord, which does not have 
the status of a treaty, and has never been presented for 
ratification in any of the parliaments of the participating 
countries, is the sole legal framework for the organisation. 
While this is a sufficient working basis, it presented 
certain difficulties regarding recognition by the United
1
Report of the Ministerial Pre-Summit Meeting, and the 
Ayub-Inonu-Mansur joint communique, referred to above.
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Nations. This informal situation appears satisfactory 
to each of the members, none of whom has made any move 
to place RCD on a firmer legal footing.
The highest authority responsible for making 
decisions is the Ministerial Council. It was envisaged 
that the Council, consisting of Ministers designated by 
each of the members, would meet once every four months, 
or more often if necessary. Its task was to study the 
report of the Regional Planning Council, to make 
decisions on the basis of this report regarding economic 
cooperation, and to follow up the decisions and progress 
made. The members are usually represented on the Council 
by their Foreign Ministers, and the meetings, lasting 
two or three days, are held in rotation in the three 
capitals. The initial optimistic suggestion that 
meetings be at four-monthly intervals has not worked out 
in practice, although they are still fairly frequent.
Since its establishment in July 1964, ten meetings have 
been held, the most recent in Islamabad in June 1969.
The Regional Planning Council, composed of the 
heads of the three member planning organisations, is 
probably the most important single body in the functioning 
of RCD. Its reports, based on the reports of the various 
committees and sub-committees, are usually accepted with 
little debate by the Ministerial Council. Its meetings . 
are geared to those of the Ministerial Council (or 
perhaps vice versa), and occur immediately before them.
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The Planning officials usually remain on hand during the 
Council meetings.
At the first Ministerial Council meeting in October 
1964, the working groups, of which there were 16, became 
known as permanent committees."*' These committees met 
frequently and, with the large number in existence, the 
round of meetings was hectic. In the first year there 
were more than 50 RCD meetings of various kinds. At the 
Ramsar Summit (July 1967) the decision was taken to 
streamline the committee structure, and the number was 
reduced to seven: the Industry Committee (which deals 
with matters relating to Joint Purpose Enterprises); the 
Committee on Petroleum and Petrochemicals; the Committee 
on Trade, which combines activities relating to promotion 
of trade and removal of trade barriers, the RCD Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry, Tourism, Banking and Insurance; 
the Committee on Transport and Communications, which 
replaces those on Transportation, Shipping, Roads and
1
The 16 permanent committees were as follows: Joint 
Purpose Enterprises, Trade, Banking and Insurance, 
Petroleum, Petrochemical Industries, Technical Cooperation 
and Public Administration, Cultural Cooperation, Tourism, 
Shipping, Post and Telecommunications, Air Transportation, 
Roads and Railways, Budget and Administration, Information, 
Health and Family Planning, Co-ordination. In addition 
there were two ad hoc groups on Agriculture and Women's 
Cooperation. Background Paper on RCD, p.5.
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Railways, Posts and Telecommunications; the Committee 
on Technical Cooperation, which deals with the technical 
assistance programme, public administration, health, 
family planning, agriculture and water resources 
development; the Committee on Social Affairs, which takes 
charge of cultural and information activities, and the 
Co-ordination Committee which deals with organisational 
matters relating to budget and administration, and 
co-ordinates the work of RCD generally.
The Committees have been described as the 'thinking 
cells' of RCD and are composed of technical experts 
appointed by each of the member countries. They provide 
direct contact with the various government agencies 
concerned.
Underpinning these other bodies is the permanent 
Secretariat headed by the Secretary-General. The Foreign 
Ministers recommended the establishment of a Secretariat 
in their report of 19 July 1964, and it was initially 
decided that it should be located in Teheran for the 
first year, and thereafter in each of the other capitals 
in rotation. The Ministerial Council later decided that 
it should remain for three years in Teheran, and it has 
since been established there permanently. Officials 
appointed to the Secretariat were to be paid by their 
own governments. The Iranian Plan Organization was to 
provide accommodation for it.
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The Secretariat was opened on 29 August 1964, under 
the temporary Directorship of Dr Javad Vafa, a former 
Director of the Iranian Plan Organization.^  On 18 March 
1965 the Ministerial Council approved the appointment of 
Dr Fuad Rouhani for a period of three years. Dr Rouhani, 
a special adviser to the Prime Minister of Iran, had 
been Secretary-General and Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), and it was no doubt hoped that his 
experience of one international organisation would be 
helpful in setting RCD on its feet. His successor,
Mr Masarrat Husain Zuberi, of Pakistan, previously 
Secretary in the Ministries of Industries, Fuel and 
Power and Natural Resources, as well as Communications, 
and a former member of the UN Transport and.Communications 
Commission, was appointed in March 1968. Perhaps by then 
it was felt that experience of a different order would be 
an advantage to the organisation.
The staff of the Secretariat is small: there are 
two Directors and one Assistant-Director from each 
country. These may be (and in the case of Turkey 
usually are) diplomatic officers, but this is not 
necessarily so. Initially each Director was associated
1
Dawn, 28 August 1964, and Ministerial Council 
Communiqué, 19 March 1965, Background Paper on RCD, 
pp.60-3.
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with three or four committees, changing regularly in 
order to gain experience, which meant that the tempo of 
work was considerable.'*' The reduction in the number of 
committees has eased the burden on Directors and 
Assistant Directors to a very large extent.
The Secretariat is now housed in a small brown 
stone building in downtown Teheran, new and 
air-conditioned. The morale of the staff is apparently 
high, and they quickly developed a group feeling, an 
identity with the organisation. Irritation and 
frustration develops more frequently as a result of the 
slowness of their own governments to respond to RCD 
policy decisions than with each other. The relationship 
between the Directors and Dr Rouhani was remote, and some 
felt that Rouhani was perhaps too aloof a figure; on the 
other hand, there is some suggestion that Rouhani 
himself experienced a high degree of frustration as 
Secretary-General, and became rather dispirited about 
the organisation as a whole. At the time of writing,
1
Especially for one Turkish Director who was required 
by the Ambassador in Teheran to work in the Embassy as 
well. He maintained there were some administrative 
economies: as Director he wrote himself letters in the 
morning to which, as First Secretary, he drafted replies 
after lunch, agreeing, naturally, to all his own 
proposals.
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nothing is known of the relationship between the new 
Secretary-General and his staff.^
Organisation within each of the member states 
varies, and only in Pakistan does it appear to have been 
constituted with sufficient authority to overrule 
individual ministries, and enable RCD policy to be 
executed.
In Turkey the administration of RCD policy is in
the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Initially
an RCD Desk was set up in the Ministry's Department of
Economic Relations, but in March 1968 a separate RCD
Bureau was established with an expanded staff. Although
still attached to the Economic Department it was better
able, as a separate Bureau, to co-ordinate the various
aspects - trade, tourism, communications - of RCD, which
previously were dealt with by other branches of the
Foreign Ministry. It is now through the Bureau that
policy decisions are passed on to the relevant Ministries
in the Turkish Government. The Chief of the Bureau, who
also dealt with some matters relating to EEC, was of
Acting Assistant Director-General rank. The Turkish Plan
2Organization appears to have little to do with RCD.
1
Conversations, necessarily unquotable, in Ankara and 
Teheran, August/September 1968.
2
Interview with Nurver Nures, Acting Assistant Director- 
General and Chief of the RCD Bureau, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ankara, 21 August 1968.
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The headquarters of the Iranian RCD organisation 
are to be found in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
head of this section was not clear how many staff he had 
working under him but he estimated there were six or 
seven.
The location of the Iranian RCD headquarters was, 
in 1964, the subject of a dispute between the Foreign 
Ministry and the Plan Organization. Dr Rouhani favoured 
its establishment within the Plan Organization, where 
the economic experts would be in control, rather than 
having decisions channelled through the Foreign Ministry. 
The then Prime Minister, Hassan Ali Mansur, had decided 
to leave direction of RCD affairs in the hands of the 
Foreign Ministry. As the Plan Organization, which is a 
separate authority directly responsible to the Shah, has 
its own source of funds (80 per cent of oil.revenue* and 
loans from abroad) and as any enterprise or project, 
regional or otherwise, must be approved by the Plan 
Organization, this body has effective control. The 
division between formal and actual authority does not, 
however, make for smooth handling of RCD matters. As 
late as 1966 it was reported that no allocation had been 
made in the Iranian budget for RCD. This was ascribed 
to the 'absence of mechanism in the administrative 
machinery of the government to exercise effective
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administrative control over the policies and 
commitments made by the government on the regional 
level.'
In Pakistan RCD matters come clearly within the 
authority of the Planning Division, the RCD Section of 
which was set up in August 1964. The head of the section 
is Mr Akbar Adil, who has held this position since the 
Section was established. He has the rank of Joint 
Secretary in the President's Secretariat, which gives 
him the necessary authority to give directives to the 
various Ministries. He is responsible to the Secretariat 
of Planning and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning 
Commission. There are two Deputy Chiefs in the RCD 
Section, an Assistant Chief and allied staff. Their 
task is to co-ordinate RCD activities with all the 
Ministries concerned and to liaise with the RCD 
Secretariat. Matters relating to RCD are referred to 
the Ministry concerned. All delegations to RCD meetings 
are sponsored by the Section, which co-ordinates the 
views of the Government and intimates the result to the 
Governments of Iran and Turkey.
1
'Report of the Businessmen's Mission to the RCD Countries', 
First Joint Course in Public Administration and Management 
for Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, held at the Pakistan 
Administrative Staff College, Lahore, from October 8 to 
November 18, 1967, vol.II, Documentation, Speeches, Field 
Visits in Iran, ^Pakistan and Turkey (Pakistan 
Administrative Staff College: Lahore, December 1967).
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Akbar Adil is relatively the most senior 
administrator in charge of RCD matters in the region, 
and the machinery set up in Pakistan appears to be 
designed to work as efficiently as possible. The 
implications seem to be that, while Pakistan is serious 
about the implementation of RCD's economic objectives, 
both Turkey and Iran regard the organisation in terms 
primarily of diplomacy, and wish to keep the countries' 
relations with RCD firmly in the hands of the Foreign 
Ministry.
There is an obvious though unacknowledged 
relationship with CENTO, although the Pakistani view is 
that the only thing gained from CENTO was that Turkey, 
Iran and Pakistan learned to work together, and that, 
now UK and USA are absent from the conference table, 
things go much more smoothly. RCD has taken over none 
of the old CENTO machinery or apparatus, and, although 
there is some overlap, RCD has been able to work out 
methods which suit the members better. 'CENTO have their 
way of doing things, we have ours.1'*'
One example of the confusion resulting from this is 
the CENTO road and rail project, which is financed by 
CENTO and directed by the CENTO Economic Committee.
This committee structure is duplicated by RCD and does
1
In the words of a Pakistani official.
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not appear to be doing anything new or vital in the 
field. This does not happen only with respect to 
communications, however, as one news item in the 
Pakistan News Digest indicates. Headed 'RCD Plan to 
Check Epidemic Diseases', it goes on to describe a plan 
whereby Pakistan, Iran and Turkey would help each other 
in the event of an outbreak of cholera or smallpox, 
adding: 'This plan to co-operate was revealed at a 
meeting in Ankara of the CENTO working group of 
communicable diseases . . . . '
The reason for this continued confusion is to a
large extent financial, for most of the projects are
dependent on some level of foreign financial or technical
aid, which comes frequently through CENTO and its
committees. No aid has been given to RCD as an
organisation, or to any of the members for specifically
2RCD purposes, nor have they sought it. Pakistanis are
1
1 March 1968.
2
RCD appears, in fact, to have been ignored by both the 
USA and the USSR. Moscow radio broadcasts in Turkish 
(18 July 1964) and Arabic (20 July 1964) said that the 
aim of the summit conference in Istanbul was to set up 
'a new form of CENTO', and Izvestia on 21 July 1964 simply 
noted the arrival of Iranian and Pakistani leaders in 
Istanbul, without comment. Mizan, July-August 1964.
Since then there have been practically no references to 
RCD by Russian sources. Similarly, the formation of RCD 
was reported by The New York Times, 19, 21 and 22 July 1964, 
but there was no official US comment.
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especially proud that RCD is a purely regional 
organisation, without outside participation of any kind. 
So the situation has developed that some projects at 
least are claimed by RCD while receiving CENTO 
assistance. Since it makes no difference to the actual 
project, the only people who are perhaps a little 
regretful about it are the members of the CENTO 
Secretariat. Steps were shortly taken to transform the 
conceptual relationship with UNCTAD into something more 
formal. The UN Secretary-General, U Thant, had welcomed 
the formation of RCD and early in 1966 Dr Rouhani, at 
the invitation of Dr Raul Prebisch, the Secretary-General 
of UNCTAD, visited New York to take part in discussions 
which centred on ways and means of providing finance for 
development projects undertaken by regional groupings. 
Rouhani gave the meeting a briefing on the background, 
objectives and achievements of RCD.'*’ This aroused 
interest, especially among the countries of the Maghreb 
(then planning a grouping of their own) which sought 
advice from the RCD Secretariat. Rouhani and Prebisch 
decided that continued contact would be an advantage to 
both UNCTAD and RCD.
1
Dr Fuad Rouhani, 'Report on Secretary-General's Visit 
to Geneva and New York', referred to p.254, n.2.
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In August 1967 the Council of Ministers
noted with satisfaction that the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council had 
very recently approved the establishment 
of relationship between RCD and the 
Economic and Social Council and its 
subsidiary bodies giving RCD consultative 
status
and that the Secretary-General should attend meetings of 
the UNCTAD Board in Geneva, and the meeting of the UNCTAD 
group on Economic Development later in 1967.
3. The Working of RCD: Objectives, Achievements and 
Some Problems Encountered
One of the difficulties involved in assessing the 
achievements of RCD is the need to decide exactly what 
its founders expected of the organisation. Were its 
objectives primarily economic, or were they also 
political? To what extent did political objectives 
enter into the decision to form RCD? Much confusion has 
resulted from the mass of propaganda which surrounds RCD, 
which has been referred to at times in extravagant terms 
by newspapers and officials. Yet to go back to the 
Istanbul Accord itself is to go back to a rather modest 
set of objectives erected by a group of men who appeared 
only too well aware of the difficulties involved in their 
task.
1
Seventh Session of RCD Council of Ministers, Joint 
Communique. RCD News, vol.3, no.20, August 1967.
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While Turkey, Iran and Pakistan are all among the 
less developed nations, there are differences in degree 
which can have important implications for foreign 
economic policy.'*' Turkey's per capita income is higher 
than that of Iran and almost three times that of 
Pakistan. Turkey hopes by 1972 to be self-supporting in 
food production and to have tipped the balance of its 
economy in favour of industrialisation. Its economy is 
approaching a point of self-sustained growth known to 
economists as a 'take-off'. In Iran the situation is 
different. Although it has the highest growth rate of 
the three countries, this is closely related to the oil 
industry, which provides a source of foreign exchange 
for Iran not available to Turkey or Pakistan. It cannot 
be claimed as Iranian industry, however, and in other 
respects Iran is little better developed than Pakistan.
While the figures relating to Pakistan's development 
appear encouraging, the success of its development plans 
is endangered by the sheer enormity of the problems 
involved, especially as regards population increase and 
the disparity between the two wings of the country which 
contributes to political instability.
Regional trade is not competitive, except insofar 
as Turkey and Pakistan are exporters of cotton, but both
1
See Appendix I .
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are only marginal suppliers on the world market.
However, each finds its main market outside the region,
and while there is some trade between them
it is clear that insofar as exports of 
primary products constitute the main source 
of foreign exchange for the RCD countries 
it will not be in their interest to divert 
trade away from the advanced countries from 
whom they obtain their much needed capital 
goods.1
It is against this background that the implementation 
of the ten principal economic objectives of the Istanbul 
Accord should be viewed. The three Heads of State agreed 
in principle to:
(i) a free or freer movement of goods through 
all practical means such as the conclusion 
of trade agreements,
(ii) establish closer collaboration amongst 
existing Chambers of Commerce and 
eventually to set up a joint Chamber of 
Commerce,
(iii)the formulation and implementation of 
joint proposed projects,
(iv) reduce the postal rates between the 
three countries to the level of internal 
rates,
(v) improve the air transport services within 
the region and the eventual establishment
1
Nurul Islam, 'Regional Co-operation for Development', 
Journal of Common Market Studies, March 1967, p.287.
274
of a strong and competitive international 
airline among the three countries,
(vi) investigate the possibilities of securing 
a close cooperation in the field of 
shipping including the establishment of a 
joint maritime line or 'conference' 
arrangements,
(vii)undertake necessary studies for construction 
and improvement of rail and road links,
(viii)sign at an early date an agreement with 
a view to promoting tourism,
(ix) abolish visa formalities among the three 
countries for travel purposes and
(x) provide technical assistance to each 
other in the form of experts and training 
facilities.1
The three Heads of State ended with an expression of 
confidence that 'the combined efforts of their peoples 
to this end will open new vistas of hope and opportunity 
for them and thus contribute to world peace and to the 
prosperity of the whole region.'
There was really nothing startlingly new in these 
objectives. An increase in trade and investigation of 
ways and means of bringing this about had been the concern 
of CENTO for many years, and the CENTO Economic Affairs 
Committee had even gone into the possibility of a free
1
Istanbul Accord, 22 July 1964, Background Paper on RCD, 
p . 46.
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trade organisation. Trade agreements had already been 
concluded between the three partners on a bilateral 
basis providing for most favoured nation treatment and 
transit facilities for trade, and restricting the 
re-export of goods imported from partner countries. The 
Iran-Pakistan trade agreement listed a number of 
commodities in which an expansion of trade was considered 
desirable by the signatories.'*'
The idea of joint projects was not new either, 
although nothing had gone beyond the stage of discussion 
of possible areas of such cooperation. One such area 
was shipping. Another was oil exploration, between Iran 
and Pakistan. Cooperation among the airlines was also a 
matter discussed within the framework of CENTO. Work 
towards improved road and rail links had been begun by 
CENTO in 1957. The provision of technical assistance 
had also been in operation for some years.
What was new was the decision of the three Heads of 
State to undertake such projects by multilateral 
cooperation, and to establish administrative machinery 
with sufficient authority to take action once agreement 
was reached.
1
Nurul Islam, p.291.
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As a result RCD was able to boast of progress in 
several fields at the end of its first year. In their 
Joint Communique of 2 3 July 1965, the 3rd Session of the 
Ministerial Council reviewed past progress and approved 
plans for the coming year. In concrete terms they were 
able to report the establishment of a Joint Shipping 
Conference, 'RCD Shipping Services', in which Pakistan 
was entitled to a 50 per cent share of the total pooled 
trade, Turkey to 35 per cent and Iran to 15 per cent.
Its headquarters were at Istanbul.'*’ Tourism agreements 
had been signed and visas abolished for travel of 
nationals of the three countries within the region. Post, 
telegraph and telecommunication rates had been reduced. The 
Regional Cultural Institute had been established in Teheran. 
The RCD Reinsurance Centre was established in Karachi.
Other plans were still in the stage of investigation, 
or had been approved but were awaiting implementation.
The Joint Purpose Enterprises Committee had identified 19 
groups of industries for development as joint purpose 
enterprises, and studies of these industries had been
1
Background Paper on RCD, p.66.
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allocated among the three countries. The subcommittee 
on air transportation had met three times and discussed 
matters relating to the establishment of a joint airline. 
The possibilities of establishing joint oil exploration 
companies were under study by the petroleum committee, 
as well as the establishment of new refineries and 
setting up of filling stations in border areas. Studies 
were also being made of the possibilities for establishing 
petrochemical industries in the region. Trade was said 
to have 1 shown a healthy upward trend1 but no further 
details were given.
Three years after its establishment, studies and
discussions under RCD auspices were proliferating, and
'general agreements in principle' were thick on the
ground. The RCD Shipping Service, plying from USA and
within the region, had begun its operations in June 1966,
although the number of ships involved or their tonnage
. 2was not revealed m  the Ministerial Communique. During
1
Allocated as follows: Iran : electronics, aluminium, 
basic drugs and pharmaceuticals, dye stuffs, chemicals 
and lubricating oils; Pakistan: motor vehicles, electrical 
machinery and equipment, heavy engineering goods, machine 
tools, bank note paper, agricultural machinery and 
equipment; Turkey: cement, locomotives, sugar, ship­
building, iron and steel and coal.
2
Ministerial Council, 5th Session, Joint Communique, 
Background Paper on RCD, p.80.
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the same period three Reinsurance pools were set up,
Fire (Turkey), Marine (Hull and Cargo) (Pakistan) and
Accident (Iran), operating from July 1966, representing
a saving in foreign exchange usually paid outside the
region for this facility. Implementation of agreements
to establish joint purpose enterprises was somewhat
slower. In August 1967 the Ministerial Council
noted with satisfaction that the Aluminium 
project located in Iran and Bank Note Paper 
project located in Pakistan are being 
implemented satisfactorily. The Carbon 
Black project, which was approved for 
implementation in Iran, was being revised 
by the Government of Iran and would be 
taken up for implementation shortly.!
Negotiations were being finalised on the establishment
of a locomotive industry in Turkey and three projects
in Pakistan, cotton linter pulp, wires and cables and
2 . . ball bearings. The establishment of an oil refinery
at Izmir was agreed upon in principle and the construction
of an oil pipeline from Iran to Turkey was under study.
In addition 13 studies related to various groups of
industries were in preparation, in addition to
feasibility reports on 26 specific industries.
1
Ministerial Council, 7th Session, Joint Communique, 
ibid., p .96.
2
This situation appeared basically unchanged in April 
1968. See Ministerial Council, 8th Session, Joint 
Communique (mimeographed).
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The complete unanimity regarding the need to expand 
intra-regional trade had little apparent effect on the 
trade itself, which represents only a very small 
proportion of the members' total trade.'*'
Despite the optimism of the Ministerial communiques,
the President of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce said in
January 1967 that there had not been a substantial
improvement in regional trade, due largely to traditional
trading patterns of the members. What was more, in view
of the imbalance, with Pakistan having a large deficit
in trade with Iran (sharply reduced in 1964-6 period)
and Turkey having a deficit with Pakistan,
if immediate steps are not taken, foreign 
exchange difficulties may lead to a 
shrinkage in the overall trade of the 
region. I would, therefore, stress that 
urgent action should be taken to finalize 
a scheme for introducing an RCD Payments 
Union.... 2
In so doing he was echoing the report of the Pakistani 
businessmen's mission which, with the encouragement of 
the Pakistan Export Promotion Bureau, had toured Iran 
and Turkey in March 1966. They had suggested a scheme 
under which payments should be made in the national 
currency of the buyer, the difference to be paid at the
1
See Appendix I.
2
'First Council Session and RCD Chamber of Commerce', 
Supplement, Dawn, 27 January 1967.
/
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end of the year in hard currency. Such a scheme would
have been particularly attractive to Pakistan which
probably has more severe foreign exchange problems than
Turkey and Iran, but this proposal presented
difficulties to all the governments involved because of
2other trade obligations. Turkey made it clear that 
because of its commitments to the EEC and the 
unfavourable reaction of the IMF it would be difficult 
for it to enter into such an agreement.
A compromise was reached in April 1967, which, 
though only a small step, represented the first real 
effort to improve conditions of trade. The RCD Union 
for Multilateral Payments Arrangements provides for a 
credit of up to $2m. to be extended by each of the members 
to the others, the balance to be paid in an acceptable 
convertible currency within a prescribed period. At the 
end of the financial year 50 per cent of the debts are 
to be paid, also in an acceptable convertible foreign 
currency, the remaining 50 per cent to be carried forward. 
Invisible payments, border trade and armaments were 
excluded from the agreements which, initially for two 
years, provided for possible extension and revision of 
the $2m. limit. Unless the amount is increased, it is
1
See 'Report of the Businessmen's Mission'.
2
See Nurul Islam, p.290.
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difficult to see to what extent this agreement is going 
in fact to help improve the future of regional trade. 
Reluctance to accept any proposal for payment, even in 
part, in national currencies means that pressure on 
foreign exchange reserves is not greatly relieved except 
for the provision of the limited credit facility of $2m.
While payments arrangements are an important aspect 
of trade promotion, there were other difficulties under 
which regional trade was labouring. Little is revealed 
in the official communiques, but the businessmen's 
mission which toured Iran and Turkey, unhampered by the 
political and diplomatic inhibitions usually afflicting 
official delegations, produced a report which is 
particularly illuminating with regard to the problems 
encountered by intra-regional trade from the point of 
view of Pakistan.'*'
Two principal points emerged. Poor communications 
and 'overland trade arrangements with Iran which were a 
legacy of British days' inhibited trade and aggravated 
the imbalance. In the case of Turkey, there was also an 
imbalance although in the reverse direction and, unless 
Pakistan was able to increase its imports from Turkey, 
they saw little prospect of overall increase. This 
situation too was aggravated by poor communications.
1
See 'Report of the Businessmen's Mission'.
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Another factor which emerged was the competition 
faced by Pakistani jute exporters from Indian jute 
manufacturers. The mission pointed out that there was 
still
considerable trade in the hands of Hindus 
and Sikhs in Iran and Jews, Iranians and 
Greeks in Turkey who on account of their 
traditional ties with India and Britain 
resisted any orientation of mutual trade 
between the RCD countries which would 
dislodge them....
It was noted that India was the main supplier of jute
to Iran.'*'
Pakistan was at a serious disadvantage in Iran 
vis-a-vis Indian jute manufacturers because 'Indian 
suppliers enjoy the reputation of being able to supply 
goods at very short notice'. While there were direct 
sailings from Calcutta to Persian Gulf ports, the only 
direct vessel from Chittagong (in East Pakistan) which 
accepted cargo for Khorramshehr (on the Persian Gulf) 
with trans-shipment at Karachi, charged a higher rate 
than the Indian shipping companies. The Turkish 
Government was willing to issue single country licences 
for the import of jute in order to orient trade to 
Pakistan, but this was resisted by importers used to 
buying from India.
1
Iranian imports from India are greater than from 
Pakistan and have increased since formation of RCD. 
See Appendix I.
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It is essential that through arranging 
direct shipments from East Pakistan and 
enabling early deliveries to be effected 
Pakistan should strengthen the Turkish 
Government's hands.!
They also urged that plans already begun for the
establishment of a joint venture jute mill in Turkey be
pursued. The nearness of Turkey to Europe emphasised
the disadvantages Pakistan suffered through lack of
regular sailings. Since the publication of this report
the joint shipping line has begun operation but, with
the closure of the Suez Canal and in the absence of any
effective overland link between Turkey and the Persian
Gulf, the problem remains acute.
Until the prerequisites of improved communications 
and a more constructive payments arrangement are met 
there is little prospect for a dramatic increase in 
trade.
The other major aspect of RCD cooperation is the 
establishment of joint purpose enterprises. The fact that 
in five years of its existence plans for only three such 
enterprises have actually been executed, and that of the 
three the bank note paper in Pakistan is the only one 
within sight of production, appears to point to some 
serious difficulties beneath the initial enthusiasm for 
joint efforts. The usefulness of the feasibility reports
1
'Report of the Businessmen's Mission'.
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should not be minimised: they are a necessary step 
towards any more concrete cooperation. But the fact 
remains that until 1967, while everything was in the 
investigation stage, progress was apparently satisfactory.
Discussions on RCD Committees were generally 
amicable and there was practically never any serious 
disagreement among the members.'*’ It has been suggested, 
however, that this was to a large extent because the 
sentimentality with which RCD had been surrounded made 
members reluctant to destroy the atmosphere of brotherly 
cooperation: agreement was reached frequently at the 
price of sincerity. Governments not wishing to fulfil 
obligations undertaken in the Committees resorted to
prevarication and procrastination or simply ignored
. . 2 Committee decisions.
For obvious reasons it is difficult to document 
these instances, but some examples are perhaps worth 
noting. Agreement was reached in May 1966 on the 
decision to establish a carbon black factory as a joint 
purpose enterprise. Carbon black, extremely important 
in the manufacture of synthetic rubber, may be
1
This view was expressed by all those to whom I spoke 
who had had experience on RCD Committees.
2
Interviews in Rawalpindi, Ankara and Teheran, May- 
September 1968.
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manufactured from coal, but within the region Iran's 
high quality natural gas made it the most appropriate 
place for the establishment of the industry. Since it 
is an important industry, each of the members wanted to 
establish it themselves. Ultimately agreement was 
reached to set it up in Iran, as a joint enterprise 
between Iran, Pakistan and a foreign collaborator. The 
Iranian Government at the end of 1967 was still involved 
in negotiations with a foreign 'Government/Firm for 
technical and financial collaboration in this project'.^ 
Turkey had previously indicated that it would not 
participate in the equity of any joint purpose enterprise 
in which foreign concerns from outside the region also 
participated on an equity basis; it favoured foreign 
participation through the purchase of licences and/or 
payment of royalties. Whether this statement was made 
with particular reference to the carbon black project
2(which Turkey had wanted for itself anyway) is not known.
Another project which has encountered difficulties 
is the proposed oil pipeline from Iran to the Turkish 
Mediterranean port of Iskanderun. According to Turkish 
sources, the plan was initially to build the pipeline
1
Background, p.10.
2
See A Detailed Note on RCD, Appendix A (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs: Islamabad (mimeographed)).
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from the northern Iranian oilfields, but there was
insufficient oil there to make the project economical.
The Iranians then proposed that it should be built from
the southern oilfields, but the problem remains. The
cost of building the 1750km. pipeline is estimated at
about $550m. For this to be economical it would have to
transport 35m. tons of crude oil per annum. This the
National Iranian Oil Company cannot supply, and
negotiations must take place with the Consortium.'*'
Turkish sources claim that they were misled by the
Iranians who did not from the first make it clear that
they could not supply the oil. Iranian sources claim
that this is untrue, and that they quoted a price for
the oil to the Turks, who used it to bargain with the 
2Consortium. Whether the accusations of bad faith are 
justified or not is perhaps less important in this case 
than the fact that they were made. (It is possible that 
the Iranian Government was unaware of the volume of oil 
needed to make the project pay, since this study was 
being done by the Turkish Government. They do have a 
limited amount of oil which they may dispose of themselves.)
1
Hurriyet (Istanbul), 14 July 1969, reported in The Pulse, 
14 July 1969.
2
Interviews with Turkish and Iranian officials in Ankara 
and Teheran, August-September 1968.
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The delay in Iranian agreement to the acceptance 
of 'tourist cards' for travel by nationals of the three 
countries within the region also represents a breakdown 
in cooperation and has been officially attributed by 
the Iranian Government to the difficulty of getting the 
approval of the Majlis, an explanation which is not 
easy to accept in a country where the executive is in a 
particularly strong position to implement measures it 
considers desirable. The unofficial explanation is said 
to be reluctance on Iran's part to open its doors to 
the possibility of an influx of Pakistanis seeking work 
in Iran, with the attendant risk of the spread of diseases 
like cholera which are endemic in Pakistan, an objection 
Iran could hardly make explicit without endangering the 
spirit of brotherly cooperation so carefully nurtured.
Even with the most efficient cooperation there are 
problems which would be difficult to overcome. Studies 
and surveys are comparatively inexpensive. The 
establishment of industries and implementation of 
decisions regarding joint projects requires vast amounts 
of capital (e.g. the Iran-Turkey oil pipeline) which must 
come from outside the region, and is not often easy to 
obtain. A further restraint has been placed on this 
development by the conditions imposed by Turkey on its 
participation in joint purpose enterprises in which 
foreign capital would participate.
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Co-ordination of national development plans would 
help to eliminate some of these difficulties, but although
each of the three countries has entered a new plan period
since the establishment of RCD, Pakistan is the only
member which claims to have made any attempt to integrate
RCD projects into the national plan. Since the Third
Five Year Plan was initiated in 1965 it made only general
provision for regional projects, and developments related
to RCD are integrated into the Annual Development
Programme. Greatest progress has been made in the field
of petrochemicals.’*' The principal difficulty confronting
regional co-ordination of development planning is that,
in countries such as Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, which
lack a national industrial base, national development
of this base is usually given priority over wider
regional development. The establishment of industries
on a regional basis would lead to specialised development
of each member, and thus to the dependence of each on the
2others. At this stage none of the three feels able to
1
Interview with Mr Zainal Abbouddin, Deputy Chief of the 
RCD Section, Planning Division, President's Secretariat, 
Government of Pakistan, 1 June 1968. See Government of 
Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Third Five Year Plan 
1965-70 (Manager of Publications: Karachi, 1967), p.457.
2
See Nurul Islam, pp.298-300.
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permit this. It appears that, beyond a minimal fringe, 
economic collaboration is at present neither possible 
nor genuinely desired by the members.
4. Political Aspects of RCD
In view of the lack of any real development of 
economic collaboration since the establishment of RCD 
in 1964, and the difficulties encountered in implementing 
many of the decisions, it could be argued that RCD is not 
a particularly useful organisation. This is assuming 
that the objectives of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, in 
forming RCD, were purely economic, which is not 
necessarily the case. It is also arguable that despite 
the public statements each of the three members decided 
to participate for substantially different reasons. The 
economic surveys of the members make it clear that both 
Turkey and Iran are more advanced economically than 
Pakistan which probably has most to gain and little to 
lose from that kind of cooperative development.
The possibility of RCD evolving into a free trade 
area and later a common market has been under 
consideration at least in Pakistan since the foundation 
of the organisation. In December 1964 instructions were 
given the Pakistan delegation to the Trade Committee
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meeting to pursue this objective.'*' The head of the RCD
Section of Pakistan's Planning Division acknowledges
that he sees a common market as the ultimate end of
2RCD, an aim supported by sections of the Pakistan
3press. The Shah is also reported to have advocated the
formation of a common market in an interview with
4Cumhunyet m  May 1968, although he was not very 
explicit about it. The Turkish Government is very cool 
about the proposal, and officially maintains that the 
possibility of the formation of an RCD common market 
has never been considered. This is no doubt a result 
of its association with the EEC.
Despite a reluctance to discuss the subject, the 
complications likely to arise through Turkey's
1
Government of Pakistan, President's Secretariat 
(Planning Division), Brief to and Composition of 
Delegations to Meetings of RCD Committees to be held at 
Karachi on December 2, 1964 (Karachi, 26 November 1964).
2
Interview with Mr Akbar Adii, Chief and Ex-Officio 
Joint Secretary in Charge of the RCD Section Planning 
Division, President's Secretariat, 8 June 1968.
3
Dawn, 27 August and 5 September 1968.
4
Reported in The Pakistan Times, 30 May 1968.
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increasingly close association with the EEC have not 
escaped the notice of officials in any of the three 
capitals. The most common reaction is that Turkish 
membership of EEC is a long way off, and that the 
problem will be dealt with when it arises. Pakistani 
officials make no secret of their belief that Turkish 
policy is misguided in attempting to integrate with 
Europe, and some argue that Turkey itself is realising 
that it is primarily a Middle Eastern power, pointing to 
closer Turkish involvement in the Middle East since 1964. 
They are encouraged in this view by Turkish membership 
of RCD and a moderation of Turkey's pro-Israeli position, 
together with increasing trade and diplomatic relations 
with both the Arab and non-Arab Middle East. Their 
assessment is, however, only partly right, for Turkish
1
This view has been bluntly expressed by President Ayub 
Khan: 'Well, after some discussions I began to push home 
some truths to the Turks....I told them, make up your 
mind as to what you are going to do. So far you have 
been saying that you will be part of Europe. But the 
Europeans will never accept you as Europeans. They are 
Christians and not Muslims. Even though some of you 
may not believe in Islam, you are suspected by them, 
for you have fought against them for six hundred years. 
They are not going to trust you....' Speech at the 
Thinkers' Forum at the University Campus, Lahore,
4 October 1964. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and 
Statements, vol.VII, p.47.
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advances towards the Arabs have sprung from quite 
different motives. During the Cyprus crisis of 1964 
Turkey found itself very much alone, opposed by the 
USSR and the communist countries, deserted by the US 
and without support from any Arab state. As a result 
the Turkish Government decided to cultivate the support 
of the Afro-Asian and particularly the Arab world. At 
the same time Turkey is in need of markets for the 
manufactured goods it is beginning to produce, and is 
attempting to expand its trade with the Arab countries. 
Although Turkish concern with the Middle East has 
increased for these reasons, this does not signify any 
basic moderation of its Europe-oriented policy.
While Turkey and Pakistan might therefore gain from 
an increase in the level of development and trade within 
the region, Iranian participation can hardly be explained 
in economic terms. As the only member with access to 
large foreign exchange earnings, it could conceivably 
become a source of regional capital, but at the moment 
uses most of its oil income for Iranian development.
In any case, had economic cooperation been the sole 
or even the principal motive for the formation of RCD, 
it is reasonable to ask why the established machinery 
of CENTO was abandoned and why it was found necessary 
to duplicate much of CENTO's work without the access to 
financial assistance, however inadequate it may have 
appeared, provided by CENTO. At the risk of being
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repetitive it is necessary to recall Pakistan's 
dissatisfaction with the old alliance structure, a 
dissatisfaction soon shared to a greater or lesser 
extent by Iran and Turkey: all three countries found it 
convenient to attempt to build a new international image 
for themselves by means of an independent regional 
organisation. Care was taken to emphasise that RCD, 
though parallel to CENTO, was quite separate from it.^
All three countries found it desirable to improve 
their relations with the Soviet bloc and the Afro-Asian 
group and considered a neutralist pose useful for these 
purposes. This diplomatic initiative was welcomed by 
the USSR which seized the opportunity of improving its 
relations with northern tier countries and thus apparently 
weakening American influence in the region. Turkey, Iran 
and Pakistan have derived some benefit from the new 
relationship with the USSR, but the gains made have not 
been spectacular. On the question of Cyprus the Soviet 
Union has moved from opposition to Turkey to a position 
of neutrality, maintaining that while the island should
1
See the joint communique issued by the Foreign Ministers 
of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey in Ankara, 4 July 1964, Dawn,
6 July 1964; statement by Turkish Foreign Minister, Cemal 
Erkin, 18 July, Pakistan Observer, 21 July 1964; and 
statement by Pakistan Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto, at a press conference at Istanbul, 22 July,
BBCSWB, ME/1613/E/5, Ankara home service, 22 July 1964.
294
not be partitioned, 'the Cyprus Republic should continue
to exist as an independent State1,  ^ that is, there should
be no union with Greece (Enosis). Russia has also
abandoned its policy of support for India in the Kashmir
dispute and taken a strictly neutral stand, mediating
between India and Pakistan following the Kashmir war in
2September 1965.
More emphasis has been placed on the economic than
on the diplomatic aspects of the relationship. Attempts
have been made to increase trade between Russia and the
countries of the northern tier. Russia is building a
steel works, an aluminium plant and an oil refinery in
3Turkey; it has undertaken to build a steel mill in
1
Statement by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, in 
Ankara: 'We want a solution based on the principle of the 
existence of two separate national communities in the 
island and the preservation of their mutual rights. We 
believe the Cyprus Republic should continue to exist as 
an independent State'. Press conference, Ankara home 
service, 21 May 1965, BBCSWB, ME/1866/C/2.
2
The Tashkent Agreement which followed the Indo-Pakistan 
talks appeared to make concessions to the Indian point of 
view and was unpopular in Pakistan, especially West 
Pakistan. Soviet neutrality was not very helpful to 
Pakistan in this instance. See Government of India, 
External Publicity Division, Tashkent Declaration,
January 1966.
3
Tass report, 20 August 1966, BBCSWB, SU/2253/A4/2, and 
Moscow radio and Tass report, Mizan, Supplement 'A', 
March-April 1969.
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Iran, and to buy natural gas (for which a pipeline must 
be laid) in return.'*' Agreement has been reached with 
Pakistan for Soviet assistance in the construction of a 
steel mill, a nuclear power station, and port facilities 
at Gwadar in Baluchistan, not far from the Iranian 
border.2
Both Iran and Pakistan have concluded arms sales 
agreements with the USSR, Iran being the first American 
ally to do so. In Iran's case the agreement early in 
1967 to buy an estimated $100m. worth of military 
equipment was apparently an attempt to put pressure on 
the US to deliver two squadrons of Phantom jets ordered 
in 1966. The Russian equipment ordered was of an 
unsophisticated nature (such as armoured troop carriers) 
of which some was delivered towards the end of 1967. In
1
Arms Sales to Near and South Asian Countries. Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United 
States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, 1967, 
p.15.
Dawn, 16 August 1968.
2
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August 1967 the US agreed to deliver some of the jets
ordered.'*' Pakistan also wished to buy American arms,
to re-equip its forces following the war with India in
1965, but the American embargo on arms and spare parts
forced it to turn elsewhere. The USSR was finally
persuaded to sell some military equipment to Pakistan
after Kosygin's visit to that country in April 1968,
2enough to irritate India without satisfying Pakistan,
3which has said little about the Soviet arms.
The material gains to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan 
have not therefore been great, particularly compared to
1
Estimates of the value of the arms deal vary from $90m. 
to $100m. (The New York Times, 8 February 1967, p.l), to 
$110m. (Arms Sales to Near and South Asian Countries, p.l). 
The Iranian manoeuvre was apparently successful as the US, 
after the Shah's visit in August 1967, agreed to deliver 
some of the Phantoms (The Times, 2 September 1967) . It 
should be noted, however, that Britain's decision to 
withdraw from 'East of Suez', announced in February 
1967, might have influenced the US assessment or Iran's 
role in the Persian Gulf area.
2
See, for example, the speech by the Indian Prime 
Minister, Indira Gandhi, in the Lok Sabha, expressing 
concern on supply of arms to Pakistan by the USSR, text 
in The Times of India, 22 July 1968.
3
It is not clear exactly what Russian equipment has been 
delivered to Pakistan apart from 40 MiG-19 jet 
interceptors, listed in The Military Balance, 1968-1969, 
Institute of Strategic * Studies, London, 1968.
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the scale of assistance received from the US and Western
Europe, but the improved relations with the USSR have a
propaganda value for the governments of the three
countries involved, both in terms of their internal
politics and in their relations with the Afro-Asian
countries. This aspect is more important for Turkey and
Pakistan, although the success of Turkey's efforts to
acquire Afro-Asian, particularly Arab, support remains
uncertain. Pakistan did, however, make clear diplomatic
gains, particularly among the more militant Arabs.^
This re-orientation of foreign policy on the part of these
three countries is not, of course, a consequence of the
2formation of RCD, but membership of a regional 
organisation which they can claim is quite apart from 
CENTO has probably given some credibility to, and thereby 
facilitated, their new diplomatic initiatives.
5. Conclusion
The success of RCD should not be judged in economic 
terms alone: it has permitted the members to project a 
new international image of themselves as, if not non- 
aligned, at least much less aligned than previously.
It has also served a purpose in terms of restoring their
1
See Chapter VIII.
2
See Chapter V.
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self-respect: meeting around a conference table at 
which British and American representatives are not 
present and making decisions in which these two powers 
have no part has a value of its own. Progress in 
economic development has been slow and cooperation 
among Turkey, Iran and Pakistan often difficult to 
achieve. Although this has in some cases arisen from 
circumstances largely beyond the control of the three 
countries involved (lack of capital, technological 
knowledge and inadequate communications have all 
hampered development) there is evidence which suggests 
that the members of RCD are unwilling to make some of 
the concessions necessary for successful co-ordination 
of regional development projects. It should be noted, 
however, that other regional economic organisations 
established among less developed countries have also 
been beset by difficulties frequently arising from the 
low level of economic development, and have had 
difficulty in policy co-ordination.'*’ Even the European 
Economic Community, the most successful regional 
economic organisation, has encountered problems arising 
from a clash of interests among members, despite the high 
level of economic development they enjoy.
1
See, for example, Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, 
'Economics and Differential Patterns of Political 
Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America', 
International Organization, Autumn 1964.
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RCD is important to Pakistan for several additional
reasons. It is at least a partial fulfilment of the
ideal of closer collaboration with other Muslim countries,
particularly within the northern tier. It also represents
a new attempt by Pakistan to find security. Both aspects
of RCD were referred to frequently by President Ayub Khan,
especially in the months immediately after the signing
of the Istanbul Accord.
It had for long been my desire to bring about 
community of thought and action among countries 
of this region with whom we have bonds of 
brotherhood and common history....In entering 
this arrangement not only have we promoted the 
interests of our respective countries, but, I 
believe, we have promoted the interests of 
Islam, and have set an example for others to 
follow.1
' Cultural exchange has been an important part of the
RCD programme, especially in Pakistan, and much emphasis
has been placed on the 'bonds of brotherhood and common
history'. RCD is popular in Pakistan where, although
2proposals for confederation did not win support, there 
is a strong sentimental attachment to Turkey and Iran,
1
First-of-the-Month Broadcast, 1 August 1964, Mohammad 
Ayub Khan. Speeches and Statements, vol.VII, p.16.
2
See Chapter V.
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and to the ideal of Muslim solidarity.'*' Afghan 
membership of RCD would be welcomed by Pakistan, and 
the Istanbul Accord stated that the participation of 
other countries of the region would be considered by 
the members. Afghanistan has, however, remained aloof, 
and according to Pakistani officials care has been
taken not to appear to put pressure on the Afghan
. . 2 Government to join RCD.
Ayub Khan also saw membership of RCD as a means
whereby Pakistan could increase its security:
Asia today is divided into three mighty 
countries on one side and smaller countries 
on the other.... They can only expand at the 
cost of smaller countries in Asia. What then 
is the future of smaller countries in Asia 
except getting together on a common platform 
to be able to defend their freedom and to 
pool their resources to better their future....
At a later date he spelled this point out in more 
detail, naming Russia, China and India as the three great 
countries which, if they were to expand, could only do so
1
Turkey and Iran do not appear to place the same 
emphasis on this aspect of RCD.
2
Interviews with officials in Rawalpindi, May 1968.
3
Speech at the Arts Council of Pakistan, Karachi,
25 July 1964. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and 
Statements, vol.VII, p.10.
301
at the cost of the small states around them. The 
precise nature of the threat is not mentioned and, 
while Pakistan fears India most of all, it is 
interesting that in this context Ayub referred to 
China, which Pakistan claimed as a friend, and Russia, 
with which it was attempting to improve relations.
As to what the organisation itself was designed to
achieve, Ayub was and remained cautious. He referred
to it as 'a common platform', saying: 'We have not
entered into a pact with Iran and Turkey with any
motives. We want only a hand of friendship and we
2have complete faith in each other.'
He later stated: 'the benefits of RCD cannot be 
measured in material terms alone. As a concept, the 
philosophy behind RCD is of a much higher and superior 
order.1^
1
Speech at the Thinkers' Forum, Lahore, 4 October 1964, 
ibid., p.45. See also Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not 
Masters: a Political Autobiography, p.157.
2
Broadcast, 1 August 1964, Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches 
and Statements, vol.VII, p.16.
3
Inaugural address at the RCD Ministerial Council 
Session, Islamabad, 3 February 1966, ibid., vol.VIII, 
p. 86.
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He has also referred to RCD as the nucleus of a
'constellation' of Muslim powers reaching from Morocco
to Indonesia,'*’ though how and when this was to be
achieved he did not say. If the formation of a common
market among the RCD countries is an objective of the
Pakistan Government, Ayub did not refer to it publicly
and officially, and his statements regarding the ultimate
end of RCD generally reveal little:
The RCD has made a promising beginning. We 
are determined to develop it in depth in 
order to strengthen the economies of the 
three countries by consolidating and 
widening the collaboration between them.
The replacement of Ayub Khan as President of 
Pakistan by General Yahya Khan in April 1969 does not 
appear to have altered Pakistan's attitude to RCD. 
President Yahya has made few statements dealing with 
foreign policy except to assure Pakistan's allies that 
there would be no changes, and the RCD Ministerial 
Council meeting went ahead as planned in June.
So far as Pakistan is concerned one might conclude 
that the fundamental aims of RCD are not purely economic 
and that Pakistan wishes rather to build up cooperation
1
Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.181.
2
Speech at the Annual Dinner of the Pakistan Institute 
of International Affairs, Karachi, 28 January 1967. 
Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol.IX, p.86.
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on a wider and vaguer basis. RCD provides a group to 
which Pakistan can belong, thus helping to eliminate 
the isolation it has felt since Partition, without the 
necessity to compete with India (as in the British 
Commonwealth), and without the international political 
liability of a British or American presence (as in the 
defence pacts). Economic development, particularly 
technical cooperation, is a welcome and important part 
of this design, for Pakistan has little to lose from 
increased economic integration in the region. On the 
contrary, the more deeply Turkey and Iran can be 
involved in Pakistan's development, the more they are 
likely to be committed to that country politically.
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Relations with Afghanistan,
A Regional Problem
1. Introduction
The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
has always been tense. The basis for the conflict 
between them is both geographical and historical, and 
the internal weakness of each has made compromise 
difficult if not impossible. Afghanistan is a 
landlocked state, for which the cheapest and most 
convenient outlet route is through Pakistan, by road 
and rail through Quetta and Peshawar to the Arabian Sea 
port of Karachi. Fresh fruit is one of Afghanistan's 
major exports, and India one of its biggest customers, 
so the trade route through Pakistan assumes an even 
greater significance and means considerable dependence 
on Pakistani goodwill for its safety.
Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have a heterogeneous 
population, of which two groups, Pathans and Baluchis, 
are divided between the two countries. These people 
live in an area which is difficult to police and control, 
and have traditionally defied attempts to govern them 
from outside their own tribal structure, regardless of 
whether the attempt is made from Kabul, Rawalpindi or 
Delhi. While the Pathans are the largest single group
CHAPTER VII
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in Afghanistan, there are also a number of Persian-Tajik 
speaking groups in the west and the centre and Turki 
speaking groups in the north. In Pakistan, apart from 
the Bengalis of East Pakistan, there are Punjabis and 
Sindhis, as well as Baluchis and Pathans, in West 
Pakistan. There is strong provincial, or tribal, 
feeling within each of these groups, and as a result 
there is in both Afghanistan and Pakistan an element of 
uncertainty regarding national unity.
Superimposed on this situation is the question of 
Pushtunistan, a concept based on the linguistic Pushtu 
group (the Pathans, inhabiting the area along the 
north-west frontier of Pakistan), which calls in question 
the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, known as the 
Durand Line, negotiated by the British and the Afghan king 
in 1893 and reaffirmed in a number of treaties between 
Britain and Afghanistan, the latest concluded in 1919. 
Afghanistan maintains that the Durand Line was forced on 
the Afghan ruler by the British, and repudiates the 
treaties which it claims were signed under duress.
However, Afghanistan maintains that it has no territorial 
claim on Pakistan, and only supports the right of the 
Pushtu-speaking people to choose their own destiny. The 
Pakistan claim that the people in question were given a 
choice in the plebiscite in 1947 is denied by Afghanistan 
with some justification, since the choice before the 
North-West Frontier Province was of union with India or 
Pakistan, and did not include the possibility of
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independence. Pakistan refuses to recognise the dispute, 
basing its position on the validity in international law 
of the agreement reached in 1893, and of the subsequent 
treaties, and its position as a successor state to 
Britain in this regard. Afghanistan, it argues, is bound 
by these treaties. This being so, there can be no 
boundary dispute, and any Afghan support for Pushtunistan 
amounts to interference in the internal affairs of 
Pakistan.
The relationship is further complicated by great 
power involvement. Britain is involved because it 
negotiated the boundary agreement and bequeathed the 
Durand Line and the frontier problem to Pakistan and is 
therefore committed to support the Pakistani position, 
which it has done. Russia became involved because the 
dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan presented an 
irresistible opportunity to put pressure on an American 
ally, Pakistan. America became involved through a 
reluctance to see Russian influence growing in 
Afghanistan. Beneath all this was the awareness on both 
sides that the road through Kabul led to the Khyber Pass, 
the plains of West Pakistan, to Karachi and the warm 
waters of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Since Afghanistan is part of the northern tier which 
includes Turkey and Iran as well as Pakistan, developments 
in Afghanistan cannot be ignored by the other countries of 
the region, and the tension which exists between Pakistan
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and Afghanistan has from time to time been a matter of 
concern for Turkey and Iran.
2. The Background to the 1Pushtunistan1 Movement
Despite Pakistani arguments, Pushtunistan is not 
solely an Afghan fabrication, although Afghanistan has 
magnified its significance. The nationalist movement in 
the North-West Frontier Province, slower to develop 
than elsewhere in India, was linked with the Indian 
National Congress, and its leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan, was known as 'The Frontier Gandhi'. Cooperation 
with a predominantly Hindu party did not appear unwise 
to the Muslims of the frontier, secure in a 94 per cent 
majority, and far from Delhi. Not until independence 
became an immediate prospect did the realisation of the 
full implications of the possibility of Hindu rule from 
Delhi dawn on the Frontier Congress. At this stage the 
need to hold a plebiscite in the North-West Frontier 
Province was being discussed, and Khan Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan, with the support of his party, asked that a third 
choice of 'a free Pathan State of all Pakhtoons' be 
given, in addition to that of union with either India or 
Pakistan.'*' While the Indian National Congress agreed to 
this proposition, Jinnah refused even to consider the
1
D.G. Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Gandhi Peace 
Foundation, Popular Prakashan: Bombay, 1967), pp.439-41.
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idea. Since the two major parties, the Muslim League 
and the Congress, could not agree, Mountbatten refused 
to alter the terms of the referendum. Khan Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan then called on his supporters to boycott the 
referendum, to be held on 6 July 1947, and it seems many 
of them did. Only 50.99 per cent of the electorate 
voted, although an overwhelming majority of these voted 
for union with Pakistan.^
It was on the issue of the referendum that
Afghanistan first intervened: on 3 July Notes were
presented to the British and Indian Governments asking
that the inhabitants of the North-West Frontier Province
and Baluchistan be given the right to decide between
2association with India or Afghanistan. Both Hindu and 
Muslim press in India, as well as the two Governments, 
took strong exception to what was described as open 
intervention in the internal affairs of another country. 
However Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan may have felt about this 
unfortunate support he received from Kabul, he carefully 
avoided any mention of Afghan involvement, and later, in 
stating his demands, he seemed to envisage a state which 
would be autonomous in terms of internal administration,
1
289,244 in favour of Pakistan, 2,874 against. Keesing1s 
Contemporary Archives, 1947, p.8734.
2
The Times, 3 July 1947.
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but which would enter an agreement with Pakistan 
concerning matters such as Defence, External Affairs and 
Communications.^
The North-West Frontier Province was not the only
region where absorption into Pakistan aroused mixed
feelings among those concerned. On 15 August 1947 none
of the princely states within its borders had acceded
to Pakistan, and there is some evidence that the Khan of
Kalat had hopes of regaining independent status, and
2that he sought Afghan assistance to this end. Pakistan
quickly suppressed the badly organised rebellion that
took place early in 1948, but despite the relative ease
of this operation Baluchistan remained a problem to be
handled delicately by successive Pakistan governments.
In the context of relations with Afghanistan this is
particularly important because of the Baluchi minority
in Afghanistan, and because there are family connections
between the Khan of Kalat and various Afghan families,
which make a disaffected Baluchistan more dangerous to
Pakistan. In addition, Baluchistan is a frontier area
3of strategic importance to Pakistan. The area of
1
G. Allana, Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah (Ferozsons: Lahore, 
1967), p.464.
2
W .A . Wilcox, Pakistan, the Consolidation of a Nation 
(Columbia University Press: New York, 1963), pp.75-81.
3
The Economist, 21 February 1948.
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Baluchistan, taken with that of the North-West Frontier 
Province, forms a large proportion of West Pakistan 
through which westward communications must pass: trouble 
in these areas can only be of advantage to an unfriendly 
Afghanistan.
After Partition, the North-West Frontier Province 
proved somewhat less of a problem than was at first 
anticipated, perhaps because of the determined manner 
in which the Pakistan Government dealt with anti-Muslim 
League forces. Despite his declarations of loyalty to 
Pakistan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was felt to be a 
danger to the new state, and on 15 June 1948 he was 
arrested and the following day sentenced to three years' 
imprisonment. In September his organisation, the Khudai 
Khidmatgaran (Redshirts), was banned. It should be 
remembered that during 1948 Pakistan and India were 
virtually at war in Kashmir, which perhaps explains the 
hypersensitivity of the Pakistan Government to any 
activity which appeared even remotely subversive.
3. Relations with Afghanistan, 1947-52
It was not initially clear how effectively Pakistan 
would be able to establish control in the frontier areas, 
and Afghanistan perhaps overestimated the strength of 
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's organisation. Afghan 
opposition to Pakistan's membership of the United Nations 
in September 1947 should be seen in this context.
311
Pakistan, however, moved swiftly to remove cause for 
grievance on the frontier by withdrawing all regular 
forces by December 1947, and by allocating substantial 
funds to frontier development.^ The preoccupation 
during 1948 of many of the tribesmen with the war in 
Kashmir, regarded by many of them as jihad (holy war), 
probably assisted the Pakistan Government to establish 
itself in the frontier.
At the end of 1947 Jinnah sent his personal envoy 
to Kabul, and shortly after an Afghan special envoy, 
Sardar Najibullah Khan, visited Karachi. Although
2agreement was reached on the exchange of Ambassadors,
consideration of a commercial agreement, including
transit facilities and border questions, and of a
friendship treaty did not progress beyond discussion
3stage. In December 1948, however, much goodwill was 
generated in Pakistan by the visit of a prominent Afghan 
divine, Hazrat Nurul Mashaikh of Shor Bazar, who made no
1
Said to be more than the total Afghan Budget. See 
The Times, 30 May 1949. One estimate of Pakistan 
expenditure in the region was £7.5m. sterling. The 
Economist, 6 August 1949.
2
The first Afghan Ambassador presented his credentials 
in May 1948.
3
Dawn, 24 January 1948; The Times, 9 February 1948.
secret of his support for Pakistan regarding Kashmir."*"
The Afghan Foreign Minister somewhat spoiled this effect
by stating that the Afghan Government, as a friend of
both India and Pakistan, wanted to see a peaceful
solution to the Kashmir dispute and that Hazrat Sahib's
2views on ~\ ihad in Kashmir were entirely his own.
In January 1949 large numbers of tribesmen returned
to the frontier from Kashmir, and the Afghan Government
perhaps entertained hopes that they might be drawn into
a revitalised Pushtunistan campaign. The Pakistan
Government was alive to this danger, and in March the
Governor-General, Khwaja Nazimuddin, toured the
North-West Frontier Province, where he declared that the
tribal area formed an 'integral part of Pakistan'. The
Afghan Government immediately objected to this statement,
claiming that it was a denial of pledges given by Jinnah
3before his death. The diplomatic staff was withdrawn
4from the embassy in Karachi by the beginning of April,
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1
Dawn, 13, 16 December 1948.
2
Ibid., 23 December 1948.
3
Reported in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1949, 
p.10172.
4
The Times, 2 April 1949.
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and at the same time the Afghan Prime Minister toured 
the eastern provinces of Afghanistan seeking support 
for his policy on Pakistan.^ He later declared the 
determination of his Government to pursue a policy of
2'rescuing our brother Afghans wherever they might be.'
Tension increased in June following the Moghalgai 
incident when Pakistani aircraft bombed a town on the 
Afghan side of the border. However, a joint Pakistan- 
Afghan commission of enquiry reported that although 
Pakistan was responsible for bombing Afghan territory 
it was by a genuine mistake and Pakistan agreed to pay 
compensation.
Attempts by Afghanistan to secure support for its 
demands for a plebiscite in Pushtunistan were 
unsuccessful. Britain maintained that Pakistan was in 
international law the inheritor of the rights and duties 
of the former Government of India and of the British 
Government in the North-West Frontier, and that the
3Durand Line was an international frontier.
1
Ibid., 6 April 1949.
2
Ibid., 29 April 1949.
3
The Times, 29 June 1949, and The New York Times,
1 July 1949, p.10.
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Following the worsening of relations with Pakistan 
in March Afghanistan turned its attention to India, and 
Sardar Najibullah was sent as Ambassador to New Delhi.
The Pakistan press reported discussion of the possibility 
of Indian financial assistance to Afghanistan and of the 
question of taking the Pushtunistan issue to the United 
Nations.^
In January 1950 India and Afghanistan signed a
five-year Treaty of Friendship, and two days later Nehru
was reported to have said that he had already approached
the Pakistan Government regarding the desirability of a
joint declaration renouncing the possibility of war
2between them, but Pakistan had not replied. India 
appeared however to treat with caution the suggestion
3of taking the Pushtunistan issue to the United Nations. 
Following the announcement of the Afghan-Indian treaty,
Liaquat Ali Khan described Pushtunistan as 1 a figment of
4the imagination of certain individuals m  Afghanistan'. 
Dawn welcomed his statement, making no secret of its
1
Dawn, 28 April 1949.
2
The Times, 7 January 1950.
3
The Economist, 9 April 1949.
4
Statement, 9 January 1950, reported Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives, 1950, p.10568.
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suspicions regarding Afghan-Indian relations, and 
virtually called for action to be taken against 
Afghanistan's trade routes through Pakistan.^
In March 1950 King Zahir Shah toured the Middle
East, visiting Cairo, Riadh, Baghdad and Teheran. The
Pakistan press reported that the Egyption, Iranian and
Saudi governments would urge Afghanistan to cease
anti-Pakistan propaganda (although it is not known if
they did so), and suggested that Egypt might offer to
2mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The only 
mediation offer, however, came from the Shah of Iran, 
with no tangible results.
At this time Pakistan's view of its place in the
world was changing, and there was some disappointment
3with the British Commonwealth. Britain's affirmation 
of the validity of the Durand Line, though firmly 
stated, was not considered sufficient in Pakistan, and 
Liaquat was reported to have said that it would be 
'useful' if Britain declared that any violation of the
1
Editorial, 'Afghanistan', Dawn, 12 January 1950.
2
Ibid., 2 February, 9 and 13 March 1950.
3
See Chapter III.
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Durand Line by Afghanistan would be considered a 
violation of a Commonwealth frontier.'*'
The appearance of American and Russian interest
in Afghanistan complicated the situation in the early
1950s. The Afghan Government was said to be disappointed
in its hopes for military assistance when an American
loan of $21m. was given for public works. American
cooperation with Britain was thought to have eliminated
2the US as a possible close friend of Afghanistan. At
the same time Afghanistan appeared to welcome Soviet
advances: since the conclusion of a boundary agreement
in 1946 there had been little interest shown in
Afghanistan by the USSR, but there were reports in
January 1950 of Soviet technicians in Afghanistan and
3the visit of a trade mission to Kabul. In July 1950,
Afghanistan concluded a four-year trade pact with Russia,
the first attempt to regularise the trade which had been
4going on for some time. Just as the Americans were 
becoming apprehensive about Soviet approaches to
1
The New York Times, 13 April 1950, p.12.
2
Ibid., 23 January 1950, p.11.
3
Ibid.
4
The Times, 19 July 1950.
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Afghanistan, the USSR was protesting that American 
specialists were making military roads and maps in 
Afghanistan.^
During the second half of 1950, Pakistan-Afghan
relations deteriorated further, and there was a
suggestion that the Afghan Government may have been
encouraged to step up border incidents by Russian
statements accusing Pakistan of being a satellite of the
2Western powers. Early in October the Pakistan
Government complained that Afghan regular troops had
3taken part in a border raid near Chaman, a railhead for
Afghanistan's transit trade through Quetta. Meanwhile
the battle between Afghanistan and Pakistan was carried
on by their respective Ambassadors in London in the
4columns of The Times.
In December the United States, hoping to end the 
dispute, put forward a set of proposals which were
1
Ibid., 17 May 1950, p.2. A charge denied by the US 
State Department.
2
This followed Liaquat's visit to America and his 
support for US policy on Korea. See The Economist,
23 December 1950.
3
Liaquat statement, Constituent Assembly (Legislature) 
Debates, (CA(L)D), 1950, vol.II, 7 October 1950, pp.260-1.
4
The Times, 10 and 12 October 1950.
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satisfactory to neither party. While agreeing in 
principle to American mediation, Pakistan objected that 
the proposals appeared to make the Durand Line open to 
discussion, a suggestion it could not accept. The 
Afghan Government stated that it welcomed the American 
proposals and agreed with their suggestions, 'subject 
to some reservations, and to equal acceptance of the 
said suggestions by the government of Pakistan.'^
The same month the 'All-India Pakhtun Jirga' was
v
held in Delhi. Organised by officials of the Afghan
Embassy, including Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal, Press
Adviser to King Zahir Shah, and attended by a number of
2Afghans, mostly resident in India, the Jirga demanded
the release of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his brother
and also urged India and other countries to bring
pressure to bear on Pakistan to release the Redshirts
3imprisoned after Partition. Pakistan protested to the
Indian Government, and Dawn concluded that India was
'trying to make other people do what she herself cannot
4with any show of propriety.'
1
Rahman Pazhwak, Afghan Press Attache in London, ibid., 
8 February 1951.
2
Tribal assembly.
3
Dawn, 1 January 1951.
4
Editorial, 'Open Scheming', ibid., 25 January 1950.
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The tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
continued throughout 1951. During June and July 
Pakistan reported border raids by Afghan tribesmen and 
regular troops near Chaman. At the end of August a 
proposal by the Afghan Embassy in London to hold a 
reception to celebrate 1Pushtunistan Day' on 2 September 
brought strong protest from the Pakistan High 
Commissioner.^ The year closed with an Afghan statement 
that Afghanistan had no intention of annexing, 
incorporating, or in any way dominating the territories 
in dispute, but that it would not rest until the
2independence of Pushtunistan was finally recognised.
4. The Afghan Response to 'One Unit1 and American 
Military Aid to Pakistan
In December 1952 the Basic Principles Committee, 
established by the Pakistan Government to advise on the 
new Constitution, published its report in which, inter 
alia it suggested that the provinces of West Pakistan 
be drawn together to form one unit. Therein lay the 
seeds of a new crisis in relations with Afghanistan, for 
the integration of the North-West Frontier Province into
1
The Times, 31 August 1951.
2
Statement by the Afghan Ambassador in London, ibid., 
18 December 1951.
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the administration of West Pakistan would make the 
possibility of detaching Pushtunistan from the rest of 
Pakistan more remote than ever.
Another move which, 12 months later, caused 
apprehension in Afghanistan, was the suggestion that 
Pakistan should enter a defence agreement with America. 
Afghanistan, which preferred to remain non-aligned, 
regarded the proposal that Pakistan should receive 
military aid from America as 1 a grave danger to the 
security of Afghanistan.'^ This trend in Pakistan's 
foreign policy also met with the disapproval of the 
USSR and India, thus providing Afghanistan with potential 
allies.
Although tension diminished slightly in November 
1954 when the Afghan Foreign Minister, Sardar Naim 
Khan, visited Karachi, it became clear during the talks 
that Pushtunistan remained a preoccupation of the Afghan 
Government. Naim reaffirmed Afghanistan's desire that 
the people of Pushtunistan be given an opportunity to 
express themselves on their 'status and way of living',
2but added that there was no territorial claim involved.
1
Statement by the Afghan Prime Minister, Sardar Mohammed 
Daud Khan, 30 December 1953. Keesing's Contemporary 
Archives, 1954, p.13463.
2
Speaking at a press conference, Karachi, 7 November
1954. Dawn, 8 November 1954.
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The progress of plans for the unification of West 
Pakistan brought a formal protest from the Afghan 
Government at the end of March 1955 and a wave of 
demonstrations against Pakistan, including attacks on 
the Embassy in Kabul and the Pakistan Consulates in 
Qandahar and Jalalabad. Pakistani demonstrators 
retaliated with attacks on the Afghan Consulate in 
Peshawar and the Embassy in Karachi. Pakistan closed 
its offices in Afghanistan and demanded that Afghan 
Consulates and Trade agencies leave Pakistan. In the 
face of an ultimatum that Afghanistan make adequate 
amends or face the consequences, the Afghan Government 
began mobilisation.'*'
Mediation offers were made by several Middle 
Eastern countries. The first came from Egypt following 
visits by President Nasser to Pakistan and Afghanistan 
on his way to and from the Bandung Conference in April. 
The Egyptian offer was welcomed by Afghanistan and 
later, on 12 May, accepted by Pakistan. A Saudi offer 
to mediate was also accepted by Pakistan, as was a 
similar offer from Iraq. The Iraqi Ministers in Kabul 
and Karachi were appointed mediators. The Saudi 
representative reached Kabul and later Karachi in 
mid-May, and the Egyptian representative arrived in
1
The Pakistan Times, 31 March and 1 April 1955. See 
also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1955, p.14217.
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Karachi on 7 June. By the end of that month, however, 
all of the Arab mediators had admitted failure. In 
each case Pakistan accepted the mediation offers on the 
understanding that negotiations relate only to the 
recent incidents, and not to issues affecting its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. According to 
Pakistani sources, the stumbling block was Afghanistan's 
refusal to suspend anti-Pakistan propaganda.'*'
The next mediation attempt was made by the Turkish
Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, following a visit to
2Ankara by the Afghan Foreign Minister. The first
tangible result of his efforts was an Afghan order on
29 July demobilising forces called up in May and ending
the state of emergency. Afghanistan finally agreed to
Pakistan's demands, including the suspension of
3propaganda, on 9 September.
Despite this apparent improvement in relations, 
Afghan opposition to the integration of the North-West 
Frontier Province into West Pakistan did not diminish, 
and when 'One Unit' became a reality on 14 October, 
Afghanistan protested, and three days later withdrew its
1
For details of negotiations see The Pakistan Times, 
May and June 1955.
2
Ibid., 17 and 20 July 1955.
3
Ibid., 13 September 1955.
Minister in Karachi. Pakistan replied by recalling its 
Ambassador in Kabul.
The visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to Afghanistan
in December 1955 and the open support they gave the
Afghan stand on Pushtunistan served only to stiffen the
Afghan attitude and embitter Soviet-Pakistan relations."*"
At the same time the American Government also offended
Pakistan by a reference to 'border territory differences'
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, thus appearing to give
2status to the Afghan case which Pakistan denied.
October 1955 had, however, brought Iskandar Mirza
3to power as Governor-General in Pakistan. An 
'Afghanophile', his term of office was one of the most 
cordial and peaceful periods of Afghan-Pakistan relations. 
He visited Kabul in August 1956, and three months later
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See Bulganin statement to Supreme Soviet, 29 December
1955, Visit of Friendship to India, Burma and Afghanistan; 
Speeches and Official Documents, November-December 1955 
(Foreign Languages Publishing House: Moscow, 1956).
2
The Pakistan Times, 23 December 1955.
3
In most Commonwealth countries the office of Governor- 
General is not associated with the exercise of political 
power, but in Pakistan, following the precedent established 
by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the Governor-General usually 
wielded considerable power. Iskandar Mirza was no 
exception.
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Sardar Mohammed Daud Khan returned the visit. A joint
communique issued on 1 December said that conversations
on Pushtunistan had deepened understanding between them.
Although a Pakistani spokesman said that the reference
to Pushtunistan meant that the Afghan Government regarded
this concept 'which was purely their own' as the only
difference between them and Pakistan, the statement
marked a relaxation in Pakistan's official attitude,
for this was the first time that the subject had even
been acknowledged as one for discussion under any
circumstances.'*' In June 1957 the Pakistan Prime Minister,
Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, paid an official visit to
Afghanistan, as a result of which Pakistan and Afghanistan
2agreed to reappoint the Ambassadors earlier withdrawn.
Such was the eagerness of both governments to 
maintain the air of cordiality lately come to their 
relations that when in February 1958 Afghan authorities 
in Jalalabad, anxious to gain a larger share of the 
transit trade for Afghans, detained 400 Pakistani trucks 
and drivers, agreement was soon reached in Kabul and 
Karachi that in future such difficulties would be removed
1
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1956, pp.15071, 15279.
2
Text of the communique issued 11 June 19 57, Pakistan 
Horizon, June 1957, p.116*
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without reference to the capitals. The Afghan Foreign
Minister also gave an assurance that loudspeakers set
up on the border near Torkham, broadcasting Kabul Radio
programmes, would soon be removed. It was explained
that these had been purely for the entertainment of
Afghan troops stationed just across the border.'*’ This
gesture was accepted by Pakistan without comment on the
presence of Afghan troops in the area. In March the
Pakistan Prime Minister, Firoz Khan Noon, announced
that Naim Khan had assured him of Afghan acceptance of
2the Durand Line.
*
5. The Effects of Soviet and American Involvement 
in Afghan-Pakistan Relations, 1958-1961.
A new Transit Trade Agreement, sought by Afghanistan
3for some time, was eventually signed on 17 June 1958.
It provided for elimination of duty on goods bound for 
Afghanistan in the first instance, rather than refund 
of duty later, and for greater facilities for the speedy 
clearance of goods. There was also a proposal that
1
The Pakistan Times, 15 February 1958; Dawn, 21 February 
1958.
2
Dawn, 7 March 1958.
3
Dawn, 7 May and 22 June 1958.
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railway lines should be extended into Afghanistan from 
Torkham and Chaman. That Afghanistan had had American 
support in its desire for a new agreement was confirmed 
by Firoz Khan Noon, who said that America had been 
instrumental in bringing about closer understanding and 
friendship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was 
due to US influence alone that the proposal to extend 
the railway into Afghanistan might take concrete shape.'*’
The announcement of an American loan to Pakistan
of over $7m. to improve transport links with Afghanistan,
and of a similar agreement to be concluded with
Afghanistan, made on the eve of a visit by the Afghan
Prime Minister to the USA, was further evidence of
2American interest.
Although initially the Pakistan press had welcomed
the negotiations, it later urged the Pakistan Government
to ensure that, in return for improved transit
facilities, Afghanistan should agree to abandon support
for Pushtunistan and affirm its recognition of the Durand
3Line. When American involvement in the negotiations
1
The Pakistan Times, 5 June 1958.
2
Dawn, 2 July 1958.
3
Editorial, 'Kabul Talks', The Pakistan Times, 27 May
1958.
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became clear, the fear arose in Pakistan that the USA 
might use Pakistan in an attempt to woo Afghanistan 
away from the path of non-alignment, and that Pakistan 
would be forced to make one-sided concessions to 
Afghanistan, in effect 'to pull the chestnuts out of 
the Kabul fire for Washington.1'*'
Criticism of his policy did not disturb Noon, who
tended to be pro-Western as well as pro-Afghan. Indeed,
in his enthusiasm for closer relations with Afghanistan,
he referred to the possibility of a federation between
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. This suggestion brought
such a hue and cry that he was forced to repudiate the
2statement. But Noon was growing unpopular and his 
government was soon to fall. In October 1958 Ayub Khan 
seized power and relations with Afghanistan began almost 
imperceptibly to sour.
The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan,
like most other relationships in the region, was
seriously affected as a result of the revolution in Iraq
in July 1958. The negotiation of a new Bilateral
3Agreement between Pakistan and the USA following the
1
Ibid., 5 June 1958.
2
See Chapter V.
3
Identical agreements were concluded with Iran and 
Turkey.
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reorganisation of the Baghdad Pact, now CENTO, was
criticised by Afghanistan in December ISSS'*' and again in
2February 1959, this time with the support of India.
Towards the end of 1959 fear of increasing Russian
influence in Afghanistan became evident in Pakistan.
President Ayub referred to the improvement in strategic
communications in Afghanistan which would ultimately
be capable of carrying major military equipment and,
being built in a north-south direction, could only
3carry it towards Pakistan. The USSR, which had reacted
sharply to the new Bilateral Agreements, was waging a
propaganda war against the Iranian Government, and both
Iran and Pakistan were at the time seeking a joint
command structure which would strengthen the military
4capacity of CENTO.
1
Dawn, 5 December 1958.
2
Afghan-Indian joint communique following Daud Khan's 
visit to New Delhi, Foreign Affairs Record, 1959, p.15.
3
The Pakistan Times, 21 December 1959.
4
See Chapter V. Pakistan's objectives regarding 
Kashmir and the increasing Chinese pressure on India 
should also be kept in mind.
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There was also increased tension along the Afghan-
Pakistan border. An attempt by the Pakistan Foreign
Minister, Manzur Qadir, to initiate talks with Naim
Khan in New York in October 1959 was apparently
unsuccessful'*' and Ayub later remarked:
If they [Afghanistan] think they can make 
Pakistan give up its position [regarding 
Pushtunistan] they are sadly mistaken.
Pakistan has the means and knows how to 
defend its position.2
Through November and December the Pakistan press
gave wide coverage to reports of unrest in southern
Afghanistan, claiming that some 3,000 Afghan tribesmen
had taken refuge in Pakistan from the 'un-Islamic'
Afghan regime which, they complained, had fallen too
3much under Moscow's influence.
In December, plans were made for the visit of the 
Afghan Foreign Minister, Naim Khan, to Pakistan the 
following January in order to discuss Russian involvement 
and the question of the tribesmen. Although care was 
taken by Pakistan to emphasise that President Eisenhower's 
tour of the region in December had nothing to do with
1
Dawn, 14 and 22 October 1959.
2
Dawn, 24 October 1959.
3
See, for example, Dawn, 2 and 11 November, and The
Pakistan Times, 9 November 1959.
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Naim's proposed visit, reports that America had 
encouraged the move were later apparently confirmed by 
the statement of the American Ambassador in Kabul 
that 'friendly relations between the two neighbouring 
countries... are quite essential in the larger interests 
of both.'
The effect of Naim1s visit was if anything to
embitter relations still further, and it seems there
was little will on either side to reach agreement. On
his arrival in Pakistan he said that the object of his
visit was to attempt to settle political differences
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which he said were
2well known. Nettled by his remarks the Pakistan press
was antagonistic throughout his visit, which in any case
was suddenly cut short. Back in Kabul he said that the
'completely negative attitude' of Pakistan's present
regime had jeopardised relations with his country. He
had wanted to discuss Pushtunistan, and his mission had
3failed because Pakistan had refused to do so.
1
Dawn, 16 January 1960.
2
The Pakistan Times, 11 January, and Dawn, 12 January
1960.
3
Dawn, 29 February 1960.
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It was not long before Russia entered the propaganda 
fray. Visiting Afghanistan in March I960, Khrushchev 
assured the Afghans that the Soviet Union did not want 
to interfere in their internal affairs, but only to 
help them develop.'*' He promised an additional $300m. 
economic aid.
The joint communique issued at the end of his visit
stated that the question of the Pushtu-speaking people
2could be solved by means of self-determination, and on
his return to Moscow Khruschev suggested that a
plebiscite be held to determine whether the Pushtu people
wanted independence or union with Afghanistan or
3Pakistan. These remarks brought an immediate reaction
from Rawalpindi. In a statement issued on 7 March,
Manzur Qadir challenged the Afghan Government to hold a
plebiscite among the Pushtu-speaking people of
Afghanistan giving them a similar choice to that demanded
for their fellows in Pakistan, or to drop the subject of
4Pushtunistan altogether.
1
The Times of India, 6 March 1960.
2
Ibid.
3
The Pakistan Times, 6 March 1960.
4
For text of statement, see Dawn, 8 March 1960.
In case the Soviet view should have been 
misunderstood, the new Ambassador in Karachi, immediately 
after presenting his credentials, repeated the demand 
for self-determination for the Pushtu people of Pakistan. 
He described Manzur Qadir's suggestion that a similar 
plebiscite be held among the Pathans of Afghanistan as 
a joke: since Pathans were the basic population of 
Afghanistan the question did not arise.'*' Pakistani 
reactions to his comments were summed up in an editorial 
entitled•'An Envoy We Can Do Without', published in 
Dawn on 14 March.
Relations between Pakistan and Russia deteriorated
2still further following the 'U-2' incident in May 1960. 
While not of major importance in the relationship with 
Afghanistan, it gave the Afghans an opportunity to adopt 
a superior attitude towards Pakistan and confirmed them 
in their dislike of military pacts. ‘Although they 
contented themselves with lodging a protest with the US 
and Pakistan Governments, the incident did nothing to 
improve the atmosphere of distrust which existed between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
332
1
The Times, 14 March 1960.
2
See Chapter V.
The incidents contributing to increased tension
continued, leading ultimately to the break in diplomatic
relations which occurred in September 1961. From
September 1960 Pakistan Government statements appeared
protesting against concentrations of Afghan troops
along the border, particularly around Bajaur."*" The
Afghans claimed that Pakistan was attempting to hide the
fact of mounting unrest in the frontier regions and was
using these accusations as a pretext to move military
2reinforcements into the area. The Pakistan press
continued to publish reports of unrest in southern
Afghanistan. In March 1961 Ayub Khan stated that between
five and eight brigades of Afghan troops were concentrated
along Pakistan's borders. 'If they are so foolish as
to cross into our territory, then we shall do the
3needful.'
The extent to which the USSR was responsible for
the Afghan policy cannot be determined. Certainly the
Pakistanis held Soviet influence largely responsible for
4the increase in tension, and Daud's visit to Moscow in
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April, during which the Soviet stand on Pushtunistan
was reaffirmed, tended to confirm this view. Ayub Khan
spoke bluntly to US News and World Report;
They have infiltrated deeply into 
Afghanistan, and would like to intimidate 
us wherever it is possible. They want us 
to be knocked out of CENTO and SEATO.
They don't like our alliances with you.
They think that, if we can be knocked out, 
then the whole of the defence system in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia will 
crumble. And I think there is some truth 
in that.-*-
Soon after he gave the interview, the Pakistan Air
Force destroyed 'enemy mortar and machine gun positions'
attacking Pakistan posts in the Bajaur area. The question
of the use of US arms was raised in America, and Ayub
replied: 'At times our American friends seem to question
our right to even defend our territory or to take such
2action that will bring about security.'
On 12 June Pakistan again protested that Afghan 
activity on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line amounted 
to aggression, and announced that the free entry of 
nomadic Afghan tribesmen (powindahs) into its territory 
would be prohibited from the following year.
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6. The Diplomatic Break, 1961-1963.
Complaining of harassment of Pakistani officials by 
Afghan authorities, and accusing Afghanistan of using 
its Consulates and Trade Agencies in Pakistan for 
subversive activities,'*' Pakistan ordered the closure of 
Afghan offices in Pakistan on 2 September 1961. The 
Afghan reaction was to close the border at Torkham on
3 September and three days later to break diplomatic 
relations.
It has been argued that the crisis was planned by 
Pakistan in the event of Ayub's failure to persuade the 
US to put pressure on India over Kashmir. Pakistan 
planned to make itself felt in the region by closing the 
Afghan offices and engineering the diplomatic break and 
border closure, thus depriving Afghanistan of its 
normal trade channels and forcing it to seek a settlement 
of the Pushtunistan question, or at least stop inciting 
the tribes. Pakistan succeeded in bringing about the 
border closure but failed in the larger objective since 
Afghanistan did not shun the idea of trade through the 
USSR.2
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Afghan Consulates and Trade Agencies in Pakistan,
2 September 1961.
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This explanation is unnecessarily complicated: in
any case there appeared at the time to be some confusion
as to whether the border was actually closed and who
closed it.1 Pakistani charges against Afghanistan appear
to have been justified, and while the closure of the
Afghan trade offices in Pakistan was no doubt a punitive
measure calculated to hinder the transit trade, it seems
2that Pakistan did not intend to stop it altogether.
Afghanistan argued that its decision to close the border
completely was the only way to draw attention to the
full implications of the Pakistani action in closing its
trade offices, which made the proper clearance of goods
3impossible. If this explanation is correct the immediate 
logic of the Afghan action is not apparent, for they stood 
to lose most by the border closure. Fresh fruit for 
Pakistan and India is an important aspect of Afghanistan's 
export trade, and in September the ripe grape crop was 
ready for shipment by truck to markets in the 
subcontinent. Also important was the delay of US aid
1
The Times, 11 November 1961, seemed under the 
impression that it was Pakistani retaliation for the 
severed diplomatic relations.
2
Manzur Qadir in a speech to the Afro-Asian Cultural 
Council Meeting in Lahore said that Pakistan would 
honour its commitments under the 1958 Transit Trade 
Agreement. The Times, 19 September 1961.
3
Ibid., 26 September 1961.
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goods, although Kabul appeared to regard the dislocation
of the US aid programme as a loss for America rather
than for Afghanistan.1 The effects on Pakistan were
minor. There was a shortage of fresh fruit in Peshawar,
perhaps causing some discontent in the frontier region,
but more important was the strain placed on Karachi port
facilities and the rail junction of Lahore which were
blocked by Afghan goods, thus slowing down deliveries
throughout Pakistan. Perhaps as Pakistan had hoped to
put pressure on Afghanistan by hindering trade,
Afghanistan hoped to call its bluff, no doubt calculating
that the USSR would swiftly offer help, as indeed it did.
Planes were immediately sent to airlift the grape crop,
2much of which was bought by the USSR, and Russia 
offered alternative transit facilities. It is possible 
that Afghanistan by turning to the USSR and dislocating 
the US aid programme sought to persuade America to exert 
pressure on Pakistan to re-open the trade offices and 
perhaps negotiate on Pushtunistan.
The US was certainly anxious that the dispute be 
settled, but its reactions tended to antagonise 
Pakistani opinion, particularly when a USIS handout 
referred to 'border disputes' between Pakistan and
1
The Times, 26 September 1961.
2
Louis Dupree, '"Pushtunistan": The Problem and its 
Larger Implications, Part III: The Big Gamble Continues'.
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Afghanistan. As an ally, America ought, they felt, to
be firmly on their side and not offering to mediate.
Again the fear that the US might attempt to force
Pakistan to make concessions to the Afghans was expressed
in the Pakistan press.1 Meanwhile the Pakistan
Ambassador in Washington stated that Pakistan would not
allow the goods question to be used as a political
lever to force it to re-open the Afghan consulates:
2these were two separate questions.
Despite Pakistan's lack of enthusiasm for US
mediation, President Kennedy's special envoy, Livingstone
Merchant, was accepted on condition that Afghanistan also
accept, and that discussion be confined to the trade
issue. In a statement on his arrival in Pakistan,
3Merchant agreed to these terms. After three weeks, on
10 November, he announced the failure of his mission,
saying that future US mediation attempts would continue
4through normal diplomatic channels. A week later the 
US Secretary of State said that the break between
1
Editorial, 'Our Friends at it Again', Dawn, 7 October
1961.
2
Report, ibid., 7 October 1961.
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4
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Pakistan and Afghanistan was a world problem in which
the US could have only a limited role as a 'friendly
counsellor and adviser'. This was the last overt US
attempt to solve the dispute, although support was
later given the Shah in his efforts, and through
negotiations in Kabul the American Ambassador was able
to persuade Afghanistan to re-open the border for eight
weeks from 29 January 1962 to permit American aid to
2reach its destination.
Meanwhile a serious attempt was made by Afghanistan 
to find other transit routes. A transit agreement was 
signed with Iran which was also anxious to prevent 
Afghanistan coming further under Soviet influence.
Afghan goods were to be taken by truck to Meshed and 
then by rail to either Bandar Shahpur or Khorramshehr 
on the Persian Gulf. Imports from Europe and India as 
well as some US aid goods were shipped to Khorramshehr. 
The new route was more expensive and less convenient 
than the old Karachi route: Khorramshehr did not have 
port facilities equal to those available at Karachi, 
nor were there equivalent road and rail links. There 
were reports of increased pilferage on the way through 
Iran and a number of illegal imposts on the goods at
1
Dawn, 19 November 1961.
2
The New York Times, 23 January 1962, p. 3.
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various points. The route through the USSR was also 
longer and less satisfactory, at least to Afghanistan's 
Western trading partners.
The Shah, who had offered to mediate within days 
of the diplomatic break, renewed his offer during a 
hastily arranged visit to Rawalpindi early in July. 
Pakistan's acceptance was announced on 3 July, and a 
formal approach was made to the Afghan Government through 
diplomatic channels in Teheran. On 12 July the Afghan 
Ambassador in Teheran announced acceptance by King Zahir 
Shah. The Shah had talks with the Afghan King in Kabul 
on 27 and 28 August, flying to Rawalpindi on 31 July for 
discussions with Ayub and returning that evening to 
Kabul. On 1 August he was back in Teheran, his efforts 
so far without success. Neither side was ready to 
compromise: Afghanistan was anxious to have the 
Consulates and Trade Agencies re-established, while 
Pakistan was adamant that they should not be. The 
Pakistan Government wanted the border re-opened and the 
congestion at their railway junctions and at Karachi Port 
ended, and was prepared to re-open diplomatic relations.
In addition there was in Pakistan an openly voiced desire 
to prevent the further development of Afghan-Soviet 
relations, a suggestion that the Afghan Government 
interpreted as an attempt to interfere with Afghanistan's 
chosen policy of non-alignment. In order to make it clear 
that this policy would not be modified, King Zahir Shah 
set off for Moscow as soon as the Shah departed.
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An attempt to arrange a Foreign Ministers' meeting 
in Teheran at the end of August came to nothing, but 
Mohammed Ali and Naim Khan did eventually meet during 
the UN General Assembly Session in New York, and the 
ground was broken for later talks. Meanwhile 
Afghanistan and the USSR signed a transit trade agreement 
whereby all Afghan trade with Europe was to be routed 
through Russia. A 50 per cent freight concession had 
been made to Afghanistan, and Russia agreed to improve 
the road between Kabul and the Russian border.1
A change of government in Afghanistan in March 1963
appeared to open the way for a settlement with Pakistan.
Daud Khan, who had been deeply committed to the friendly
relationship with the USSR and to the demand for
Pushtunistan, was replaced by Mohammed Yusuf, the first
time the office had been held by someone other than a
member of the royal family. In an early statement,
however, the new Prime Minister reaffirmed Afghan
support for 'the legitimate demands of the people of 
2Pushtunistan', and said that Pakistan would not be 
permitted to use resumption of trade as a bargaining 
point to compel Afghanistan on the issue of Pushtunistan.'
1
The Pakistan Times, 23 October 1962.
2
Ibid., 17 March 1963.
3
Ibid., 22 April 1963.
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When agreement was reached on 28 May, following talks
in Teheran between the Afghan Minister for Information
and Press, Qasim Rishtya, and the Pakistan Foreign
Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the terms appeared a
clear diplomatic victory for Afghanistan. The border
was to be re-opened, diplomatic relations to be restored,
and the trade and consular offices were to be opened
again.1 Little appeared to have changed in the attitudes
of the two governments. Rishtya expressed the hope that
this agreement would pave the way for the 'resolution
2of political differences.' His veiled reference to
Pushtunistan brought the customary response from
Pakistan: Bhutto stated that the Pushtunistan issue was
completely closed. In fact, as far as Pakistan was
3concerned it had never existed.
The border was re-opened on 20 July when the new 
Afghan Consul arrived in Peshawar with his staff and 
his trade agent. Trade was resumed on 26 July, Ariana
1
Text of agreement, Dawn, 30 May 1963.
2
The Hindu, 31 May 1963. This is a phrase often used 
by Afghan officials to refer to the question of 
Pushtunistan.
3
Dawn, 31 May 1963.
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Airlines began flights to Pakistan once more, and the 
Ambassador Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal returned to his 
post.1
7. Relations, 1963-1968
In the five years following the restoration of 
diplomatic relations there has been an attempt, 
particularly by Pakistan, to work out a modus vivendi 
with Afghanistan which has been partially successful, 
although the basic position of both governments has not 
changed and the underlying tension remains.
In June 1963 Ayub Khan repeated the call for 'closer
collaboration' with Afghanistan and Iran which he had 
2made in 1962. It was not well received in Pakistan and
turned down flat in Kabul, but the message that Pakistan
was prepared for increased cooperation was apparently
understood. When the new Pakistan Ambassador to
Afghanistan crossed the border at Torkham on 4 November
3he was greeted with bouquets and a guard of honour.
1
Previously Press Adviser to King Zahir Shah (see p.318 
above) and former Ambassador to Pakistan (1957-58). He 
subsequently became Prime Minister of Afghanistan.
2
See Chapter V.
3
Outlook, 16 November 1963.
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In January 1964 a new Air Agreement was signed giving PIA 
and Ariana Airlines reciprocal rights. In March Pakistan 
agreed that two new Afghan trade offices in East and West 
Pakistan should be established and a new Transit Trade 
Agreement, replacing that reached in 1958, was announced.
Despite a willingness to participate in bilateral
cooperation, Afghanistan remained wary of regional
schemes. Before the conclusion of the Istanbul Accord in
July 1964, and the formation of RCD, President Ayub
stopped briefly in Kabul for talks with King Zahir Shah.
He put his proposals for regional cooperation to the
Afghan leaders,1 but received a negative response.
Nevertheless the hope of eventual Afghan participation in
RCD was not abandoned, as was made clear in the Istanbul
2Accord itself and in later statements from members. 
Afghanistan has, however, remained aloof, no doubt 
fearing that participation in such an organisation might 
jeopardise its non-alignment, despite assurances that 
RCD is a purely regional grouping, quite outside CENTO.
1
President Ayub Khan, speech at the Thinkers' Forum at 
the University Campus, Lahore, 4 October 1964. Mohammad 
Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, vol.VII, July 1964 - 
June 1965 (Pakistan Publications: Karachi (n.d.)), p.46.
2
For example, the statement by the Shah of Iran, London.
Dawn, 10 March 1965.
345
Politically, Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan 
have remained uneasy, and trouble in Baluchistan has 
contributed to the sensitivity of the Pakistan Government 
to Afghan statements (see below) of support for 
Pushtunistan. Although incidents in Baluchistan did not 
receive wide coverage in the Pakistan press, the weekly 
magazine, Outlook, later suspended, referred to a 
'regrettable incident' early in 1964 when tribesmen 
ambushed a police party, killing nine of them. While 
the Government may have simply taken action to maintain 
law and order, the fact remained that most Baluchi 
leaders were in gaol. 'Whether one agrees with their 
politics or not, it is difficult not to be disturbed by 
the long stretches of imprisonment which has been the 
fate of some of them,'1 the magazine declared. Through 
1965, Kabul press and radio reported widespread revolt
2and fighting in the tribal areas, including Baluchistan.
By this time, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, having been 
released, had gone to Kabul and called on his followers 
to achieve an independent homeland for the Pushtu-speaking
1
Outlook, 14 March 1964.
2
Kabul radio, in Pushtu, 5 July 1965, BBCSWB, FE/1906/ 
A3/8; Kabul radio in English, ibid., FE/1949/A3/13; New 
Delhi in English, ibid., FE/2865/A3/6; Kabul Times,
13 September 1965; reported in Asian Recorder, 1965, 
p.6721.
people.1 In the first half of 1968, unrest in Baluchistan 
flared once more with the release of a popular Baluchi 
leader from a ten-year imprisonment. Quetta was for some 
weeks placed under curfew after a series of riots which 
ended in the shooting of a student.
At the same time the Afghan Government had made
several statements in support of the 'demands of the
people of Pushtunistan': King Zahir Shah referred to it
2in his Independence Day address on 23 August 1965; the 
Prime Minister, Maiwandwal, spoke of Pushtunistan to a
3National Press Club luncheon in Washington in March 1967;
and the Afghan representative to the United Nations,
Mohammed Pazhwak, dealt with the subject at length in
4October 1968. Despite the Pakistan Foreign Ministry's 
adherence to the view that there are no problems in 
Pakistan's relationship with Afghanistan, except in the 
imagination of the Afghan Government, Afghanistan's
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1
Statement, 31 August 1965, Kabul radio, reported in 
Asian Recorder, 1965, p.6662.
2
Kabul radio in English, BBCSWB, FE/1945/B/3.
3
Dawn, 30 April 1967.
4
General Assembly Official Records (GAPR), Twenty-Third 
Session, speech by the Afghan Permanent Representative, 
Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, 1690 Plenary Meeting, 10 October 
1968.
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continued propaganda support of dissident elements in 
the tribal areas has contributed to a general air of 
bitterness between Kabul and Rawalpindi.
8. Conclusion
The hostility with which Pakistan's relations with 
Afghanistan began has continued for over 20 years and 
twice erupted into crisis, the first time leading to a 
suspension of diplomatic relations, the second to 
interruption of trade and a complete diplomatic break. 
Underlying the quarrel on both occasions was 
Afghanistan's support for the Pushtunistan movement. In
1955 Afghanistan objected to the unification of West 
Pakistan on the grounds that the wishes of the people of 
the North-West Frontier Province had not been ascertained. 
The crisis of 1961-3 arose from Pakistan's complaints 
that Afghanistan's offices in the frontier towns were 
carrying on subversive activities among the tribes.
Pakistan believes that the Afghan Government raises 
the issue of Pushtunistan whenever its position is 
threatened by internal instability. There is perhaps 
some truth in this, for the tribesmen in Afghanistan 
are as conservative and independent minded as those on 
the Pakistan side of the Durand Line, and tend to object 
to modernisation, especially as it touches traditional 
education or the role of women in their society. It was 
from such measures, claimed to be Soviet-inspired, that
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the refugees who came to Peshawar in 1960 were said to 
be escaping. There is, however, more reality in the 
Pushtunistan movement than Pakistan will acknowledge, 
and unrest in the tribal areas, especially in 
Baluchistan,1 is sufficient to make the Government 
object to Afghan propaganda.
Although Afghanistan1s position as a landlocked 
state makes it vulnerable to pressure from the countries 
through which the transit routes run - in this case 
Pakistan and the USSR, for the route through Iran is of 
minor importance - Afghanistan has managed to turn the 
situation to its advantage to a considerable extent. 
United States anxiety to prevent the expansion of Soviet 
influence has led to America's intervention whenever 
Afghanistan appeared likely to become dependent on the 
USSR. The US supported Afghanistan's demand for a new 
Transit Trade Agreement with Pakistan in 1958, and made 
grants to both countries to improve transit facilities, 
especially the extension of the railway across the 
border from Chaman to Spin Baidak in Afghanistan. It 
has assisted Afghanistan to build a road from Spin Baidak 
north to Kabul. When the Afghan-Pakistan border was
1
Although Baluchistan is not a Pathan area and does 
not fall within Pushtunistan proper, it is a tribal area 
and also has links with Afghanistan, and it is included 
in that definition of Pushtunistan which refers to all 
of West Pakistan west of the Indus.
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closed in 1961 the US, anxious that its aid goods were 
not reaching their destination, persuaded the Afghan 
Government to temporarily open the border.
Afghanistan has taken advantage of this situation 
and welcomed Soviet assistance, which has been readily 
available: for instance, the building of a road from 
the Russian border south to Kabul and assistance in 
providing transit facilities through Russia. Although 
in material terms Soviet aid is less than that from the 
US, Russia has in the past given support to Afghanistan's 
political demands regarding Pushtunistan. In attempting 
to prevent an increase in Soviet influence in Afghanistan 
the US has taken a neutral position in the dispute 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it is likely that 
from time to time America has attempted to persuade 
Pakistan to make concessions to Afghan demands.
Other mediation attempts have been made by Egypt, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. Tension between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan is of little concern to the 
Arab countries, and only one attempt was made by them, 
in 1955, perhaps motivated by the heady spirit of Bandung 
and a desire to restore good relations between two Muslim 
countries. For the other members of the northern tier, 
Turkey and Iran, relations between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan are of more consequence. Both would be loath 
to see an expansion of Russian influence into Afghanistan 
which they regard as part of their region. At the same 
time they would like to see Afghanistan drawn into some
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kind of regional grouping for which the now defunct 
Saadabad Pact provides a precedent. Both Turkey and 
Iran are acceptable mediators to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, and the efforts of Menderes in 1955 and the 
Shah in 1961-3 were welcomed by both parties. Whether 
the Turkish attempt succeeded is not known, but shortly 
after Menderes1 visits to Karachi and Kabul an agreement 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan was reached. The later 
efforts by the Shah did not appear, in 1962, to have 
been very successful, and were perhaps undermined by 
the suspicion that, having just visited America, he 
was acting on US initiative. When the reconciliation 
came it was nearly a year after the Shah's round of talks 
in the two capitals, and apart from the fact that the 
final agreement occurred in Teheran, it appeared to have 
little to do with Iranian mediation. However the Shah 
received much of the credit, just as Menderes had done 
in 1955.
Despite encouragement from Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan, Afghanistan has remained aloof from RCD. 
Although willing to develop bilateral relations with each 
of the members, Afghanistan prefers not to participate in 
a regional organisation, perhaps fearing that such a 
move would jeopardise its non-alignment, and assurances 
that RCD is quite outside CENTO have had no effect. It 
is also likely that Afghanistan has calculated that it 
will benefit from development of the region regardless
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of its own participation, and perhaps will gain more by- 
remaining outside the organisation.
Economic calculations aside, the question of
Pushtunistan remains an important consideration for
the Afghan Government. It may, as Pakistan claims, be
a 'stunt' to gain support for an unstable regime, but it
is also one to which many Afghans are deeply attached:
It is never to be forgotten that the present 
ruling family are the direct descendents of 
the Peshawar Sardars; the present King, Zahir 
Shah, and his leading ministers are the 
great-great-grandsons of Sultan Muhammad Khan.
The lure of Peshawar is a passion, deep in 
their hearts.1
So long as there is discontent on either side of 
the Durand Line, support for 'the demands of the 
Pushtu speaking people' is unlikely to be abandoned by 
the Afghan Government, and so long as the Afghan policy 
of playing the great powers off one against the other 
continues, the efforts of the regional powers to settle 
the differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 
to draw Afghanistan into some form of regional 
cooperation, are unlikely to succeed.
1
Olaf Caroe, The Pathans 550 B.C. - A.D. 1957 (Macmillan 
London, 1958), p.435. Although under the Constitution of 
1963 the royal family surrendered much of its power, the 
attitude of subsequent governments to the question of 
Pushtunistan has not changed.
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CHAPTER Vili
Kashmir: Middle Eastern 
Responses to a Pakistani Problem
1. Introduction
Pakistan's relationship with India tends to dominate 
its view of the world. The hostility which has existed 
between these two countries since Partition, and the fear 
of India which this hostility has generated, have been 
the mainspring of many Pakistani policy decisions. The 
central issue of this hostility is the question of 
Kashmir.1 It is by its policy on this issue that 
Pakistan claims to know its friends.
Apart from the legal question, and the economic 
and strategic interests of both India and Pakistan, the
1
The basis of the Kashmir dispute was outlined briefly 
in Chapter III. For detailed discussion of the history 
of this question see, for example, Michael Brecher, The 
Struggle for Kashmir (Ryerson Press: Toronto, 1953); 
Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton University 
Press: Princeton, N.J., 1954); K. Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan 
and the United Nations, Prepared for the Pakistan 
Institute of International Affairs and the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (Manhattan Publishing 
Co.: New York, 1960); Sisir Gupta, Kashmir, a Study in 
India-Pakistan Relations (Asia Publishing House: Bombay, 
1964); Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 1947 to 1966 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1966); G.W. Choudhury, 
Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966 (Pall Mall 
Press: London, 1968).
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basic philosophy which underlies the attitude of each 
probably contributes to the insolubility of the Kashmir 
problem. The partition of the subcontinent and the birth 
of the Muslim state of Pakistan arose directly from the 
'two nation' theory, developed by the Muslim League, which 
argued that Muslims and Hindus constituted separate 
nations and should therefore have separate states. For 
Pakistan to abandon its demand for a plebiscite in 
Kashmir (the results of which Pakistanis generally believe 
would be favourable to them) is to abandon Kashmir to 
India and to admit that the Muslims of Kashmir can be 
absorbed into the Indian Union. Such an admission would 
strike at the roots of the 'two nation' theory, and the 
raison d 'etre of Pakistan itself.1 This view is rarely 
articulated by Pakistanis, but it is implicit in many of 
their arguments relating to Kashmir. For India the 
problem is reversed: to abandon part of the Indian Union 
(which it maintains the State of Jammu and Kashmir to 
be) on the basis of the religious persuasion of its 
inhabitants would at once call in question India's claim 
to be a secular state and, especially since steps have 
been taken to integrate the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
within the terms of the Indian Constitution, might open 
the way for similar demands from other Indian States or 
groups. This way lies the spectre of disintegration.
1
This argument has been raised both by Keith Callard, 
Pakistan: a Political Study (Macmillan: New York, 1957), 
p.309, and Arif Hussain, Pakistan, its Ideology and 
Foreign Policy (Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.: London, 1966),p.65.
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This being the case, the international posture of 
the protagonists is closely defined, leaving little room 
for manoeuvre. So far as India is concerned, Kashmir 
legally acceded to India in 1947, and Pakistan has 
invaded and occupied part of that State. The question 
is therefore one of Pakistani aggression, and the 
dispute would be settled, India maintains, if Pakistan 
withdrew from Indian territory. Since India is in 
possession of the largest, most populous and wealthy part 
of Kashmir, it has little to gain by forcing the issue 
of Pakistani occupation of that area which in Pakistan 
is known as Azad (or Free) Kashmir. Pakistan, however, 
has little to lose and much to gain in keeping the 
issue of the plebiscite alive which, however, necessitates 
a double effort: it must prevent the question of Kashmir 
from disappearing from the international scene, by 
continually raising it in the UN and elsewhere, and at 
the same time attempt to gain a solution satisfactory to 
itself. India has thereby been forced to give attention 
to a matter it would much prefer to drop.
Pakistan's attempts to implement this policy in the 
Middle East have aroused a mixed though frequently 
favourable reaction. For the most part the Arab states 
have acknowledged Pakistan's case: Iraq has been a 
constant ally in this respect. Egypt has, however, 
presented a challenge to Pakistani diplomacy, and much of 
the following discussion is concerned with the policy
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adopted by Egypt. In the non-Arab region, Afghanistan, 
for reasons related to its own conflict with Pakistan, 
has remained neutral with regard to Kashmir. Iran and 
Turkey, each valuing good relations with India, were 
initially reluctant to become involved, but the 
development of the CENTO alliance had the effect of 
making them, ultimately, Pakistan's best friends in 
the dispute.
2. The Middle East and Kashmir, 1947-55
'Muslim causes', so far as most Pakistanis are
concerned, ought to be supported. In the years
immediately following Partition the atmosphere of
religious fervour then prevailing tended to encourage
the Pakistan Government to assume that other Muslim
countries would react in the same way.
Islam does not recognize any land frontiers 
and there is no difference between the 
Muslims of Pakistan, Kashmir, Afghanistan,
Iran, Indonesia or any other Muslim country...
The time has come when they should rise or 
fall together. They have to fight the Jewish 
menace in Palestine and the rising tide of 
Hindu imperialism in southern Asia...Muslim 
opinion has been outraged by the Maharaja of 
Kashmir's action in acceding to the Indian 
Union against the wishes of 90 per cent 
majority of the state.^
1
Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, Premier of the North-West 
Frontier Province, at a press conference at Peshawar, 
31 October 1947. The Pakistan Times, 2 November 1947.
356
This was wishful thinking: not only was the Muslim 
world outside Pakistan not outraged, it was hardly even 
aware. Pakistan had to make its presence felt throughout 
the region before support on the question of Kashmir 
could be sought with any assurance of success.
Although representatives were appointed to most
Middle East countries within a year or two of Partition,
it has been suggested that 'Pakistan always sent her
able ambassadors to other countries rather than to the
Middle East.'1 With one exception, the first four
appointees in the region were noted for their scholarship,
particularly in religion, rather than for their diplomatic
ability. One, the Ambassador to Turkey, was later
recalled on the request of the Turkish Government because
2he was encouraging 'religious reactionaries'.
The visits made by Liaquat Ali Khan and other 
Pakistani Ministers to various Middle East countries 
between 1947 and 1952 were more in the nature of public 
relations efforts to explain what Pakistan was all 
about rather than specifically to gain support over 
Kashmir. The Government of Azad Kashmir has a special 
relationship with Pakistan, which allowed the Azad Kashmir 
Foreign Minister and later its President to make tours of
1
Arif Hussain, p.140.
2
Ibid., p.139.
the Middle East in 1948 and 1950,1 but it is probably
true to say that at this time there was little awareness
in Pakistan that a special effort had to be made. At
that stage it still appeared possible that the United
Nations might find a solution, or that the two
governments might themselves be able to come to terms.
Only after Nehru's statement of April 1954 did it
appear that India would reject the proposed plebiscite,
and the position of the two countries, never very
2flexible, finally hardened.
Although the Pakistan Government itself made no 
special effort to win support in the Middle East, 
non-Government organisations such as the Motamar-i- 
Alam-i-Islami (the World Muslim Congress) were active 
in this respect. During the Motamar conferences in 
1949 and 1951 Pakistan's point of view was canvassed 
among the delegates, and resolutions calling for 
self-determination in Kashmir and declaring that it was
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Sardar M. Ibrahim Khan, President of Azad Jammu and 
Kashmir, The Kashmir Saga (Ripon Printing Press Ltd.: 
Lahore, 1965), Chapter XX. Dawn, 20 December 1948 and 
9 February 1950.
2
Nehru, letter to Mohammed Ali, 13 April 1954, Kashmir, 
Meetings and Correspondence between the Prime Ministers 
of India and Pakistan (July 1953 - October 1954), White 
Paper, Ministry of External Affairs (Government of 
India: 1954), p.85.
part of Pakistan were adopted.1 In October 1950 the
Motamar began a world campaign for support on Kashmir,
collecting signed pledges demanding that the United
Nations take 'determined action in the case of Kashmir
to do justice by Kashmir and the Kashmiries.' Support
for Pakistan was certainly forthcoming from religious
organisations and leaders, wielding influence and
commanding respect, but without the power to determine
foreign policy. The leader of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood was one such supporter, but this organisation
was banned by the Egyptian Government in December 1948.
Following the revolution in Egypt in 1952, it was
implicated in an assassination attempt on Colonel Nasser
and its leaders were condemned to death. The Grand Mufti
of Jerusalem, seasoned campaigner against the
establishment of Israel, also took Pakistan's part over 
2Kashmir. Following Liaquat's statement on 15 July that
the bulk of the Indian Army had been concentrated on
Pakistan's frontiers, the Grand Mufti declared that the
duty of defending Pakistan devolved on the entire Muslim
3world. In Iran a group of religious leaders, of whom
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Dawn, 20 February 1949 and 13 February 1951.
2
Ibid., 23 February 1950.
3
Ibid., 20 July 1951.
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the most prominent was Maulana Kashani, the leader of the 
Fedayyeen Islam (an extreme right wing organisation), 
met and passed a resolution calling on the Iranian 
representative at the UN to 'do his utmost for the 
deliverance of the Kashmiri Muslims.1 The same day the 
Iranian Senate adopted a resolution demanding an 
immediate and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir.1
At a press conference in May 1951 the Pakistan 
Foreign Minister, Zafrulla Khan, said that since no 
Arab country was a member of the Security Council there
was little they could do, but that Pakistan had Turkish
2 . . .  support. Referring to the Security Council resolution
3of March 1951 the Turkish delegate called for 
arbitration on points of disagreement. He argued that 
a plebiscite was the only way to bring about a just
1
Pakistan News, 20 February, 11 March 1951.
2
Dawn, 15 May 1951.
3
This resolution decided to appoint a United Nations 
representative for India and Pakistan in succession to 
Sir Owen Dixon to continue efforts to bring about the 
demilitarisation of Jammu and Kashmir, and called upon 
India and Pakistan to accept arbitration on all points 
of difference which remained after consultation with 
the United Nations Representative. Resolution 91(1951) 
of 30 March 1951 (S/2017/Rev.1), Resolutions and 
Decisions of the Security Council, 1951, Security 
Council Official Records (SCOR), Sixth Year.
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settlement, but that since both parties were agreed on
this principle,1 only minor points remained. Arbitration
2was the only way to settle them impartially.
Turkey was nevertheless reluctant to offend India, and 
even after the announcement in February 1954 that Pakistan 
and Turkey had agreed to sign a treaty, the Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Mehmet Fuad Koprulu, declared that Turkey was 
strictly neutral in international affairs not directly 
concerning it, including Kashmir, Palestine and 
Pushtunistan.^
Outside the Security Council, Turkey, Iran and the 
Arab governments had expressed the wish that the problem
1
Indian agreement was conditional: '...once the soil of 
the State had been cleared of the invader and normal 
conditions restored, its people would be free to decide 
their future by the recognised democratic method of 
plebiscite or referendum....' Government of India, 
letter to the Security Council, 31 December 1947, SCOR,
Third Year, Supplement for November 1948, Annex 28.
2
Speech by Turkish delegate Selim Sarper, 538 Meeting,
29 March 1951, Security Council Official Records (SCOR),
Sixth Year. See also Mehmet Gonlubol, Turkish 
Participation m  the United Nations 1945-54 (Faculty of 
Political Science, University of Ankara: Ankara, 1965), 
p . 46.
3
Koprulu, 20 February 1954, New York Times, 21 February,p.24. 
Foreign Ministry spokesman, 3 March 1954, The Pakistan 
Times, 6 March.
should be quickly resolved.1 The Iranian Foreign 
Minister informed the Indian and Pakistan Ambassadors
that in Iran's view the Kashmir question should be
2settled peacefully and by referendum. (At this stage 
Mossadeq was in power, and was in at least temporary 
alliance with Maulana Kashani over the issue of 
nationalisation of the AIOC.)
Egyptian official statements were cautious: in 
February 1950 the Egyptian Foreign Minister said that 
Egypt was anxious that India and Pakistan should reach 
a quick and peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem,
adding that if Egypt's mediation would be fruitful, it
3would not hesitate to mediate. One man responsible 
for the generation of much goodwill in Pakistan was the 
Egyptian Ambassador, Abdul Wahab Azzam Bey, who 
declared that Kashmir was just as much Egypt's problem 
as the Nile valley. These and other pro-Pakistan 
remarks, reported widely in the Pakistan press, were 
the cause of some strain in Egypt's relations with India,
although the Ambassador's views were quickly disowned by
4the Egyptian Foreign Ministry.
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The Arab League Secretary-General, Azzam Pasha,
was quoted by Dawn as stating on the occasion of
'Kashmir Day', held in Cairo in 1951, that the seven
member states deplored the Indian attitude to Kashmir.1
He was later reported as saying that the Arab League
feared that a war between India and Pakistan would not
be confined to the subcontinent, as it was absurd to
imagine that the Arab States would remain mere
observers when 80 million Muslims of Pakistan were in 
2trouble. Egyptian and Arab League offers of mediation
were reportedly declined by India which felt it
undesirable that a Muslim power or organisation should
3take this role.
Impartial reports are few, and naturally the 
Pakistan press was anxious to give the impression that 
opinion, especially Arab opinion, was on their side.
This is not to say that it was not. It is probably 
more reasonable to assume that when Arab leaders thought 
about it at all, it was always with the notion that 
while they might extend sympathy to Pakistan, India must 
not be offended. They tended in any case to be 
preoccupied with Palestine. Although the Indian 
Ambassador in Egypt was heard to express regret that
1
Ibid., 6 July, 12 August 1951.
2
Ibid., 7 August 1951.
3
The Times, 6 January 1951.
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there was a great deal of sympathy with Pakistan in that 
country, Dawn pointed out that the Egyptian Government, 
as a government, had not spoken out in support of 
Pakistan in the context of the Kashmir question.1
3. The Effects of the Cold War on Middle East
Reactions to the Question of Kashmir, 1955-62
Pakistan's decision to join the western military
alliance system, especially the Baghdad Pact, brought
it, and with it Kashmir, into the arena of the cold war,
which in turn affected relations with the Middle East.
The first major response was Khrushchev's statement,
during his tour of India in December 1955: 'The
question about Kashmir as one of the States of the
Republic of India has been decided by the people of
Kashmir itself....' Lest he be misunderstood, he added:
We are confident that this Baghdad Pact 
will burst like a soap bubble and only 
unpleasant recollections of it will remain.
We have never supported and we shall never 
support participants in the Baghdad Pact.^
The idea of the Baghdad Pact had been opposed also by
Egypt and a number of Arab countries and after the
Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956 the Pact became
1
Dawn, 5 October 1951.
2
The Pakistan Times, 11 December 1955.
364
even more suspect. Pakistan's qualified support for 
Egypt at that time received no thanks from Cairo.
A dislike of military pacts, and the discovery
that Soviet support could be useful, no doubt helped
to draw Egypt and India closer together. Nehru's
ventures into the field of foreign policy before
independence are well known. One of the primary aspects
of this was support for the Arabs against Jewish demands
in Palestine, mainly on the grounds that both were
struggling against the British. In response to
Pakistan's alliance with the United States, India sought
to strengthen relations with the non-aligned Afro-Asian
group, particularly with Egypt.1 In February 1955 Nehru
and Nasser declared that international disputes should
be settled peacefully by negotiation, adding that
military alliances and power entanglements, which
increased tension and rivalry in armaments, did not add
2to the security of a country. The Bandung conference
1
'Nehru was keenly mindful of the potential influence 
of Egypt after the 1952 revolution, and the ensuing 
Nehru-Nasser personal friendship cannot be discounted 
as a factor in India's Middle East policies.' R.J. 
Kozicki, 'Indian Policy Toward the Middle East', Orbis, 
vol.XI, no.3, p.790.
2
Joint Communique, 17 February 1955, Foreign Affairs 
Record, 1955, p.28. This affinity apparently appeared 
much earlier when Egypt urged India to take up the case 
of Indonesia in the UN. See Egypt and the United Nations, 
Report of a Study Group set up by the Egyptian Society
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of April that year, attended by 29 Afro-Asian nations, 
was dominated by Nehru, although Pakistan was one of the 
sponsors. Nasser's brief visit to Pakistan on his way 
to Bandung was not an unqualified success, if the absence 
of any joint communique may be taken as an indication.
Following the conference, Nehru's contacts with 
Middle Eastern leaders increased. In March 1955 the 
Shah visited India, and King Saud went there in November. 
In July Nehru had visited Cairo. The following year he 
took part in a tripartite meeting with Nasser and Tito 
in July, visiting Syria in the course of his journey.
While Pakistan may have alienated the sympathy of 
Egypt, membership of the Baghdad Pact brought a more 
definite response from Turkey and Iran. In its 
communique in April 1956, the Baghdad Pact Council 
stated :
Specific problems which were causing tension 
in this area were also discussed thoroughly 
and frankly in a spirit of mutual comprehension.
In particular the Council emphasised the need 
for an early settlement of the Palestine and 
Kashmir disputes.-*-
(cont.)
of International Law, Prepared by the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace (Manhattan Publishing Co. :
New York, 1957), pp.73-4.
1
Text in Pakistan Horizon, June 1956, p.106. It is 
perhaps noteworthy that the SEATO communique of March
1956 took an even stronger line, in response to Soviet 
statements on Kashmir and Pushtunistan. See ibid.,
March 1956.
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In May the Turkish Government, in an aide-memoire to
the Indian Government, declared:
Since the Kashmir problem is causing 
anxiety to a member-country of the Baghdad 
Pact, it concerns the other members of the 
Pact and, consequently Turkey. Since the 
Kashmir problem is creating unrest in the 
Middle East, it concerns the Baghdad Pact, 
which was set up for the defence of that 
area and which consequently concerns Turkey 
as well.l
The following month a similar aide-memoire to India 
from Iraq declared interest in this question which was 
causing tension in the region.2
In July Adnan Menderes made what was probably the
most outspoken Turkish statement up to that time: 'On
the Kashmir issue we will always stand by the side of
our brother and ally, Pakistan, not only because we are
brothers and allies, but because we believe their cause
3is just and right.' This change in the Turkish 
attitude from the declaration of neutrality of 1954 was
1
4 May 1956. Referred to by Krishna Menon in a speech 
to the Security Council, 799 Meeting, 5 November 1957. 
SCOR, Twelfth Year.
2
Ibid., 26 June 1956.
3
The Pakistan Times, 25 July 1956.
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perhaps attributable in part to Pakistan's support for 
Turkey on the Cyprus question in the United Nations 
in December 1954.1
The attitudes which were developing towards the
question of Kashmir revealed themselves clearly in the
Security Council debate of 1957. Commenting on the
2January 24 resolution, the Soviet delegate said that
the question had been raised in the first place as one
of protecting the population of Kashmir from the
activities of certain hostile tribes from Pakistan
territory and later from Pakistan forces. Attention
was now being focussed not on settling the question by
direct negotiation but on the preparation of a plebiscite
with 'interference from outside.' The Kashmir
Constituent Assembly, the Soviet delegate asserted, had
settled the matter for themselves, and the State was
3now an integral part of the Indian Republic. The USSR, 
however, did not veto the resolution.
Nehru commented that it was unfortunate that some 
members of the Security Council were in military alliance
1
Ibid., 17 December 1954.
2
Resolution 122(1957), (S/3779), Resolutions and 
Decisions of the Security Council 1957, SCOR, Twelfth 
Year.
3
Speech to the Security Council, 765 Meeting, 24.,January 
1957, SCOR, Twelfth Year.
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with Pakistan and some were not happy with India over 
a different issue, and as a result did not consider 
the Kashmir problem on its merits.1 There were 
reports from Cairo claiming that the Indian view was 
shared by 'Arab political circles in the Egyptian 
capital' which maintained that the passing of the 
resolution at a time when the Baghdad Pact prospects 
were at a low ebb was intended to give a 'false 
impression' to any country belonging to the Pact
2that they would receive the support of the Big Powers.
When the Security Council met to debate the 
report of the United Nations Representative for India 
and Pakistan, a five power resolution, sponsored by 
the USA, the UK, Australia, Columbia and the Philippines 
proposed to send him back to the subcontinent to explore 
further ways and means of bringing about the 
demilitarisation of Kashmir. The Iraq delegate 
supported the resolution, although he added that his 
Government would have preferred action along the lines
1
Speaking at New Delhi, 3 February, The Times of India,
4 February 1957.
2
Ibid., 28 January 1957.
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suggested by Pakistan, that troops be withdrawn from 
the ceasefire line and replaced by UN troops. The 
resolution was, however, opposed by India, which 
maintained that the question at issue was one of Pakistan 
aggression and military build-up,1 and again the USSR 
abstained.
Although the revolution of 1958 resulted in Iraq's
withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, this did not
fundamentally alter Iraq's policy on Kashmir, except
that actions especially likely to antagonise India,
such as the aide-memoire of June 1956, were not repeated.
On 30 May 1960 President Kassem's Foreign Minister told
Pakistani journalists: 'I do not say that Kashmir should
come to you or go to India but that the people of
Kashmir should be given an opportunity to decide their
own future.' As leader of the Iraq delegation to the
Security Council under the previous regime, he supported
Pakistan's case, not because they both belonged to the
Baghdad Pact, but because he considered the Pakistan
2stand to be just and right. In June 1962, Iraq was
1
Following the adoption of amendments submitted by 
Sweden, the Five Power draft resolution was adopted 
by the Security Council on 2 December 1957, by ten votes 
to none, with the USSR abstaining. Resolution 126(1957), 
(S/3922), Resolutions and Decisions of the Security 
Council 1957, SCOR, Twelfth Year.
2
The Pakistan Times, 1 June 1960.
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host to the 5th World Muslim Congress, which was opened 
by President Kassem, and which passed resolutions in 
support of a plebiscite in Kashmir. This favourable 
attitude on the part of Iraq continued after the 
overthrow of President Kassem and in a Joint Communique 
in 1964 his successor, President Arif, and President 
Ayub Khan of Pakistan 'evinced a deep understanding' 
of Kashmir and expressed the hope that the dispute 
would 'be resolved early in accordance with the spirit 
of Afro-Asian solidarity and in conformity with the 
spirit of the UN Charter and the UN Resolutions.'1 It 
is difficult to assess the extent to which Iraq's 
attitude arose from genuine sympathy for Pakistan, and 
how much was perhaps the result of continuing rivalry 
between Iraq and Egypt.
Despite efforts made from time to time by Pakistan,
relations with Egypt remained difficult. Pakistani
press attacks on Nasser during 1958 brought protests
from the Egyptian Embassy in Karachi to the effect that
2Nasser had never referred to Kashmir as part of India. 
There are indeed few statements directly attributable
1
Dawn, 27 March 1964.
2
See Suhrawardy statement, Dawn, 4 August, The Pakistan
Times, 5 August 1958.
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to Nasser which express pro-Indian views on Kashmir, 
but his carefully neutral statements did not disguise 
a close relationship with Nehru in other respects. 
There was disappointment in Pakistan that outright 
Egyptian support was withheld. Considering the 
sentimental attitude of many Pakistanis towards the 
Muslim Arabs, such support would have been highly 
prized. After Ayub Khan seized power in October 1958, 
an attempt had been made to overcome the bitterness 
which had developed between Nasser and Pakistan's 
former leaders, especially Suhrawardy, Prime Minister 
during the Suez crisis, whom Nasser had snubbed in 
December 1956.
There were hopes, therefore, in Pakistan that 
Nasser's proposed visit in April 1960 would open a new 
era in Egyptian-Pakistani relations. Now that 
'Pakistan has found its political bearings, after a 
decade of trials and tribulations, and the UAR has 
successfully consolidated its independence, the two 
countries are bound to come closer together...' Dawn 
wrote enthusiastically.1 While Nasser was in India, 
prior to his visit to Pakistan, there were a number of 
reports that he had offered to mediate in the Kashmir 
dispute, some of which construed this as 'recognition
1
Editorial, 'President Nasser', 10 April 1960.
of Kashmir's right to determine its own future....'1
These imaginative reports apparently annoyed Ayub Khan.
'Why do you want to embarrass a good friend?' he asked
the press. Nasser would not offer mediation unless he
was sure that India as well as Pakistan would accept
2it. Nasser also was cautious. He had, he said, offered 
to use his 'good offices', though not to mediate. He 
would not comment on the issue of self-determination, 
arguing that this would undermine any influence he 
might have.^
The Joint Communique issued after Nasser's talks
with Ayub called for a solution of the Palestine question
in keeping with the UN Resolutions, but there was no
4mention of Kashmir. Returning the visit in November, 
President Ayub appeared to be anxious to clear up any 
misunderstanding regarding the role of Pakistan in the
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1
The Pakistan Times, 10 April, commenting on Nasser's 
statement that he hoped for a settlement according to 
the principles of Bandung Declarations, which The 
Pakistan Times pointed out included the right of 
self-determination.
2
Dawn, 10 April 1960.
3
Ibid., 15 April 1960.
4
Text of Joint Communique, Pakistan Horizon, vol.13, 
no.2, 1960, p.163.
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Suez crisis, saying that while he personally had
supported Egypt, and Pakistan had taken a pro-Egyptian
stand, 'there were misunderstandings', and the matter
had been handled clumsily by Pakistani leaders at the
time. He added pointedly that he understood the
Egyptian reaction, for 'one gets hurt if one does not
get the support from...friends in the manner you
think it should be given.'1 From Pakistan's point of
view Ayub's visit to Cairo was not particularly
successful. This time the Joint Communique was much
shorter, without reference either to Palestine or
2Kashmir. It was later suggested that despite Ayub's
claims to support Arab causes, he refused to include
 ^ 3Palestine in the communique. It is also possible 
that the Pakistan President regarded a reference to 
Kashmir as a reasonable quid pro quo for Pakistani 
support on Palestine. Nasser once again made his 
neutrality clear, however: 'Is it wise to say to one of
1
Address to National Union Rally, Cairo University,
7 November 1960, Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and 
Statements, vol.Ill, July 1960-June 1961 (Pakistan 
Publications: Karachi, 1961), pp.47-8.
2
Text of Joint Communique, Pakistan Horizon, vol.XIII, 
no.4, 1960, p.355.
3
Mustafa Amin, Editor of al-Akbar, reported in Asian 
Recorder, 1962, p.4739.
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the two parties that I support you and thus bring 
myself in conflict with the other? What will be the 
effect? Will you get Kashmir?'1
When in 1962 Pakistan brought the question of
Kashmir before the Security Council/ of which the UAR
was then a member/ it became clear that Egyptian policy
had not changed. The resolution/ urging a resumption
of direct negotiations/ which Pakistan was anxious to
have adopted/ was one of the mildest ever proposed,
2from Pakistan's point of view. The UAR explained its
refusal to sponsor the resolution/ and its later
abstention/ saying that it did not favour any action
3which was not acceptable to both parties. The editor 
of al-Akbar argued that the UAR action should have 
been no surprise as it conformed with that country's 
policy/ as a friend of both parties, of maintaining
1
Dawn/ 12 November 1960.
2
Draft resolution S/5134, sponsored by Ireland, failed 
of adoption by the Security Council, 22 June 1962, with 
Rumania and the USSR voting against and the UAR and 
Ghana abstaining.
3
Speech by the UAR delegate in the Security Council, 
1013 Meeting, 19 June 1962, SCOR, Seventeenth Year.
375
good relations with both. Opinion in Pakistan was in
no mood to take this view. So far as Pakistan was
concerned, the UAR action in refraining from supporting
Pakistan had the effect of supporting India. The fact
that it was the Soviet veto which lost the resolution
and not the UAR abstention appeared to count for
little. The Pakistan Times summed up the attitude of
many Pakistanis: 'The attitude of the Afro-Asian members,
UAR and Ghana, caused more disappointment and shock to
2people here than the Russian veto....' Another paper 
wrote:
Our hearts cry out in anguish at the agonising 
thought that...a great Muslim country... should 
have deemed it appropriate to withhold her 
support in an issue of such vital importance... 
not only to us but to millions of Muslims of 
Jammu and Kashmir....^
Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra, remarked:
'Unfortunately...we do not always get the same response
1
Mustafa Amin, of al-Akbar (Cairo), quoted in Asian 
Recorder, 1962, p.4739.
2
Editorial, 'Afro-Asian Stand More Shocking than Veto', 
24 June 1962.
3
Morning News (Karachi), 26 June 1962.
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to the emotions and sentiments which we display towards 
them at all times.'1
There was much soul-searching in Pakistan as a
result of the UAR action. It was intolerable to many
Pakistanis that a Muslim country should not support
them: the situation, as they saw it, did not admit the
possibility of neutrality. Nor did it occur to those
making the public outcry at the time that Pakistan1 s
friendly relations with Saudi Arabia, and the agreement
to sell arms to that country reached during the visit
of the Saudi Defence Minister to Pakistan in December
1961, would be interpreted in Cairo as an unfriendly
act, although this was made abundantly clear by the UAR
2protests against the arms sales in January 1963.
Many Pakistanis blamed membership of CENTO and 
SEATO for Pakistan's isolation, and one member of the 
National Assembly urged the Foreign Minister to 'rush' 
to Cairo and Kabul and remove the suspicion and
1
Dawn, 28 June 1962.
2
The complaint was made by the Chairman of the UAR 
Executive Council, Aly Sabri, in New Delhi. The 
Pakistan Government confirmed that equipment was being 
supplied to Saudi Arabia, but denied knowledge of its 
use in Yemen. Ibid., 15, 17 January 1963.
misunderstanding. The Pakistan Times argued that,
while there was reason to be shocked by the action of
the UAR and Ghana, there was 'no reason whatever to
change our friendly disposition towards them...instead
of being halted in the process of rethinking that
started some time ago, we must get on with it until
2better results accrue.'
4. Changing Attitudes and Orientation, 1963-65
The Pakistan Government began to realise that its 
entire international posture was becoming unsatisfactory 
it threw the non-aligned world (including the Middle 
Eastern Islamic members of it) into association with 
India, and made Soviet opposition to its objectives 
inevitable. At the same time there was a growing 
conviction in Pakistan that the benefits derived from 
its present foreign policy were inadequate. As a 
result the Government began to revise its position. 
Pakistan's gradual disengagement from CENTO was 
accompanied by greater participation in Afro-Asian 
affairs, previously inhibited by its identification 
with the West.
1
Ibid., 28 June 1962.
2
Editorial, 'The Soviet Veto', 25 June 1962.
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While this is not directly related to the Middle 
East, it helped to make Pakistan more respectable in the 
eyes of those committed to non-alignment and for the 
first time placed it in a position to compete for support 
in a context similar to that of India. Although not 
spectacularly successful, Pakistan made steady progress, 
particularly in relations with UAR. This trend was no 
doubt accelerated by the death of Pandit Nehru in May
1964, which ended the special relationship existing 
between the leadership of India and Egypt.
In endeavouring to improve relations with the Arab 
countries the Pakistan Government initially placed 
emphasis on the development of trade relations, especially 
with Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan, as well as the Gulf 
states. Towards the end of 1963 the former Foreign 
Secretary, S.K. Dehlavi, one of Pakistan's more capable 
diplomats, was appointed Ambassador in Cairo, where he 
set about explaining Pakistan's policy and laying the 
groundwork for the Pakistan diplomatic offensive which 
began in earnest in 1964 at the Afro-Asian Solidarity 
Council meeting in Algiers in March and the Second 
Afro-Asian Preparatory Conference in Bandung in April.
At both of these conferences Pakistan cooperated with 
China and Indonesia to keep the USSR and Malaysia out 
of the proposed Second Afro-Asian Conference, in 
opposition to India who supported participation of these 
two powers. Both of these conferences, attended by
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delegates from all the Arab countries, gave Pakistan a 
valuable opportunity for lobbying among them on its own 
behalf.
Also in the first half of 1964, two Pakistan
delegations toured the Middle East seeking support on
Kashmir, which had once more come before the Security
Council. Khwaja Shahabuddin, Minister for Information,
visited Turkey where he received the assurance of
support from the Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inonu.1
An unofficial delegation, led by Mir Waiz Mohammad
Yusuf Shah visited Saudi Arabia, UAR, Syria, Iraq, Iran
and Afghanistan. Although it was received by Prince
Feisal, then Saudi premier, by the Presidents of Iraq
and Syria, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, the
Secretary-General of the Arab League and the Iranian
Prime Minister, Dawn1s enthusiastic reports were perhaps
2exaggerated for the tour was ignored by Arab 
broadcasts.
The Sixth World Muslim Congress, held in Mogadishu 
in December-January 1964-5 also represented a propaganda 
victory for Pakistan, although the absence of the UAR 
and Algeria from the list of 30 countries present
1
Dawn, 4 April 1964.
2
Ibid., 4, 7, 14 and 15 April 1964.
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perhaps took something from the triumph. A
controversy arose over the exclusion of two Indian
delegates, which brought strong protest from India,
although there was little which differed from the
practice of earlier Congresses. Invitations had been
sent to a number of Muslim organisations, but the
Indian Government had refused them permission to attend.
On this occasion, however, the Indian Government
attempted to impose two of its own nominees as
representatives, which the Congress 'unanimously decided
to disallow.'1 While this was no doubt part of
Pakistan's revitalised anti-India campaign, it should be
noted that the Indian action also was without precedent.
After the expulsion of the two unwanted Indians, the
Conference passed a resounding resolution calling on
the United Nations to implement its resolution on the
2plebiscite in Kashmir.
Pakistan's new image did not receive unqualified 
approval among old and valued allies, a point made clear 
by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Aram, at a press
1
Muslim World (the organ of the Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami),
2 January 1965. See also BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
(BBCSWB), Part 4, Africa and the Middle East, ME/1747/B/4, 
from Nairobi in English, 30 December 1964, and ME/1748/B/3, 
from Mogadishu in Swahili, 31 December 1964.
2
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conference in Karachi in January 1964. Regarding
objections raised by Pakistan to the proposed presence
of the US Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean, he said
that it was for Pakistan to decide its own attitude
but 'the US is our ally...and we find no objection to
their coming into our waters.' Iran supported the
proposed Second Afro-Asian Conference, provided all
agreed to attend, and added that 'such conferences
are useful only if they are not used for propaganda
purposes to further one country's aims.'1 Although
there were no comments in the Pakistan press, 'The
National Voice of Iran' referred in a broadcast to
Aram's 'irresponsible' statements in Pakistan, declaring
that it was his task to bring the West's displeasure to
the notice of the Pakistan Government, and that
consequently the visit ended with interference in
2Pakistan affairs. In addition to its dislike of 
Pakistan's anti-Indian policy, which Iran was reluctant 
to join, Pakistan's attempts to woo Nasser were no doubt 
unwelcome in Teheran considering the increase in pitch
1
The Pakistan Times, 31 January 1964.
2
BBCSWB, ME/1478/D/1, 'The National Voice of Iran', 
broadcasting in Persian, 7 February 1964. 'The National 
Voice of Iran' is a clandestine radio station opposed to 
the Shah's Government.
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of the radio battle between the Shah and the UAR 
President at the end of 1964.1
The Cyprus crisis which flared in December 1963
and came very close to war in August 1964 was probably
another source of embarrassment to Pakistan in its
growing relationship with UAR. When the outbreak began
Pakistan immediately declared its fullest support for
Turkey. President Ayub at the Commonwealth Prime
Ministers' Conference in London in July argued the
Turkish case, and succeeded in getting a reference to
. 2Cyprus included m  the official communique. As the
Turkish Air Force made threatening gestures at the
island, Damascus radio said that Syria could not ignore
such incidents taking place near its coastline, and
other reports said that a Turkish attack on Cyprus
would be considered to jeopardise the security of the
3Arab states, including Syria. Medical supplies were 
sent to Cyprus from the UAR, and towards the end of
1
BBCSWB, ME/1745/i, 28-29 December 1964; ME/1754/D/1, 
5, 7 January 1965; ME/1758/i, 13 January 1965; The New 
York Times, 28 December 1964, p. 2.
2
Pakistan News Digest, 10 July 1964; The Times,
16 July 1964.
3
BBCSWB, ME/1627/i, Damascus radio, 9 August, and
BBCSWB, ME/1617/C/3, Athens home service, 27 July 1964.
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August Makarios visited that country. In the Joint 
Communique issued at the end of their talks Nasser and 
Makarios declared their support for 1 full and 
unconditional independence' for the Cypriots and 'the 
preservation of the unity of their territory and their 
right of self-determination.'1 While there is no 
evidence to suggest that Pakistan was involved in this 
controversy/ it serves to underline the difficulties 
encountered by it in attempting to maintain good 
relations with all the states of the region.
As preparations for the Second Afro-Asian Conference 
gathered momentum/ Pakistan gained an unexpected 
propaganda bonus as a result of Sheikh Abdullah's tour 
of the Middle East and the Indian reaction to it. The 
former Kashmir premier was opposed to the integration 
of Kashmir into India and set about explaining this# 
with Pakistani assistance, in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and 
Algeria. He met President Nasser and Ali Sabri in 
Cairo, and gave a press conference organised by the 
Pakistan Embassy, but the Cairo press and radio paid 
little heed to his visit. In Algeria, however, Sheikh 
Abdullah had a much publicised interview with 
Chou En-lai (who happened also to be there on a visit) 
during which he sought Chinese assistance for his
1
Report of Joint Communiqué, BBCSWB, ME/1645/E/1, Cairo
home service, 31 August 1964.
384
campaign against the Indian Government. The Indian 
reaction was immediate: already under fire for 
permitting the Sheikh to make anti-Indian propaganda 
in Cairo, the Government decided to cancel the passports 
of the Sheikh and his party.1 On their return to India 
early in May they were arrested and detained in south 
India. The result was an outbreak of rioting in Kashmir 
in which 'at least four persons were killed when Indian
2policemen opened fire on demonstrators m  Srinagar....'
The Pakistan press made the most of what appeared to be
a fine disregard for freedom and justice on the part of
3the Indian Government, and an Indian delegation was 
sent around various capitals to repair the damage and 
explain the Indian position on Kashmir. The UAR 
Government no doubt found the situation somewhat 
embarrassing, and the Egyptian Vice-President, Zakaria 
Mohie El-Din, in Bombay at the end of April (before the 
arrest of the Sheikh), stated that the UAR Government 
had extended to him the hospitality due to a citizen
1
The Times of India, 8, 16, 17 March and 6 April 1965.
2
The New York Times, 9 May 1965, p.l.
3
For example, see Editorial, 'A Grave Provocation', 
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from a friendly country according to protocol. The
Sheikh had also made press statements, but the press
was free in the UAR, he said. Egypt had not, he
assured the Indian Government, changed its point of
view on Kashmir.1 The realisation, however, was
dawning on the Indian Government that assurances of
neutrality in a dispute were not always satisfactory.
Shastri visited Cairo in June, and though he was
cordially received he was not given the welcome or the
publicity given President Ayub who arrived soon after.
In the Nasser-Ayub Joint Communique issued on 16 June,
the two Presidents
reasserted the peoples' right of self- 
determination and their right to decide 
their futures by their own free will.
They also asserted that this right forms 
a basic principle and should be effectively 
exercised. They further condemned the 
resort to force, terrorism and intervention 
in all its forms to prevent the exercise of 
this right,
adding that they 'expressed their hope for an early and
peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes between
2India and Pakistan.' Though not a clear declaration 
in favour of a plebiscite, this was the furthest
1
The Times of India, 16 April 19650
2
Text published Dawn, 18 June 1965.
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President Nasser had ever gone towards abandoning his 
neutrality in the Kashmir dispute in favour of Pakistan. 
While in Cairo, Ayub took part in talks with Nasser, 
Sukarno and Chou En-lai, all waiting until it was clear 
whether the scheduled Second Afro-Asian Conference 
would after all be held. Egypt was apparently well 
satisfied with the talks, a 'cornerstone for the Afro- 
Asian group,' which enhanced Cairo's reputation as a 
centre for such a meeting,1 and Ayub Khan was well 
satisfied to be at last accepted as a member of the 
club.
5. The Middle East and the War, September 1965
An increasing number of incidents in Kashmir during
July and August led to the outbreak of hostilities
between India and Pakistan in September 1965. The United
Nations considered 5 August as the date on which
violations of the ceasefire line from the Pakistan side
substantially increased, marking the beginning of the
crisis, although Pakistan disputes this, for it was not
until the Indian drive toward Lahore on 6 September that
2President Ayub declared 'we are at war.'
1
Cairo radio, 29-30 June, BBCSWB, ME/1898/ic
2
Broadcast, 6 September 1965. Mohammad Ayub Khan, 
Speeches and Statements, vol.VIII, July 1965-June 1966 
(Pakistan Publications: Karachi (n.d.)), pp.24-6.
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It was not until after 6 September that any official
reaction came from either Turkey or Iran - not, in fact,
until after the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, called for assistance from Pakistan's CENTO
allies.1 Information on this subject is oddly vague:
it seems that no formal request was made, although the
Pakistan Ambassador in Ankara discussed the situation
with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hasan Isik. He also
informally approached the representatives of the CENTO
countries in Ankara, perhaps with the intention of
2asking for a meeting of the CENTO Council. The British
Government refused to be involved, but on 8 September
both the Iranian and Turkish Governments issued statements
in support of Pakistan. The Iranians referred bluntly
3to 'India's aggression' against Pakistan, and the Turkish 
statement declared that the situation had been aggravated
by the fact that India had carried the conflict into
4 . . . .Pakistan's territory. The Iranian Prime Minister,
1
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Abbas Hoveida, went to Ankara for discussions with his 
Turkish counterpart, Suat Urguplu, on 9 and 10 September. 
The two Prime Ministers supported the UN call for a 
ceasefire, and offered Turkish and Iranian troops for a 
UN peace force, if a decision should be made to send one, 
adding that unless a solution was found to the Kashmir 
question 'repetition of such grave incidents cannot be 
avoided.' The final paragraph of the communique^ 
stated:
The Turkish and Iranian Governments 
confirm the solidarity among Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan and that they are prepared to support 
their brother and ally Pakistan. The two 
countries will continue to watch future 
developments in the situation closely in the 
spirit of this solidarity. The two Governments 
will regard the continuation of the conflict 
as a grave development and will maintain 
constant consultations, both between themselves 
and with Pakistan, on the additional 
representations to be made and aid to be 
accorded.1
They had already referred to their 'special
commitments to Pakistan, not only within the framework
of CENTO but also within that of the sincere friendship
2and close partnership binding the three countries.1
1
Text of the Turkish-Iranian Communique. BBCSWB,
ME/1958/E/1, Ankara home service, 10 September 1965.
2
Ibid.
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It was clear, however, that CENTO could not be invoked
by Pakistan since this was not a case of communist
aggression,1 and although Turkey did have a treaty
2commitment to Pakistan outside CENTO, Iran did not. 
Nevertheless both these countries, taking into 
consideration the international obligations of each, 
went as far as they could in assisting Pakistan both 
materially and diplomatically.
Pakistan's special envoy, Air-Marshal Asghar Khan, 
previously Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, 
went to Ankara to ask 'all the help that Turkey can 
give us.' It was reported that this included jet 
fighters and pilots. The Indian Prime Minister, Lai 
Bahadur Shastri, wrote to Urguplu seeking clarification
1
This point was emphasised by officials of the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry and the CENTO Secretariat 
during interviews conducted in August 1968. For 
discussion of this question see Chapter V.
2
See Article 4 of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement for 
Friendly Co-operation of April 1954. Denise Folliot 
(ed.), Documents on International Affairs 1954 (OUP: 
London, 1957), pp.185-6. See also text of letters 
exchanged between the Turkish and Pakistan Governments 
amending the treaty, Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks 
Security (Longmans: Pakistan, 1960), Appendix II, 
pp.180-1.
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of these reports, but it soon became clear that
Turkey's agreement to supply defence equipment to
Pakistan was qualified by its obligations not to
dispose of NATO and CENTO equipment, and on these
2grounds Asghar Khan's request was refused.
On 14 September, the day on which U Thant's time
limit for a ceasefire expired, Isik and Hoveida came
for talks to Rawalpindi. There is little reliable
detail regarding the discussions which Bhutto declared
to be satisfactory. Hoveida stated that Iran was
prepared to give full and closest support to Pakistan,
3and Isik promised Turkey's 'best assistance'. On his
return to Ankara, however, he emphasised that it
is now definitely clear that so long as no 
final solution is found to the Kashmir 
question it is not really possible to hope 
for peace on the Indian subcontinent.
Consequently it is the task of all peace- 
loving countries to ensure the cessation 
of hostilities on the subcontinent and, 
not content with that, also to find a final 
solution to the Kashmir problem. The final
1
The Times of India, 11 September 1965.
2
Ibid., 14 September, The New York Times, 15 September 
1965, p.2.
3
Dawn, 15, 16 September 1965.
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solution should be a just one agreed 
upon by both sides.^
Although the version of his statement broadcast
by Ankara radio carefully avoided any mention of a
plebiscite, Dawn carried the report under the headline
2'Turkey Backs Plebiscite'.
Reports of the assistance which Pakistan received
from Turkey and Iran vary, and are understandably
difficult to document. Both Governments were warned
by India that they should not take any steps which
would give the impression that they were taking a
partisan attitude in the conflict, and that any material
help which they gave Pakistan would be considered an
3unfriendly act by India, but it is uncertain to what 
extent this warning affected their actions.
The sum of Turkish aid to Pakistan was said to be
$5m. worth of arms and ammunition, which Urguplu stated
4would be sent under an existing trade agreement. It
1
Text of Isik statement, BBCSWB, ME/1962/C/2, Ankara 
radio, 15 September 1965.
2
Dawn, 15 September 1965.
3
The Times of India, 17 September 1965.
4
Statement at a press conference at Izmir, 18 September 
1965, BBCSWB, ME/1965/C/1, Ankara home service, 18 
September 1965; The New York Times, 12 September 1965, 
p . 3.
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seems that Turkey made much more military equipment
available, but problems of logistics were such that it
could not be transported to Pakistan in time to be
decisive in the fighting. When the war began Turkey
apparently sent to Pakistan all its available stock from
its own armaments industry, including an estimated
$150m. worth of equipment on order to West Germany.1
There were reports of truckloads of Turkish guns coming
through Iran, and a ship bound from Istanbul to Karachi,
held up at Suez at the end of September following an
Indian protest, was found to be carrying explosives,
2mine-laying equipment and arms supplied by Turkey.
Later reports of 200 Patton tanks sold to Pakistan to
fill gaps resulting from the American arms embargo have
been denied by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, although
the results of a US Senate Committee discussion of this
3matter have not yet been published. There are also 
unconfirmed reports that rockets were supplied to 
Pakistan by Turkey and that Turkish munitions factories
1
Interview with a Turkish official, May 1968.
2
The Times of India, 30 September 1965.
3
Ulus (Istanbul) reported in The Pulse, 7 August 1969.
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were subsequently retooled to produce ammunition for 
the Chinese weapons which Pakistan has obtained.1
Details of Iranian assistance during the fighting
are equally imprecise. The Iranian Ambassador in New
Delhi denied that Iran had decided to stop oil supplies
to India, and assured the Indian Foreign Minister that
the Iranian Government had not made any supplies of
arms to Pakistan, only sending essential articles on
2humanitarian grounds. This apparently included oil,
medical supplies and a field hospital. Like the Turks,
however, the Iranians were more willing to assist
Pakistan to replace equipment lost when the fighting
was over. An Iranian General was sent on a buying
expedition to West Germany on Pakistan's behalf,
arranging for the purchase of the 90 Sabre jets which
3were 'loaned' by Iran to Pakistan.
In the diplomatic aftermath of the war, both 
Iran and Turkey made statements in the General Assembly
1
See p.392, note 1.
2
The New York Times, 15 September 1965, p.3;
The Hindu (Madras), 22 September 1965.
3
Arms Sales to Near East and South Asian Countries, 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, 
1967.
in support of Pakistan's case.1 Iran maintained that the 
conflict should be settled on the basis of self-
determination. Turkey has argued that the UN resolutions 
on Kashmir should be implemented, and has refused to 
accept the Tashkent Declaration as the basis for a 
settlement (as the Indian Government claims it is) but 
at the same time the Turkish Government is in a difficult 
position regarding the question of a plebiscite in 
Kashmir, for the principle could be turned against it on
2the question of Cyprus, where the Turks form a minority.
While Turkey and Iran had certain obligations as 
allies of Pakistan, the Arabs did not and there was no 
question of more than diplomatic support for Pakistan, 
if that.
Most of the Arab Governments, including Jordan, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Syria had made statements in 
support of self-determination in Kashmir previous to the 
outbreak of hostilities. Such statements were repeated
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GAOR, Twentieth Session, speech by Hasan Isik, Turkish 
Foreign Minister, 1343 Plenary Meeting, 30 September
1965, p.11, and by Mahdu Vakilk, Iranian delegate,
1362 Plenary Meeting, 14 October 1965, p. 13.
2
Interview with a Turkish Foreign Ministry official, 
August 1968.
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by Syria, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan and the 
Sudan between 11 and 15 September.1
The UAR, however, had given no such assurance. In
view of the prestige of the Egyptian leadership in the
Arab world, particularly as a summit meeting of the Arab
League was due to take place at Casablanca, the stand
taken by Cairo was regarded as particularly important
both in New Delhi and Rawalpindi. Although Cairo radio
reported the conflict, there was no official comment
2from the UAR Government. In his speech to the
Casablanca Conference, Nasser was non-committal,
saying simply:
We live in a world fraught with tension.
We cannot confine our attention to what is 
happening on our own soil. We cannot here 
ignore the bloody clash which causes us all 
sorrow which is taking place between India 
and Pakistan.^
The final communique of the Casablanca Conference, 
however, linked the question of self-determination with 
that of the Indo-Pakistan dispute in a much more
1
BBCSWB, ME/1956/i, 9 September 1965; Dawn, 11 and 16 
September 1965.
2
BBCSWB, ME/1955/i, 8 September 1965.
3
Ibid., ME/1960/A/2, 13 September 1965.
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pro-Pakistan statement than any that had previously
been issued by the Arab League. The assembled Kings
and Presidents affirmed
that the causes of freedom are indivisible 
and that aggression against one of them is 
tantamount to aggression against the whole, 
and call once again for the renunciation of 
the policy of force, for the solution of 
international questions by peaceful means 
and for respect for the right of self- 
determination .
Accordingly they express deep anxiety 
at the armed dispute between India and 
Pakistan and call on the two states to 
hasten to stop the fighting and settle the 
dispute by peaceful means in accordance 
with the principles and resolutions of the 
United Nations.... ^
The communique was welcomed in Pakistan, but Indian
sources were reluctant to recognise the implications of
the document. The official Indian view intimated to the
Arab Ambassadors in New Delhi was that India would have
preferred the Casablanca conference to adhere to the
convention of not discussing Kashmir, or Indo-Pakistani
differences at all. If they wanted to refer to the
issue they should draw a distinction between the present
conflict and the issue regarding the status of Kashmir.
India would not take exception to an appeal for the
1
Text of the Casablanca Communique, ibid., ME/1964/A/1, 
from Rabat and Cairo, 17 September 1965.
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cessation of hostilities, since it had itself agreed to
such a step.1 The Casablanca communique, referring as
it did to 'respect for the right of self-determination1
in the context of the dispute between India and
Pakistan, although avoiding any explicit mention of
Kashmir, nevertheless represented a diplomatic defeat
for India. One Indian press report claimed that the
Casablanca Summit meeting had deleted references to
self-determination from the draft submitted b y ‘the
Foreign Ministers. Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq had
apparently wanted the inclusion of a declaration that
the dispute should be solved on the basis of the United
Nations' resolutions and self-determination. The report
claimed that President Nasser had opposed this, asking
the Summit to restrict itself to an appeal for cessation
of hostilities and the settlement of the dispute
'peacefully in accordance with the principles and
resolutions of the United Nations', which is very nearly
the same thing, and only slightly more favourable to
2India. In any case, while the Casablanca communique
1
The Times of India, 17 September 1965. PTI report.
2
Ibid., 19 September 1965. If there was a Foreign 
Ministers' draft worded more strongly in favour of 
Pakistan, which was modified at Nasser's insistence, 
the writer has found no other reference to it.
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may have been a clear propaganda victory for Pakistan, 
it availed that country little insofar as the diplomatic 
outcome of the conflict was concerned.
The only Arab state in a position to assist the 
Pakistan case in any practical sense was Jordan, during 
1965 a member of the Security Council, though as a 
non-permanent member its influence could be only 
marginal. Just as the activities of the UAR in the 
Security Council debate of 1962 had a tremendous 
effect on public opinion in Pakistan, despite the fact 
that it was the Soviet veto which killed the resolution 
Pakistan favoured, so the activities of Jordan on 
Pakistan's behalf, while in no way decisive, had the 
effect of raising Pakistani morale.
The Jordanian representative supported the Pakistan 
argument that the Council was called upon to propose 
practical means for settling the question, and that it 
should uphold the principle of self-determination as 
embedded and reaffirmed in all its past pronouncements 
on the problem.1 He argued against the interpretation
1
Speech by the Jordanian delegate, Abdul Monem Rifa'i, 
1241 Meeting, 18 September 1965, SCOR, Twentieth Year.
of the 6 September resolution1 which called on the
parties to 'promptly withdraw all armed personnel back
to the positions held by them before August 5, 1965' as
'marking the beginning of aggression by Pakistan against
India' as suggested by the Indian delegate, maintaining
that no judgment was implied in this resolution. This
view was not accepted by the Malaysian delegate whose
pro-Indian stand ultimately led to a break in diplomatic
relations between Pakistan and Malaysia, further
evidence of the store placed by Pakistan on the stand
taken in the Security Council by Muslim members. When
the 20 September resolution (which reiterated the
demands of the earlier resolutions but continued to
separate the questions of ceasefire and political
settlement) came to the vote, Jordan, along with the
2USSR, abstained.
At the end of October the Security Council resumed 
its discussion of the Indo-Pakistan question and Jordan 
again entered the fray, this time on procedural questions, 
in support of Bhutto who wished to discuss the internal 
situation in Kashmir which the Indian delegate claimed
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was out of order. The argument continued to the point 
where the President of the Security Council decided to 
adjourn the meeting.
Since Jordanian action had little more than 
nuisance value nothing would be gained by going into 
the further detail on the Security Council debates 
which, in any case, were inconclusive: this is simply 
to illustrate the teamwork that took place between 
Pakistan and Jordan, and to point out, by reference to 
Pakistan's reaction to the actions of Malaysia, the 
weight attached to this by Pakistan.
7. Conclusion
If anything emerges from the discussion it is that 
the role of the Middle Eastern countries in the Kashmir 
dispute is at the most marginal, regardless of the 
policy followed by them. The great powers alone are 
able to influence developments, and then only when their 
policies tend to reinforce one another. In the war of 
September 1965, for example, United States suspension 
of military aid and the Chinese threat of intervention 
helped end hostilities, and Soviet diplomacy later 
brought the two parties together to negotiate the 
Tashkent agreement. For the most part Pakistan had the 
moral support of the Arab countries, as well as Turkey 
and Iran, and even Afghanistan (which took exception to 
reports of Indian air attacks on 'Pushtunistan' and was
said to be in sympathy with Pakistan's objectives).1 
Although this represented a propaganda gain and helped 
to raise Pakistani morale, it did not assist them in 
any way to gain their objective of bringing about a 
plebiscite in Kashmir, the possibility of which is as 
remote as ever. Insofar as Pakistan's objective is 
to keep the Kashmir issue alive and to mobilise 
international opinion, the implied reference to Kashmir 
in the Casablanca Communique and the support of the 
Jordanian delegate to the Security Council represented 
important achievements.
It is also clear that no one, not even Turkey or 
Iran, was willing to involve itself in the conflict, 
or to take any more risks than necessary in order to 
aid Pakistan. Within the limits imposed by other 
international obligations and interests Turkey and Iran 
did their utmost to support Pakistan during the 1965 
war. It so happened, however, that the international 
obligations of both of them precluded their giving 
Pakistan the only assistance that may have been decisive: 
the immediate use of jet fighters and pilots. While 
Turkey calculated that India had already been antagonised, 
it was not at that stage willing to run foul of the
401
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United States by handing over NATO equipment to 
Pakistan. The same is true of Iran: the loan of the 
Sabre jets took place after the fighting had stopped.
By the time it became known sufficient time had passed 
to considerably lessen US disapproval. Certainly 
Turkey sold arms to Pakistan when they were required, 
but for hard currency which Pakistan could ill-afford.
So far as Pakistan's cultivation of the Arab 
countries, especially the UAR, is concerned, while it 
brought propaganda advantages it also created 
difficulties in Pakistan's relations with Iran. At the 
same time the question of Cyprus, although never made 
a touchstone by either the UAR or Syria (the two states 
most strongly in support of Makarios), represented 
another issue on which Pakistan's declared policy brought 
it into disagreement with other friends. Even remaining 
aloof from Arab disputes was no easy matter so long as 
President Nasser and King Feisal were virtually at war 
in the Yemen. As the Saudi King and the Shah draw 
together with the object of keeping outside powers out 
of the Gulf, this dilemma will not diminish. For this 
reason Pakistan has been cautious about Feisal's 
proposal, made in 1966, for an Islamic summit conference,#
a suggestion strongly opposed by President Nasser.
At the same time, in 1965, there was a realisation 
in Pakistan that the Arab countries, and especially
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the UAR, had done all that could be reasonably expected 
of them. That it was not enough was also clear. What 
emerges is that neither Pakistan on the one hand nor the 
states of the Middle East are in a position to render 
each other effective assistance, as the continued 
existence of both the Kashmir and Palestine questions 
demonstrates.
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The Palestine Question: Pakistan's 
Involvement in an Arab Problem
1. Introduction
The Palestine question is essentially an Arab 
problem, but one with which Pakistan has identified 
itself. This involvement has produced a conflict 
between sentimental attachment to the Arabs and the 
pragmatic requirements of foreign policy. It is a 
product of the history of the Muslims of the subcontinent, 
and of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the creation 
of Pakistan, which serve to reinforce and perpetuate the 
emotional attachment that the Muslims of India developed 
for the Muslim world, and the Arab Muslim world in 
particular. It is a unique issue in Pakistan foreign 
policy in that the Palestine policy was formed long 
before Pakistan itself came into being, the only case 
where newly independent Pakistan had, in August 1947, an 
articulate policy. It has continued as an issue of 
primary concern, perhaps more with the public than with 
the Government, for in the actual conduct of foreign 
policy other considerations have become progressively 
more important. Nevertheless, the statement that,
Kashmir excepted, 'no issue that has ever come up before 
the United Nations has so stirred the people of Pakistan,
CHAPTER IX
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or has called forth such exertions from its representatives, 
as the question of Palestine'1 is an accurate assessment 
of its importance. Another Pakistani, a senior official, 
told a European friend during the Arab-Israel war in 
June 1967: 'You must not expect us to be rational over 
Palestine.'
Many Pakistanis, deeply conscious of their identity 
as Muslims, tend to glorify the Arabs and Arab history 
and culture as the source of their religion. This 
emphasis is found among the Muslims of the Indian 
subcontinent perhaps because, almost alone in the Muslim 
world, they were surrounded by a non-Muslim majority and 
ruled by a non-Muslim colonial power. These factors 
contributed to a sense of insecurity which led them to 
place far more importance on their religion than did the 
Arabs, who for the most part took it for granted. The 
emphasis placed on religion by Pakistanis (from time to 
time irritating to their Muslim allies) may also arise 
from the fact that, being somewhat isolated from the 
rest of the Muslim world, they felt a need to prove 
themselves 'proper' Muslims. The fact that this need
1
K. Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations, 
prepared for the Pakistan Institute of International 
Affairs and the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace (Manhattan Publishing Co.: New York, 1960), 
p .165.
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has apparently never been felt by the Iranians, although 
as members of an unorthodox sect they have frequently 
been regarded as something less than true Muslims by 
the purists of the Arabian peninsula, perhaps points to 
an uncertain sense of national identity among Pakistanis. 
Iranians are secure in the knowledge that Iran existed 
long before Islam, but for Pakistan Islam is the raison 
d1etre, the foundations and the mortar without which the 
entire edifice would never have been constructed. 
Unquestioned support of Arab causes, of which the 
principal one is Palestine, is therefore an extension 
into the foreign policy field of the preoccupation with 
the Islamic basis of the state which in Pakistan is an 
essential part of the nation-building process.
This has over the years posed a number of problems 
for the Government of Pakistan. Egypt, particularly 
since Colonel Nasser came to power, has arrogated to 
itself the leadership of the Arab world. Egyptian 
leadership has not always been accepted by the other Arab 
countries, thus raising the question of which Arabs 
Pakistan should support. In the context of Palestine 
this is perhaps less important since the Arab states 
are in general agreement on this issue. When Pakistanis 
complain of Arab ingratitude, as they do from time to 
time, it is usually Egyptian ingratitude to which they 
refer. At the same time, Pakistan's consistent support 
of the Arabs has periodically produced strains in its
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alliance with Turkey and Iran, neither of which is 
prepared to give such unqualified approval to Arab
policy on Palestine, particularly in its Egyptian 
manifestations. The history of Pakistan's Palestine 
policy is therefore an illustration of the tightrope- 
walking in which it has been forced to engage by the 
demands of ideology and sentiment on the one hand and 
considerations of strategy and political affinity on 
the other, a dilemma which has grown more pressing and 
more obvious with the passage of time.
2. The Palestine Policy of the All-India Muslim League
As mentioned earlier,1 throughout the 1914-18 war 
the Muslims of India had suffered the agony of divided 
loyalty, for the Government of India was at war with the 
Ottoman Empire, the seat of the Caliphate. When the 
fighting ended, they were anxious for the preservation of 
Turkey and of the Caliphate, and particularly anxious that 
the Jaziratu'1-1arab, the holy land, in which they 
included Palestine, should not fall into the hands of a 
non-Muslim ruler. They were therefore opposed from the 
first to the British Mandate. Initially the campaign of 
opposition was carried on by the Khilafat movement, in 
which the Muslim League was not formally involved, although 
Jinnah did give support to its aims and objectives.
1
See Chapter I .
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At the time, however, the full implications of the 
Mandate were not appreciated in India, or for that 
matter anywhere except Palestine itself. It was a Class 
A Mandate, which meant that speedy development towards 
independence was an obligation of the Mandatory Power.
At the same time, the League of Nations stipulated that 
Britain, to whom the Mandate was given, should implement 
the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which promised a 
National Home for the Jews in Palestine. In effect the 
terms of the Mandate were impossible to implement, 
unless the Arabs of Palestine were prepared to accept 
the Balfour Declaration, which they refused to do.
It was soon obvious that if Britain took steps towards 
instituting self-government in Palestine, giving the 
Arab majority control of their own affairs, they would 
be unable to guarantee the establishment of a National 
Home for the Jews. Meanwhile, as Jewish migration to 
Palestine increased, the Arabs began to fear that Britain 
would withhold self-government until a Jewish majority 
was established. They therefore pressed for an end to 
migration, and immediate self-government. In 1922 
al-Hajj Muhammed Amin al-Husayni, who held the lifetime 
office of Mufti of Jerusalem (frequently referred to as 
the Grand Mufti) was elected President of the Supreme 
Muslim Council.1 In his efforts to gain his political
1
See J.C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (W.W. 
Norton: New York, 1950), ch.4, 'The Political Structure 
of the Arab Community'.
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objectives, an end to Jewish migration and the sale of
land to Jews, together with self-government with majority
rule for Palestine, al-Hajj Amin was anxious to obtain
the support of as many people outside Palestine as
possible. In this connection he visited India in 1932.
It seems likely that he was aware of the kind of pressure
the 80 million Muslims of India could exert on the British
Government, already feeling the strain of an increasingly
restive Indian nationalism. He was no doubt also aware
that the British Government was anxious not to antagonise
the Indian Muslims and that it was sensitive to pressure
from this quarter. In any case, the Grand Mufti's
efforts at arousing Indian Muslim awareness of the
problem of Palestine were apparently quite effective.1
The result was a Resolution passed by the All-India
Muslim League at its Delhi session in November 1933:
This Session of the All-India Muslim League 
places on record its emphatic protest against 
the British Government in trying to make 
Palestine the national home of the Jews and 
requests His Excellency the Viceroy to 
represent to His Majesty's Government the 
feelings of the Muslims of India that the 
Balfour Declaration be immediately withdrawn
1
Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, Only If They Knew it (privately 
published in Karachi, 1966, also serialised in Mus1im 
World (organ of the Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami), 21 May 
- 9 July 1966).
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as it is opposed to the fundamental 
rights of the people entrusted to their 
control.1
By 1936 the Palestinian Arabs had made no progress
towards their main objectives/ and in April that year
the Arab Higher Committee was formed under the presidency
of the Grand Mufti in an attempt to unite the various
Arab factions. The Arab Higher Committee's first action
was to call a strike in order to achieve the objectives
referred to above and put forward by the Arab delegation
which had gone to London in 1930, only to return empty
handed. The atmosphere precluded any possibility of
constitutional change, at least in the opinion of the
British Government, and in July 1936 a Royal Commission
was appointed to enquire into the situation in Palestine.
It met with an Arab boycott until shortly before its
scheduled return to England, when the Arab Higher
Committee in response to a joint Iraqi-Saudi appeal
2agreed to appear before it.
In its report, published in July 1937, the Royal 
Commission declared that the terms of the Mandate were 
incompatible, that promises to Jews and Arabs were
1
Quoted, ibid.
2
For detailed discussion of these developments, see 
Hurewitz, ch.5, 'Arab Revolt and Partition Proposal'.
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contradictory and that the Mandate was unworkable, the 
first such official admission. It suggested that the 
partition of Palestine was the only possible solution.
In a White Paper published at the same time the British 
Government supported this proposal, which was acceptable 
neither to the Jews nor the Arabs.
Interest among the Indian Muslims was mounting.
An Indian Muslim delegate to the Imperial Conference in
London in May-June 1937 had put the Arab case over
Palestine in strong terms. In its Lucknow Session in
October 1937, the All-India Muslim League came out
equally firmly against the idea of partition, declaring
...in the name of the Mussalmans of India 
that recommendations of the Royal Palestine 
Commission and the subsequent statement of 
policy represented by the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies to Parliament conflict with 
their religious sentiments and in the 
interests of world peace demands its 
rescission without further delay....-*-
A Partition Commission sent to Palestine was unable 
to devise a suitable scheme. In the face of mounting 
opposition the partition proposal was dropped. Instead
1
Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, May 1924- 
December 1943 (bound volume of photostats in the 
possession of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad)
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it was proposed to call a conference of Jewish and Arab 
representatives, as well as the representatives of the 
Arab States, in London. The Indian Muslims made a bid 
to send representatives to the Conference also. In 
July the Muslim League declared that Palestine Day would 
be held on 26 August when Muslim organisations would 
hold meetings condemning 1 the unjust repressive and 
inhuman policy that is pursued by the British and 
offer prayers for the complete success of our Arab 
brethren in their honourable and just struggle for 
freedom of their country.1 At the same time a committee 
was appointed to consider the question of sending an 
influential deputation abroad, especially to Palestine 
and England. The committee was directed to consider 
ways and means by which effective pressure could be 
brought to bear upon the British Government and to 
advise the Muslim League Council with regard to the 
question of the boycott of British goods.
It was decided to send Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman,
Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, Maulana Hasrat Mohani and Maulana 
Irfan to attend the Palestine Conference in Cairo in 
October 1938, called by the Egyptian premier Allouba 
Pasha to discuss Arab demands in connection with 
Palestine. The Indian delegates remained in Cairo for 
about a month, at the end of which time it was decided 
that Khaliquzzaman and Siddiqi should go on to London 
to attend the London Conference on Palestine. On 
arrival in London they were, however, told by the
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Colonial Secretary that as British Indian subjects they 
would not be allowed to attend the conference. 
Khaliquzzaman later wrote that they had wanted to return 
to India but were persuaded to remain by Allouba Pasha. 
They kept the Muslim League informed of developments, 
and a resolution was adopted at its Patna session in 
December 1938 accusing the British of using sympathy for 
the Jews as a pretext for incorporating Palestine within 
the British Empire, and frustrating the idea of an Arab 
federation and possible Muslim unity. The holy places 
of Palestine were to be used, the resolution claimed, as
1 aerial and naval bases for their future military 
activities.' If Jewish immigration was not stopped and 
the Grand Mufti not included in the Arab delegation 
then the proposed conference would be a farce.1
In London the disappointed Muslim League delegation 
made another attempt, in a statement submitted to the 
Secretary of State for India, to have its views on 
Palestine recognised by the British Government. When 
the conference finally opened in February 1939, parallel 
discussions took place, since the Arabs refused to 
recognise the Jewish Agency and would not participate in 
discussions with the Jewish delegation. The positions 
of the Jews and the Arabs were unchanged, but by this
1
Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, May 1924- 
December 1943.
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time the British Government was more inclined to make 
concessions to the Arab view. The international 
situation was such that Jewish collaboration with the 
Axis Powers was out of the question, while the Arabs 
had displayed no such reluctance. In the context of 
Palestine, the British felt they could afford to 
concentrate on removing Arab grievances and securing 
Arab cooperation, ignoring for the time being the likely 
effect of this policy on the United States.
The proposals put forward in the White Paper 
following the conference envisaged progress towards 
self-government over a ten year period. Jewish 
immigration was to continue for five years, after which 
Arab consent would be necessary. Certain restrictions 
were placed on the sale of land to Jewish immigrants. 
These proposals were unacceptable to the Jews and, 
indeed, considering the particularly terrible plight of 
the Jews in Germany and Eastern Europe, the British 
decision was open to much criticism. The Permanent 
Mandates Commission of the League of Nations declared 
that the White Paper was incompatible with the terms of 
the Mandate. Nor were the proposals totally acceptable 
to the Arabs, who objected to any recognition of Jewish 
rights in Palestine. The British proposals were 
rejected by the Arab Higher Committee, despite the 
endeavours of Khaliquzzaman, who argued that the 
acceptance of the compromise would enable the Arabs as
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a government to put an end to Jewish migration, and of 
the Jordanian Chief Minister, Tawfiq Pasha, who also 
counselled acceptance, since by this means the threat 
of having a Jewish majority would be removed forever.1
1
There is some evidence of Jewish pressure on the 
British Government and of a misunderstanding of British 
commitment and intention on the part of the Arabs. 
Hurewitz, in The Struggle for Palestine, briefly 
describes the progress of the conference: 'The British 
unfolded their proposals in two stages. At the end of 
February preliminary suggestions, confined to 
constitutional changes, were declared wholly unacceptable 
by the Jewish delegation, while the conditional Arab 
acceptance was tantamount to rejection', p.100.
Khaliquzzaman, in Only If They Knew It, deals with 
the proposals in more detail, obviously giving them 
much more weight than Hurewitz: 'In fact they [the 
British] assured the Arabs that the scheme of Partition 
of Palestine...had been given up and the British 
Government was contemplating establishment of a Central 
Government for the whole of Palestine to which, to 
start with, a few subjects of administration will be 
transferred immediately to complete this process 
within five years.' According to Khaliquzzaman 'we were 
all jubilant over the proposals, so much so that the 
Jews boycotted the official dinner on behalf of the 
British Government.' Within two days the British had 
gone back on their plan and 'modified it in a manner 
not to fix any positive date for the transfer of power 
from British to Palestinians although privately they 
extended the period of five years to ten years.' The 
Arabs, furious and disappointed, favoured rejection, 
and Khaliquzzaman's advised acceptance was ignored.
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Khaliquzzaman, on leaving London, went to Rome with 
the intention of asking Mussolini to send military aid 
to the Palestinian Arabs, but before an interview could 
be arranged, Italy invaded Albania, a predominantly 
Muslim country, and the plan was abandoned. From Rome 
the Muslim League delegation went to Beirut where they 
met the Grand Mufti, and thence to Cairo where the 
Egyptian Prime Minister had called a second conference. 
Allouba Pasha offered a million pounds to Palestine 
'so that the poor Arabs may not sell their lands in 
Palestine to the Jews,' and asked them to accept the 
British terms. The Mufti, consulted in Beirut by 
telephone, refused. This apparently surprised the Indian 
delegates who, 'sad and disappointed,1 returned to India1 
after a nine-month absence during which they had 
endeavoured to make heard their views on Palestine, and 
had been politely ignored on all sides.
3. The Partition of Palestine and the Role of
Zafrulla Khan
During the Second World War the Muslim League 
continued to pass resolutions on Palestine, calling on 
the British to give independence to the Arabs, and
1
Khaliquzzaman, Only If They Knew It. This suggestion 
overlooked the fact that it was not the poor but the 
wealthy Arabs who were selling their land. The Mufti's 
continued refusal is not, therefore, surprising.
417
warning that delay and departure from the pledges to 
this effect given the Arabs by the British would arouse 
much resentment among the Indian Muslims.1
On 25 September 1947 Pakistan (along with the Yemen) 
became a member of the United Nations, bringing extra 
support to the Arab group. The importance of Pakistan's 
participation was increased by the fact that its 
representative was Sir Muhammed Zafrulla Khan, a 
distinguished lawyer with considerable diplomatic 
experience both as Indian representative to the League 
of Nations in 1939 and as Agent-General to China in 
1942.
In April 1947, unable to find a compromise acceptable 
to both Jews and Arabs, Britain had handed the vexed 
question of Palestine over to the United Nations. In May 
the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP) was appointed. During its visit to Palestine 
it received cooperation from the Jewish Agency, but was 
boycotted by the Arab Higher Committee, who refused to 
recognise it. UNSCOP obtained the Arab point of view 
during visits to Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan. In its 
report, finally published on 31 August 1947, UNSCOP
1
See Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League, May 
1924 to December 1943, also Resolutions of the All-India 
Muslim League from January 1944 to December 1946 
(published by Liaquat Ali Khan, Honorary Secretary, 
All-India Muslim League, (n.d.)).
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recommended that the Mandate be terminated at the
earliest possible date and, itself unable to reach
agreement on a solution, put forward two plans for the
future of Palestine. The majority plan1 envisaged
partition into an Arab State and a Jewish State, with the
2city of Jerusalem separate. An alternative plan for 
a federal state with Arab and Jewish areas and with 
the capital at Jerusalem was also put forward. When 
the United Nations General Assembly convened to discuss 
both the British decision and the UNSCOP Report, Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia submitted a proposal for the termination 
of the Mandate and the recognition of Palestine as one 
state. Both the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher 
Committee accepted invitations to attend the meetings, 
but the Arab Higher Committee agreed to enter discussion 
only on the joint Iraqi-Saudi proposals since it recognised 
neither UNSCOP nor its Report. On 2 3 September the 
ad hoc Committee on Palestine comprising all the UN 
members was established to discuss these plans.
Two subcommittees were set up. Subcommittee I was 
to devise a suitable scheme for Partition, and consisted
1
The majority plan was supported by Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay.
2
The minority plan had the support of India, Iran and 
Yugoslavia.
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of those representatives who favoured this solution.
Subcommittee II, made up of those who supported a 
solution along the lines of the Iraqi-Saudi proposal, 
was set up to recommend a suitable constitution. The 
representative of Colombia was elected President of 
Subcommittee II and Zafrulla Khan rapporteur. 
Subsequently the Colombian representative resigned and 
Zafrulla Khan was elected in his place, giving Pakistan 
its first opportunity to play a major role in the 
Palestine question.
The subcommittee divided into three working groups 
on legal, refugee and constitutional problems. Pakistan, 
Syria and Saudi Arabia made up the legal working group.
It raised three important questions: Was the United 
Nations competent to make any decision regarding the 
partition of Palestine without reference to the people 
of Palestine? Was the concept of the national home for 
the Jews compatible with League of Nations objectives 
of self-determination and therefore was the Mandate 
itself legal? And, in any case, could the Mandate be 
said to have lapsed with the disappearance of the League 
of Nations? These questions, it said, should be 
referred to the International Court of Justice. 
Subcommittee II also recommended that the Mandate should 
be terminated and the powers of the Palestine 
Administration should be handed over to a unitary 
government, elected under a democratic constitution.
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The Holy Places should be protected, as well as the 
rights of religious and racial minorities.1 The 
proposals of Subcommittee II were all rejected, 
however, while on 25 November the recommendations of 
Subcommittee I, for partition with economic union, were 
with some revision accepted by the ad hoc committee.
It was opposed by Pakistan and the Arab countries on the 
grounds that it violated the UN Charter and the principle 
of the right of self-determination of the population of 
Palestine.
The Partition plan was to come before the General 
Assembly on 26 November, but an adjournment was sought 
over Thanksgiving Eve and Thanksgiving Day. It has been 
argued that a number of smaller states which, on 
25 November were prepared to oppose Partition, by
1
'The Constitution shall recognize the right of Jews 
to employ Hebrew as a second official language in areas 
in which they are in a majority' and 'shall ensure 
adequate representation in the Legislature for all 
important sections of the citizenry in proportion to 
their numerical strength.' It should also 'provide for 
adequate reflection in the Executive and the Administration 
of the distribution of representation in the Legislature.' 
Draft Resolution on the Constitution and Future 
Government of Palestine, Yearbook of the United Nations, 
1947-48 (Department of Public Information, United Nations: 
Lake Success, New York, 1949), pp.242-3.
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29 November had been persuaded to vote in favour.
Those who have no access to what is going 
on behind the scenes have known enough 
from the Press to have fear in their hearts 
not only on this question - because this is 
one individual question - but that the 
deliberations on crucial questions of this 
great body, on which the hopes of the world 
for the future are centred, will not be left 
free.1
Opposing the Plan, Sir Zafrulla said:
There are 1,300,000 Arabs in Palestine and
650.000 Jews - with room wanted for more - 
and the problem has become insoluble. It 
is said: therefore, let us divide because 
it would be unjust and unfair that thirty- 
three per cent of the population - which is 
the Jewish population of Palestine today - 
should occupy a minority status in a unitary 
State. Let us have a fair solution, the 
Arabs to have their State and the Jews to 
have theirs.
The boundaries were drawn accordingly. 
The Arab State will be an Arab State in the 
sense that there will be only 10,000 Jews 
in it and almost 1,000,000 Arabs. Very 
well, but what of the Jewish State? In the 
Jewish State there will be 498,000 Jews and
435.000 Arabs. Have you solved the problem? 
Jews are not to live as a minority under the 
Arabs, but the Arabs are to live as a 
minority under the Jews. If one of these is
1
Speech by Zafrulla Khan, 28 November 1947, General 
Assembly Official Records (GAOR), Second Session.
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not fair then neither is the other; and 
if one is not a solution, the other is 
not. 1
He sought a delay in the final decision, in the hope
that a more acceptable solution might be found. But not
all Zafrulla's eloquence was enough to alter the UN
decision. Partition was accepted by a vote of 33 to 13
with ten abstentions. The 13 included every single
2Muslim member of the UN.
The validity of the vote was not accepted by the 
Arab world, or by Pakistan. In the first place, they 
never accepted the legal competence of the United Nations 
to deal with the matter, and in the second they objected 
to what they believed to be unfair pressures placed on 
some UN members by the United States to force the two- 
thirds majority necessary to adopt the decision, 
particularly as the Partition plan received only a 
simple majority in the ad hoc Committee.
1
Ibid. Zafrulla apparently based his argument on the 
size of the minority in question. Pakistan was in a 
delicate position, however, for arguments against the 
partition of Palestine might well have been turned 
against it.
2
The 13 negative votes were Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, 
Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Turkey and the Yemen.
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The Partition Commission sent to Palestine to 
implement the decision found the task impossible, and 
Jews and Arabs shortly took to arms to settle the 
dispute. The result was the establishment of the State 
of Israel in May 1948. It gained widespread recognition, 
and was admitted to the United Nations in May the 
following year.
4. The 1956 Crisis
By the time the next major crisis involving the
Palestine question arose, the pattern of world politics
had changed in such a way as to preclude any close
identity between Pakistan and Arab policy. In 1948
Pakistan had been, internationally, a free agent. By
1956 it had become deeply committed to the West,
through the agreement with the United States in 1953,
membership of SEATO in 1954, and in 1955 membership of
the Baghdad Pact. This last, linking Pakistan in a
military alliance with Iran, Turkey and Iraq, had been
strongly opposed by the other Arab states, particularly
by Egypt. Professions of sympathy for the Arab cause
were met with reserve by Egypt, particularly as two of
1 2Pakistan's regional allies, Turkey and Iran, had
1
Announced at Ankara, 28 March 1949.
2
De facto recognition extended 15 March 1950.
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extended recognition to Israel, and Turkey had gone so 
far as to establish diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.
In addition, Nasser found an affinity with Pandit Nehru 
whose neutralist views accorded more with his own than 
did the professions of Islamic brotherhood emanating 
from Karachi.
Although the Palestine dispute did not become 
directly involved in the Middle East crisis of 1956 
until the end of October, it was a background issue 
which conditioned the actions leading up to the Sinai 
campaign and the behaviour not only of the Arabs but of 
the Pakistan Government also. In fact the Pakistani 
leaders appeared particularly anxious to keep the 
Palestine issue separate as long and as far as possible, 
in an effort to simplify Pakistan's position as an Arab 
sympathiser on the one hand and a user of the Suez 
Canal and an ally of Britain on the other. Pakistan 
initially attempted to take a neutral position, but as 
it became clearer that the use of force against Egypt 
was seriously contemplated, this position was much more 
difficult to sustain. Following the Anglo-French 
action against Egypt, it had to be abandoned, though 
reluctantly and too late to prevent a deterioration in 
relations with Egypt .
The United States decision to withdraw aid for the 
financing of the Aswan Dam was announced on 19 July 1956. 
There followed reports that the Baghdad Pact powers had
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protested that the biggest single US aid project was being
undertaken for a country not only neutral but from time
to time actively anti-Western.1 This was a likely enough
reaction from America's allies and a means by which
America could shift some of the responsibility for a
decision unpopular in the Afro-Asian world. The half-
. . 2hearted denial of the Pakistan Foreign Minister that
Pakistan had never been consulted when the offer was made
to finance the dam, nor when it was withdrawn, and that
therefore the question of Pakistani opposition to the aid
did not arise, was hardly calculated to allay Arab
suspicions. His earlier statement that he was sorry
Egypt's project had received a set-back and that he
hoped Egypt would be able to 'disentangle herself from
the situation' was additional evidence of a lukewarm
attitude, particularly when coupled with the remark that
he neither approved nor disapproved of Egypt's neutralism,
3he was simply baffled by the word. His lack of 
enthusiasm was no doubt reinforced by the fact that 
Nasser had just concluded talks with Tito and Nehru at
1
This seems at least to have been the attitude of Iraq. 
See Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Cassell: London, 1960), 
p.421. See also Edwin L. Dale Jr., The New York Times, 
21 July 1956, p.3.
2
Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, statement to press, 27 July 
1956, reported in The Pakistan Times, 28 July 1956.
3
Ibid., 23 July 1956.
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Brioni, in the course of which they had reaffirmed 
their faith in this policy.
The report in The New York Times prompted a strong 
editorial attack on the Pakistan Government by The 
Pakistan Times, which urged that if the report were 
untrue Egypt and the other Arab countries should be 
immediately, officially informed of the fact. If, on 
the other hand, 'someone in the Foreign Office had 
blundered once again,' the Government should take steps 
to prevent a repetition.1 The Government, however, 
disregarded the suggestion and there were no further 
public statements until after President Nasser's 
announcement of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal.
At the time the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, 
was in Karachi. The Egyptian action was discussed 
between the Pakistani and Turkish leaders and official 
Pakistani sources were reported to have expressed full 
agreement with the position of the Turkish premier who, 
on departure for Ankara on 31 July, had said that 
'internationalization would perhaps be better' than 
Egyptian control. The same day the Pakistan Prime 
Minister, Mohammed Ali, said that Britain was consulting 
with other Commonwealth countries, including Pakistan, 
through 'normal diplomatic channels', but refused to
1
The Pakistan Times, 28 July 1956.
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comment further. It appeared that Pakistan was
primarily concerned with 'safe and free' use of the
Canal by all countries, and with the possibility that
Egypt might use control of the Canal to obstruct
traffic.1 Since the bulk of Pakistan's trade went
through the Canal, this was an issue of particular
2importance. The cautious reaction of the Government
was not fully endorsed in the press. The Pakistan Times
maintained that fears of Egyptian interference with
traffic were imaginary, and called on the Government
to give full backing to the Egyptian action and to make
3a statement on 'British threats of force.'
The Karachi Bar Association condemned British
threats and warned 'that the people of Pakistan are in
sympathy with Egypt and would do all to help her in her
4struggle to retain the control of the Suez Canal.'
The leader of the East Pakistan Awami League (a Leftist 
party) and of the East Pakistan Muslim League, both
1
Ibid., 1 August 1956.
2
It remains particularly important. The closure of the 
Canal means for Pakistan up to two months' delay on 
goods coming from and going to some Mediterranean and 
European ports.
3
The Pakistan Times, 1 August 1956.
4
Ibid., 8 August 1956.
issued statements supporting Nasser's action.1 After a
motion to congratulate Nasser was disallowed by the
Speaker, the opposition members of the West Pakistan
2Assembly left the chamber. This general emotional
reaction was probably reinforced by the statement of
the Rector of al-Azhar University in Cairo calling for
3
1lhad to defend the Canal.
On 4 August, without waiting for the Egyptian 
reaction, the Pakistan Government accepted the invitation 
to the Suez Canal Conference to be held in London, a 
decision which was interpreted as support for the
4Western plan for some form of internationalisation.
The Pakistan Foreign Minister, Hamidul Huq
Chowdhury, stopped in Cairo for talks with Nasser on his
way to London, following which he expressed the belief
that Nasser was ready to accept some organisation which
would be set up to run the Canal, with Egypt in
5authority, despite Nasser's statement before the opening
428
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Ibid., 4 August 1956.
2
Ibid., 2 August 1956.
3
Ibid., 4 August 1956.
4
Ibid., 5 August 1956.
5
Ibid., 16 August 1956.
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of the conference that the proposed internationalisation 
of the Canal was a 'conspiracy'.1
During the Conference the Pakistani delegation
consulted with the Turkish and Iranian representatives
in an endeavour to co-ordinate policy. Their attitude
comprised two main points: they were anxious to see
effective guarantees of the safety and continuity of
their trade through the Canal, and feared that Nasser
might at some time interfere with this for political
purposes. This view was put forward most strongly by
2the leader of the Turkish delegation, and though never 
explicitly stated officially by Pakistan it was 
generally accepted that it shared the Turkish view. In 
the second place the three powers were anxious to make 
it clear that they did not dispute Egyptian sovereignty 
over the Canal. This view was embodied in the 
amendments put forward by them, with the support of 
Ethiopia, to the United States proposals which envisaged
1
The phrase is Eden's. See Full Circle, p.443. Moraes 
of The Times of India argued that Nasser's view was 
that, while Egypt recognised the Canal as an international 
waterway, it could not be recognised as subject to 
international control, since this would derogate from 
Egypt's sovereignty. Frank Moraes, interview with 
Nasser, reported in The Times, 3 September 1956.
2
Dawn, 18 August 1956.
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an international body, having effective sanctions to 
operate the Canal in conjunction with the Egyptian 
Government. Their amendments, which were for the most 
part of a technical nature, did not substantially alter 
the plan and were accepted by the Western powers. The 
Indian delegation claimed that these guarantees of 
Egyptian sovereignty could not be effective under such 
circumstances, and put forward counter proposals that 
the international body should be purely advisory. India 
did not therefore support the amended Dulles plan, which 
became known as the 18 Nation Proposals. The Indian 
Government had been in close touch with the Egyptian 
Government throughout the discussions, and in the light 
of Nasser's later rejection of the proposals, it appears 
that the Indians were better informed than the Pakistanis 
of the position of the Egyptian Government.
Egyptian displeasure with the Pakistan stand was 
expressed by Nasser who remarked that the Pakistan 
Foreign Minister had before the conference talked with 
him for three hours pledging support for Egypt's cause, 
and subsequently betrayed it at the Conference.1 It was 
later suggested that pressure from the Western powers 
together with the influence of officials in the Pakistan
1
Interview with Frank Moraes, The Times, 3 September
1956.
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High Commission in London contributed to the weakening 
of Chowdhury's resolve.1
In any case, over the next few weeks the Pakistan
Government shifted slightly from its pro-Western
position. It was becoming clearer to the Pakistan
leaders that the object of the United Kingdom was to
impose a solution on Egypt, and that this was
particularly unpopular among the Afro-Asian nations.
With an eye to the coming United Nations debate on
Kashmir, Pakistan was probably jolted by Nasser's
forthright reaction to its policy, and by the obvious
diplomatic capital being made by India in this regard.
It was with some reluctance that Pakistan attended the
second London Conference held in September, this time,
following a change of Government, represented by Firoz
Khan Noon as Foreign Minister. Disapproving of the
proposed Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA) as an
attempt to impose a solution on Egypt, Pakistan,
followed by Iran, withdrew from the working party set
up to settle the details of SCUA. On this issue there
was a definite split with Turkey which had suggested
2that the working party be set up. On his return to
1
The Pakistan Times, 8 September 1956.
2
Ibid., 22 September 1956.
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Karachi Noon was, however, at pains to dispel the
impression that there was any weakening in the Baghdad
Pact, which he declared had nothing to do with the
Suez issue. Again he emphasised the economic importance
of the Canal to Pakistan.1 In answer to the internal
critics of his policy, he emphasised that the days of
Pan-Islamism were over and that Pakistanis should look
to their own interests first. Since the Suez Canal
issue had been referred to the United Nations Security
Council early in October, and the chances of the use of
force had receded, Pakistan was considering whether to
2join the Suez Canal Users' Association.
As it'turned out Noon's statement was wishful 
thinking. The Pakistan Government immediately condemned 
as aggression the Israeli invasion of Egypt which took 
place on 29-30 October. The position was complicated, 
however, when Anglo-French forces entered the Canal Zone 
almost immediately after. Pakistan's fear that the 
Palestine issue would eventually become mixed up with the 
question of Suez had been borne out. The Government was 
at first cautious. President Mirza, in Teheran, broke 
the silence on 1 November saying 'we have nothing but
1
Ibid., 29 September 1956.
2
Speaking in Lahore, 20 October, Dawn, 21 October 1956.
unreserved condemnation for the aggression.'1 The
following day the Prime Minister, Suhrawardy, followed
his lead with an even stronger statement that if
Britain and France did not accept the United Nations
call to withdraw their forces immediately the rest of
the world would be within their rights to join together
and use force to free Egypt from the Anglo-French
2aggression. Pakistan would give all possible help to
Egypt 'after considering our own strength.' Shortly
after, a hurried meeting of the regional members of the
Baghdad Pact took place in Teheran to discuss the
changed situation. In a communique issued on 8 November
they referred to the 'regrettable' Anglo-French action
and claimed credit for influencing the cease-fire
3decision. This was considerably milder than previous 
Pakistani or Iranian statements, and credit was given 
to Turkey for exerting a restraining influence on its 
allies. Certainly Pakistani statements were thereafter 
altered in tone. Noon even went so far as to say that 
Israel had come to stay and that it was important for
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The Pakistan Times, 2 November 1956.
2
Ibid., 3 November 1956.
3
Text of the Communique, N. Frankland (ed.), Documents 
on International Affairs 1956 (OUP: London, 1959), p.313.
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the UN to fix a boundary for it. Suhrawardy found it 
necessary to 'clarify' the Foreign Minister's statement 
three days later, saying that Pakistan had never
2recognised Israel and had no intention of so doing.
Again the Government's policy came under heavy fire at
home, where on 3 November there had been violent
anti-British and anti-French demonstrations in East and
3West Pakistan. The mildness of the Teheran communique 
brought another burst of rage from the Opposition 
parties. They demanded that Pakistan withdraw from 
the Baghdad Pact, or at least that Britain should be 
forced to leave it. The claim, confirmed by the United 
Kingdom, that the Baghdad Pact powers had influenced 
the British decision on the cease-fire, was seen as a 
device to shield the Pact from criticism, and at the 
same time enable Eden to save face.
Immediately following the Teheran conference, 
Suhrawardy set off on a tour of the Arab countries with 
the intention of explaining the stand of Pakistan and 
the other Baghdad Pact powers. His plan to include 
Cairo in his itinerary came to nothing when Nasser made
1
The Pakistan Times, 11 November 1956.
2
Ibid., 15 November 1956.
3
Ibid., 4 November 1956.
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it clear that it would not be 'convenient' for him to 
receive the Pakistan Prime Minister at that time.
Coming so soon after his refusal to have Pakistan 
troops included in the United Nations force to be sent 
to Egypt, there could be little doubt that it was his 
intention to snub the Pakistanis. In Pakistan there 
was a dual reaction to Nasser's attitude. On the one 
hand it was regarded 'as a sad return for all the 
sympathy which the people and government of Pakistan 
showed for Egypt in her hour of need.'1 On the other 
there was a tendency to accuse the Government of 
permitting itself to be pushed around by Britain, and 
more demands were made for withdrawal from the Pacts.
The regional members of the Baghdad Pact met again, 
this time in Baghdad, from 19 to 22 November. It seems 
to have been on Iraqi and Pakistani initiative that the 
meeting was called, since the Iranian and Turkish 
leaders did not indicate their intention of attending 
until the last minute. The Iraq Government had also been 
under attack following the publication of the Teheran 
communique and there had been pro-Egyptian demonstrations 
in Baghdad. It seems that Pakistan and Iraq were anxious 
to modify the position of the Teheran communique, and to 
persuade Turkey and Iran to make some concessions to the
1
Ibid., 19 November 1956.
Arab viewpoint. The Baghdad communiqué1 was short, and
while reaffirming the earlier statement following the
Teheran conference, added that the communiqué issued by
2the Arab Heads of State in Beirut on 15 November was
basically in agreement with their own views. This and
the announcement of the Turkish decision to withdraw its
diplomatic representative from Israel was seen as a shift
in policy which opened the way 'for increased harmony
3among the Muslim countries of the region.'
During December Suhrawardy and Noon toured Pakistan
in an effort to explain their policy and gain support.
Suhrawardy made it clear that he had no intention of
taking Pakistan out of any of the Pacts, pointing out that
during the recent war nobody had gone to the aid of Egypt
4who claimed to be neutral. Noon told the press: 'We are
not going to commit suicide, and our first duty is to
5strengthen our defences.'
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Speaking to students in Dacca, Suhrawardy said that
Pakistan had not declared the UK and France aggressors,
because the UN had not done so. Food, clothing and
medical aid had been sent to Egypt, however, because
'one aspect of our policy is to cultivate brotherhood
with Muslim countries.' But, he added:
We find that, whereas we go out in sympathy 
for them, there is hardly any reciprocity on 
the other side for us. We find that Egypt 
for instance, has declared that it is on the 
side of India on the question of Kashmir.
We cannot help that.
Pakistan had to do its duty as a Muslim country whether
Egypt liked it or not, but 'certain things which
unfortunately Egypt has done have rather shaken our
faith and made us pause a little and become a little
more wise in the precipitancy of our actions....' He
went on to say that he was in favour of Muslim unity,
but 'the question is asked: Why don't we get together
rather than be tied to a big Power like the UK or
America? My answer to that is that zero plus zero plus
zero plus zero is after all equal to zero.'1
An attempt to rationalise Pakistan's support for 
what appeared to be an upsurge of British imperialism,
1
H.S. Suhrawardy, Address to a Meeting of Students at 
Salimullah Muslim Hall, Dacca, 9 December 1956, 
(Department of Advertising, Films and Publications, 
Government of Pakistan: Karachi (n.d.)).
438
this speech at the same time reflected the blow to 
Pakistani pride of Nasser's plainly expressed contempt, 
and also a degree of irritation that Nasser had not 
appreciated the extent, however limited, to which 
Pakistan had tried to stand up to its allies.
5. The Arab-Israel War, June 1967
The crisis leading up to the war of June 1967 and 
the diplomatic aftermath again demonstrate the Pakistan 
Government's caution and the emotionalism of the public 
reaction. Though the Government made statements in 
support of the Arabs, it seems clear that Pakistan had 
no intention of becoming involved in the dispute.
Despite attempts made by Ayub Khan after his 
seizure of power in 1958 to effect a reconciliation with 
President Nasser, relations with Egypt had improved only 
slightly. There was an exchange of visits in 1960, but 
in 1962 Egypt failed to support a UN resolution on Kashmir 
favourable to Pakistan, occasioning some bitter comment 
in the Pakistan press. A Pakistani diplomatic offensive 
followed in preparation for the UN Security Council 
debate in 1964, with some success, although in the 1965 
war against India, Egyptian backing for Pakistan had 
been restricted to expressions of support couched in the 
mildest terms.1 There is, however, an Arab League office
1
See Chapter VIII.
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in New Delhi, but none in Pakistan. In 1967, therefore, 
at least on the official level, there was little 
enthusiasm for a war which appeared to be largely of 
Nasser's making.
As the Israel-Syria border tension mounted through
May, an official statement from the Pakistan Foreign
Office condemned 'these provocative activities on the
part of Israel' and reaffirmed its full support to the
Arab countries 'in their efforts to defend themselves
and to repel aggression.'1 On 18 May U Thant, at Nasser's
request, ordered the withdrawal of the UN force from the
UAR, and his action was officially supported in the UN
by the Pakistan representative. When four days later
the news came through that Nasser had blockaded the
Straits of Tiran, President Ayub told one of his close
2associates that war was inevitable.
On 24 May the Foreign Minister, Sharifuddin Pirzada,
promised that Pakistan would 'render every support to
the Arab countries in their efforts to resist Israeli
3aggression.' Five days later, speaking in the National
1
The Pakistan Times, 21 May 1967.
2
Interview, Rawalpindi, May 1968.
3
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Assembly, he reaffirmed this support, stating that in 
Pakistan's view the responsibility for the present 
crisis in the Middle East lay entirely with Israel, and 
denying that Israel had any right of passage in or 
through the Gulf of Aqaba.1
Despite his assessment that the situation was
leading inevitably to war, Ayub announced his intention
to go ahead with plans for a three-day tour of Quetta
and Kalat Divisions, a remote area in the south-west of
West Pakistan, where he would be virtually inaccessible.
The tour was to begin on 6 June. Before his departure,
however, he plainly stated his position:
The recent crisis which has overtaken the 
Middle East is the inevitable result of the 
aggressive moves of Israel. On this issue, 
we have always given full support to the Arab 
viewpoint which is based on the principles of 
justice and right. These principles, we are 
confident, will overcome every other force.
It is our earnest prayer that this crisis may 
be resolved in a peaceful manner. On such 
occasions, it is imperative to exercise a 
check on our emotions. When the issue relates 
to matters of principle and righteousness, it 
is necessary to consider with a cool mind 
every aspect of it, so that one could take a 
firm stand in support of j u s t i c e . ^
1
For text of statement, see ibid., 30 May 1967.
2
President's First-of-the-Month broadcast, text ibid.,
2 June 1967.
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President Nasser's special envoy arrived in
Pakistan from India on 4 June, and was received by Ayub
in Rawalpindi, where they had a half-hour talk. It is
reported1 that before he had time to begin Ayub offered
Pakistan's support, adding that, of course, Egypt
would not seek military assistance: had Pakistan in
1965 had the planes and other equipment that Egypt had
in 1967, then the Indians would have been wiped off
the map. The envoy later told the press that he was
quite satisfied with his interview with President Ayub,
and that he had not come to seek military assistance,
but to explain Egypt's position. In any case, he cut
short his visit to Rawalpindi and returned to Karachi,
2where he had long discussions with Pirzada.
On 5 June Israel attacked Egypt, and on the
following morning Ayub left for Quetta, handing over
the conduct of Pakistan policy to his Foreigm Minister.
From Quetta he sent the following statement to the Heads
of State of UAR, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria:
Israel's aggression against your country 
has come to me, as to all Pakistanis, as a 
great shock. We are watching with admiration 
the valour of your armed forces in defending 
your country. We have full confidence in
1
By a source who understandably wishes to remain 
anonymous.
2
The Pakistan Times, 5 and 6 June 1967.
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your ability not only to repel the attack, 
but carry the fight to the enemy's camp 
and deliver him crippling blows. All 
Pakistanis feel at one with their brethren 
in this crisis and wish to extend to them 
all possible assistance. Please feel free 
to call upon us for whatever material help 
you require and we shall do our utmost to 
render it within our capabilities. Our 
earnest prayers are with you and your people 
for victory.1
Meanwhile public reaction in Pakistan was wildly
and vociferously pro-Arab. In the early days of May
the tone of editorials had tended to be that Israel was
a grave danger to the peace of the Middle East, and it
was up to the Arabs to settle their differences and put
2up a united front. It was for Z.A. Suleri, a journalist
with considerable prestige among many in Pakistan, to
suggest that a battalion should be sent to join the Arab
3forces. Two days later another commentator boldly
stated that 'the hundred million strong Muslim nation of
Pakistan is ready today as it always was to give its
4last drop of blood in this holy "jihad".' At the same
1
Text, ibid., 7 June 1967.
2
See, for example, editorials, ibid., 17 and 25 May 1967.
3
Ibid., 24 May 1967.
4
Ibid., 26 May 1967.
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time the Arab students in Karachi and Lahore were 
active, and gained ready sympathy from their Pakistani
vconfreres. The United States Consulate-General and 
USIS offices in Lahore were mobbed, and an attempt was 
made to burn down the USIS library.1 There were also 
demonstrations in Karachi. In all cases the police 
took measures to prevent serious damage being done.
On 29 May a move to force a debate in the National
Assembly was adroitly foiled by the Government which
argued that 'an adjournment motion was far too
restricted by rules and regulations to be a suitable
framework for full discussion.' The issue was vital and
would be much better taken up during the foreign policy
2debate which would soon take place. Meanwhile the 
National Awami Party and the Jamaat-i-Islami Party both 
passed resolutions supporting the Arabs. Unofficial 
recruiting centres were set up to enlist volunteers.
It is not possible to discover the actual number which 
responded, but it has been suggested that, had the war 
not ended so quickly, Ayub may have found it difficult 
to resist the pressure to allow them to go and fight. 
Enthusiasm continued long after it became clear that 
Israel had won a decisive victory. The press for the
1
Ibid., 27 May 1967.
2
Ibid., 30 May 1967.
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most part followed Cairo Radio reports, so that the 
news of the Arab defeat and the realisation of its 
implications took two or three days to filter through. 
The first reaction was bitterness against the West for 
supporting Israel, followed by anger against the USSR 
for what was felt to be a betrayal of the Arabs. It 
was emphasised that the error of the UAR was in placing 
its trust in a single great power and not following the 
path of neutrality!
In the diplomatic aftermath of the hostilities, 
under Pirzada's guidance, Pakistan gave active support 
to the Arab states. When the Security Council debate 
opened, the representatives of Israel and interested 
Arab countries were invited to participate in the 
discussion. Pakistan was also invited to take part, the 
only non-Arab Muslim country to seek such an invitation. 
In his statement to the Security Council, the Pakistan 
representative, Agha Shahi, criticised that body for 
failing effectively to check Israeli aggression. To 
simply call for a ceasefire without insisting on the 
withdrawal of forces was to perpetuate aggression. He 
recalled that such a withdrawal had been insisted upon 
in the case of the Indo-Pakistan war in September 1965.1
1
Agha Shahi, Speech to Security Council, 1360 Meeting, 
14 June 1967, SCOR, Twenty-Second Year.
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It is said that what may be achieved by 
Israel's armies being permitted to remain 
on the soil of Egypt, Jordan and Syria is 
a peace of reconciliation. But we know 
better. It is not a peace of reconciliation 
which will result from permitting Israel's 
aggression to remain unvacated. It will be 
a diktat. But let me make one thing plain.
We will not be a party to the imprimatur of 
the United Nations being lent to any scheme 
that, in reality, is nothing more than a 
plan to humiliate and coerce the Arab 
countries into submission.
The fate of the UN Charter was at stake, he said, and
the damage done could be repaired only by taking three
measures: first, Israeli aggression must be condemned;
second, a demand must be made for the immediate withdrawal
of the Israeli forces to the demarcation lines laid down
in the Armistice Agreements, and third, when this had
been completed, the Security Council should actively
participate in the exploration of some means of
implementing the UN resolutions relating to Palestine.
In a long statement on 22 June in the Emergency 
Special Session of the General Assembly, Pirzada defended 
Nasser's blockade of the Straits of Tiran and argued that 
as a juridical issue it could not be regarded as 
justification of the use of force on the part of Israel.
He pointed out that the call for a cease-fire came when 
Israel had accomplished most of its objectives, and was 
not accepted by Israel until these objectives had 
unquestionably been gained. Since there was no
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accompanying demand for a withdrawal of Israeli forces, 
the United Nations had in effect countenanced the 
aggression.
He also raised the question of Israel's proposal 
to annex the Arab sector of Jerusalem, against which 
Pakistan had protested in a letter to the Secretary- 
General on 16 June. 'If Israel can invade and keep 
Jerusalem, why should not every other State invade and 
keep whatever territory it may covet?'
The root of the problem, he concluded, was that 
Palestine was the only former mandated territory where 
the principle of self-determination was totally 
disregarded, resulting in three wars in two decades.
'A lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be based on 
the perpetuation of injustice. The wrongs done to the 
Arabs must be righted. Only thus will conditions be 
created for a just and durable peace in the region.'1
Pakistan was one of the co-sponsors of the Afro- 
Asian and non-aligned resolution calling for the 
withdrawal (under UN supervision) of the Israeli forces 
to their positions before 5 June. Another draft 
resolution, sponsored by the Latin American countries, 
was opposed by Pakistan on the grounds that it linked
1
Sharifuddin Pirzada, speech to General Assembly, 1531 
Plenary Meeting, 22 June 1967, GAOR, Fifth Emergency 
Special Session.
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the withdrawal of Israeli forces with other questions
at issue between the parties, whereas the withdrawal
should be unconditional if it was to be in accordance
with the UN Charter. This Pakistan regarded as the
minimum requisite for any peace settlement.
In maintaining its troops in areas under 
the jurisdiction of other Member States,
Israel is continuing to use force and to 
violate the Charter. But in withholding 
recognition from a State which has not 
fulfilled the conditions attached to its 
establishment by the United Nations, the 
Arab States are not violating the Charter.
Some may think - we do not - that 
they are wrong in doing so. But, in making 
them renounce what they deeply and 
passionately consider their national rights, 
the Latin American draft resolution would 
subject them to coercion. Can, and should, 
recognition be coerced, extorted or imposed 
by military occupation of the territories 
of non-recognizing States? That is the 
question we have to answer. The Latin 
American draft resolution, we fear, lends 
its authority and sanction to the 
imposition of recognition.!
When the draft resolutions came before the Assembly 
for a vote, neither gained the necessary two-thirds 
majority.
1
Pirzada, speech to General Assembly, 1546 Plenary 
Meeting, 3 July 1967, ibid.
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Pakistan did, however, play a considerable part in
the passage of two, more limited, resolutions. One was
the 'Humanitarian Assistance' Resolution.1 The other,
relating to the Israeli decision to annex Jerusalem,
was sponsored by Pakistan, along with Iran, Turkey,
Guinea, Niger and Mali, and introduced by Pirzada on
4 July. It called on Israel to rescind all measures
taken to absorb Old Jerusalem and to refrain from taking
any further measures which would alter the status of the
city. The Secretary-General was requested to report on
the situation and the implementation of the resolution
2within a week of its adoption. The Assembly then went
into recess, reconvening on 12 July to hear the
Secretary-General's report, which consisted of a letter
from the Israeli Foreign Minister refusing to rescind
any of the measures taken regarding Jerusalem. A new
resolution, introduced by Pakistan, Iran and Turkey,
along with Afghanistan, Guinea, Mali and Somalia,
deplored the Israeli reply and repeated the demands made
3in the earlier Resolution.
1
Resolution No.2252.
2
Resolution No.2253, introduced by Sharifuddin Pirzada, 
1548 Plenary Meeting, 4 July 1967, ibid.
3
Resolution No.2254, introduced by Agha Shahi, 1554 
Plenary Meeting, 14 July 1967, ibid.
449
During the following week no progress was made and
on 21 July a procedural resolution to return the matter
to the Security Council was adopted. This resolution,
regarded as a victory for Israel, was supported by the
United States and the Soviet Union, opposed by all the
Arab countries as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan,
while Turkey, Iran and Israel abstained.1 Dawn summed
up Pakistan's view of this resolution as follows:
The emergency session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, called to consider the 
Middle East crisis, has ended in a failure.
It failed to call a spade a spade; it failed 
to secure the vacation of aggression; it 
failed even to condemn Israel for spurning 
the Assembly's near-unanimous call for 
annulling its annexation of Jordanian 
Jerusalem; in short, it failed to promote 
the cause of peace and justice in the Middle 
East.
The next effective UN move came on 22 November when
the Security Council unanimously adopted a British
2resolution calling for a withdrawal of Israeli forces
from occupied territory and the
termination of all claims or states of 
belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political
1
Resolution No.2256. See The Times, 22 July 1967; 
Dawn, 24 July 1967.
Security Council Resolution No.242(1967).
2
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independence of every State in the area 
and their right to live in peace within 
secure and recognized boundaries free 
from threats or acts of force.
Freedom of navigation through international waterways
in the area was to be guaranteed and a just settlement
of the refugee problem to be achieved. The
Secretary-General was requested to appoint a Special
Representative to proceed to the Middle East to set
about implementing these conditions. Although Syria
rejected the resolution outright, the UAR, Israel and
Jordan were persuaded to accept it, though each reserved
the right to its own interpretation. The November 22
Resolution represented a failure for Pakistani diplomacy,
which aimed at separating the issue of Israeli
withdrawal from the question of belligerency, recognition
and freedom of navigation. By the same token it
represented a concession on the part of those Arab
countries who had at least tacitly accepted it.1
Pakistan found itself broadly in agreement with its 
allies Iran and Turkey over the issue, but there were
1
Nasser, wary of too apparent agreement, called for a 
summit meeting of Arab leaders to discuss the 
resolution. While reaffirming his refusal to recognise 
Israel, saying that Israeli evacuation of the occupied 
territory was not subject to negotiation, Nasser was 
careful to leave the door open for discussion. The New 
York Times, 24 November 1967, p. 13 L.
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significant differences in emphasis. In contrast with 
Pakistan's whole-hearted expressions of sympathy for 
the Arabs and determination to see a solution favourable 
to them, both Turkey and Iran were more cautious.
During May 1967 the Arab states made an effort to 
obtain a statement of support from the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry. They had to be content with a statement which, 
while referring to the 'present close relations between 
Turkey and the Arab countries,' emphasised its belief 
'in the necessity of refraining from all actions likely 
to lead to the violation of peace.'1
The Turkish Foreign Minister, Caglayangil, assured
the Arab Ambassadors that Turkey would not allow NATO
bases to be used against them and that Turkish troops
2would not be concentrated on the Syrian frontier. With 
this they had to be content. In any case it represented 
an advance in their relations with Turkey.
Following the outbreak of the war in June, the Prime 
Minister, Demirel, on being asked what measures Turkey 
would take, replied: 'What measures do you want? Turkey 
is not in the armed conflict that she should take
1
The Pulse (Ankara), 29 May 1967.
2
Statement, 2 June 1967, reported ibid., 5 June 1967.
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measures. It is obvious how the obligations of the 
State are run. The public knows very well what our 
commitments are.'1
In the United Nations Turkey joined the call for
Israeli withdrawal, but the tone of Caglayangil's speech
differed markedly from that of Pirzada.
We have always stated that we consider 
inadmissible the use of force for the 
settlement of international disputes, for 
territorial aggrandizement, or for obtaining 
an advantageous position in negotiation.
Nor can we accept faits accomplis as bases 
for the elaboration of settlements.... The 
General Assembly must, therefore, insist 
that the Israeli forces evacuate the 
territories which they have occupied.
He concluded by saying: 'It is true that our ultimate
objective should be to reach an over-all settlement
which will enable us to achieve a lasting and firmly
based peace in the Middle East.' This was a veiled hint
that concessions should also be forthcoming from the
Arabs. On the annexation of Jerusalem, however, which
the Muslim world took to heart more thoroughly than any
other Israeli action, Turkey and Iran both supported the
Pakistani resolution. Caglayangil told the General
Assembly: 'In particular, it must not confront the
world with a fait accompli in Jerusalem. I must remind
1
Ibid., 6 June 1967.
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the Government of Israel of the very close interest of
the Turkish people in the Holy Places in that city....'1
While the Turkish Government was giving carefully
phrased support to the Arab case, the Turkish press,
with a much more rugged tradition than that of the press
of either Iran or Pakistan, gave them scant sympathy.
The most common reaction seemed to be that Turkey should
remain neutral, and as far as possible prevent
hostilities from spreading. It was essentially a great
power confrontation in which Turkey should not become
involved. Underlying this was admiration for Israeli
determination and military efficiency, coupled with a
2tendency to despise and distrust the Arab countries.
At the official level there was difficulty involved 
in commitment of any kind, because of that element of 
contempt for the Arabs in Turkish opinion, together 
with a long period of relatively close cooperation with 
Israel. At the same time Turkey had recently attempted 
to improve its relations with the Arab states. Some 
diplomatic support for them was therefore necessary.
1
Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, speech to General Assembly, 
1532 Plenary Meeting, 22 June 1967, GAOR, Fifth 
Emergency Special Session.
2
Cumhuriyet, Milliyet (both Istanbul), Son Havadis
(Ankara), reported in The Pulse, 19 June 1967.
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The Iranian position was also more restrained than 
that of Pakistan, for relations between the Shah and 
President Nasser have always been strained. At the 
outbreak of hostilities the Shah returned hurriedly 
from a European tour and stopped over in Ankara for 
brief talks with President Sunay, after which it was 
announced that Turkey and Iran had reached full 
agreement on their Middle East policies, On the question 
of oil the Shah said that Iran did not sell to Israel but 
to foreign oil companies which Iran could not control.1 
Egyptian attempts, through Pakistan, to persuade the 
Shah not to sell oil to Israel were apparently without 
effect.
Some days later the Shah returned to Turkey on a 
state visit. Rumours that no communique would be issued 
because of a disagreement on the Middle East situation 
were squashed when the document was presented for 
approval to the two Heads of State on 20 June. Their 
statement on the Middle East was restrained. They were 
in agreement. They were against gaining territory or 
political advantage by the use of force. They confirmed 
their friendship for the Arabs and the importance they 
attached to 'the protection of their legitimate rights,'
1
Ibid., 8 June 1967.
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but omitted any mention of what they considered these 
rights to be.1
The pattern of the 1956 crisis was repeated when
the three Heads of State met at a hurriedly arranged
conference at Ramsar in Iran at the end of July. It is
not clear on whose initiative they met, but it seems
likely that the existence of policy differences,
particularly over the Middle East, had much to do with
the decision. Before the conference opened, a Pakistan
Foreign Office spokesman said that the meeting had been
planned for some time and should not be a surprise to
anyone. 'There is considerable agreement between the
three countries on the Middle East situation,' he said,
adding that 'each country, however, has its sovereign
2right to take its own position on such issues.' It is 
likely that the Shah took the opportunity of expressing 
his distaste for the extravagant press campaign being 
carried on in Pakistan, where the slightest statement 
in Iran favourable to the Arabs was exaggerated to 
imply Iranian backing.
Whatever attempts the Pakistan Government may have 
made to persuade its allies to take a firmer pro-Arab
1
Ibid., 22 June 1967.
2
The Pakistan Times, 28 July 1967.
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line were not successful, at least as reflected in the 
Joint Communique issued on 31 July, which simply said 
that a withdrawal of the Israeli forces was essential 
for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East, and reiterated 'their firm opposition to 
the measures taken by Israel to change the status of 
Jerusalem....'1
On his return to Pakistan, President Ayub told the 
press:
We had two days of useful discussions about 
the Middle East situation as well as our 
mutual problems. It was a very useful 
opportunity. We had not met each other for 
a long time and we now understand each 
other's point of view. One way or the 
other, it has been a profitable visit indeed.
6. Conclusion
Pakistan continued to give diplomatic support to 
the Arabs, but the emotionalism which dominated the 
scene before and during the June 1967 war was tempered 
somewhat. Pirzada, a devout Muslim, was known to be 
sympathetic to the Arab cause, and at the same time was 
inexperienced in diplomacy. It appears that Ayub, after
1
Text, RCD News, vol.3, no.19, July 1967.
2
The Pakistan Times, 1 August 1967.
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himself having set the limits, was content to leave 
conduct of foreign policy during the crisis to his 
Foreign Minister. The demands of internal public 
opinion were thereby satisfied, and Ayub himself 
remained in the background. Pirzada's subsequent 
resignation points to the possibility that his enthusiasm, 
useful at the height of the crisis, had by the end of 
1967 become something of an embarrassment to the 
President. As early as January 1968 it was known that 
Pirzada had submitted his resignation, although he was 
not replaced until 1 May (when Arshad Hussain was 
appointed Foreign Minister). There was a change of tone 
in many of the articles written about the Palestine issue, 
and for the first time there appeared to be a frank 
appraisal of the situation and of Arab shortcomings, 
rather than an uncritical acceptance of the view that 
Arab defeat was the result of Western interference on 
behalf of Israel.1
Palestine remains, however, an issue on which, though 
policy may be modified in some respects, the popular 
attachment to the Arabs would make it impossible for any 
government to substantially change its course. Official 
statements tend to be vague about proposals for a
1
See articles by H.K. Burki in The Pakistan Times, also 
Pakistan Horizon, vol.20, no.3 (the journal of the 
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs), which is 
devoted entirely to the Middle East crisis.
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settlement of the dispute, They are confined to 
condemnation of Israel and exposition of the Arab case, 
and it is unlikely that Pakistan would take any lead 
in seeking a compromise solution.
Differences remain over the Palestine question 
with Pakistan's allies, Turkey and Iran. Pakistan's 
attempts to persuade them to take a more pro-Arab view 
have met with minimal success. Since Pakistan has 
disengaged to some extent from its previously total 
commitment to the Western pacts, and since for reasons 
of its own Turkey is seeking a rapprochement with the 
Arab states (some Pakistanis claim credit for this change 
of policy in Turkey), the objectives of these two 
countries in respect of Palestine are probably closer 
now than at any time in the past. Changes however are 
only marginal, since Turkish public opinion is as 
strongly anti-Arab as Pakistani opinion is sympathetic.
In the recent crisis there were probably bigger 
differences with Iran, and rather than persuading Iran 
to take a more pro-Arab position, it has been suggested 
that Iran had more success in persuading Pakistan to 
take a quieter (if no less firm) course. Iran's growing 
neutrality has not brought it very much closer to the 
Arab position. Its system of government is frequently 
under fire from the 'progressive' Arab states, and the 
Shah has been a target of personal attack from Nasser 
and others. In addition, Iran's interest in the Persian
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Gulf is a source of rivalry and suspicion between itself 
and the Arab Gulf states, as well as Egypt, although 
Egypt's potential for interference has been reduced 
somewhat since June 1967.
While the difficulties inherent in the situation 
have diminished a little since 1956, the Pakistan 
Government is still called upon to perform a delicate 
balancing act between the demands of Pakistan's alliance 
with Turkey and Iran and a sentimental attachment to the 
Arab cause, accentuated by internal pressure from the 
powerful traditional religious groups.
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CONCLUSION
In the modern world Pakistan is a rare phenomenon: 
a state established purely on the basis of the religious 
convictions of the majority of its inhabitants in order 
to protect them against the threat of cultural and 
political suffocation as a minority in a wider community 
with different and incompatible beliefs.1 Before 
Partition it was generally accepted by those who 
supported it that Pakistan would be an Islamic state.
This phrase meant different things to the Westernised, 
secularist leaders of the Muslim League and to the 
orthodox ulema, who insisted on a voice in framing a 
constitution for the new State. Their inability to agree 
on what constituted an Islamic state, together with 
provincial rivalry within the country, kept Pakistan 
without a constitution until 1956.
Under its first Constitution it was known as 1 The 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan'. The word 'Islamic' was 
dropped by President Ayub Khan in the Constitution
1
A parallel with Israel can be drawn to some extent, 
but differences in the size of the two countries, and 
in the conduct of foreign policy by each, prevent the 
analogy from being carried further than the 
establishment of both states.
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promulgated by him in 1962, but he was forced by pressure 
of opinion in Pakistan to replace it in December the 
following year, and Pakistan became once again an 
'Islamic Republic'. The Constitution declared that 'the 
principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance 
and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, should be 
fully observed in Pakistan', and that 'the Muslims of 
Pakistan should be enabled, individually and collectively, 
to order their lives in accordance with the teachings 
and requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Quran 
and Sunnah.'1 Exactly how they should do this is often 
a matter for heated debate.
It is sometimes argued that 'Islam has had little,
if any, noticeable influence upon the reasoning,
planning, decision-making, or expression of Muslim
2policy-makers', and that a Muslim statesman, 'however
1
The Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan 
(Government of Pakistan Press: Karachi, 1962), p.l.
This phrase (my italics) was included under the 
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963. Dawn,
28 December 1963. The Constitution was abrogated by 
President Yahya Khan in April 1969, but there is no 
reason to believe that the pressures which produced 
these aspects of earlier Constitutions have substantially 
altered.
2
Fayez A. Sayegh, 'Islam and Neutralism', in J. Harris 
Proctor, Islam and International Relations (Pall Mall
Press: London, 1965), p.61.
462
nonsecular his approach to internal national affairs...
is bound to act in international affairs as though he 
were secularly oriented.'1
In terms of discussion of Pakistan's relations with 
the countries of the Middle East this is not strictly 
correct. As Islam has from 1947 to the present been 
thought to have a definite role in the government of the 
country, it is also thought to have a place in the 
conduct of foreign policy. The Constitutions of 1956 
and 1962 both contained a clause committing the 
Government to preserve and strengthen the 'bonds of 
unity amongst Muslim countries.' At the time of 
Partition it was a genuinely and widely held belief in 
Pakistan that Islam could be a force in international 
affairs, and that the objective of Muslim solidarity was 
one which could and should be pursued. This concept 
was, however, open to as many interpretations as the 
concept of the Islamic State itself. The Government of 
Pakistan, in 1947, was in the hands of the Muslim League 
leaders, men who had generally either been educated in 
Britain, or at least within the British system, and who 
therefore tended to have a Western outlook and approach 
to the problems of government. Many held the rather 
romantic view that Islam comprehends all that is good
1
Ibid., p.93.
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in the West, including democracy, and insisted that 
Islam is adaptable to modern conditions.1 As a result 
of their vagueness on theological questions, the 
religious enthusiasm which surrounded the birth of 
Pakistan placed the orthodox groups in a strong position 
to influence the Government, including its foreign 
policy (a matter to which the Muslim League had paid 
scant attention), and particularly as this policy 
affected relations with the Muslim states of the Middle 
East.
Concepts of Muslim solidarity propounded in Pakistan 
in the years immediately after Partition were heavily 
coloured by other concepts of unity and international 
cooperation current at the time. The example of the 
British Commonwealth probably influenced the thinking 
of many Pakistani leaders. The Prime Ministers' 
meeting of October 1948 was attended for the first time 
by the leaders of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, giving 
rise to much optimism regarding the future of the 
Commonwealth. The United Nations, the Charter of which 
declared its faith in 'the equal rights of men and women 
and of nations large and small', and which provided a 
forum for international discussion, was also an
1
Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan 
(University of California Press: Berkeley, 1961), p.7.
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organisation which appeared to have a hopeful future.
The end of the 1940s saw the development of two major 
ideologically based power blocs in world politics - one 
Soviet-Communist, the other Western-Capitalist. In 
addition, the Arab League had been established in 1945. 
Each of these four types of institution appeared to 
influence the various proposals for Muslim solidarity 
put forward at the time. Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman 
variously referred to his Islamistan project as an 
Islamic union with an Assembly in which all participating
countries, regardless of size or population would have
1 2one vote, as a 'World Muslim League', a Middle East
3 4bloc, and an enlarged Arab League. The idea of a
Muslim bloc had a special appeal to Pakistan, where
neither of the major ideologies appeared attractive, and
the alternative of non-alignment had been pre-empted by
Pakistan's international rival, India. It seemed to
many in Pakistan that the Muslim nations of the world
provided ready material for another world bloc, to which
1
Dawn, 8 October 1948.
2
Ibid., 10 October 1948.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid., 30 October 1948.
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Pakistan would automatically belong, and in which it 
might even take a leading part. It would have the 
additional advantage of excluding India. Liaquat Ali 
Khan was among those who supported this idea.1
Ghulam Mohammed had a similar idea in mind when he 
took part in the establishment of the International 
Islamic Economic Conference. Although the object of 
the organisation was to overcome the economic 
backwardness which weakened the Muslim countries, there 
was an underlying assumption that, if economically strong 
and united, they would be able to make their collective 
voice heard and impose their will with regard to 
relevant international problems such as Palestine and 
Kashmir.
In a more limited form, the concept of Muslim 
solidarity was embodied in proposals to hold conferences 
to discuss Muslim affairs, such as those held by the 
Motamar-i-Alam-i-Islami, or World Muslim Congress, a 
body which originated and disintegrated before the 
establishment of Pakistan but which was revived by a 
group of Pakistanis in 1949. As a medium for discussing 
matters of cultural and intellectual interest to Muslims,
1
1 Id al-Fitr address, 6 July 1951, The Islamic Review, 
September 1951, referred to above, Chapter II, p.85.
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the Conferences held in 1949 and 1951 in Karachi (and in 
Baghdad in 1962 and Mogadishu in 1965) might have been 
useful. Resolutions adopted in support of the Arabs in 
Palestine and Pakistan over Kashmir were not backed by 
any power on the part of the delegates involved, for the 
most part Islamic scholars and dignitaries, and were 
therefore no more than unofficial expressions of opinion.
One attempt made by the Pakistan Government to 
convene an official Muslim Prime Ministers' conference 
in the Middle East in 1952 collapsed, and the Government 
did not try again.
This indicates a failure of 'Muslim solidarity' as 
a force whereby the countries of the Middle East might 
be galvanised into action to support Pakistan's 
international objectives, and in part appears to support 
the contention of Fayez A. Sayegh, referred to above.
It points also to the fact that Pakistanis, for whom 
Islam was a motivating force, and who were for so long 
isolated from the Muslims of the Middle East, 
misunderstood the role of Islam in the politics of that 
region and failed to realise that Arab Nationalism 
(albeit based on Islam) was for the Arabs a more 
immediate unifying force than Islam. They underestimated 
the secularism in Turkish politics and failed to realise 
the gulf between the Iranians and the Arabs.
Pakistan is not, however, the only Muslim country 
in the region to have put forward schemes for Islamic
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solidarity. President Nasser has referred to the
desirability of a Muslim organisation to be based on the
Haj, and announced plans for the establishment of an
Islamic secretariat in 1954.1 In 1963 he called an
2Islamic conference in Cairo, but objected in strong
terms to the attempts of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia,
during 1966 and subsequently, to convene a Muslim summit
3conference. Just as Pakistan had hoped to further its 
international objectives by initiating such schemes, 
Nasser was anxious to strengthen Egypt's claim to 
leadership of the Arab Muslim world and Faisal hoped to 
forestall such a development. The support Faisal
4received from the Shah and King Hussein of Jordan (both 
among the 'reactionary' forces which, along with Saudi 
Arabia, are frequently attacked by Cairo) lends 
credibility to this suggestion and to the wider
1
The Times, 2 and 17 September 1954.
2
Muslim World, 2 September 1963.
3
Editorial, 'Old Bait', Egyptian Gazette, 24 February
1966.
4
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (BBCSWB), Part 4, 
Africa and the Middle East, ME/1882/A/2, Amman radio,
10 June 1965. Dawn, 4 May 1966.
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speculation that calls for Islamic unity are used 
predominantly as a means of seeking international 
support by modern Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as 
surely as by Sultan Abdul Hamid half a century earlier, 
and with scarcely more success.
The caution displayed by the Pakistan Government 
in both these instances demonstrates an awareness of 
the political rivalry within the Middle East and the 
problem it poses for Pakistani diplomacy in the region. 
The initial division between Turks and Arabs during the 
First World War surprised and shocked many Indian 
Muslims who failed to understand that Turkish rule was 
as oppressive to the Arabs as British rule was to 
themselves. They were shocked even more deeply when 
the Turkish Government abolished the Caliphate and 
secularised the state. In the rivalry between the 
Saudis and the Hashemite ruler of Mecca, the sympathy 
of many Indian Muslims lay with the former, for the 
first time bringing them into conflict of opinion with 
Egyptian leaders who, even in the 1920s, distrusted the 
Saudi Arabian rulers. The leaders of Pakistan in 1947, 
however, had had little personal contact with the Middle 
East, and if they were aware of these divisions the 
full implications escaped them until much later.
Relations with Egypt have been consistently 
regarded as important by Pakistani leaders as well as
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articulate Pakistani opinion, and Cairo was one of the 
first places in the Middle East visited by Liaquat Ali 
Khan in his efforts to explain Pakistan to the world.
In Egypt's dispute with the UK over the presence of 
British troops in the Suez Canal zone, Pakistan, despite 
its reluctance to antagonise Britain, attempted to 
persuade the British Government to accede to Egypt's 
demands and supported the Egyptian view that 
negotiations on a Middle East defence pact could not 
take place until the question of Suez had been settled. 
The Egyptian reaction to Pakistan's treaty with Turkey 
in April 1954 was unfavourable, and it is likely that 
Pakistan's realisation that it could not continue to 
ignore the divisions within the Middle East dated from 
this time. It is not unlikely that Egypt's strong 
objection to the Turkey-Iraq Pact (Baghdad Pact) was a 
factor contributing to the delay in the Pakistan 
Government's accession to the Pact.
Despite the deterioration in Pakistan-Egyptian 
relations which followed Pakistan's accession to the 
Baghdad Pact, and more especially its equivocation 
regarding the Suez dispute of 1956, the Pakistan 
Government has by careful diplomacy avoided the kind of 
quarrels which in the case of Turkey and Iran led to 
diplomatic breaks with Egypt. Pakistan has 
consistently supported the Arab case on the Palestine
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question, and refused to recognise Israel (the issue 
over which Egypt, or the UAR, severed relations with 
Iran in July 1960). When Syria seceded from the UAR in 
September, Turkey, along with Jordan, immediately 
recognised its new status, thus precipitating a 
diplomatic break with the UAR. Pakistan refrained 
from taking any action until some time after Nasser 
himself had accepted Syrian secession.
On the whole Pakistan has taken care not to 
involve itself in disputes between Middle East countries, 
an exception being the sale of military equipment to 
Saudi Arabia, which the UAR protested was being sent to 
the Yemen for use against Egyptian troops. Pakistan 
has remained neutral in Iraq's disputes with Iran and 
Kuwait, and has refused to commit itself officially in 
the struggle for supremacy in the Persian Gulf (referred 
to by Arab sources as the Arabian Gulf) in anticipation 
of British withdrawal.
This policy of neutrality together with its 
pro-Arab position regarding the Palestine question has 
proved successful to the extent that Pakistan remains 
on relatively good terms with all the countries of the 
region. Evidence of this success is the fact that most 
of the Middle Eastern countries support Pakistan, in 
varying degrees, over the question of 'self-determination' 
in Kashmir, and that none supports India. Even Egypt,
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with which Pakistan's relations have been most difficult 
and which has enjoyed a particularly close 
relationship with India, never diverged from a policy of 
neutrality between India and Pakistan and although in 
the United Nations Security Council in 1962 the UAR 
failed to support a resolution favourable to Pakistan, 
in 1965 President Nasser supported the principle of 
self-determination in the context of India-Pakistan 
relations.
It says much for Pakistani diplomacy that its 
position of neutrality has been regarded as credible by 
the Arab countries, particularly the more militant 
'Arab socialist' states such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq, 
when Pakistan is quite clearly allied with Turkey and 
Iran, each of which has disputes with its Arab 
neighbours and maintains relations with Israel.
Certainly Turkey and more particularly Iran have from 
time to time objected to what appear to be Pakistani 
attempts to curry favour with Egypt.
Even if it is possible to conclude that Pakistan's 
Middle East policy has, in the long term, been 
successful, one must ask: what place does the Middle 
East have in the totality of Pakistan's foreign 
relations, and how important has this success been for 
Pakistan? Pakistan may be said to have two overriding 
objectives (which are to some extent linked). The
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first arises from its rivalry with India and the dispute 
over Kashmir: it is of primary importance to Pakistan to 
keep the Kashmir issue before world opinion with the 
ultimate aim of securing 'self-determination' for the 
predominantly Muslim Kashmiri people, and the minimum 
aim of preventing India from completely absorbing the 
State. The second objective is economic development for 
which external assistance is necessary. These two 
objectives are linked because Pakistan believes that it 
must be prepared for hostilities with India at any time, 
and therefore needs a strong and efficient military 
machine, which cannot operate without a solid economic 
base. Pakistan's initiatives towards Muslim solidarity 
during the first five or six years of its existence 
should be seen in the light of these two major 
objectives.
Apart from any other considerations, Pakistan's 
consciousness of itself as a Muslim country resulted in 
a greater concern for the Middle East than for any 
other region, and its participation in the affairs of 
other areas has been slight. The decision to join the 
South East Asia Treaty Organization in September 1954 
was an unexpected development. Possibly taken under 
American pressure, this step might also be seen as a 
concession to East Pakistani opinion, since East 
Pakistan is geographically more nearly part of South 
East Asia than the Middle East. By contrast, Pakistan's
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membership of a Middle East defence organisation was 
rumoured, and was apparently under consideration from 
1951 or 1952, when it was regarded as another aspect 
of Pakistan's objective of establishing some kind of 
grouping of Middle East countries.
What might be termed Pakistan's 'Pan-Islamic' 
phase ended in disillusionment at the end of 1952, but 
its involvement in the affairs of the region continued, 
despite the new trend discernible in Pakistan foreign 
policy from that time. This trend was influenced by 
factors quite apart from Arab disinterest in Pakistan's 
schemes for international cooperation in the Middle 
East.
There was a growing realisation, especially in 
Government circles, that even if such unity were 
possible the Muslim countries of the Middle East were 
not sufficiently advanced economically, despite the vast 
oil wealth of the region, to be able to assist each 
other's and Pakistan's development. They were therefore 
unlikely to be in a position of sufficient strength to 
gain either Pakistan's international objectives or their 
own. This weakness in the region was underlined by the 
virtual collapse of the oil industry in Iran when, 
after its nationalisation by the Iranian Government in 
1951, the foreign technicians left the country. Its 
own economic weakness was brought home to Pakistan after
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the Korean War ended in 1953, and falling jute and cotton 
prices seriously undermined Pakistan's balance of 
payments position. At the time exports were mostly of 
raw jute and cotton, and hardly any processing was done 
in Pakistan. Little attention had been devoted to 
planned economic development during the early years.
The International Islamic Economic Organization, in 
which Ghulam Mohammed had placed so much hope, proved 
inadequate. When the third (and last) meeting was held 
in 1954 it was clear that it had achieved no more than 
a brief statistical survey of the Middle East and the 
establishment in Pakistan of an institute for the 
training of economists. The Pakistan Government sought 
economic aid and launched the First Five Year Plan 
(1955-60) with a high percentage of participation by 
American capital. This pattern has continued in 
subsequent Five Year Plans, although the Government is 
endeavouring to reduce the percentage of foreign capital 
participation relative to domestic capital.
At the same time Pakistan required military aid, 
and this too was offered by the USA, albeit 
conditionally upon Pakistan's participation in regional 
defence. Pakistan's acceptance of American aid placed 
it in a position where its policy was subject to 
American influence and perhaps pressure. The 
abandonment of its earlier non-aligned stand brought it 
into diplomatic conflict with the USSR and isolated it
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from the non-aligned members of the Afro-Asian world. 
Pakistan lost little support in the Middle East on the 
question of Kashmir as a result of this move and gains 
to India in this respect were marginal. Although the 
UAR refused to support a pro-Pakistan resolution in 
the Security Council in 1962, it was Soviet action in 
vetoing the resolution which was decisive in that 
instance.
Membership of the Baghdad Pact, however, drew 
Pakistan into a more intimate relationship with Turkey, 
Iran and Iraq, which in the case of the latter endured 
after its withdrawal from the Pact. Even after Pakistan 
itself began to lose interest in the Baghdad Pact (or 
CENTO, as it had then become) it maintained its close 
and special ties with Turkey and Iran in Regional 
Co-operation for Development.
By the same token, Pakistan's gradual disengagement 
from active participation in the American-backed defence 
system had only a marginal effect on its relations with 
the countries of the Middle East, although in propaganda 
terms such improvement as was demonstrated in the 
communique issued by the Arab League following the 
Casablanca Conference in September 1965 was regarded as 
valuable by Pakistan. As previously, however, Pakistan's 
altered international posture had more effect on its 
relations with Russia, China and America than with the 
states of the Middle East.
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Successful as its foreign policy might appear to 
have been in the Middle East, the support thereby gained 
has not assisted Pakistan to achieve its larger 
objectives. Nor has Pakistan been able to affect 
substantially developments in the Middle East.
Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan hinge on 
Afghanistan's status as a landlocked state and its 
demands regarding Pushtunistan, and are characterised 
by a quiet hostility which occasionally flares into 
crisis. This relationship has consistently been 
subject to great power intervention, and reveals the 
inability of regional countries to take any effective 
action in the dispute. Both major crises, in 1955 and 
1961-3, occurred at a period of high Soviet-Pakistani 
tension and followed Soviet statements supporting Afghan 
claims against Pakistan. The USA, anxious to prevent 
the USSR from extending its influence in Afghanistan, 
has continually encouraged Pakistan to extend better 
transit facilities to Afghanistan, and was particularly 
concerned at the closure of the border in 1961-3. 
Successful Turkish mediation in 1955 and Iranian 
mediation in 1963 coincided with American diplomatic 
activity and probable pressure on Pakistan. That the 
intervention of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq (acting 
in a spirit which probably combined the ideas of 
Afro-Asian and Muslim solidarity) was ineffective,
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suggests that Middle Eastern attempts to settle the 
dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been 
unavailing because neither the will to compromise on 
the part of the protagonists nor the means to exert 
pressure on the part of the mediators existed. Only 
when the weight of an outside power - in this case the 
USA - was added, was regional activity effective.
In the case of Kashmir, a problem of no direct 
relevance to the Middle East, the activities of the 
countries of this region have been quite ineffective. 
Support for Pakistan in the case of the Arab countries, 
even at its most outspoken, has been restricted to 
diplomatic activity. Turkey and Iran were prepared to 
give Pakistan material assistance, including some 
military equipment, but neither was prepared to risk 
becoming involved in hostilities or jeopardising its 
larger interests. This was particularly evident in the 
case of Turkey's refusal to supply jet aircraft, a step 
which it feared would antagonise the United States, for 
despite some dissatisfaction with the American alliance 
this remains the keystone of Turkish foreign policy. 
Both Iran and Turkey assisted Pakistan to repair its 
damaged military machine after the hostilities ended, 
but neither this nor the diplomatic support extended by 
them in any way altered the course of the dispute. It 
can also be assumed that any attempt they made to 
restrain Pakistan in this instance was equally 
ineffective.
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Even at the cost of irritating its non-Arab 
Muslim allies, Pakistan has been far more vocal in 
support of the Arabs' cause in Palestine than the Arab 
countries have been on Pakistan's behalf in the Kashmir 
dispute. It has not shown any inclination to commit 
itself to more than diplomatic assistance. It could be 
argued that in 1967, militarily weakened by its war 
with India in 1965, Pakistan was not in a position to 
give material aid to the Arab countries, even had it 
desired to do so and had the war against Israel 
continued long enough to make such assistance practical.
Several points emerge from this discussion. It is 
clear that Pakistan's relations with the countries of 
the Middle East are incidental to the totality of its 
foreign policy: at no time has the Middle East been in 
an economic, military or diplomatic position to render 
effective assistance to Pakistan in the pursuit of its 
principal foreign policy objectives. Nor has Pakistan 
been able to act decisively in a Middle East context. 
This being the case, it is remarkable that Pakistan has 
paid so much attention to the region. Although the 
intensity and style of Pakistan's relations with the 
countries of the Middle East have varied since 1947, 
from the naive Pan-Islamism of the early years to the 
concentration on relations with the non-Arab northern 
tier first within the context of the American alliance
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system and later outside it, Pakistan's special 
interest in this region has persisted.
Many factors contribute to this interest. In 
geographical terms Pakistan's location on the periphery 
of the Middle East gives it the option of participating 
in the affairs of the region, and its quarrel with 
India has precluded identification with the 
subcontinent, Pakistan's other geographical alternative. 
Its sense of isolation has driven Pakistan to seek 
friends wherever it might find them: most obviously 
within the British Commonwealth and the Middle East. 
Other factors exert pressure in the opposite direction, 
pulling Pakistan away from the Middle East: an urgent 
need for economic and military aid forced it to involve 
itself outside the region, first with America, later 
with the Soviet Union and China at the possible expense 
of its friendship with some of the countries of the 
Middle East. Its quarrel with Afghanistan, also a 
Muslim state and a member of the northern tier, has 
not contributed to Pakistan's sense of nearness to the 
Middle East, and has persisted despite the intercession 
of other powers, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.
Despite these pressures to the contrary, Pakistan 
remains deeply involved in the Middle East. Through 
the entire fabric runs the thread of Islam, 
intricately woven into the pattern of Pakistan's
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relations with the countries of the region, giving 
coherence and meaning to actions and attitudes which 
might otherwise appear incomprehensible.
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APPENDIX
Economic Survey of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey
There are many similarities in the economic 
structures of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, all of which 
are among the less developed nations of the world, but 
each has special features which alter the approach of 
the respective governments to the common problem of 
economic development. Per capita income is low in all 
three, but Pakistan lags behind Turkey and Iran in this 
respect. Agriculture accounts for a large proportion 
of the gross national product of each and the majority 
of the work force is engaged in agriculture. They are 
all to some extent dependent on foreign capital, although 
Iran is in a much more favourable position by virtue of 
its oil wealth.
Industrialisation, self-sufficiency in food and 
elimination of dependence on external assistance are 
common objectives sought within the framework of national 
development plans.
Regarded as highly successful by United Nations 
experts, planning in Pakistan is organised over five- 
year periods, within an overall Perspective Plan (1965- 
85). The current (Third) Five Year Plan (1965-70) is 
implemented by means of Annual Development Programmes
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which facilitate regular assessment and revision of the 
Plan where necessary. As a result of the postponement 
of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium meeting in July 1965 
and the war with India in September that year the 
progress of this Plan was set back, but despite revision 
made to the 1965-6 Annual Development Programme the size, 
objectives and targets of the Plan were not altered.1
The Perspective Plan aims at quadrupling the Gross 
National Product (GNP) from about Rs.43,000m. in 1964-5 
to an estimated Rs.174,000m. in 1985, and doubling the
2per capita income from Rs.386 m  1965 to Rs.932 in 1985. 
The objective of the current Plan is a minimum increase 
of 37 per cent in the GNP and an annual rate of increase 
of 6.5 per cent per annum.
In 1963-4 per capita income in East Pakistan was
3estimated at Rs.305 against Rs.388 for West Pakistan,
1
'Revised Phasing, Sectoral Priorities and Allocations 
of the Third Five Year Plan (1965-70)', March 1967, p.l, 
in Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Third 
Five Year Plan (1965-70) (Karachi, 1967).
2
'Third Five Year Plan (1965-70)', June 1965, ibid.,
P . 17 ,
3
Ibid., p .127.
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a telling reference to the difficulties inherent in a 
situation where more than half the population, and the 
most literate half, earn substantially less than the rest 
of the population. This is particularly galling to East 
Pakistanis who are aware that their Province is the 
greater foreign exchange earner. Within the overall 
target of growth, the Plan envisages elimination of this 
disparity in income between East and West Pakistan by 
1985, and a reduction of disparity from 25 per cent 
in 1965 to 20 per cent in 1970.1
Pakistan is heavily dependent on external assistance 
for the financing of its development plans, but it is 
expected that 68 per cent of the capital outlay for the
2Third Five Year Plan will come from internal resources, 
and the Perspective Plan envisages the elimination of 
the need for external aid by 1985.
Under the current Plan the sectoral allocation for 
industries, fuels and minerals, while still the largest 
(24.9 per cent), is slightly less than under the Second 
Five Year Plan, and proportionately more attention has 
been given to the development of agriculture than
1
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Pakistan 
Basic Facts, 1967-68 (Seventh Edition, Islamabad (n.d.)), 
p.110.
2
Ibid., p .114.
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previously. Water and power, transport and communications 
are also high on the list of priorities for development.
It is hoped thereby to develop basic industries so that 
further industrialisation can be met by the country's own 
capacity, and to increase food production, thereby 
reducing the expenditure of foreign exchange on food 
imports and improving the overall balance of payments 
1position.
Also included in the Plan is progress towards full 
employment and universal literacy, which it is hoped will 
be achieved by 1985. The planners are, however, aware 
that their objectives are to some extent contradictory.
The goal of full employment may conflict with that of 
raising the national income by 400 per cent, since this 
would imply wide use of modern technology which is 
frequently capital intensive. Equalisation of per 
capita income between the two Provinces might require 
restriction of West Pakistan's rate of growth, which
2would in turn affect the increase in national income.
1
See 'Third Five Year Plan (1965-70)', p.41, Table 1, 
for sectoral allocations under the Third Five Year Plan, 
and Pakistan Basic Facts, 1967-68, p.112, for the 
revised sectoral allocations.
2
'Third Five Year Plan (1965-70)', p.18.
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Much of the success of Pakistan's development plans 
depends on effective population control, for if the 
birthrate is not checked the population, estimated at 
112 million in 1965, could double itself by 1985. 
According to Pakistan's planners, such an increase would 
defeat any attempts to raise per capita incomes 'by a 
significant amount'.1
In Iran planning is the responsibility of the Plan 
Organization, a body directly responsible to the Shah.
The current Fourth Development Plan (1968-73) aims at 
increasing the relative importance of the industrial 
sector, particularly in the fields of petrochemicals and 
natural gas. Major projects being undertaken under the 
Plan are a steel mill, two machine plants, a 
petrochemical complex, an aluminium plant and a tractor 
plant. In the agricultural field special emphasis is 
being placed on the expansion of sugar beet and cane 
production, as well as tea; except for these commodities 
Iran is self-sufficient in food, and by 1973 expects to 
rectify this deficiency. The Plan aims at a target of 
about 57 per cent increase in GNP, or an annual growth 
rate of about 9.3 per cent. Assuming an annual 
population growth of 2.6 per cent during the same period,
1
Ibid., p .24.
per capita income is expected to rise from $220 to $307.1 
These plans are perhaps ambitious, and depend to a large 
extent on expected expansion in the oil industry.
The importance of oil in the Iranian economy is
indicated by the fact that foreign exchange proceeds
from oil paid for about 65 per cent of Iran's imports in
1966-67, and about 50 per cent of Government revenue
originated from this sector, which accounts for 13 per
2cent of GNP. Behind the Iranian oil industry and the 
National Iranian Oil Company stands the Consortium. 
Established following the Oil Agreement of August 1954, 
the Consortium is a group of eight companies of which 
the old Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now the British 
Petroleum Company) has the largest share, the rest being 
controlled by a group of American companies, a Dutch 
company and a French company. Under a 25 year agreement, 
the Consortium was to operate the oil fields of south­
west Iran, and the refinery at Abadan. Profits were to 
be shared equally between Iran and the Consortium, and 
the 100,000 square mile area exploited by the Consortium
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1
Regional Co-operation for Development, Report of the 
Planning Experts Group, Background Paper on Iran 
(mimeographed, Teheran (n.d.)), p.9.
2
Ibid., p .2.
was to be gradually reduced.1 As time passed Iran wished 
to renegotiate this agreement, especially as since 1954 
more favourable agreements had been negotiated with 
other oil companies. During 1966 an agreement was 
reached whereby the Consortium promised to increase 
production by 12 per cent in 1967 and possibly 13-14 per 
cent per annum thereafter. Net profit was to be shared 
on a 50-50 basis, and in addition the Consortium agreed 
to pay certain royalties. As part of the agreement 
Iran was to receive about 12-1/2 per cent payment in 
kind. An important aspect of the agreement is that all 
the oil is sold by the Consortium and Iran must have 
its acquiescence before oil can be sold elsewhere, 
although this is usually forthcoming for areas where the 
Consortium itself does not operate, such as Eastern 
Europe. Since the Consortium pays substantially more 
than the market price for oil (one estimate was 50 per 
cent more per barrel) there is little incentive to sell 
elsewhere. Although there are agreements with Italian, 
French and Canadian companies, the Consortium still 
produces the lion's share. A 1968 estimate was that
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1
Peter Avery, Modern Iran (Ernest Benn Limited: London,
1965), pp.453-4.
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Iran would receive $865m. from Consortium operations for 
that year, and $30-35m. from the other companies 
combined.1
Turkey is the most industrialised of the three 
countries, if one excludes from consideration the oil 
industry in Iran. It is hoped that during the current 
plan period (1968-72) in Turkey an average annual growth 
rate of 7 per cent will be attained, which will raise 
the GNP by approximately 40 per cent by 1972. The 
estimated growth rate for industry during this period 
is 11.1 per cent which should alter the structure of the 
economy giving industry a 30.7 per cent share of the GNP 
as against 26.6 per cent for agriculture. The projected 
growth rate for the agricultural sector is 4.2 per cent
which it is hoped will permit Turkey to feed itself by
21972. The current (Second) Five Year Plan aims at 
reducing the contribution of external assistance in both
1
Precise, authoritative information regarding Iran's
oil agreements is difficult to obtain. The above 
information was gained partly from Iranian officials.
See also 'Iran's Breakthrough', The Economist, 14 January
1967, and Alfred Friendly, 'Iran Needs Oil Earnings to 
Fill Vacuum in Gulf', Washington Post, 16 June 1969.
2
Turkiye Is Bankasi, A.S., Head Office, Economic 
Research Department, Development Plan of Turkey, Second 
Five-Year (1968-72), Summary (Ankara (n.d.)), pp.1-2, 
42-3.
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amount and percentage, but the realisation of this 
objective is heavily dependent on Turkey's being able to 
carry out a successful import substitution programme and 
at the same time to increase its exports.
This aspect of Turkey's development is particularly 
important because under its agreement of association 
with the European Economic Community the 'Transitional 
Period' ends in 1969, after which Turkey must take steps 
to integrate its economy into that of the Community, 
gradually lowering its own tariff barriers.1
The trading patterns of the three member countries 
reveal many similarities also. Both Pakistan and Turkey 
depend on agricultural rather than industrial exports 
(jute, cotton, tobacco, dried fruit, nuts, etc.), and 
both have an overall unfavourable balance of trade. 
Iran's exports, based on oil, give it a special trade 
pattern, and make it the only member of RCD with a 
favourable trade balance. All three, however, import 
machinery and other industrial goods needed for the 
development of their own economy. This means that they 
are not at present in a position to provide a market 
for each other's goods, and trade is mostly with North 
America and Europe, especially the European Economic 
Community.
1
Ibid., pp.40-1.
Table 1._____ Population and National Income Figures
Pakistan Iran Turkey
1963 1966 1963 1966 1963 1966
Population Total (millions)1 99 5105 23 25 30 32
Percentage Rate of 
Increase 1963-6"*- 2.1 2.8 2.5
Percentage Engaged in
Agriculture^ 74 57 72
3National Income ($USm.) 5,482 49, 724 4,188 5,086 6,622 8,974
3Per Capita Income ($US) 82 954 180 207 223 276
1
1967 Statistical Yearbook (United Nations: New York, 1968).
2
Production Yearbook 1967, vol.21 (F.A.O.: Rome, 1968), 1965 estimates.
3
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1967 (United Nations: New York, 
1968).
4
Figures refer to 1965.
5
This figure conflicts with the estimate given in the 'Third Five Year 
Plan (1965-70)', see p.485 above.
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Table 2._____ Industrial Origin of the Gross National Product1
By percentage
Pakistan Iran Turkey
1963 1966 1963 1965 1963 1966
Agriculture 48 49 28 28 41 37
Industry 12 10 302
CNoCO 16 18
Construction 4 4 4 4 5 6
Transport & Communications 6 6 7 6 8 8
Wholesale & Retail Trade 12 12 8 9 8 8
Other 17 17 20 20 22 23
1
1967 Statistical Yearbook, Table 181. Estimates relate to Gross 
Domestic Product at current factor cost.
2
Includes extraction of crude petroleum.
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Table 3._____Average Annual Rates of Growth of Real Gross
Domestic Product at Factor Cost, 1960-66^
By percentage
Pakistan 2Iran Turkey
Overall Growth Rate 5.3 6.4 5.4
Per capita Growth Rate 3.1 3.4 2.3
Industrial Sector 8.9 8.6 7.7
Agricultural Sector 3.0 2.9 3.0
1
1967 Statistical Yearbook, Table 183.
Figures for period 1960-65.
2
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($USm.)
1963
Table 4._____ Regional Trade, including Trade with India
Exports to:
Iran Pakis­
tan
Turkey India
Imports from: Iran 34.9 6.4 80.8
Pakistan 1.2 0.3 27.4
Turkey - - -
India 10.5 15.2 7.8
1967
Exports to :
Iran Pakis­ Turkey India
tan
Imports from: Iran 39.3 0.2 73.8
Pakistan 3.4 5.0 0.1
Turkey 0.2 1.1 0.3
India 16.5 - . 6
1
International Monetary Fund, International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, a 
Supplement to International Financial Statistics,
Annual 1963-67 (Washington (n.d.)). The figures are those 
given for exports for Iran (pp.212-3), India (pp.207-8), 
Pakistan (pp.285-6), and Turkey (pp.345-6). Comparison 
with import figures reveals some discrepancy, probably 
attributable to smuggling or to the 'leads and lags' 
problem in recording international trade.
Table 5. Trade Patterns of RCD Members^
($USm.)
Pakistan Iran Turkey
Exports 1967 645 1,930 523
Imports 1967 1,101 1/127 691
Largest USA 361 Germany(F.R.) 243 Germany(F.R.) 135
Import UK 141 USA 208 USA 124
Suppliers Japan 95 UK 139 UK 89
Germany(F.R.) 93 Japan 77 Italy 50
Australia 50 France 59 France) 9 7USSR ) z/
Largest USA 79 Japan 533 USA 93
Export UK 75 UK 431 Germany(F.R.) 84
Buyers Japan 36 Italy 67 Italy 36
China(P.R.) 34 S.Africa 66 UK 34
Hong Kong 33 USA 65 France 29
Imports by Re^ gion:
N.America 395 210 126
EEC 196 426 240
Europe (excl 36 91 59EEC and UK)
Soviet Bloc 93 68 91
(Table 5 cont.)
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Table 5 (cont.)
Pakistan Iran Turkey-
Exports by Rec}ion
N.America 83 101 94
EEC 78 262 177
Europe (excl. 
EEC and UK) 33 63 67
Soviet Bloc 84 56 88
Direction of Trade Annual, 1963-67.
1
Table 6. (i) Principal Exports of RCD Countries
Pakistan1 2Iran 3Turkey
Commodity % of Total Commodity
% of 
Total Commodity
% of 
Total
Raw Jute 24 Woollen Carpets 27 Nuts, Raisins
& Citrus Fruit
Jute Manufactures 20 Cotton 18
Cotton 24
Raw Cotton • 14 Dried &
Fresh Fruits -L o Tobacco 22
Cotton Manufactures 6
Hides, leather 9 Industrial Products
Rice 5 (including 15
Mineral Ores 6 Copper)
Fish 2
Herbs, Seeds 4 Chrome Ore & AWool 1 Other Minerals 4Gum Tragacanth 3
Livestock 2Caviar 2
Mohair wool 2
(Table 6 cont.)
Table 6 (cont.) (ii) Principal Imports of RCD Countries
Pakistan1 2Iran Turkey^
Commodity % of Total Commodity
% of 
Total Commodity
% of 
Total
Machinery 23 Machinery & 23 Machinery 33
Grain,pulses, flour 13 components Medicines, dyes 9
Iron, steel, and Q Iron & Ironware 11 Vehicles 9
manufactures therec 
Transport & equip. 
Electrical goods 
Oil minerals 
Non-ferrous metals
f 9 
9 
6 
5
A
Chemicals & 
Pharmaceuticals
Electrical Goods
Sugar, wheat, tea
Fats & oils
9
7
5
3
Liquid fuel 
Iron and Steel 
Textiles & yarns 
Wheat
8
7
6
3
& manuf.
1 Pakistan Basic Facts, 1967-1968, pp.71, 73. The percentages are approximate.
2 Report of the Planning Experts Group, Background Paper on Iran, pp.5-6.
The percentages are approximate. Figures relate to 1966. Exports exclude oil.
3 Turkiye Is Bankase, A.S., Head Office, Economic Research Department,
Economic Indicators of Turkey, 1963-1967 (Ankara (n.d.)), pp.6-7. The
percentages are approximate. Figures relate to 1967.
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